意识的四个要素理论

基于实验事实 ,提出了意识内部结构的观念。按照本文提出的意识的四个要素理论 ,意识由意识的四个要素及它们之间的相互作用组成。意识的四个要素是意识觉醒、意识内容、意识指向和意识感情。讨论了意识四个要素的脑机制     

Evidence that phenomenal olfactory content exceeds what can later be accessed

Visual experience is information rich, but only a small proportion is available for later access. We tested for this distinction in olfaction. In two experiments (E1&2), participants undertook trials rating an odor’s features (e.g., how banana-like?), the during-smelling-profile, followed by an after-smelling-profile, upon the odor’s removal. On some trials during and after-smelling-profiles were identical and on others they were different. Each trial with a particular odor was repeated. For half the odors both trials were identical (congruent) and for the remainder, one was different and the other identical (incongruent). Crucially, the after-smelling-profile was always the same for each odor, allowing reliability to be measured. E1&2 revealed that incongruent profiles were the least reliable. Attempting to access particular odor features in an odor’s absence is harder if those features were not attended during smelling. This suggests more information is available during smelling, than can be accessed after the odors removal.     

Access is mainly a second-order process: SDT models whether phenomenally (first-order) conscious states are accessed by reflectively (second-order) conscious processes

Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine’s [Irvine, E. (2009). Signal detection theory, the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness—Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction? Consciousness and Cognition.] partial access argument fails because exclusion failure is indeed due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient phenomenally conscious information. Further, the enable account conforms with both qualitative differences and subjective report, and is simpler than the endow account. Finally, although first-order access may be a distinct and important process, second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally.     

内隐序列学习意识的理论、测量和影响因素

内隐序列学习意识理论有二分和渐进两种观点。意识的主观和客观行为测量来源于二分理论, 其研究却产生了渐进理论; 电生理和脑成像测量则存在严重的二分偏向。影响意识的三因素--反应刺激间隔(RSI)、人格开放性和新异刺激都是意识产生的原因, 其有关研究各自支持或反对两种意识理论, 进一步探索可能孕育出新的意识理论。鉴于二分理论无法解释中间意识, 反之渐进理论无法解释意识与无意识的脑区分离, 本文提出双系统渐进理论或可统合两者, 且可能促使大脑网络技术探索意识产生机制的多样性和竞争性等新研究的产生。此外, 所有测量方式的敏感性等级尚待确定, 影响意识三因素的交互作用也值得探索。     

Signal detection theory,the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness—Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction?

Block [Block, N. (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 46–52] and Snodgrass (2006) claim that a signal detection theory (SDT) analysis of qualitative difference paradigms, in particular the exclusion failure paradigm, reveals cases of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness. This claim is unwarranted on several grounds. First, partial cognitive access rather than a total lack of cognitive access can account for exclusion failure results. Second, Snodgrass’s Objective Threshold/Strategic (OT/S) model of perception relies on a problematic ‘enable’ approach to perception that denies the possibility of intentional control of unconscious perception and any effect of following different task instructions on the presence/absence of phenomenal consciousness. Many of Block’s purported examples of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access also rely on this problematic approach. Third, qualitative difference paradigms may index only a subset of access consciousness. Thus, qualitative difference paradigms like exclusion failure cannot be used to isolate phenomenal consciousness, any attempt to do so still faces serious methodological problems.     

Shifting goal posts: First and second order access

Snodgrass et al.’s (2009) commentary makes explicit one of the major problems in consciousness research; that there seem to be just as many definitions of basic terms are there are people in the field. Although Snodgrass et al.’s position appears at odds with the views expressed in Irvine (2009), many of their arguments are actually consistent with the proposed views, or else fail to engage with them as a consequence of the shifting goal posts of what basic terms mean.     

内隐学习意识性研究的两种理论取向:二分与渐进

传统的内隐学习研究范式大多致力于意识与无意识加工的操作性分离。随着学习任务和测量手段的改进,越来越多的研究发现量化渐变比二元分离能更好地兼容实验数据。本文对认知领域中与二分和渐进两种取向相关的理论框架和实证研究进行介绍和评价,指出意识的二分与渐进假设是源自不同的概念定义层次的理论框架,即功能性概念和解释性概念,因而对现象学数据具有不同的解释效力。它们的共存提供了不同的研究视角,丰富了我们对内隐学习活动的认识。     

The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?

It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems to set aside crucial aspects of consciousness; and the state-based approach seems over-inclusive in a way that is hard to rectify without losing sight of the crucial conscious–unconscious contrast. Consequently, the search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of new experimental paradigms.     

The Consciousness (R)Evolution Paradigm

Consciousness represents the core of the new paradigm, the unitary, systemic vision, and comprehension that emerges in every field of science, culture, and spirituality. For centuries, consciousness has been divided from matter, the soul from the physical body. Now, in this historical beginning of globalization, we need a new holistic model, a global paradigm based on consciousness that can explain the unitary evolutionary process, the psychosomatic unity of human being, the neurophysiological roots of harmony between peoples and the way to personal and collective evolution of consciousness in order to realize a more conscious, peaceful, and sustainable planetary future. Consciousness is the key of human evolution.     

心智游移：现象、机制及意义

心智游移是一种常见的非自主内源性意识体验, 是意识流的重要组成部分, 它的存在提示非感官意识在人类意识经验中的重要地位, 以及持续进行的无意识加工对个体生存可能具有的重要意义, 对心智游移的研究是心理学和认知神经科学领域内新兴的热点课题。本文重点回顾了关于心智游移的体验内容、与情绪的关系及其相关神经活动方面的研究成果, 在此基础上探讨了心智游移的发生机制及适应性功能。文章最后总结了目前心智游移研究中存在的定义不清、研究策略和方法过于局限以及研究内容上存在的问题, 并提出了该领域未来的研究方向以及应用价值。     

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics’ performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which — hopefully — will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.     

The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible for her to easily obtain as much information as she may need. The argument for this account of consciousness' functional role will proceed in three main stages. First, the phenomenological approach to consciousness as peripheral self-awareness will be expounded and endorsed. Second, an account of the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness will be offered. Finally, the account of the functional role of peripheral self-awareness will be obtained by straightforward extension from the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

内隐序列学习意识的具身机制

内隐序列学习意识已有三类理论如全局工作平台理论、神经可塑性理论、新异刺激理论都忽略了身体感受的关键因素, 难以揭示意识产生的根本原因。具身意识理论和研究发现, 运动/情感镜像神经元系统及与自我、认知控制系统的交互, 是初级/高级意识产生的本源, 但未涉及内隐序列学习规则意识这个对人类学习认知至关重要的领域。内隐序列学习研究实质上已接近揭示其学习机制正是感知觉运动具身学习, 其意识机制很可能是感知觉运动/情感具身意识, 并且其意识加工脑区与具身意识脑区有关键重合。未来研究可采用Granger因果大脑网络技术证明内隐序列学习意识的具身本源, 并考察已有三类意识理论的具身基础, 以及探索意识影响因素的具身机制。     

Postmodern consciousness in psychotherapy

Modern consciousness is a cultural and historical achievement in the West and a developmental task for each person now. Modern consciousness consists in the emancipation from the power of community, animistic nature and the unconscious. It is connected with neurosis and psychotherapy because it has to do with inner conflicts. But today there is an increasing number of cases which are characterized by dissociation and acting out, without the feeling of conflicts. Consciousness seems to be changing toward a new conception which might be called 'postmodern consciousness'. The essence of postmodern consciousness is shown by interpreting two dreams internally. The first dream from a case of depersonalization indicates that it is not necessary to be entangled with the object. There is a different kind of coniunctio in the mode of seeing. The second dream from a case of dissociative disorder shows a world which has neither traces of pre-modern cosmology-high and low, here and the beyond-nor modern interiority. There is only surface and self-reflection without content. The discussion of dreams suggests that postmodern consciousness is not to be understood as premature and pathological. It is therapeutically important to refine and deepen postmodern consciousness.     

向整合的超个人心理学

超个人心理学是20世纪60年代末在美国兴起的一种心理学流派。它认为个体能够通过对自我潜能的发掘,通过对意识状态的扩充,达到超越自我,超越时空的所谓超个人状态。本文追溯了超个人心理学产生的历史渊源,阐释了其基本理论框架和研究特点,从历史与现实、理论与实验相结合的角度探讨了这一学派的一些最新研究成果,如转换的意识状态,意识谱理论,沉思的研究与训练,揭示了当代西方心理学正在走向整合的新趋向。     

意识和无意识权衡现象的四个特征

本实验以探讨意识和无意识之间的复杂关系为目的 ,采用 5 (年龄 :老年、中年、大学生、初三和高小 )× 2 (贡献来源 :意识和无意识 )的两因素混合设计 ,通过加工分离程序 (PDP)的包含和排除测验 ,计算意识和无意识的贡献大小。结果表明在对具体图片的记忆中 ,1)意识和无意识贡献出现了发展上的分离 ;2 )老年组的无意识贡献高于意识贡献 ,但未达到显著水平 ,其余四个组别则表现出意识贡献水平极其显著地高于无意识贡献水平。在此基础上 ,本研究对意识和无意识的权衡现象的四个特征 (相互独立、相互作用、互为主次、互相依存 )分别进行了阐述     

无意识的意识本性

就精神分析的无意识而言,无意识实际上是由意识创建而来的。不是无意识派生了意识,而是意识派生了无意识。无意识是意识的一种变体,它恰恰体现了意识的塑造能力和它自身的可塑性。弗洛伊德在《意识与什么是无意识》中对意识和无意识的关系问题做了集中的论述。该文借助对这篇论文的全面解析进行阐述。     

Husserl on Intentionality as an Essential Property of Consciousness

In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition （Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.） generally share the following two commitments： （i） intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and （ii） all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Follesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective.