A conceptual replication examining the risk of overtly listing eligibility criteria on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk

Recent scholarship indicates that explicitly listing eligibility requirements on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk can lead to eligibility falsification. Offering a conceptual replication of prior studies, we assessed the prevalence of eligibility falsification and its impact on data integrity. A screener survey collected the summer before the 2016 presidential election assessed political affiliation. Participants were then randomly assigned to be exposed to a second survey link for which they were eligible or ineligible. There was a significant interaction such that the differences between self‐reported Republicans and Democrats on outcome measures (e.g., attitudes toward Hillary Clinton), were smaller among participants that were falsifying eligibility (i.e., imposters) than those that were not (i.e., genuine participants). Moreover, for most outcomes, imposters put forth responses that were significantly different from the responses put forth by those in the political party with which imposters were pretending to be affiliated. Imposters’ responses were also significantly different from participants in the political party with which imposters initially claimed to genuinely belong. For example, those who self‐reported themselves as Democrats on the screener survey but responded to a survey for “only Republicans” (i.e., imposter Republicans), reported more favorable attitudes toward Donald Trump than genuine Democrats, but indicated less favorable attitudes toward Donald Trump than genuine Republicans. These results highlight the potential harms of explicitly listing eligibility requirements and emphasize the importance of minimizing imposter participation.     

Speaking two “Languages” in America: A semantic space analysis of how presidential candidates and their supporters represent abstract political concepts differently

In this article we report a computational semantic analysis of the presidential candidates’ speeches in the two major political parties in the USA. In Study One, we modeled the political semantic spaces as a function of party, candidate, and time of election, and findings revealed patterns of differences in the semantic representation of key political concepts and the changing landscapes in which the presidential candidates align or misalign with their parties in terms of the representation and organization of politically central concepts. Our models further showed that the 2016 US presidential nominees had distinct conceptual representations from those of previous election years, and these patterns did not necessarily align with their respective political parties’ average representation of the key political concepts. In Study Two, structural equation modeling demonstrated that reported political engagement among voters differentially predicted reported likelihoods of voting for Clinton versus Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Study Three indicated that Republicans and Democrats showed distinct, systematic word association patterns for the same concepts/terms, which could be reliably distinguished using machine learning methods. These studies suggest that given an individual’s political beliefs, we can make reliable predictions about how they understand words, and given how an individual understands those same words, we can also predict an individual’s political beliefs. Our study provides a bridge between semantic space models and abstract representations of political concepts on the one hand, and the representations of political concepts and citizens’ voting behavior on the other.     

Overestimating Reported Prejudice Causes Democrats to Believe Disadvantaged Groups Are Less Electable

Four studies show that Democrats overestimate the explicit prejudice reported by the American electorate, leading them to perceive presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups as less electable. Study 1 (MTurk; n = 728) found that Democrats overestimated the percentage of Americans who say they would not vote for presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups. Study 2 (MTurk; n = 597) replicated this finding and demonstrated that Democrats who perceive high levels of explicit prejudice toward a group also believe presidential candidates from that group are less electable. Moreover, Democrats who more frequently interacted with Republicans were more accurate in estimating the amount of explicit prejudice reported by Republicans, Democrats, and Americans in general. Studies 3A (Prolific; n = 930) and 3B (YouGov; n = 747) found that presenting information about true levels of reported prejudice made Democrats believe generic presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups would be more electable. We did not find evidence that information about true levels of reported prejudice affected Democrats' beliefs about the electability of specific candidates in the 2020 Democratic Primary or their support for these candidates.     

God Versus Party: Competing Effects on Attitudes Concerning Criminal Punishment,National Security,and Military Service

We explore how images of God interact with political party to predict attitudes concerning the appropriate role of government in both criminal punishment and national security. Using the second wave of the Baylor Religion Survey (2007), we analyze the extent to which beliefs regarding God's moral judgment moderate the influence of party affiliation on opinions about the death penalty, fighting terrorism, punishing criminals, serving in the military, and U.S. involvement in the Iraq War. Specifically, we find that Democrats who believe in a judgmental God tend to support more conservative policies. In fact, attitudes converge such that the effects of party membership are erased if rival partisans both believe in a judgmental moral authority.     

Judging a Book by its Cover: The Effects of Candidate Party Label and issue Stands on Voting Behavior

Americans vote party lines; nothing predicts election outcomes as well. People may vote party lines because party candidates have views that accurately reflect the positions of their members, because party identification acts as a convenient cue that eliminates the need for greater information search or cognitive processing, or because party classification biases interpretation of other information people have about the candidates. To investigate these competing hypotheses for party effects on voter decision making, participants were presented with a choice between 2 candidates whose policy positions were more inconsistent than consistent with their party identification (Study l), or completely inconsistent with their party identification (Study 2). People voted as a function of party label in Study I, but issue stand emerged as a stronger predictor in Study 2 (although Democrats were more likely to cross party lines than Republicans). These results suggest that party identification influences how other information about the candidate is perceived and processed. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

The Effects of US Presidential Elections on Work Engagement and Job Performance

We predicted that presidential election results would spill over to influence the work domain. Individuals who voted for the winning candidate were expected to experience increased engagement, whereas individuals who voted for the losing candidate were expected to experience decreased engagement. We tested these predictions within the context of the 2016 US presidential election. Using a sample of 232 working Americans, work engagement and job performance were assessed one week prior to the election, the day after the election, and one week after the election. Contrary to our prediction, individuals who voted for Trump (the winning candidate) did not report increased work engagement, thereby providing no evidence of positive spillover. However, individuals who voted for Clinton (the losing candidate) were less engaged on the day after the election compared to baseline, demonstrating negative spillover. Downstream, work engagement was positively related to job performance. However, these effects were relatively short-lived, as engagement returned to baseline levels within one week following the election. Our results suggest that elections can have important implications for work-related outcomes. From a practical perspective we suggest that to the extent possible it may be prudent to avoid scheduling important work tasks for the days following presidential elections.     

Screw Those Guys: Polarization,Empathy, and Attitudes About Out-Partisans

Empathic ability is the ability to interpret the emotional state of others. In today's highly partisan and polarized environment, empathic ability may play a key role in determining how partisans respond emotionally to changes in public policy and those helped or harmed by the policy. Utilizing Baron-Cohen et al.'s (Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 241–251, 2001) “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test to measure empathic ability, we conduct a survey experiment where we asked participants to read about a partisan individual who may lose their health insurance if the Affordable Care Act were to be repealed. We show that empathic ability shapes attitudes about people and policies, but that the effects are contingent upon the respondent's partisanship, the target's partisanship, and an interaction of the two. Empathic ability produces more positive affect and policy support among Democrats but reduces positive affect among Republicans. The divergent effects of empathic ability on Democrats and Republicans are further exacerbated when the target is an out-partisan.     

Religion in American Presidential Campaigns, 1952–2016: Applying a New Framework for Understanding Candidate Communication

The content and impact of religious communication in politics has been a topic of increasing public and scholarly interest in recent years. To provide a foundation for future research in this area, the present study theorizes five broad factors—historical trajectory, party expectations, audience religiosity, candidate attributes, and opponent strategy—that may help explain why political candidates use religious language. We employ this framework in a large‐scale computer‐assisted content analysis of U.S. presidential campaign speeches from 1952 to 2016. Findings reveal that the Reagan shift observed in prior research was driven specifically by God language, that the “God gap” between Democrats and Republicans is modest and topic‐specific, and that audience characteristics are crucial in explaining candidates’ religious communication.     

Intergroup anxiety and political loss: The buffering effects of believing in the open marketplace of ideas and openness to diverse political discussions

The polarized divide in current U.S. politics continues to separate citizens and impede political decision‐making. Ameliorating this polarization may require addressing intergroup anxiety. The current work examines the buffering effect of endorsing the open marketplace of ideas and openness to engaging in political conversations with people who hold opposing political views on partisans' intergroup anxiety. In Study 1 (N = 319), openness to diverse political discussions negatively predicted postelection intergroup anxiety among Obama supporters in the 2012 U.S. election. Among Romney supporters, endorsement of the open marketplace and openness to diverse political discussions negatively predicted intergroup anxiety. Study 2 (N = 349 Democrats and Republicans), employed an experimental design and produced results consistent with Study 1. For Democrats and Republicans, openness to participating in political discussions characterized by multiple political perspectives was associated with reduced intergroup anxiety. Regardless of the threat of their candidate losing the 2016 election, Republicans (compared to Democrats) expressed reduced intergroup anxiety when endorsing the open marketplace of ideas and being open to engaging in diverse political discussions. Results are discussed in terms of contact theory within the context of the American political system.     

Moral Conviction and Political Engagement

The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election—indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left.     

Social Movements and Party Politics: The Case of the Christian Right

This paper explores the uneasy relationship between social movements and major political parties by considering the case of the Christian Right and the Republican Party in the 1994 elections. We look at four states where the movement was active in party politics and where Republican electoral fortunes varied from failure to success. We found that the degree of intraparty division generated by the Christian Right seemed to hurt Republicans at the polls, but the level of movement activity in itself apparently helped the Republicans. Most factors associated with support for the Christian Right did not help account for electoral outcomes across the states. Instead, the accessibility of the political party nomination processes to the movement best accounted for the election results: greater party openness was associated with poor results and more limited access with greater success for the GOP.     

Predicting Voting Choice from Within- versus Across-Subject Attitudes

The relationship of attitudes to both intentions and behavior was investigated in the context of the 1984 presidential election. Davidson and Morrison's (1983) within-subject approach (where an individual's attitudes toward alternative intentions and behaviors are the predictors) was compared to the more typical across-subject approach (where extremity of attitude across subjects is the predictor). Prior to the election, 45 American, undergraduate, registered voters indicated their attitudes and voting intentions toward the presidential candidates. Following the elections voting behavior was assessed. Phi coefficients indicated that an expectancy-value index of attitudes was more closely related to both behavioral intentions and voting behavior with a within- rather than an across-subject analysis (Phi coefficients of .59 & .73 versus .45 & .45 respectively).     

Does How I Feel About It Matter? The Role of Affect in Cognitive and Behavioral Reactions to an Illness Diagnosis

Individuals often have low rates of compliance with treatment recommendations. We examined the role that experienced affect at the time of illness diagnosis might play in influencing thoughts and feelings relating treatment compliance. Participants were randomly assigned to receive a positive, neutral, or negative affect induction after imagining they were diagnosed with kidney cancer. They then reported on thoughts and feelings about the illness and the treatment regimen. Participants also reported interest in additional information about the illness and behavioral intentions for complying with the treatment regimen. Affect significantly influenced interest in information and behavioral intentions. Both effects were mediated by the influence of affect on participants' self-efficacy beliefs. These mediational findings support a mood-as-resource interpretation of the role of affect in treatment compliance.     

The two faces of dominance: The differential effect of ingroup superiority and outgroup inferiority on dominant-group identity and group esteem

The present paper provides evidence that dominant-group members distinguish dominance framed as ingroup superiority from dominance framed as outgroup inferiority, and that ingroup superiority enhances esteem for, and thus identification with, the group more than outgroup inferiority. In Experiment 1, Democrats report higher levels of party identification after being told that Democrats won an election than after being told that Republicans lost the election. These effects are attenuated among dominant group members whose values are in conflict with how dominance was achieved. In Experiments 2a and 2b, unearned dominance framed as ingroup superiority resulted in higher levels of White identification than unearned dominance framed as outgroup inferiority among Whites who did not value meritocracy. In contrast, Whites who valued meritocracy did not increase their levels of identification with the group. In Experiment 2b, this interactive effect on racial identification was mediated by esteem for the group.     

A single exposure to the American flag shifts support toward Republicanism up to 8 months later

There is scant evidence that incidental cues in the environment significantly alter people's political judgments and behavior in a durable way. We report that a brief exposure to the American flag led to a shift toward Republican beliefs, attitudes, and voting behavior among both Republican and Democratic participants, despite their overwhelming belief that exposure to the flag would not influence their behavior. In Experiment 1, which was conducted online during the 2008 U.S. presidential election, a single exposure to an American flag resulted in a significant increase in participants' Republican voting intentions, voting behavior, political beliefs, and implicit and explicit attitudes, with some effects lasting 8 months after the exposure to the prime. In Experiment 2, we replicated the findings more than a year into the current Democratic presidential term. These results constitute the first evidence that nonconscious priming effects from exposure to a national flag can bias the citizenry toward one political party and can have considerable durability.     

Does Complex or Simple Rhetoric Win Elections? An Integrative Complexity Analysis of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Research suggests that the integrative complexity of political rhetoric tends to drop during election season, but little research to date directly addresses if this drop in complexity serves to increase or decrease electoral success. The two present studies help fill this gap. Study 1 demonstrates that, during the Democratic Party primary debates in 2003–2004, the eventual winners of the party nomination showed a steeper drop in integrative complexity as the election season progressed than nonwinning candidates. Study 2 presents laboratory evidence from the most recent presidential campaign demonstrating that, while the complexity of Obama's rhetoric had little impact on college students' subsequent intentions to vote for him, the complexity of McCain's rhetoric was significantly positively correlated with their likelihood of voting for him. Taken together, this research is inconsistent with an unqualified simple is effective view of the complexity‐success relationship. Rather, it is more consistent with a compensatory view: Effective use of complexity (or simplicity) may compensate for perceived weaknesses. Thus, appropriately timed shifts in complexity levels, and/or violations of negative expectations relevant to complexity, may be an effective means of winning elections. Surprisingly, mere simplicity as such seems largely ineffective.     

Exploring the Psychological Foundations of Ideological and Social Sorting

Americans are sorting ideologically: Liberals and conservatives are more likely to respectively identify as Democrats and Republicans. They are sorting socially as well: Partisans like and trust copartisans more than opposing partisans. Existing explanations for these phenomena rely on exogenous factors, such as elite polarization. But exogenous explanations cannot fully explain variation in sorting. We argue that psychological characteristics can help explain the tendency to sort ideologically or socially. Specifically, we investigate an individual’s responsiveness to internal values versus normative social pressures as a determinant of sorting. We test this theory with several nationally representative surveys, as well as one survey experiment, and find strong support that an individual’s own tendency to respond to social cues, as opposed to ideological values, has important consequences for this process. Our work allows for a better understanding of the psychological factors that promote partisan sorting and for interpreting variation in the degree to which citizens sort into partisan groups.     

Impact of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election on Politically Divided Relationships

Political identity represents a salient component of counselor and client identity tied to one's values and beliefs. The 2016 U.S. presidential election has been viewed as an especially divisive political environment that may have heightened emotion and elevated personal and collective political identities to new levels of awareness. We present findings from a consensual qualitative research study exploring personal and relational impacts of the election and discuss participants' (N = 16) strategies for relationship maintenance.