What,After All,Is the Work of Culture?

This paper offers an overview of Joseph Margolis’s philosophy of culture, highlighting how Margolis’s radical historicism is not inconsistent with our realistic intuitions regrading facts and objectivity. While Margolis identifies interpretation as the work of culture, the paper suggests that a much more basic sense of human labor needs to be thematized more fully than Margolis does in any defensible account of culture. Margolis of course appreciates work in this sense, but he does not consistently make it integral to his conception of culture. Even so, what he so forcefully defends is, as one commentator has put it, “beautiful. It’s also erudite, elegant, and insightful (and frightfully, dialectically intricate).”     

Quine on the Nature of Naturalism

Quine's metaphilosophical naturalism is often dismissed as overly “scientistic.” Many contemporary naturalists reject Quine's idea that epistemology should become a “chapter of psychology” (1969a, 83) and urge for a more “liberal,” “pluralistic,” and/or “open‐minded” naturalism instead. Still, whenever Quine explicitly reflects on the nature of his naturalism, he always insists that his position is modest and that he does not “think of philosophy as part of natural science” (1993, 10). Analyzing this tension, Susan Haack has argued that Quine's naturalism contains a “deep‐seated and significant ambivalence” (1993a, 353). In this paper, I argue that a more charitable interpretation is possible—a reading that does justice to Quine's own pronouncements on the issue. I reconstruct Quine's position and argue (i) that Haack and Quine, in their exchanges, have been talking past each other and (ii) that once this mutual misunderstanding is cleared up, Quine's naturalism turns out to be more modest, and hence less scientistic, than many contemporary naturalists have presupposed. I show that Quine's naturalism is first and foremost a rejection of the transcendental. It is only after adopting a broadly science‐immanent perspective that Quine, in regimenting our language, starts making choices that many contemporary philosophers have argued to be unduly restrictive.     

Joseph Margolis on Pragmatism

This paper begins with a memoir of the author’s interactions with Joseph Margolis that delineates both Margolis’s importance as a teacher and their disagreements on aspects of American philosophy. It then turns to Margolis’s discussions of pragmatism as a philosophical movement, with an emphasis on his understanding of John Dewey. The paper considers, third, Margolis’s account of the decline and rebirth of pragmatism, the latter process attributed largely to the work of Richard Rorty. The paper concludes with an examination of what it sees as Margolis’s most valuable work: his explorations of the nature of the self and of human society.     

Normative Naturalism and Epistemic Relativism

In previous work, I defended Larry Laudan against the criticism that the axiological component of his normative naturalism lacks a naturalistic justification. I argued that this criticism depends on an equivocation over the term ‘naturalism’ and that it begs the question against what we are entitled to include in our concept of nature. In this paper, I generalize that argument and explore its implications for Laudan and other proponents of epistemic naturalism. Here, I argue that a commitment to naturalism in the methods and aims of science inevitably entails a kind of epistemic relativism. However, I argue that this should not be interpreted as a reductio of naturalism, since the admission of contextually based standards and aims of science does not result in quietism when it comes to important questions concerning scientific rationality.     

The clinical psychology of lightner witmer: A case study of institutional innovation and intellectual change

The name Lightner Witmer is rarely invoked in the historian's litany of psychological saints. Neither a grand systematizer nor an ardent experimentalist, the “world's first clinical psychologist” is even dismissed by contemporary clinicians because of his purported failure to achieve for psychologists professional hegemony over the “problem child.” Yet disciplinary ventures which in Joseph Ben-David's phrase fail to “take off” represent extremely illuminating indicators of a discipline's shifting ideas, roles, and aspirations. Explicitly urging that historians pay more attention to subgroups of larger disciplines, this paper constitutes an attempt to assess the impact of changing social roles upon psychologists' intellectual stances through an examination of Witmer's novel activities at the University of Pennsylvania.     

A DEFENSE OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION: REFLECTIONS ON PETER HARRISON'S “AFTER SCIENCE AND RELIGION” PROJECT

Recent scholars have called into question the categories “science” and “religion” because they bring metaphysical and theological assumptions that theologians should find problematic. The critique of the categories “science” and “religion” has above all been associated with Peter Harrison and his influential argument in The Territories of Science and Religion (2015). This article evaluates the philosophical conclusions that Harrison draws from his antiessentialist philosophy in the two volumes associated with his “After Science and Religion Project.” I argue that Harrison's project is too skeptical toward the categories “science” and “religion” and places too much emphasis on naturalism being incompatible with Christian theology. One can accept the lessons of antiessentialism—above all, how meanings of terms shift over time—and still use the terms “science” and “religion” in responsible ways. This article defends the basic impulse of most scholars in science and religion who promote dialogue and argues for a more moderate reading of the lesson of Territories.     

Some Problems with Scientific Relativism and Moral Realism

In its early development philosophy of science did not allow the possibility of a relativistic approach with regard to explanation of external phenomena. Relativism was seen as justified exclusively with regard to internal phenomena, for example, in the realm of moral and aesthetic judgment. In the realm of moral judgment, external realism functions as a necessary hypothesis, according to which our moral judgment and moral decisions have a real effect in the external world, for which we can be held responsible. A paradigm shift in the theory of science, inaugurated by Th. S. Kuhn, led to the rise of relativism with regard to judgment in the realm of external phenomena and specifically with regard to the validity of scientific theories. Critics of relativism do not take into account that it is not enough to point out the logical inconsistency of relativism. Most arguments for scientific justification of external realism are doomed to failure, because they do not take into account the role of the judgmental subject. In this article I will show that the role of “second nature” is significant not only for the constitution of moral realism, but also for the implementation of scientific naturalism.     

Edmund Husserl, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Logical Investigations. Volume I. Prolegomena to Pure Logic</Emphasis>

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s review of the first Russian translation of volume one of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”), which was translated by E. A. Berstein and published in 1909 by a Petersburgian editor. The review appeared in the Muscovite philosophical journal Pyccкaя мыcль (Russian Thought) in 1909. In this short text, Lossky expresses his agreement with Husserl’s early anti-psychologism in logic. He also manifests his stance against logical and axiological relativism and naturalism. As an ontological realist, Lossky thought he had found in the author of the Logische Untersuchungen an ally against the subjectivistic trends then still prevalent in Germany. The review is significant in intellectual history for its vanguard role in the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl’s thought in Russia. (Frédéric Tremblay)     

Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?1

The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty. It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so‐called “naturalist” readings of On Certainty, which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in On Certainty as a form of “internal rationalism.”     

Constitutivism,Error, and Moral Responsibility in Bishop Butler's Ethics

In his writings on moral philosophy, Bishop Joseph Butler adopts an identifiably “constitutivist” strategy because he seeks to ground normativity in features of agency. Butler's constitutivist strategy deserves our attention both because he is an influential precursor to much modern moral philosophy and because it sheds light on current debates about constitutivism. For example, Butler's approach can easily satisfy the “error constraint” that is often thought to derail modern constitutivist approaches. It does this by defining actions relative to the kind of being who performs them, instead of relative to the circumstances of their performance. This gives Butler a conceptually stable account of something that is both fully an action yet morally bad, for which an agent might be held morally responsible. Should modern constitutivists wish to model their views on Butler's in order to satisfy the error constraint, they need not adopt all his theological and other commitments, but they will have to avoid the currently popular constitutivist strategy of deriving normative force from the inescapability of a given principle.     

Rortian Realism

This paper motivates and defends “Rortian realism,” a position that is Rortian in respect of its underlying philosophical theses but non‐Rortian in terms of the lessons it draws from these for cultural politics. The philosophical theses amount to what the paper calls Rorty's “anti‐representationalism” (AR), arguing that AR is robust to critique as being anti‐realist, relativist, or sceptical, invoking Rorty's historicism/ethnocentrism as part of the defence. The latter, however, creates problems for Rorty in so far as his reformative views on the nature of philosophical and academic activity are meant to be foisted on an academy that ex hypothesi holds views different from these. The paper suggests we can motivate a different conception of the consequences of AR more amenable to the academy: Rortian realism, a view that makes greater concessions to realism and a kind of scientific naturalism than Rorty would like, but that for those very reasons is more likely to allow AR to prevail.     

Skepticism,naturalism, pyrrhonism

Skepticism and naturalism bear important connections with one another. Do they conflict or are they different sides of the same coin? In this paper, by considering the ways in which Sextus and Hume have examined these issues, I offer a Pyrrhonian response to Penelope Maddy's attempt to reject skepticism within the form of naturalism that she calls “second philosophy” (Maddy, 2007, 2017) and to Timothy Williamson's attempt to avoid skepticism from emerging within his knowledge-first approach (Williamson, 2000). Some lessons about Pyrrhonism result.     

CIRCULARITY AND INCONSISTENCY IN KUHN'S DEFENSE OF HIS RELATIVISM

For more than a century, it has been a standard ploy to argue against relativism on the grounds of self-referential incoherence (e.g., “if the relativists say that beliefs have no objective validity then that belief itself has none,” etc.). This paper determines the particular form this sort of charge takes when applied to a problematic passage in which Kuhn defends his relativistic theory of science by applying that theory to the debate between his critics and himself. If Kuhn were to give up relativism with respect to facts and truth but retain it with respect to the strength of reasons, a pair of dilemmas charging circularity and inconsistency could be circumvented.     

Margolis Looks at the Arts

This paper examines the early aesthetic writings of Joseph Margolis from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s in order to argue for the relevance of these works in understanding Margolis’s later, more well-known views in the philosophy of art. Specifically, the paper addresses Margolis’s early essays on the definition and ontology of art and aesthetic perception. These essays not only show Margolis engaged in the most significant debates in mid-century analytic aesthetics but also provide important indications of the limitations of that approach to thinking about the arts that informs the development of Margolis’s later cultural realism.     

Biting the Bullet on Moral Twin Earth

Abstract

Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiment shows that realist ethical naturalism entails a kind of conceptual relativism about moral predicates. This conceptual relativism implies, further, that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings do not express substantive disagreement with one another. Because this latter implication clashes with considered linguistic intuitions, Horgan and Timmons conclude that we should reject realist ethical naturalism. Against this, several critics recommend that realists ‘bite the bullet’ with respect to Moral Twin Earth: despite our intuitions, we should accept that the speakers do not disagree. These critics argue that the intuitions elicited by the thought experiment are either the result of a failure on the part of readers to appreciate hidden details of the Moral Twin Earth case, or else they are mere artifacts of readers’ epistemic limitations. In this paper, I show that the Moral Twin Earth argument prevails against this line of attack.     

Relativism of Distance - a Step in the Naturalization of Meta-Ethics

Bernard Williams proposed his relativism of distance based on the recognition “that others are at varying distances from us”. Recent work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy highlights the prevalence of folk relativism in relation to spatial and temporal distance. However, Williams’ relativism of distance as well as recent empirical findings which seem to support some of Williams’ main ideas on this issue have received scant attention. In this article, we would like to focus on the phenomenon of moral relativism regarding spatiotemporal distance as an entry point to the nature of folk moral relativism and the methodology of meta-ethics. To do so, we first introduce Williams’ relativism of distance. Then we compare Williams’ approach on this matter to recent experimental approaches on folk relativism. On this score the main result is that Williams’ proposal is consistent with several well-established insights on the experimental study of folk relativism. Williams’ relativism of distance is not only empirically plausible, but it is also of relevance for shaping the methodology of an empirically informed meta-ethics. We close this paper by stressing this methodological contribution.     

BEYOND MATERIALISM: MENTAL CAPACITY AND NATURALISM,A CONSIDERATION OF METHOD

Abstract: This article challenges the neo‐Darwinist physicalist position assumed by currently prevalent naturalizing accounts of consciousness. It suggests instead an evolutionary (Deweyan) understanding of cognitive emergence and an acceptance of mental capacity as a phenomenon in its own right, differing qualitatively from, although not independent of, the physical and material world. I argue that if we accept that consciousness is an adaptation enabling survival through immediate individual intuition of the world, we may accept this metaphysics as a given. Methodological focus can then shift to investigating the, as yet untheorized, nature of consciousness itself as capacity/interconnectivity/potential. The article accepts Joseph Margolis's recent advocacy of a pragmatist approach that is “natural but not naturalizable” ( Margolis 2002 , 7), that is, an anti‐reductionist as opposed to an eliminativist position, but it seeks to develop this position further and to give it new direction.     

Forcing materialism upon metaphysics: Three approaches to Adorno's method

Recent Adorno scholarship has been shaped by the idea that his critical theory cannot account coherently for its own method. Call this the Problem of Adornian Critical Theory (PACT). In this paper, I examine three recent approaches to Adorno—the “ethics of resistance” (associated with Gordon Finlayson and Brian O'Connor), “negative naturalism” (associated with Fabian Freyenhagen), and “inverse theology” (associated with Peter E. Gordon). Individually, I argue, all three approaches are subject to a key limitation that prevents them from being able to solve the PACT. But, by synthesising them, we can see how the scholarship already—effectively—possesses a solution to it. The synthesis that results is characterised in terms of “materialist metaphysics”—a position Adorno can clearly be read as articulating in the “Meditations on Metaphysics” chapter of Negative Dialectics.     

Fine's Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity

In “Tense and Reality”, Kit Fine ( 2005 ) proposed a novel way to think about realism about tense in the metaphysics of time. In particular, he explored two non‐standard forms of realism about tense (“external relativism” and “fragmentalism”), arguing that they are to be preferred over standard forms of realism. In the process of defending his own preferred view, fragmentalism, he proposed a fragmentalist interpretation of the special theory of relativity (STR), which will be our focus in this paper. After presenting Fine's position, we will raise a problem for his fragmentalist interpretation of STR. We will argue that Fine's view is in tension with the proper explanation of why various facts (such as the Lorentz transformations) obtain. We will then consider whether similar considerations also speak against fragmentalism in domains other than STR, notably fragmentalism about tense.     

Reduction in chemistry - a second response to Scerri

In this rejoinder to Eric Scerri's response to my first comment on his paper on the reduction of chemistry to physics, the main point concerns laws in chemistry. But other themes touched upon include the assumptions involved in ab initio calculations, the question of what is reduced to what on Scerri's view, and the significance he attaches to the term “naturalism”.