Sources of difficulty in deductive reasoning: The THOG task

The THOG task presents four designs constructed from two shapes and two colours. Subjects are told that the experimenter has written down one of the shapes and one of the colours and are provided the rule that if, and only if, any design has either the shape or the colour, but not both, written down, then it is a THOG. Finally, they are given an exemplar and are asked to classify the remaining designs. Successful solution requires construction of hypotheses, reasoning under each hypothesis, and comparison of the results under each to reach a final conclusion. Few subjects are able to provide adequate responses on the standard version of the task. We present the results of four experiments, with 160 undergraduates each presented with one of eight versions of the task. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that (1) some subjects think that the properties that are written down are identical to those of the exemplar, although these are not the same subjects who exhibit the modal error pattern, (2) many subjects correctly understand the disjunction of the rule but fail to consider the hypotheses, and (3) poor initial encoding of the problem is not easily corrected. Experiment 3 investigates the sufficiency of the claim of Griggs and Newstead (1982) that appropriate problem solution follows from explicit presentation of all problem information (including use of positive labels for properties that are not written down), and Experiment 4 investigates the necessity of the claim. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 show that presenting positive category labels does increase the frequency of correct solution; however, positive category labels are not necessary for such improvement. Separation of the labels of the THOG rule from those of the exemplar, or informing subjects that only one other design is a THOG, also increases the frequency of successful solution. The results suggest that many people have some fairly sophisticated reasoning skills. but application of these skills is easily discouraged when the features of the task lead to poor initial encoding.     

Effects of Environmental Stimulation on the M,FM, and m Responses in the Rorschach

The Rorschach was administered twice to 20 young male subjects in its usual clinical form with an interval of about a year between tests. The second administration was carried out on board ship under conditions of a severe storm, which is assumed to have provided marked movement stimulation. The difference between the tests was analyzed for variation in the total number of responses, and number of human movement, animal movement, and inanimate movement responses. It was hypothesised that since M and FM responses reflect basic personality characteristics or attitudes, no change in their appearance should occur even under severe environmental stimulation. The m response, however, was expected to reflect the individual's response to stress and therefore to change under the experimental conditions. The results showed no change in the M and FM responses, but a large and significant increase in the m responses. All three hypotheses were thus confirmed.     

The effect of sufficiency and necessity on perceptions of control and responsibility

Discrepancies in perceptions of control and responsibility have been depicted as paradoxical because both types of perceptions are presumed to reflect perceptions of causality. The paradox may, in part, reflect a failure to distinguish between two dimensions of an actor's causality: sufficiency and necessity. Sufficiency of an actor is defined as the ability of the actor to bring about or prevent an outcome. Necessity of an actor is defined as the inverse of the sufficiency of other actors. In the studies described here, the sufficiency and necessity of an actor is varied, and subjects are asked to rate the actor's control and responsibility. The findings from Studies 1 and 2 support the prediction that variations in sufficiency have a greater effect on perceptions of control than on perceptions of responsibility; the findings from Study 2 support the prediction that variations in necessity have a greater effect on perceptions of responsibility than on perceptions of control. Studies 3 and 4 further demonstrate the occurrence of the paradox, and support the general conclusion that the effect of sufficiency relative to the effect of necessity is greater for perceptions of control than for perceptions of responsibility. The tendency of sufficiency to have a greater effect on males than on females, and the tendency of necessity to have a greater effect on females than on males, are linked to findings from previous research.     

Interpretational factors in conditional reasoning

Two experiments examined the role of necessity and sufficiency relationships in conditional reasoning. The results indicated that perceived necessity and sufficiency predicted variability in reasoning performance for four pragmatic relations (permission, obligation, causation, and definition), for both determinant and indeterminant syntactic forms, and for both a conditional arguments and a truth table evaluation task, as well as when the temporal relationship between the antecedent and consequent events was reversed. These data support the general utility of perceived necessity and sufficiency in the interpretation and evaluation of conditional relationships. However, the effects of necessity and sufficiency were smaller for reversed than for forward statements, which suggests that necessity/sufficiency-based interpretations may be more useful for evaluating some types of conditional relations than others. In addition, people were more likely to accept valid rather than invalid arguments, regardless of necessity/sufficiency relations, a finding that suggests that abstract, content-free representations may play a functional role in conditional reasoning.     

ANXIETY AROUSING MESSAGES AND EGO-INVOLVEMENT AS DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNICATIVE PREDISPOSITIONS

A theoretically integrated rationale was generated combining affiliation, ego-involvement, and balance-restoring responses and research was conducted testing hypotheses: (1) slightly involved subjects will demonstrate a greater desire to communicate upon receipt of an anxiety-arousing discrepant message than highly involved subjects; and (2) slightly involved subjects will demonstrate a greater desire to communicate upon receipt of a nonanxiety-arousing discrepant message than highly involved subjects. Results confirmed both hypotheses and the findings were discussed in terms of a proposed theoretic framework identifying the effects of message impact on communicative predispositions.     

Adapting chronometric tests for field studies of cognitive ability

This study was designed to examine the relationship of hand preference to performance on a thumb-positioning task. Two hypotheses were proposed on the basis of hemispheric lateralization. The first stated that all subjects would perform the task more accurately using the left thumb, regardless of hand preference. The second hypothesis tested was that left-handed subjects would perform more accurately than right-handed subjects. Each of 20 neurologically intact adults grouped by hand preference reproduced a criterion thumb position with both thumbs simultaneously. Absolute error, recorded for each movement and analyzed by mixed analysis of variance, did support the first hypothesis. However, the left-handed group did not perform statistically differently from right-handed subjects. Factors influencing the data are discussed and recommendations for further studies are made.     

Personality,expectations, and response strategies in multiple‐choice question examinations in university students: a test of Gray's hypotheses

The relation between personality and type of error made in multiple‐choice examinations when correction for guessing is applied was investigated across two studies. Our general hypothesis was that disinhibited subjects (those scoring high on the Sensitivity to Reward (SR) scale and/or low on the Sensitivity to Punishment (SP) scale) would make more incorrect responses and fewer omission errors (blanks) than inhibited subjects (those with high SP and/or low SR scores). The meta‐analyses of 19 examinations in study 1 confirmed our hypotheses for SP, SR, and extraversion. Regression analyses on effect sizes revealed that SP differences were obtained in examinations with low marks, whereas SR differences were obtained in examinations with more responses and fewer questions. Study 2 showed that a low‐mark expectation increased omissions in high‐SP subjects, whereas a high‐mark expectation increased incorrect responses in high‐SR subjects. These results suggest two different mechanisms mediating inhibition/disinhibition: one associated with aversive motivation, and the other with appetitive motivation. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sufficiency and Necessity Assumptions in Causal Structure Induction

Research on human causal induction has shown that people have general prior assumptions about causal strength and about how causes interact with the background. We propose that these prior assumptions about the parameters of causal systems do not only manifest themselves in estimations of causal strength or the selection of causes but also when deciding between alternative causal structures. In three experiments, we requested subjects to choose which of two observable variables was the cause and which the effect. We found strong evidence that learners have interindividually variable but intraindividually stable priors about causal parameters that express a preference for causal determinism (sufficiency or necessity; Experiment 1). These priors predict which structure subjects preferentially select. The priors can be manipulated experimentally (Experiment 2) and appear to be domain‐general (Experiment 3). Heuristic strategies of structure induction are suggested that can be viewed as simplified implementations of the priors.     

Putting ifs to work: goal-based relevance in conditional directives

Conditional directives are used by speakers to instruct hearers which actions are to be taken should certain events occur. The authors demonstrate that conditional directives are distinct from indicative conditionals in which speakers predict what is likely to be observed should certain events occur. The 1st set of experiments shows that goal structure determines what information speakers will select to test whether conditional directives have been followed but that these selections do not reflect their interpretations of the deontic necessity and sufficiency of the conditional relation. The 2nd set of experiments shows that formulations of conditional directives differ in how clearly speakers consider them to express their situation-specific intentions and that hearers accurately perceive what speakers intend them to do as a result of these formulations. The authors' findings illustrate a form of social rationality common in everyday interaction, which broadens normative conceptions of conditionals.     

Knowledge of results for motor learning: relationship between error estimation and knowledge of results frequency

The authors of the present study investigated the apparent contradiction between early and more recent views of knowledge of results (KR), the idea that how one is engaged before receiving KR may not be independent of how one uses that KR. In a 2 ×: 2 factorial design, participants (N = 64) practiced a simple force-production task and (a) were required, or not required, to estimate error about their previous response and (b) were provided KR either after every response (100%) or after every 5th response (20%) during acquisition. A no-KR retention test revealed an interaction between acquisition error estimation and KR frequencies. The group that received 100% KR and was required to error estimate during acquisition performed the best during retention. The 2 groups that received 20% KR performed less well. Finally, the group that received 100% KR and was not required to error estimate during acquisition performed the poorest during retention. One general interpretation of that pattern of results is that motor learning is an increasing function of the degree to which participants use KR to test response hypotheses (J. A. Adams, 1971; R. A. Schmidt, 1975). Practicing simple responses coupled with error estimation may embody response hypotheses that can be tested with KR, thus benefiting motor learning most under a 100% KR condition. Practicing simple responses without error estimation is less likely to embody response hypothesis, however, which may increase the probability that participants will use KR to guide upcoming responses, thus attenuating motor learning under a 100% KR condition. The authors conclude, therefore, that how one is engaged before receiving KR may not be independent of how one uses KR.     

Knowledge of Results for Motor Learning: Relationship Between Error Estimation and Knowledge of Results Frequency

The authors of the present study investigated the apparent contradiction between early and more recent views of knowledge of results (KR), the idea that how one is engaged before receiving KR may not be independent of how one uses that KR. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, participants (N = 64) practiced a simple force-production task and (a) were required, or not required, to estimate error about their previous response and (b) were provided KR either after every response (100%) or after every 5th response (20%) during acquisition. A no-KR retention test revealed an interaction between acquisition error estimation and KR frequencies. The group that received 100% KR and was required to error estimate during acquisition performed the best during retention. The 2 groups that received 20% KR performed less well. Finally, the group that received 100% KR and was not required to error estimate during acquisition performed the poorest during retention. One general interpretation of that pattern of results is that motor learning is an increasing function of the degree to which participants use KR to test response hypotheses (J. A. Adams, 1971; R. A. Schmidt, 1975). Practicing simple responses coupled with error estimation may embody response hypotheses that can be tested with KR, thus benefiting motor learning most under a 100% KR condition. Practicing simple responses without error estimation is less likely to embody response hypothesis, however, which may increase the probability that participants will use KR to guide upcoming responses, thus attenuating motor learning under a 100% KR condition. The authors conclude, therefore, that how one is engaged before receiving KR may not be independent of how one uses KR.     

Error, falsification and scientific inference: An experimental investigation

This paper reports the results of four experiments designed to test the methodological falsificationist's assumption that replication is sufficient to prevent the possibility of error from being used to immunize hypotheses against disconfirmation. The first three experiments compare the performance of subjects on tasks that simulate scientific reasoning under two conditions: (1) where there is a 0-20% possibility of error in experimental results, but no actual error; and (2) a control condition.

All experiments used Wason's 2-4-6 task, in which subjects propose triples and are told whether each corresponds to a rule. In Experiment 1, subjects in the possible-error condition proposed significantly more triples than control subjects. Experiment 2 added colour and letter dimensions to the 2-4-6 task; possible-error subjects proposed significantly more triples and replicated the same triple more often than control subjects. Experiment 3 made replication more difficult by limiting the number of experiments subjects could perform and by altering the rule to make the results of the current trial dependent on previous ones. Control subjects solved this problem significantly more often than possible-error subjects.

Experiment 4 was run in a manner very similar to Experiment 1, except that an actual 20% error condition was added. Subjects in this condition solved the rule significantly less often than subjects in other conditions, and also took more time and replicated more often. Implications of these results for the methodological falsificationist's position are discussed.     

The direct measurement of hypothesis-sampling strategies

The concept-identification (CI) literature supports a hypothesis-sampling theory. Hypotheses based on attributes, sample sizes greater than one, and nonreplacement of eliminated hypotheses all occur. An experimental procedure was developed to measure hypothesis-sampling directly where the subject is allowed to select attributes that he wishes to see, then randomly selected values on the selected attributes are presented.Generally, the average sample size before the trial of the last error (TLE) does not change but does change after TLE. The probabilities of eliminating inconsistent hypotheses and keeping consistent hypotheses increase over problems. The proportion of eliminated attributes which are resampled decreases over problems. Individual subjects are extremely varied in sample size, efficiency measures, and resampling tendencies. The rate of solution, TLE, is related to the efficiency and resampling measures but not to the sample size.     

Anxiety,Immigration, and the Search for Information

In this article, we use the issue of immigration to explore the role of anxiety in responses to political appeals. According to previous literature, anxiety motivates citizens to learn and pay more attention to news coverage. Literature in psychology demonstrates that anxiety is associated with a tendency to pay closer attention to threatening information. We predict that anxious citizens will seek more information but that they will seek out and be attracted to threatening information. In an experiment, we induce anxiety about immigration and then subjects have the opportunity to search for additional information in a website designed to mimic online news sources. The website has both immigration and nonimmigration stories, and the immigration stories are split between threatening coverage and nonthreatening coverage. We find that anxious subjects exhibit biased information processing; they read, remember, and agree with threatening information.     

对充分条件句语义关系的概念理解与逻辑理解的相关与分离

实验用大学生被试考察了充分条件句语义关系表达形式（逻辑形式和概念形式）和条件句类型（五种条件句）对充分条件句语义关系理解的影响。实验结果发现,语义关系表达形式影响被试对条件句中必要性的语义关系理解,而不影响被试对条件句中充分性的语义关系理解,在对条件句前后件之间语义关系的逻辑理解成绩和概念理解成绩之间既有相关又有分离：对是否充分的语义关系的两种理解成绩之间存在相关一致,而对是否必要的语义关系的两种理解成绩之间存在分离;五种条件句在对后件对前件的必要性的知觉难易程度受条件句意义内容的影响而存在明显差异,这种差异导致被试对许可句和定义句的后件必要性理解成绩高于对偶然句、义务句和因果句的后件必要性理解成绩。     

Causes versus enabling conditions.

People distinguish between a cause (e.g., a malfunctioning component in an airplane causing it to crash) and a condition (e.g., gravity) that merely enables the cause to yield its effect. This distinction cannot be explained by accounts of reasoning formulated purely in terms of necessity and sufficiency, because causes and enabling conditions hold the same logical relationship to the effect in those terms. Proposals to account for this apparent deviation from accounts based on necessity and sufficiency may be classified into three types. One approach explains the distinction in terms of an inferential rule based on the normality of the potential causal factors. Another approach explains the distinction in terms of the conversational principle of being informative to the inquirer given assumptions about his or her state of knowledge. The present paper evaluates variants of these two approaches, and presents our probabilistic contrast model, which takes a third approach. This approach explains the distinction between causes and enabling conditions by the covariation between potential causes and the effect in question over a focal set--a set of events implied by the context. Covariation is defined probabilistically, with necessity and sufficiency as extreme cases of the components defining contrasts. We report two experiments testing our model against variants of the normality and conversational views.     

Necessity and sufficiency in abstract conditional reasoning

The necessity and sufficiency of the cause relates to the conclusions people draw on everyday conditional inference problems. The current research explores the effects of necessity and sufficiency in an abstract causal context. Three experiments showed that the subjective ratings of necessity and sufficiency diverge from the objective levels: A sufficient and necessary cause is more often labelled as sufficient than a sufficient and not-necessary cause. Likewise, a necessary and sufficient cause is more often labelled necessary than a necessary and not-sufficient cause. In Experiments 1 and 2 we observed that the robust effects of sufficiency on MP and MT, and of necessity on AC and DA found on everyday reasoning generalise to abstract conditionals. There were also partial effects of sufficiency on AC and DA, and of necessity on MP and MT. When the problem presentation is simplified, as in Experiment 3, these partial effects on reasoning disappear. The reasoning results then relate to the objective levels and less to the subjective levels of necessity and sufficiency. This divergence sheds doubt on the idea that reasoners base their inferences on an active assessment of the necessity and/or sufficiency of the causal relation.     

Necessity, Sufficiency, and Perspective Effects in Causal Conditional Reasoning

A growing body of research indicates that in causal conditional reasoning, the conclusion that P is necessary for Q is suppressed where alternative conditions for Q are available. Similarly, the conclusion that P is sufficient for Q is suppressed where disabling conditions for P or additional requirements for Q are available. This paper describes experiments in which these factors were used to produce 'perspective effects' in causal contexts that appear identical to the perspective effects found in previous research with deontic tasks. It is therefore proposed that deontic perspective effects are themselves also attributable to the influence of pragmatic factors upon perceived necessity and sufficiency. A generalized theory based on a modification of the mental model theory of deontic reasoning is presented, which accounts for perspective effects across the two domains.     

Relation of Economic Depression to Delinquency,Crime, and Drunkenness in Massachusetts

Abstract

Two experiments using the same paradigm were conducted to examine when members of a disadvantaged group will accept their situation, take individual action, or engage in collective action. In both experiments, Canadian undergraduate subjects received feedback that they had been unsuccessful in their attempt to gain entrance into a high status group. Experiment 1 involved a justice manipulation in which the main hypothesis was that collective action would be associated with procedural injustice, whereas distributive injustice would lead to individualistic action. The main hypothesis of Experiment 2 was that collective action would be instigated by those who are extremely close to gaining entry to the high status group. Although only partial support was obtained for the hypotheses, it was possible to specify conditions that discriminate between individual and collective action.