Attention, intention and domain-specific processing

Many researchers use subliminal priming to investigate domain-specific processing mechanisms, which have classically been defined in terms of their autonomy from other cognitive systems. Surprisingly, recent research has demonstrated that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes are not independent of attention. By extension, these findings have been used to call into question the autonomy of domain-specific processing mechanisms. By contrast, we argue that the demonstrated modulation of nonconscious cognitive processes by attention occurs at a predomain-specific stage of processing. Thus, although we agree that attention might be a prerequisite of nonconscious processes, we suggest that there is no reason to think that higher-level cognitive systems directly modulate domain-specific processes.     

Nonconscious perception, conscious awareness and attention

Because it is unclear how a nonconscious stimulus is cognitively processed, there is uncertainty concerning variables that modulate the processing. In this context recent findings of a set of neuroimaging experiments are important. These findings suggest that conscious and nonconscious stimuli activate same areas of the brain during performance of a similar task. Further, different areas are activated when a task is performed with or without awareness of processing. It appears that the neural network involved in cognitive processing depends on the awareness of processing rather than awareness of perception. Since conscious and nonconscious cognitive processing use separate neural networks, each processing is modulated by different variables. Attention modulates most conscious cognitive processing and most, but not all, nonconscious processing is attention dependent. Nonconscious tasks that require attentional resources, with or without conscious awareness, are processed using the attention dependent system. Further, because attention dependent and attention independent tasks are processed by separate neural networks, the cognitive processing and modulating variables can be understood better if cognitive tasks are defined as attention dependent or attention independent, rather than conscious or nonconscious.     

Don’t make me angry,you wouldn’t like me when I’m angry: Volitional choices to act or inhibit are modulated by subliminal perception of emotional faces

Volitional action and self-control—feelings of acting according to one’s own intentions and in being control of one’s own actions—are fundamental aspects of human conscious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipulated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each target, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to render them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects. In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal, which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta component—associated with cognitive control processes—which is present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by subliminal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby subliminally presented “threat” stimuli affect conscious control processes. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on volitional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.     

Cognitive change processes in psychotherapy

Several types of cognitive-behavioral therapy are now practiced that use different sets of theoretical concepts and propose different kinds of change mechanisms. None, however, is directly grounded in experimental research in cognitive and social psychology, and few address basic issues such as the relevance of conscious versus nonconscious cognitive processes and the validity of the self-report data on which therapy depends. Put forward in this article is a model that describes the conscious and nonconscious processing of emotional stimuli and distinguishes between knowledge that is verbally accessible and knowledge that can only be recovered by exposure to situational cues. Also proposed are three mechanisms of cognitive change that involve altering verbally accessible knowledge, the accessibility of nonconscious situational memories, and self-regulatory strategies. These mechanisms are related to the current practices of behavioral and cognitive-behavioral therapists.     

The Role of Conscious Awareness in Consumer Behavior

Consumer behavior can be influenced by mental processes that occur outside of conscious awareness. It is argued that in each domain of automaticity, researchers should specify the aspects of which consumers are presumably unaware. Three types of awareness are identified. These include awareness of (a) the environmental features that trigger an automatic process, (b) the automatic process itself, and (c) the outcome of that automatic process. Individuals may be unaware of one or more of these stages, thereby making the process nonconscious. With additional clarity regarding which aspects are nonconscious in which domains and the specific role that awareness plays, we can begin building a more comprehensive model of nonconscious processes in consumer behavior.     

Can expectancies produce placebo effects for implicit learning?

The placebo effect is an important phenomenon whereby real changes occur in response to an otherwise inert intervention. Despite increasing research attention, it remains unclear exactly which processes are amenable to placebo effects. The current study tested whether an instructional manipulation could produce placebo effects on a nonconscious cognitive task, namely implicit learning. Four hundred and sixty-four university students completed a visual search task while smelling an odor or no odor, in alternating blocks. Unknown to them, the task contained a contingency whereby on half the trials the target's location was cued by the pattern of distractors, which was achieved by repeating some configurations of targets and distractors. Prior to the task, participants received positive, negative, or no information about the odor's possible effects on performance. Those given positive information demonstrated faster reaction times on cued trials than other participants. Those given negative information showed slower reaction times on cued trials compared with participants given no information. Further, the cuing effect appeared to be nonconscious, with participants' ability to recognize the repeated configurations equivalent to chance and no evidence that performance on a recognition test was related to the magnitude of the cuing effect. This suggests that instructional manipulations can produce placebo effects on some nonconscious processes.     

A Symbolic Model of the Nonconscious Acquisition of Information

This article presents counter evidence against Smolensky's theory that human intuitive/nonconscious congnitive processes can only be accurately explained in terms of subsymbolic computations carried out in artificial neural networks. We present symbolic learning models of two well-studied, complicated cognitive tasks involving nonconscious acquisition of information: learning production rules and artificial finite state grammars. Our results demonstrate that intuitive learning does not imply subsymbolic computation, and that the already well-established, perceived correlation between “conscious” and “symbolic” on the one hand, and between “nonconscious” and “subsymbolic” on the other, does not exist.     

Don't sit so close to me: unconsciously elicited affect automatically provokes social avoidance

Behavior may be automatically prompted by cues in our social environment. Previous research has focused on cognitive explanations for such effects. Here we hypothesize that affective processes are susceptible to similar automatic influences. We propose that exposure to groups stereotyped as dangerous or violent may provoke an anxiety response and, thus, a tendency to move away. In the present experiment, we subliminally exposed participants to images of such a group, and found that they displayed greater avoidance in a subsequent interaction. Critically, this effect was explained by their increased sensitivity to threat-related information. These findings demonstrate an affective mechanism responsible for nonconscious priming effects on interpersonal behavior.     

On the status of nonconscious processes in human cognition: comment on Reber

Two issues are discussed. The first one pertains to the generality of the nonconscious learning processes and their somewhat paradoxical status in cognitive psychology. We argue that the ability of the human cognitive system to nonconsciously acquire complex knowledge structures is one of its elementary and indispensable properties. Moreover, the existence of this ability constitutes one of the necessary metatheoretical assumptions of contemporary cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, the contemporary cognitive psychology literature often implies that it is only one of many controversial and unusual phenomena. The second issue pertains to the distinction between the so-called primitive unconscious and the sophisticated unconscious as proposed by Reber (1989).     

Loading working memory enhances affective priming

Stronger affective priming (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) with suboptimal (i.e., reduced consciousness) than with optimal (i.e., full consciousness) prime presentation suggests that nonconscious processes form an important part of emotions. Merikle and Joordens (1997) have argued that both impoverished presentation and divided attention can produce suboptimal conditions and result in parallel effects. We manipulated attention by means of a concurrent working memory load while keeping presentation duration constant, as participants evaluated Japanese ideographs that were preceded by happy, neutral, or angry faces (affective priming) and male or female faces (nonaffective priming). In contrast to nonaffective priming, affective priming was larger with divided attention than with focused attention. It is concluded that manipulations of stimulus quality and of attention can both be used to probe the distinction between conscious and nonconscious processes and that the highest chances of obtaining the pattern of stronger priming with suboptimal presentation than with optimal presentation occur in the affective domain.     

Nonconscious acquisition of information.

The authors review and summarize evidence for the process of acquisition of information outside of conscious awareness (covariations, nonconscious indirect and interactive inferences, self-perpetuation of procedural knowledge). Data indicate that as compared with consciously controlled cognition, the nonconscious information-acquisition processes are not only much faster but are also structurally more sophisticated, in that they are capable of efficient processing of multidimensional and interactive relations between variables. Those mechanisms of nonconscious acquisition of information provide a major channel for the development of procedural knowledge that is indispensable for such important aspects of cognitive functioning as encoding and interpretation of stimuli and the triggering of emotional reactions.     

Automatic identification of familiar faces

Much research has suggested that facial identification has some characteristics of automaticity, in that it is rapid, nonconscious, and mandatory. However, little research has tested whether it can occur even if attention is already devoted to the demanding central processes of another task. In the present study, we addressed this type of automaticity using the psychological refractory period paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants successfully identified familiar faces, even while they were engaged with another task, indicating the automaticity of familiar-face identification. In Experiments 3 and 4, however, participants could not identify unfamiliar faces as automatically as they could identify the familiar faces. We concluded that automatic face identification is possible, but dependent on prior familiarity.     

Affect of the unconscious: Visually suppressed angry faces modulate our decisions

Emotional and affective processing imposes itself over cognitive processes and modulates our perception of the surrounding environment. In two experiments, we addressed the issue of whether nonconscious processing of affect can take place even under deep states of unawareness, such as those induced by interocular suppression techniques, and can elicit an affective response that can influence our understanding of the surrounding environment. In Experiment 1, participants judged the likeability of an unfamiliar item—a Chinese character—that was preceded by a face expressing a particular emotion (either happy or angry). The face was rendered invisible through an interocular suppression technique (continuous flash suppression; CFS). In Experiment 2, backward masking (BM), a less robust masking technique, was used to render the facial expressions invisible. We found that despite equivalent phenomenological suppression of the visual primes under CFS and BM, different patterns of affective processing were obtained with the two masking techniques. Under BM, nonconscious affective priming was obtained for both happy and angry invisible facial expressions. However, under CFS, nonconscious affective priming was obtained only for angry facial expressions. We discuss an interpretation of this dissociation between affective processing and visual masking techniques in terms of distinct routes from the retina to the amygdala.     

Inhibition of attended processing during saccadic eye movements

People are unable to perform some, but not all, cognitive tasks while moving their eyes. A possible common denominator among disrupted processes is the use of attention. The present research proposes and tests an attentional suppression hypothesis to evaluate this claim. This hypothesis states that because attention is obligatorily allocated to a to-be-fixated location prior to the onset of a saccade, during saccadic events attentional resources are unavailable to direct processing associated with higher order cognitive tasks. Subjects were engaged in a task that combined saccades and shifts of attention across global and local levels of hierarchical figures. When the eyes did not move, this shift took place between stimulus presentations. When saccades intervened between the stimuli, the global-local shifts of attention were interrupted, suggesting that saccades suppress cognitive processes requiring attention.     

Who distinguishes between sinners and sins at the implicit level of awareness?

Several researchers have investigated the possibility that people indeed can love individuals who are engaged in behaviors that are considered unacceptable. In the present research, the authors evaluated the possibility that people distinguish between presumably sinful persons and presumably sinful behaviors at a cognitive level that does not involve conscious intent and awareness: the implicit (nonconscious) level of awareness. Participants performed a speeded-response task, the Implicit Association Test. Results indicated that participants were able to make such a (person vs. behavior) distinction and that in doing so, they manifested positive implicit evaluations of sinful people relative to sinful actions.     

Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues

Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality (representation per se), transparency (immediacy of cognitive content consequent upon the unawareness of underlying representational processes), subjectivity (first-person perspective) or reflexivity (autonoetic awareness). However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible for operationalizing such a reflexive state. Current reliance by higher-order and intrinsic self-representational theories on self-representing data structures to achieve reflexive self-awareness is highly problematic, suggesting a solution in terms of a self-referential processing regime.     

A Piagetian approach to infant referential behaviors

Near the end of the first year of life, infants begin producing referential behaviors that in adults indicate joint attention, or coordinating shared attention to an object with another person. These behaviors have been interpreted in the social cognitive literature as an indication that infants realize they are sharing attention to an object with another person. In this paper, we address theory and research on infant referential behaviors described as joint attention and offer an alternative explanation for the presence of these behaviors. Using Piaget's constructivist theory, we show how research in this area can be interpreted without assuming that infants have advanced social cognitive abilities. We argue that infants’ referential behaviors are motor signifiers of thought and that infants recognize humans as particularly relevant objects for their goal-directed behaviors. Finally, we describe how the field of infant joint attention research should proceed if a comprehensive understanding of infant cognitive processes is to be desired.     

Understanding dieting: A social cognitive analysis of hedonic processes in self-regulation

The present paper introduces a novel approach to understanding failures of self-regulation in chronic dieters. Traditional approaches to this problem have focused on consciously controlled processes of eating regulation, such as the realisation that one has overeaten, or the experience of food cravings. We argue, however, that dieters' problem might rather lie in their sensitivity to the hedonic aspects of food and the resulting inhibition of their dieting goal. We present a goal-conflict model that integrates recent findings on hedonic sensitivity in eating regulation with social cognition research on nonconscious goal pursuit. We show that the perception of attractive food triggers hedonic thoughts about food in chronic dieters and leads to the inhibition of their dieting goal. These processes make subsequent overeating more likely, while bypassing dieters' conscious awareness. We discuss how our model can accommodate earlier research findings in this area, and we consider its implications for dieting behaviour and for our attempts to resist temptations more generally.     

Evidence that nonconscious processes are sufficient to produce false memories

Are nonconscious processes sufficient to cause false memories of a nonstudied event? To investigate this issue, we controlled and measured conscious processing in the DRM task, in which studying associates (e.g., bed, rest, awake...) causes false memories of nonstudied associates (e.g., sleep). During the study phase, subjects studied visually masked associates at extremely rapid rates, followed by immediate recall. After this initial phase, nonstudied test words were rapidly presented for perceptual identification, followed by recognition memory judgments. On the perceptual identification task, we found significant priming of nonstudied associates, relative to control words. We also found significant false recognition of these nonstudied associates, even when subjects did not recall this word at study or identify it at test, indicating that nonconscious processes can cause false recognition. These recognition effects were found immediately after studying each list of associates, but not on a delayed test that occurred after the presentation of several intervening lists. Nonconscious processes are sufficient to cause this memory illusion on immediate tests, but may be insufficient for more vivid and lasting false memories.