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1.
This paper argues that a comparative study of the idea of a sense of justice in the work of John Rawls and the early Chinese
philosopher Kongzi is mutually beneficial to our understanding of the thought of both figures. It also aims to provide an
example of the relevance of moral psychology for basic questions in political philosophy. The paper offers an analysis of
Rawls’s account of a sense of justice and its place within his theory of justice, focusing on the features of this capacity
and how it develops. It then provides an account of the sense of justice in Kongzi’s thought as it is seen in the Analects. Finally, it shows how examining the similarities and differences between the two accounts can deepen our understanding of
both views, as well as our appreciation for the importance of understanding how a sense of justice develops. 相似文献
2.
I contend that a form of contractualism more individualistic than Rawls' would do better at addressing concerns about justice and the family raised by feminist theorists, and that it would also compel us to be more egalitarian. Dissatisfactions expressed with Rawls's neglect of issues related to gender and the family can only be addressed if 'parties in the original position' are strictly defined as individuals. Thus defined, they are not only able to address questions of justice within families, but can also explore the less familiar question of justice of the family, namely whether the family should exist, from the point of view of justice. I conclude by exploring the question of whether the family should be abolished, in view of its leading to life chances unequal between individuals, and compare the family with a generalized, well resourced and well run orphanage. 相似文献
4.
The Journal of Value Inquiry - 相似文献
5.
This article seeks to revisit the relationship between Rawls’s contractarianism and the moral status of animals, paying particular
attention to the recent literature. Despite Rawls’s own reluctance to include animals as recipients of justice, and my own
initial scepticism, a number of scholars have argued that his theory does provide resources that are useful for the animal
advocate. The first type takes Rawls’s exclusion of animals from his theory of justice at face value but argues that animals
can still be protected within a moral realm independently of justice, or indirectly through the motivations of human contractors.
The second type adapts his theory in a way that enables animals to be included within a contractarian theory of justice. It
is argued, though, that none of the responses offered is successful in providing a sphere of protection for animals from within
Rawls’s contractarian theory. It is doubtful if Rawls’s intention was for animals to receive a significant degree of protection
within a moral realm independently of justice, and equally doubtful if the contractors in the original position would be motivated
to act on behalf of animals. In the case of the second, whilst Rawlsian resources can be utilised to justify the attempt to
amend the veil of ignorance so as to include animals, these are not dependent on a contractural agreement. Similarly, placing
emphasis on social-co-operation as a means of incorporating animals into a theory of justice is flawed, not least because,
paradoxically, it works for domesticated animals whilst they are being exploited. 相似文献
7.
Empowerment is a key word in Catherine Audard’s new book on Rawls and a central characteristic of Rawls’ approach to justice.
A very different “hermeneutic” approach to justice is presented by Paul Ricoeur, the French philosopher and theologian who,
against the background of his own work, examined Rawls’ views in several publications. This essay compares the two views and
defends the proposition that empowerment is the common denominator. The author suggests that Rawls would not have objected
to including some of Ricoeur’s ideas in the past-principle stage of his Theory.
相似文献
9.
罗尔斯的代际正义思想作为他的正义理论的重要组成部分,体现了对传统正义观的超越与发展,为人类可持续发展所进行的国际合作和国内法律、政策的制定提供了有力的理论支撑和评价标准。 相似文献
10.
The work of John Rawls is central to contemporary political philosophy. A Theory of Justice provides a model for the justification of substantive principles of justice, and it defends principles that reject utilitarianism. Ultimately, justification is a matter of what the participants in a relationship or an institution can justify to one another. Unlike utilitarianism, which assumes that there is one good that it is the job of morality to maximize, Rawls holds that there are multiple conceptions of the good associated with different individuals. Furthermore, he holds that there are multiple principles of morality associated with different relationships and institutions. His principles of justice are designed for one of these—the basic structure of society. They establish a moral minimum that all members of a society owe to one another, but additional principles are required to govern other special relationships. 相似文献
12.
马克思和罗尔斯似乎有着十分不同的正义观。马克思主张,正义概念的功能,在意识形态上表现为以主导生产模式所要求的操行,作为具有普遍约束性的律令。罗尔斯则主张,正义是社会制度的第一美德,它的法则可能被所有这样的人所认可:他们公正、合理地商讨的问题,是如何公平划分彼此之间在社会合作中的负担和利益。尽管体现在马克思和罗尔斯立场之间的种种重要不同仍然存在,但笔者认为,这两种正义观上显然不同的立场,是能够调和的。尽管受到黑格尔和康德的不同影响,马克思和罗尔斯的观点还是能显示出一致之处。在提出明确的正义政治概念时,罗尔斯认为,可以接受的正义原则,必须是在社会体制中能够实行的。这导致他的“康德式构成主义”,向黑格尔的观点靠近,在这一点上,马克思奠定了他对普遍的、社会先验的正义原则的拒斥。笔者认为,马克思和罗尔斯两人所追问的,都可以被看作是何种社会制度能够实现作为公平的正义原则。不过,其间仍有两点重要不同。首先,马克思憧憬的,似乎是一种超越休谟和罗尔斯所谓“正义环境”的社会,而对罗尔斯(2001,P177)来说,超越正义环境的社会则是乌托邦。其次,马克思认为,作为社会基础的市场关系应该被超越,因为这些市场关系天然地包含着生产者与生产的社会过程以及社会劳动产品的异化。虽然在超越正义环境的社会里,市场的消亡也许可能,罗尔斯却宣称,在要求必须公正解决竞争的任何社会里,市场消亡均不可能。笔者认为,如果将马克思对市场的拒绝,看作是从根本上拒绝“商品拜物教”,那么马克思和罗尔斯的立场就能调和。笔者的结论是,除了马克思关于未来无阶级社会概念中含有理想成分外,在资本主义及市场的正义观上,马克思和罗尔斯的立场相当接近。 相似文献
13.
In Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies I examine political parties and partisanship within the context of John Rawls’s (Political Liberalism, expanded edn. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005a) theory of political liberalism. I argue that parties and partisanship are vital to Rawls’s political liberalism, since they offer a distinctive and crucial contribution to the process of public justification that is central to it, which combines the articulation of public reasons with the channelling into the public political realm of the particular values and conceptions of the good emerging from parties’ specific constituencies. Furthermore, I argue, partisanship generates a special kind of political obligations, and this further contributes to state legitimacy under conditions of reasonable pluralism. In this paper, I respond to three commentators who have raised important criticisms against my argument. More specifically, Section 1 provides a response to Lea Ypi’s argument that my normative account of partisanship wrongly presupposes that existing liberal societies are reasonably just. Section 2 answers Daniel Weinstock’s concerns regarding the plausibility and internal consistency of my account of partisan political obligations. Finally, Section 3 addresses Kevin Vallier’s criticisms, which challenge my account of public reason and propose an alternative one. 相似文献
15.
What should our theorizing about social justice aim at? Many political philosophers think that a crucial goal is to identify
a perfectly just society. Amartya Sen disagrees. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the proper goal of an inquiry about justice is to undertake comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios
in order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice-reduction, even if the results fall short of perfect
justice. Sen calls this the “comparative approach” to the theory of justice. He urges its adoption on the basis of a sustained
critique of the former approach, which he calls “transcendental.” In this paper I pursue two tasks, one critical and the other
constructive. First, I argue that Sen’s account of the contrast between the transcendental and the comparative approaches
is not convincing, and second, I suggest what I take to be a broader and more plausible account of comparative assessments
of justice. The core claim is that political philosophers should not shy away from the pursuit of ambitious theories of justice
(including, for example, ideal theories of perfect justice), although they should engage in careful consideration of issues
of political feasibility bearing on their practical implementation. 相似文献
18.
abstract What gives ethical and political validity to a state? This is to ask what a state is for and to provide a means to determine whether or not a constitution is just. In this paper I compare the account given by Tamir in Liberal Nationalism with that of Rawls, in order to clarify the decisive differences. Although both recognize the importance of particular associations and the moral imperative to be fair, Tamir places priority on the first and Rawls on the second. I explore their practical implications in regard to the ethical defensibility of Israel's self‐identification as a Jewish state and to conflicting nationalistic territorial claims for the Temple Mount (Haram esh‐Sharif) in Jerusalem. I suggest that if Tamir is correct in her analysis of nationalism, the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict is a problem that is without the sort of solution that is sought by those who are both interested parties and rational agents of good will. 相似文献
19.
In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice. 相似文献
20.
为走出道德多元论的困惑,重新确立政治统一性,罗尔斯提出了非完备性的政治证明方式。哈贝马斯不同意罗尔斯的观点,他提出程序主义的证明方式。程序主义的证明方式没有割裂政治与道德的关系,哈贝马斯的批判是中肯的,从中我们可以看出,政治哲学不能脱离伦理信念的支持。 相似文献
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