Foucauldian Imprints in the Early Works of Ian Hacking

Ian Hacking has defined himself as a philosopher in the analytic tradition. However, he has also recognized the profound influence that Michel Foucault had on much of his work. In this article I analyse the specific imprint of certain works by Foucault—in particular Les mots et les choses—in two of Hacking’s early works: Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? and The Emergence of Probability. I propose that these texts not only share a debt of Foucauldian thought, but also are part of what I believe is Hacking’s central project: the analysis of the historical and situated conditions of possibility for the emergence of concepts and of objects, inspired also by the French philosopher’s thought.     

Protagoras Refuted: How Clever is Socrates' "Most Clever" Argument at Theaetetus 171a–c?'

This article aims at reconstructing the logic and assessing the force of Socrates' argument against Protagoras' 'Measure Doctrine' (MD) at Theaetetus 171a–c. I examine and criticise some influential interpretations of the passage, according to which, e.g., Socrates is guilty of ignoratio elenchi by dropping the essential Protagorean qualifiers or successfully proves that md is self-refuting provided the missing qualifiers are restored by the attentive reader. Having clarified the meaning of MD, I analyse in detail the broader section 170a–171d and argue, against an extensive scholarly consensus, (1) that it contains two slightly different formulations of the same argument, and not two (or three) distinct arguments, (2) that Socrates does not highlight his own strategy at 171a–c as especially clever, and (3) that his argument successfully shows that md turns out to be untenable for Protagoras himself when submitted to scrutiny in dialectical contexts, without aiming at proving its absolute falsehood. Finally, I clarify the philosophical import of the final image of Protagoras' momentary return from the underworld.     

On Visibility and Power: An Arendtian Corrective of Foucault

Freedom, conceived ontologically, is power's condition of possibility. Yet, considering that the subject's interests and identity are constantly shaped, one still has to explain how – theoretically speaking – individuals can resist control. This is precisely the issue I address in the following pages. Following a brief overview of Foucault's contribution to our understanding of power, I turn to discuss the role of visibility vis-à-vis control, and show how the development of disciplinary techniques reversed the visibility of power. While Foucault illustrates that during different historical periods, distinct modes of visibility are produced by power in order to control society, I argue that the very same power that produces visibility is concomitantly dependent upon it. In addition, I maintain that visibility is a necessary component of resistance. But Foucault – perhaps due to his premature death – never adequately explains how individuals can resist the mechanisms of control in a world in which power is ubiquitous. To help clarify this enigma, I turn to Hannah Arendt's insights into power, freedom, plurality, and natality. These concepts, I claim, can serve as a corrective to Foucault because they make room for resistance without assuming that humans can exit power's web.     

Ricoeur's Account of Tradition and the Gadamer–Habermas Debate

While it is clear that the Gadamer–Habermas debate has had a major influence on Paul Ricoeur, his commentators have had little to say about the nature of this influence. I try to remedy this silence by showing that Ricoeur's account of tradition is a direct response to the Gadamer–Habermas debate. First, I briefly explain the debate's importance and describe Ricoeur's reaction to it. Next, I show how his discussion of tradition in Time and Narrative steers a middle course between Gadamerian hermeneutics and Habermasian Ideologiekritik. Finally, I raise some critical questions about the adequacy of Ricoeur's middle course. Specifically, I argue that it rests on an implausible distinction between the form and the content of tradition.     

More controversies about panic disorder: A reply to Klein

In his discussion of McNally's article in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (64, 88–91, 1996), Klein (1996a, Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 34, 849–853) clarifies and further defends his argument that cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT) researchers must incorporate drug and pill placebo conditions in their trial designs and must demonstrate a significant drug effect before they are entitled to make inferences about CBT's antipanic effects. The purpose of this reply is to provide a critique and rebuttal of Klein's arguments.     

Kim On Reduction

In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction.     

On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism

In the last decade, structural realism has been presented as the most promising strategy for developing a defensible realist view of science. Nevertheless, controversy still continues in relation to the exact meaning of the proposed structuralism. The stronger version of structural realism, the so-called ontic structural realism, has been argued for on the basis of some ideas related to quantum mechanics. In this paper, I will first outline these arguments, mainly developed by Steven French and James Ladyman, then challenge them, putting a particular emphasis on a metaphysical principle (the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles) which, even though it is crucial for the whole argument, hasn't been, in my opinion, clearly stated and examined yet. My overall view will be that a weaker version of the form of realism we are considering is more plausible – namely, epistemic structural realism.     

Rod Cocking's legacy: The development of psychological distancing

Thirty years of work on psychological distancing is discussed in this article. The psychological construct of psychological distance was applied to the development of children's developing representational abilities over 30 years ago [Sigel, I. E. (1970). The distancing hypothesis: A causal hypothesis for the acquisition of representational thought. In: M. R. Jones (Ed.), Miami symposium on the prediction of behavior, 1968: Effect of early experiences (pp. 99–118). Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press]. The construct has changed knowledge in three areas: (1) changes in the child's developmental status as a result of reflection on general properties of interactions with the world as well as maturation, (2) the effects of different modes of formal instruction in schooling on the development of children's thinking, and (3) the relationship of one's beliefs about how development occurs to behaviors with children that create “distancing experiences” for children. The distancing construct itself has been broadened further as the notion of psychological distance has been applied to areas as diverse as delay of gratification, divorce, video game play, and resolution of interpersonal conflicts [Cocking, R. R., & Renninger, K. A. (Eds.) (1993). The development and meaning of psychological distance. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum]. The distancing construct was evident in Rod Cocking's own program of psychological inquiry. However, much of his legacy to the field lies in his Educational Testing Service (ETS) work that extended the usefulness of this construct for other researchers working in a variety of domains of development and in his ability to see the implications of research from this perspective for the lives of children.     

A Comparison of the Evolution of Men's and Women's Dreams in Daniel Levinson's Theory of Adult Development

This article examines an important difference in the adult development of men and women never stated by Levinson, but implicit in his two books, The Seasons of a Man's Life (1978) and The Seasons of a Woman's Life (1996). The task of forming a Dream that generated a sense of vitality and excitement was central to Levinson's adult development theory in his book on men. Often occupational in nature, the men's Dreams were usually formed in their late teens and 20s. Yet, careful examination of the interviews in Levinson's last book reveals a dearth of vitalizing Dreams among his women subjects, including the career women, during the same period: None had long-term career goals and nearly all gave precedence to marriage and family. Development of individualistic animating Dreams was complicated by this a priori commitment, and usually delayed until the women's Age 30 Transitions (28–33), often provoking crisis then and subsequent instability.     

Special Relativity,Coexistence And Temporal Parts: A Reply To Gilmore

In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a: Philosophical Studies 99, 129–166; 2000b: Philosophy of Science 67 (Suppl), S549–S562), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival. Cody Gilmore (2002: Philosophical Studies 109, 241–263) has subjected my argument to an insightful three fold critique. In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to Gilmore’s first two objections. I then grant his observation that anyone who can resist the first objection is liable to succumb to the third one. This, however, opens a way to other closely related relativistic arguments against endurantism that are immune to all three objections and, in addition, throw new light on a number of important issues in the ontology of persistence. I develop two such novel arguments in the second half of the paper.     

The Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment: A comment on Zimmerman's critique

This paper is a reply to an article in this journal by M. Zimmerman titled “The Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment: A Comment on Elardo and Bradley's Review”. We found Zimmerman's critique of our original review article (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 113–145) to contain points which were well taken, and several which seemed pedantic. Specifically, we address his concerns about our discussion of the HOME scale's interrater reliability, test-retest stability, concurrent validity, and predictive validity; and we reply to his comments about the uses of the HOME scale for purposes of screening and matching environments.     

Peirce on Education: Nurturing the First Rule of Reason

Through an exegetic reading of Peirce’s minor texts on higher education, I find that Peirce’s conception of a “Liberal Education” is close to the Herbartian conception of Bildung. Peirce calls for a general education with the ambition of qualifying critical thinkers with the capacity to go beyond the strict rules and narrow borders of the artes liberales, – the different subject matters or sciences taught at a university. Thus, Peirce’s conception of a liberal education is closely linked to his interpretation of common sense – or sensis communis – as a critical commonsensism. To him, it is urgent to educate and nurture “the first rule of reason,” described as a will to learn, a curiosity, a dissatisfaction of what you already incline to think, and an intense desire to find things out. The nurturing of this “first rule of reason” is thus about educating an intellectual community of critical thinkers who are able to question authoritative beliefs, knowing how to debunk them, and how to turn away from obiter dictum.     

The foundation of the institute for experimental psychology at Leipzig University

Summary During the 1979–80 academic year psychologists from all over the world will celebrate the centennial of the Institute for Experimental Psychology at Leipzig University, established by Wilhelm Wundt during the winter of 1879–80. First, this paper will present the historical context in which the laboratory method of research instruction developed in nineteenth-century Germany. Next, Wundt's extensive experience with laboratory research before coming to Leipzig will be described. Finally, the origin, development, and organization of Wundt's laboratory will be chronicled, beginning with his call to Leipzig. The implications of Wundt's achievement for modern psychology will be discussed. Emphasis is placed on the use of archival materials, documents, and eyewitness accounts.A slightly modified version of this paper was presented as an Invited Centennial Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association in New York on September 4, 1979The preparation of this article was supported by a research award from the Dr. W.W. Kaempfer, the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama, USA     

Goldman on Probabilistic Inference

In his recent book, Knowledge in a SocialWorld, Alvin Goldman claims to haveestablished that if a reasoner starts withaccurate estimates of the reliability of newevidence and conditionalizes on thisevidence, then this reasoner is objectively likely to end up closer to thetruth. In this paper, I argue that Goldman'sresult is not nearly as philosophicallysignificant as he would have us believe. First, accurately estimating the reliability ofevidence – in the sense that Goldman requires –is not quite as easy as it might sound. Second, being objectively likely to end upcloser to the truth – in the sense that Goldmanestablishes – is not quite as valuable as itmight sound.     

Inverting Intentional Content

Critics of wide functionalism havetraditionally sought to attack the theory byexposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Widefunctionalist theories of intentionalcontent, however, were spared philosophicalscrutiny. I propose that wide functionalistaccounts of the intentional content are equallysusceptible to attack. I will attempt todemonstrate this by enlisting thefunctionalist's old foe from the qualia wars –the inverted spectrum hypothesis – in a newway. If the argument is sound, not only will Ihave shown that the inverted spectrumhypothesis may have more use than philosophicalliterature recognizes, I will have also exposeda weakness in a dominant philosophical theory:the wide functionalist theory of intentionalcontent.     

Virtual reflection: Antoine Arnauld on Descartes' concept of conscientia

ABSTRACT

Although Descartes has often been portrayed as the father of the modern concept of mind, his approach to consciousness is notoriously problematic. What makes it particularly hard to assess his role in the development of the theories of consciousness is the difficulty of clarifying the kind of consciousness he might have in mind when using the associated Latin terms (conscius, cogitatio, conscium esse, etc.). In this article, I analyse Antoine Arnauld’s early interpretation of the passages in Descartes that refer to the issue of consciousness. I argue for two separate but interconnected claims. Firstly, I show that when Arnauld sets out to make a case for Descartes’ concept of cogitatio, he reads the central passages in light of some scholastic theories of cognition, in particular, the concept of ‘reflexio virtualis’ which, far from being a Cartesian invention, comes from the late scholastic discourse. Secondly, I argue that by talking about virtual reflection Arnauld provides an interpretation of Descartes’ views in terms of the intrinsic structure of the first-order thought – a reading which is still plausible, even by our contemporary standards.     

Fromm’s understanding of the Buddhist philosophical theory and psychoanalysis: From the phenomenal ego to the authentic being1

Abstract

Erich Fromm was one of the first psychoanalytic thinkers who was genuinely interested in Asian philosophies. In the first part of this article, I will show Fromm’s imago of Buddhism as a radical, nontheistic, and ethical philosophy “without God.” I will argue that Fromm made an important difference between the phenomenal ego and being that proves crucial for his understanding of psychoanalysis and his critique of modern society. I will also explore Fromm’s synthesis of Buddhist philosophy and psychoanalysis, and show the similarities and differences between them.     

John Dewey in France

The present article on John Dewey aims at pursuing thetraces of the reception of Dewey's work in France. Itis intended as a survey of the writers who have takennote of Dewey and his ideas, and is meant to functionas a sort of additive inventory, with no claim tocomprehensiveness. Some of the articles mentioned wereunfortunately unavailable for direct examination andare thus listed merely for purposes of information.Although the educational and philosophical writings ofJohn Dewey are actually indivisible, Dewey's oeuvrehas not been read in France and Europe generally as ofa piece, but has largely been registered in terms ofthose parts which have relevance to education andteaching. Indicative of this is the fact that it tookuntil 1975 for Democracy and Education (1916) –the book which, in Dewey's own view, most clearlypresented his linking of pedagogy and philosophy(Delledalle, 1975; Suhr, 1994) – to be published inFrance. Gérard Delledalle, the translator ofDemocracy and Education, is the only person so far inFrance to have dealt systematically with the whole ofDewey's writings. He has translated other works byDewey and has written several books on him, dealingexpressly with Dewey's philosophy of pragmatism as thefoundation of his theory of education.It is actually inadequate to restrict the reception ofDewey's work to France alone. Rather, one should speakof francophone Europe, for the first translations ofDewey's educational writings into French were made byAdolphe Ferriére, Ovide Decroly and ÉdouardClaparéde – a Swiss, a Belgian, and a Frenchman.It was thanks to them that Dewey's thoughts oneducation began to make an impact on the francophonemovement for school reform in the early twentiethcentury.Discussion of his theory of education is typified inFrance as well by a division into proponents of aconcept of `learning by doing' indebted to Dewey(particularly in France) and representatives ofauthoritarian forms of education, which reject Dewey.Although French thought has not yet concerned itselfclosely with pragmatism, Dewey's opponents believed(and still believe) that they could denounce him andhis theories simply by levelling the charge of``pragmatism.' This dualistic mode of thinking whichappears to be deeply rooted in France has proved to bean obstacle to the reception of Dewey and has led toneglect and rejection of his theories.     

Aging in Grace: The Spiritual Journey of Henri Nouwen

Henri Nouwen (1932–1996), author of The Wounded Healer and dozens of other books, is best known for his religious meditations and his guides to spiritual development. The Dutch-born priest was also a pioneering religious gerontologist. Early on, Nouwen recognized that the joys and vicissitudes of aging were a relatively unexplored pathway to maturity. This article explores Nouwen's increasing sophistication and candor as he probed the dimensions of aging—his own inner torments and hopes, his relationships with others (particularly his father), and his acceptance of life's finitude. The author, who considers Nouwen a mentor, insinuates his own voice into the conversation to highlight the paradoxical extent to which the particular markers of one's journey define a life ultimately give way to an identity grounded in the commonalities of human existence.     

Causal Analyses Of Seeing

I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye.I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it doesnot rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in thisrespect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory – which involves a robot that mimics another (unseen) robot – fails. Finally I show that his `variability' requirement is not necessary, because there are cases where someone can see an object even though the variability that Tye requires doesnot exist.