Faulty Japanese sentences are judged more grammatical when punctuation is used: negative implications for Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation

88 adult Japanese speakers judged the grammaticality of isolated simple bitransitive sentences involving an uninterpretable extra argument in addition to three legitimate arguments. The sentences thus violated Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation which prohibits the structure building of a sentence including uninterpretable elements. The primary variable of interest was the presence or absence of punctuation, i.e., commas, which enclosed the extra argument. Findings showed that sentences with punctuation were judged more grammatical than the ones without punctuation, with an average score of judged grammaticality exceeding 3 on a 7-point scale (1 =least grammatical; 7=most grammatical). This score would not be expected if the speakers possess and judge the sentences in conformity with the principle of Full Interpretation.     

Judgments of Grammaticality of Japanese Sentences Violating the Principle of Full Interpretation

Two experiments investigated the linguistic intuition of Japanese speakers in which they judged the grammaticality of sentences violating Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation. Experiment 1 used bitransitive sentences, which included an extra argument that assumed a role of either subjective, dative, or objective on the one hand and that specified semantically a preceding argument or stood in par with it on the other. Findings showed that the speakers judged ungrammatical sentences involving a dative or an objective extra argument as more grammatical than those involving a subjective extra argument. Ungrammatical sentences with an extra specified argument were judged more grammatical than those with an extra par argument when the extra argument was objective. Experiment 2 used sentences that included a verbal noun (VN) comprising a noun followed by a verb, shita (did). Ungrammatical VN sentences contained two arguments given the same objective marker. These sentences were judged to be highly grammatical despite the violation of the principle. Findings suggest that speakers' actual knowledge of language is not fully consistent with the knowledge they are alleged by Chomsky to possess, including the principle of Full Interpretation.     

Judgments of grammaticality of sentences with a differing number of arguments: a comparison of English and Japanese speakers

This study explored native speakers' linguistic intuition as revealed in judging the grammaticality of sentences. Speakers of English (n = 36) and Japanese (n = 57) judged the relative grammaticality of sentences involving a verb which occurred together with one, two or three arguments. Findings showed that English speakers were more affected by the number of arguments in sentences. They judged sentences having three arguments as grammatical most often and ones having one or two arguments as grammatical less often. However, Japanese speakers gave rather similar and more grammatical judgments regardless of the number of arguments in sentences. The findings indicate a difference in tightness of argument structure in the two languages even when the sentences judged are simple sentences and they are given without any sentential context.     

Judgments of grammaticality of Japanese simple sentences involving two arguments in a whole-part relation: a further examination of Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation

Adult Japanese speakers judged the grammaticality of simple ungramatical sentences involving two arguments, each related with a single verb. The arguments were attached to the same case marker playing the same thematic role in the sentences. Thus the sentences violated Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation. The two arguments were manipulated such that, on the one hand, one argument (the part-argument) constituted a part of the other argument (the whole-argument) and that, on the other, a part-argument either preceded or followed a whole-argument. Participants rated the sentences using either a conventional 7-point rating scale or magnitude estimation. Findings showed that irrespective of rating method sentences in which the whole-argument preceded the part-argument were judged more grammatical than sentences in which the part-argument preceded the whole-argument. Such an empirical phenomenon is inconsistent with the prediction derived from Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation, while interestingly it is consistent with the grammar of classical Japanese used about 900 years ago.     

Do incompatible arguments cause extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments? The role of congruence between argument compatibility and argument quality

Previous studies have demonstrated that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are subjected to more extensive refutational processing, scrutinized longer, and judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. However, this study suggests whether extensive processing is implemented when evaluating arguments is not decided by argument compatibility, but by congruence between two evaluating tendencies elicited by both argument compatibility and argument quality. Consistent with this perspective, the results of two experiments show that relative to congruent arguments, participants judged arguments eliciting incongruent evaluating tendencies as less extreme in strength, spent more time, and felt more hesitant generating strength judgments for them. The results also show that it is mainly incongruent arguments, not congruent arguments, whose strength ratings were more closely associated with the perceived personal importance of the issue, which intensified the tendency to evaluate arguments depending on argument compatibility. These results suggest that it is the incongruity between argument compatibility and argument quality, and not simply the argument compatibility, that plays a more important role in activating an extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments.     

A context-sensitive representation of word meanings

This study provides a numerical representation of contextual effects on the meanings of words, constructed from the order judgments of 19 subjects concerning the word "red" in 19 sentences. Subjects judged whether or not the red object mentioned in a sentence was redder than, less red than, or could be equally as red as the red object mentioned in each of the other sentences. These judgments were well described as an interval order. This means that the red ascribed in a sentence can be represented by a real interval with judgments of equally red corresponding to overlapping intervals. Semiorder axioms were not met, indicating that the width of the interval varied from sentence to sentence. Possible ways of incorporating the result into theories of semantic memory were discussed, as well as ways of accounting for the pronounced individual differences which were observed. The research described herein was supported by the National Institute of Education under Contract HEW NIE-G-74-0007.     

The relativity of linguistic intuition: The effect of repetition on grammaticality judgments

Three experiments were performed to show the relativity of linguistic intuition in grammaticality judgments. In Experiment 1, 12 students judged the relative grammaticality of isolated sentences twice, receiving a repetition treatment between the two judgments. During the repetition phase, they were exposed to a repeated presentation of sentences. The findings show that the repetition treatment makes a judgment criterion more stringent for both grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. In Experiment 2, a release-from-the-proactive-inhibition paradigm was used. Twelve students first judged the grammaticality of the isolated sentences, then received the repetition treatment, and finally, made a second judgment for the sentences embedded in context. No change in judgment criterion was found for the second judgment. Judgments of the ungrammatical sentences, when embedded in context, were found to be more lenient. In Experiment 3, 12 students judged sentences embedded in context. No change in judgment criterion was found. These findings are interpreted as suggesting that linguistic intuitions as revealed in grammaticality judgments are not absolute but relative in that they are easily influenced by repetition and other variables, such as embedded context.     

句子结构与控制动词类型对题元角色指派的影响

扩展论元依存模型认为：语序固定语言的题元角色指派依赖论元的语序线索; 论元线索与动词论元表征不一致时, 题元角色再分析会产生额外的加工负荷。为检验该模型, 本研究采用眼动记录方法, 实验为2 (句子结构：居中、前置) × 2 (控制动词类型：主语控制、宾语控制)被试内设计。通过操纵句子结构, 考察汉语读者对语序线索的依赖性; 通过操纵控制动词类型, 考察汉语论元线索与动词论元表征的一致性对题元角色指派的影响。结果发现：(1)前置结构的句子在名词1、名词2和动词区域的阅读时间和回视次数多于居中结构的句子; (2)宾语控制动词条件在动词和动词后区域的第二遍阅读时间和总回视次数多于主语控制动词条件; (3)在居中结构中, 宾语控制动词条件在名词2和动词区域的阅读时间和回视次数多于主语控制动词条件; 在前置结构中, 宾语控制动词条件在动词后区域的阅读时间多于主语控制动词条件。结果支持扩展论元依存模型。     

Inductive Reasoning in Alzheimer''s Disease

We evaluated knowledge of basic level and superordinate semantic relations and the role of cognitive resources during inductive reasoning in probable Alzheimer's disease (AD). Nineteen mildly demented AD patients and 17 healthy control subjects judged the truthfulness of arguments with a premise and a conclusion that contain familiar concepts coupled with "blank" predicates, such as "Spiders contain phosphatidylcholine; therefore all insects contain phosphatidylcholine." Like healthy control subjects, AD patients were relatively insensitive to the typicality of the premise category when judging the strength of arguments with a conclusion containing a basic-level concept, but were relatively sensitive to typicality during judgments of arguments containing a superordinate in the conclusion. Moreover, AD patients resembled control subjects in judging arguments with an immediate superordinate in the conclusion compared to arguments with a distant superordinate. AD patients differed from control subjects because they could not take advantage of two premises in an argument containing basic-level concepts. We conclude that semantic knowledge is sufficiently preserved in AD to support inductive reasoning, but that limited cognitive resources may interfere with AD patients' ability to consider the entire spectrum of information available during semantic challenges.     

Mandarin learners use syntactic bootstrapping in verb acquisition

Mandarin Chinese allows pervasive ellipsis of noun arguments (NPs) in discourse, which casts doubt concerning child learners' use of syntax in verb learning. This study investigated whether Mandarin learning children would nonetheless extend verb meanings based on the number of NPs in sentences. Forty-one Mandarin-speaking two- and three-year-olds enacted sentences with familiar motion verbs. The presence of an extra postverbal NP led the toddlers to extend causative meanings to intransitive verbs, and the absence of a postverbal NP led them to extend noncausative meanings to transitive verbs. The effects of adding or subtracting an NP were statistically indistinguishable. Thus, the number of NPs in a sentence appears to play a role in verb learning in Mandarin Chinese.     

Freedom,moral responsibility,and the failure of universal defeat

Proponents of manipulation arguments against compatibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the manipulator intends that an agent perform a particular action) do not impact judgments about free will and moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people's judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: people judged that an agent was less free and responsible when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least one but not all agents) than when the manipulation was universal (impacting every agent). This study examines people's judgements about existential and universal manipulation cases that involve both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation scope also affects people's free will and responsibility judgments in manipulation cases involving both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we also found that manipulation type influences the effect that manipulation scope has on people's free will judgments but not their moral responsibility judgments, which indicates that people's free will and responsibility judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and moral responsibility are conceptually bound together.     

Two kinds of reasoning

According to one view of reasoning, people can evaluate arguments in at least two qualitatively different ways: in terms of their deductive correctness and in terms of their inductive strength. According to a second view, assessments of both correctness and strength are a function of an argument's position on a single psychological continuum (e.g., subjective conditional probability). A deductively correct argument is one with the maximum value on this continuum; a strong argument is one with a high value. The present experiment tested these theories by asking participants to evaluate the same set of arguments for correctness and strength. The results produced an interaction between type of argument and instructions: In some conditions, participants judged one argument deductively correct more often than a second, but judged the second argument inductively strong more often than the first. This finding supports the view that people have distinct ways to evaluate arguments.     

Effect of repetition on grammaticality judgments under objective and subjective self-awareness conditions

Three experiments were performed to investigate the differential effect of repeated presentation of sentences on judgments of grammaticality under the two mental states of objective and subjective self-awareness. In Experiment 1, 22 students judged the relative grammaticality of sentences twice, receiving a repetition treatment between the two judgments. During the repetition phase, they were exposed to a repeated presentation of sentences. The findings showed that repetition makes a judgment criterion more stringent on judgments after repetition than on those before repetition for the subjectively self-aware subjects, while it does not influence the judgments for the objectively self-aware subjects. Experiment 2 was run using a revised procedure with 26 students. The findings showed the expected, interaction, such that the repetition makes a criterion stringent for the subjectively self-aware subjects while it makes the criterion lenient for the objectively self-aware subjects. Experiment 3 examined with 12 students whether the finding for the latter subjects could be explained, by divided attention theory in a concurrent task condition. The findings showed no change of judgment criterion. These findings indicate that repeated exposure to the sentences exerts differential effects on grammaticality judgments dependent on whether the subjects are objectively or subjectively self-aware.     

Two contextualist fallacies

I examine the radical contextualists’ two main arguments for the semantic underdeterminacy thesis, according to which all, or almost all, English sentences lack context-independent truth conditions. I show that both arguments are fallacious. The first argument, which I call the fallacy of the many understandings, mistakenly infers that a sentence S is semantically incomplete from the fact that S can be used to mean different things in different contexts. The second argument, which I call the open texture fallacy, wrongly concludes that a sentence S lacks context-independent truth conditions from the fact that there are circumstances in which the truth value of S would be indeterminate. I do however defend the claim that a certain class of sentences not containing any indexicals do lack context-independent truth conditions, and put forward an argument to that effect. But this argument, as I show, does not generalize to all sentences, and thus fails to support the semantic underdeterminacy thesis.     

The influence of argument structure on judgements of argument strength, function, and adequacy

The present study explored the extent to which lay adults consider aspects of argument structure in judging the strength and function of informal arguments and in constructing arguments to meet specific adequacy goals. Across two experiments, college students were presented with base (one-premise) arguments, which were then expanded into convergent, coordinate, and subordinate arguments closely matched in terms of content, believability, and strength. Coordinate arguments were associated with the greatest gains in argument strength via their construction and the greatest loss in strength when one of their premises was falsified. To some degree, the argument types were also judged to perform different functions and to serve different goals. The construction of convergent arguments was associated with building independent lines of support while the construction of subordinate arguments was associated with providing justification for premises. Expansion into a coordinate argument was seen as the best way to improve an argument's persuasiveness. The construction of both coordinate and subordinate arguments was associated with building relevance, explicating assumptions, and completing the meaning of a base argument. Results are discussed in terms of argumentation theory and research.     

The influence of argument structure on judgements of argument strength,function, and adequacy

The present study explored the extent to which lay adults consider aspects of argument structure in judging the strength and function of informal arguments and in constructing arguments to meet specific adequacy goals. Across two experiments, college students were presented with base (one-premise) arguments, which were then expanded into convergent, coordinate, and subordinate arguments closely matched in terms of content, believability, and strength. Coordinate arguments were associated with the greatest gains in argument strength via their construction and the greatest loss in strength when one of their premises was falsified. To some degree, the argument types were also judged to perform different functions and to serve different goals. The construction of convergent arguments was associated with building independent lines of support while the construction of subordinate arguments was associated with providing justification for premises. Expansion into a coordinate argument was seen as the best way to improve an argument's persuasiveness. The construction of both coordinate and subordinate arguments was associated with building relevance, explicating assumptions, and completing the meaning of a base argument. Results are discussed in terms of argumentation theory and research.     

COHERENTISM AND THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL BELIEFS: A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO DO PRACTICAL ETHICS WITHOUT APPEAL TO A MORAL THEORY

This paper defends a coherentist approach to moral epistemology. In “The Immorality of Eating Meat” (2000), I offer a coherentist consistency argument to show that our own beliefs rationally commit us to the immorality of eating meat. Elsewhere, I use our own beliefs as premises to argue that we have positive duties to assist the poor (2004) and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong (2012). The present paper explores whether this consistency‐based coherentist approach of grounding particular moral judgments on beliefs we already hold, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on our core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory‐based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustrating the approach, I briefly recapitulate my consistency‐based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks.     

Circular reasoning

Good informal arguments offer justification for their conclusions. They go wrong if the justifications double back, rendering the arguments circular. Circularity, however, is not necessarily a single property of an argument, but may depend on (a) whether the argument repeats an earlier claim, (b) whether the repetition occurs within the same line of justification, and (c) whether the claim is properly grounded in agreed‐upon information. The experiments reported here examine whether people take these factors into account in their judgments of whether arguments are circular and whether they are reasonable. The results suggest that direct judgments of circularity depend heavily on repetition and structural role of claims, but only minimally on grounding. Judgments of reasonableness take repetition and grounding into account, but are relatively insensitive to structural role.