The specificity of terms affects conditional reasoning

Conditional inferences can be phrased with unspecific terms (“If a person is on a diet, then the person loses weight. A person is on a diet. The person loses weight”) or specific terms (“If Anna is on a diet, then Anna loses weight. Anna is on a diet. Anna loses weight”). We investigate whether the specificity of terms affects people's acceptance of inferences. In Experiment 1, inferences with specific terms received higher acceptance ratings than inferences with unspecific terms. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used the same problems as in Experiment 1 but also problems with unspecific terms in the conditional and specific terms in the categorical and vice versa. When the conditional and the categorical had the same specificity, results were as in Experiment 1. When the specificity of the conditional and the categorical mismatched, acceptance ratings were lower. Our results illustrate the importance of phrasing on reasoning.     

Folkbiological reasoning from a cross-cultural developmental perspective: early essentialist notions are shaped by cultural beliefs

In 2 experiments, the authors examined the evolution of folkbiological reasoning in children (4 to 10 years of age) and adults from 4 distinct communities (rural Native American, rural majority culture, and suburban and urban North American communities). Using an adoption paradigm, they examined participants' intuitions regarding the inheritance of properties and the mechanisms underlying the transmission of kindhood. Across all communities and ages, there was a strong biological component underlying reasoning about the inheritance of properties. There were also differences in children's intuitions about the mechanisms underlying kindhood: Native American children were more likely than their counterparts to consider blood as a candidate biological essence. This suggests that as children search to discover the underlying essence of a biological kind, they are guided by broad essentialist notions that are shaped by discourse within their community.     

归纳推理和演绎推理的关系理论及其模型

推理是人类高级认知过程的一种,相关的心理学研究一般将其分为归纳推理和演绎推理两个方面。归纳推理是从特殊到一般的推理过程,与之相对的演绎推理则是从一般到特殊的过程。归纳推理和演绎推理的关系问题是当前心理推理研究领域的一个重点问题。这一问题主要有两种理论解释：一种是单过程理论,该理论认为归纳推理和演绎推理本质上是同一个认知过程,以单过程理论为基础构建的推理模型称为单维模型;另一种是双过程理论,认为归纳推理和演绎推理是两个不同的认知过程,并不同程度地受到启发和分析过程的影响。未来研究可多关注推理的时间进程,以及采用不同的研究方法对各自理论提供数据支持。     

The forgotten individual: diagrammatic reasoning in mathematics

Parallelism has been drawn between modes of representation and problem-sloving processes: Diagrams are more useful for brainstorming while symbolic representation is more welcomed in a formal proof. The paper gets to the root of this clear-cut dualistic picture and argues that the strength of diagrammatic reasoning in the brainstorming process does not have to be abandoned at the stage of proof, but instead should be appreciated and could be preserved in mathematical proofs.     

Editorial: The role of reasoning in mathematical thinking

ABSTRACT

Research into mathematics often focuses on basic numerical and spatial intuitions, and one key property of numbers: their magnitude. The fact that mathematics is a system of complex relationships that invokes reasoning usually receives less attention. The purpose of this special issue is to highlight the intricate connections between reasoning and mathematics, and to use insights from the reasoning literature to obtain a more complete understanding of the processes that underlie mathematical cognition. The topics that are discussed range from the basic heuristics and biases to the various ways in which complex, effortful reasoning contributes to mathematical cognition, while also considering the role of individual differences in mathematics performance. These investigations are not only important at a theoretical level, but they also have broad and important practical implications, including the possibility to improve classroom practices and educational outcomes, to facilitate people's decision-making, as well as the clear and accessible communication of numerical information.     

The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

An extensively revised heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning is presented incorporating three principles of hypothetical thinking. The theory assumes that reasoning and judgment are facilitated by the formation of epistemic mental models that are generated one at a time (singularity principle) by preconscious heuristic processes that contextualize problems in such a way as to maximize relevance to current goals (relevance principle). Analytic processes evaluate these models but tend to accept them unless there is good reason to reject them (satisficing principle). At a minimum, analytic processing of models is required so as to generate inferences or judgments relevant to the task instructions, but more active intervention may result in modification or replacement of default models generated by the heuristic system. Evidence for this theory is provided by a review of a wide range of literature on thinking and reasoning.     

Dyslexia and reasoning: The importance of visual processes

Recent research has suggested that individuals with dyslexia rely on explicit visuospatial representations for syllogistic reasoning while most non‐dyslexics opt for an abstract verbal strategy. This paper investigates the role of visual processes in relational reasoning amongst dyslexic reasoners. Expt 1 presents written and verbal protocol evidence to suggest that reasoners with dyslexia generate detailed representations of relational properties and use these to make a visual comparison of objects. Non‐dyslexics use a linear array of objects to make a simple transitive inference. Expt 2 examined evidence for the visual‐impedance effect which suggests that visual information detracts from reasoning leading to longer latencies and reduced accuracy. While non‐dyslexics showed the impedance effects predicted, dyslexics showed only reduced accuracy on problems designed specifically to elicit imagery. Expt 3 presented problems with less semantically and visually rich content. The non‐dyslexic group again showed impedance effects, but dyslexics did not. Furthermore, in both studies, visual memory predicted reasoning accuracy for dyslexic participants, but not for non‐dyslexics, particularly on problems with highly visual content. The findings are discussed in terms of the importance of visual and semantic processes in reasoning for individuals with dyslexia, and we argue that these processes play a compensatory role, offsetting phonological and verbal memory deficits.     

The influence of complexity and reasoning direction on children's causal reasoning

Causal reasoning is the core and basis of cognition about the objective world. This experiment studied the development of causal reasoning in 86 3.5–4.5-year-olds using a ramp apparatus with two input holes and two output holes [Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Palfai, T. (1995). Theory of mind and rule-based reasoning. Cognitive Development 10, 483–527]. Results revealed that: (1) children performed better on cause–effect inferences than on effect–cause inferences; (2) there was an effect of rule complexity such that uni-dimensional causal inferences were easier than bi-dimensional inferences which, in turn, were easier than tri-dimensional causal inferences; and (3) children's causal reasoning develops rapidly between the ages of age of 3.5 and 4 years.     

Objects and Events: Linguistic and philosophical notions of 'thingness'

The article deals with the differences of the notion of 'object' or 'thing' in natural languages, concluding that some languages are by their structure more object-biased while others are more event-biased and proceeds to analyse how two common Japanese words, mono and koto , both meaning 'thing', have been treated in 20th-century Japanese thought, notably in the philosophical works of Watsuji Tetsurô, Ide Takashi, Hiromatsu Wataru and Kimura Bin. All of these thinkers represent different schools and trends (Watsuji could be called a cultural particularist, Ide was an Aristotle scholar, Hiromatsu a Marxist and Kimura is a psychiatrist), but come to similar conclusions in this respect, allowing us to regard event-biased and object-biased linguistic constructions as manifestations of two different, but equally necessary cognitive faculties.     

Sources of difficulty in deductive reasoning: The THOG task

The THOG task presents four designs constructed from two shapes and two colours. Subjects are told that the experimenter has written down one of the shapes and one of the colours and are provided the rule that if, and only if, any design has either the shape or the colour, but not both, written down, then it is a THOG. Finally, they are given an exemplar and are asked to classify the remaining designs. Successful solution requires construction of hypotheses, reasoning under each hypothesis, and comparison of the results under each to reach a final conclusion. Few subjects are able to provide adequate responses on the standard version of the task. We present the results of four experiments, with 160 undergraduates each presented with one of eight versions of the task. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that (1) some subjects think that the properties that are written down are identical to those of the exemplar, although these are not the same subjects who exhibit the modal error pattern, (2) many subjects correctly understand the disjunction of the rule but fail to consider the hypotheses, and (3) poor initial encoding of the problem is not easily corrected. Experiment 3 investigates the sufficiency of the claim of Griggs and Newstead (1982) that appropriate problem solution follows from explicit presentation of all problem information (including use of positive labels for properties that are not written down), and Experiment 4 investigates the necessity of the claim. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 show that presenting positive category labels does increase the frequency of correct solution; however, positive category labels are not necessary for such improvement. Separation of the labels of the THOG rule from those of the exemplar, or informing subjects that only one other design is a THOG, also increases the frequency of successful solution. The results suggest that many people have some fairly sophisticated reasoning skills. but application of these skills is easily discouraged when the features of the task lead to poor initial encoding.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: The test of development

Dual-process theories have become increasingly influential in the psychology of reasoning. Though the distinction they introduced between intuitive and reflective thinking should have strong developmental implications, the developmental approach has rarely been used to refine or test these theories. In this article, I review several contemporary dual-process accounts of conditional reasoning that theorize the distinction between the two systems of reasoning as a contrast between heuristic and analytic processes, probabilistic and mental model reasoning, or emphasize the role of metacognitive processes in reflective reasoning. These theories are evaluated in the light of the main developmental findings. It is argued that a proper account of developmental phenomena requires the integration of the main strengths of these three approaches. I propose such an integrative theory of conditional understanding and argue that the modern dual-process framework could benefit from earlier contributions that made the same distinction between intuition and reflective thinking, such as Piaget’s theory.     

Left-handedness and spatial reasoning abilities: The deficit hypothesis revisited

Left-handers with an inverted handwriting posture have been found by Levy and Reid to have relatively bilateral representation of tachistoscopically tested verbal and spatial functions. On the assumption that such bilateral representation is inefficient, it was hypothesized that left-inverted subjects (N = 20) would score lower than left- and right-handers with normal handwriting postures (Ns = 64, 66 respectively) on spatial reasoning. Results were consistent with the hypothesis. Possible alternative explanations and directions for future research are outlined.     

Cognitive triad: Relationship to depressive symptoms,parents' cognitive triad,and perceived parental messages

Evaluating the relationship between children's depressogenic thinking, children's depressive symptoms, parents' depressogenic thinking, and perceived parental messages about the self, world, and future was the primary objective of this investigation. Children (n =133) from grades 4 to 7 completed measures of depression and anxiety, including a semistructured clinical interview, a measure of their cognitive triad, and a measure of perceived parental messages about the self, world, and future. Mothers (n =112) and fathers (n =95) completed a measure of their own cognitive triad. Results of a series of regression analyses revealed that (1) children's views of self, world, and future (cognitive triad) are related to severity of depression; (2) mothers' but not fathers' cognitive triads are related to their children's cognitive triads; (3) perceived parental messages to the children about the self, world, and future are predictive of the children's cognitive triads and ratings of depression; and (4) the relationship between perceived parental messages and depression is completely mediated by children's cognitive triads. Analyses of covariance indicated that the obtained mediational relationship between children's views of self, world, and future, perceived parental messages, and children's depressive symptoms was specific to depressive versus anxious symptomatology. Impfications for existing theory and research are discussed.