Personal identity is social identity

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The question of the identity or persistence of the self through time may be interesting for philosophers, but it is hardly a burning question for most...     

Narrative identity,practical identity and ethical subjectivity

The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical subjectivity, the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard’s work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity.     

Relevant identity

We begin to fill a lacuna in the relevance logic enterprise by providing a foundational analysis of identity in relevance logic. We consider rival interpretations of identity in this context, settling on the relevant indiscernibility interpretation, an interpretation related to Dunn's relevant predication project. We propose a general test for the stability of an axiomatisation of identity, relative to this interpretation, and we put various axiomatisations to this test. We fill our discussion out with both formal and philosophical remarks on identity in relevance logic.     

Split identity: intransitive judgments of the identity of objects

Identity is a transitive relation, according to all standard accounts. Necessarily, if x = y and y = z, then x = z. However, people sometimes say that two objects, x and z, are the same as a third, y, even when x and z have different properties (thus, x = y and y = z, but x ≠ z). In the present experiments, participants read stories about an iceberg that breaks into two icebergs, one to the east and the other to the west. Many participants (32–54%, in baseline conditions across experiments) decided that both successors were the original iceberg, despite the different spatial locations of the successors. Experiment 1 shows that this tendency is not due to participants failing to understand both to mean both are simultaneously the original. Similarly, Experiment 2 demonstrates that the tendency is not solely due to their interpreting the question to be about properties of the icebergs rather than about the icebergs themselves. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest, instead, that participants may understand Which is the original? to mean Which, in its own right, is entitled to be the original? Emphasizing entitlement increases the number of seemingly intransitive responses, whereas emphasizing the formal properties of identity decreases them.     

Managing one's social identity: Successful and unsuccessful identity management

This work explores the motivational dynamics of social identity management. Following social identity theory, we hypothesized that a threat to a positive social identity elicits specific negative emotions (i.e., outgroup‐directed anger) and motivates identity management. Successful identity management restores a positive social identity and decreases outgroup‐directed anger. However, when a successful identity management is blocked (e.g., because of limited cognitive resources), identity management will be unsuccessful and outgroup‐directed anger will remain at a higher level. This effect of unsuccessful identity management on outgroup‐directed anger should be particularly strong for group members who highly value their group (i.e., high group‐based self‐esteem). A negative comparison outcome is discrepant with these group members' positive view of the ingroup, and therefore, unsuccessful identity management should especially elicit negative emotions (i.e., anger) towards the threatening outgroup. Two studies tested these predictions. Study 1 (N = 110) showed that participants' outgroup‐directed anger increased when threatened under cognitive load. Study 2 (N = 99) demonstrated that this was particularly true for participants high in group‐based self‐esteem. The results' implications for research on the motivational processes underlying social identity management are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory and identity

Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account.     

The identity of experiences and the identity of the subject

Philosophical Studies - Barry Dainton has developed a sophisticated version of the bundle theory of the subject of experiences. I shall focus on three claims Dainton makes: the identity-conditions...