Young infants’ expectations about hidden objects: a reply to three challenges

In this article, I address three broad challenges that have been directed at claims that even young infants are able to represent and to reason about hidden objects. The first challenge is that such claims are static and non-developmental and as such represent an unproductive approach to the study of infant cognition. The second challenge is that claims that even young infants represent hidden objects typically go hand in hand with assertions that infants are born with a belief that objects exist continuously in time and move continuously through space, and there is no evidence to date to support such assertions. Finally, the third challenge is that reports that young infants represent hidden objects can all be explained more parsimoniously in terms of low level perceptual biases in infants’ encoding and processing of events, or in terms of transient expectations formed during habituation trials and later extended to test trials.     

Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity

I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind‐independent properties, propositions, sense‐data, qualia, or intentional objects.     

When quantity trumps number: discrimination experiments in cotton-top tamarins (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Saguinus oedipus</Emphasis>) and common marmosets (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Callithrix jacchus</Emphasis>)

The capacity for non-linguistic, numerical discrimination has been well characterized in non-human animals, with recent studies providing careful controls for non-numerical confounds such as continuous extent, density, and quantity. More poorly understood are the conditions under which animals use numerical versus non-numerical quantification, and the nature of the relation between these two systems. Here we test whether cotton-top tamarins and common marmosets can discriminate between two quantities on the basis of the amount of food rather than on number. In three experiments, we show that when choosing between arrays containing different numbers and sizes of food objects, both species based their decisions on the amount of food with only minor influences of numerical information. Further, we find that subjects successfully discriminated between two quantities differing by a 2:3 or greater ratio, which is consistent with the ratio limits found for numerical discrimination with this species. These studies demonstrate that non-human primates possess mechanisms that enable quantification of total amount, in addition to the numerical representations demonstrated in previous studies, with both types of quantification subject to similar processing limits.     

Learning to perceive object unity: a connectionist account

To explore questions of how human infants begin to perceive partly occluded objects, we devised two connectionist models of perceptual development. The models were endowed with an existing ability to detect several kinds of visual information that have been found important in infants’ and adults’ perception of object unity (motion, co‐motion, common motion, relatability, parallelism, texture and T‐junctions). They were then presented with stimuli consisting of either one or two objects and an occluding screen. The models’ task was to determine whether the object or objects were joined when such a percept was ambiguous, after specified amounts of training with events in which a subset of possible visual information was provided. The model that was trained in an enriched environment achieved superior levels of performance and was able to generalize veridical percepts to a wide range of novel stimuli. Implications for perceptual development in humans, current theories of development and origins of knowledge are discussed.     

Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.     

Infants' understanding of false labeling events: the referential roles of words and the speakers who use them

The four studies reported here examine whether 16-month-old infants' responses to true and false utterances interact with their knowledge of human agents. In Study 1, infants heard repeated instances either of true or false labeling of common objects; labels came from an active human speaker seated next to the infant. In Study 2, infants experienced the same stimuli and procedure; however, we replaced the human speaker of Study 1 with an audio speaker in the same location. In Study 3, labels came from a hidden audio speaker. In Study 4, a human speaker labeled the objects while facing away from them. In Study 1, infants looked significantly longer to the human agent when she falsely labeled than when she truthfully labeled the objects. Infants did not show a similar pattern of attention for the audio speaker of Study 2, the silent human of Study 3 or the facing-backward speaker of Study 4. In fact, infants who experienced truthful labeling looked significantly longer to the facing-backward labeler of Study 4 than to true labelers of the other three contexts. Additionally, infants were more likely to correct false labels when produced by the human labeler of Study 1 than in any of the other contexts. These findings suggest, first, that infants are developing a critical conception of other human speakers as truthful communicators, and second, that infants understand that human speakers may provide uniquely useful information when a word fails to match its referent. These findings are consistent with the view that infants can recognize differences in knowledge and that such differences can be based on differences in the availability of perceptual experience.     

The 4-month-old infant’s perception of holograms and real objects: A demonstration of equivalence

Three experiments were conducted to determine whether 4-month-old infants perceive and respond to holograms as real objects. Infants in the first experiment failed to differentiate between a hologram of a toy car and the real car from which the hologram was constructed. In a second and third experiment, infants responded to holograms of two objects as they did to the real objects. The implications of using holograms in the study of early perceptual development are discussed.     

Infants chunk object arrays into sets of individuals

Research suggests that, using representations from object-based attention, infants can represent only 3 individuals at a time. For example, infants successfully represent 1, 2, or 3 hidden objects, but fail with 4 (Developmental Science 6 (2003) 568), and a similar limit is seen in adults' tracking of multiple objects (see Cognitive Psychology 38 (1999) 259). In the present experiments we used a manual search procedure to ask whether infants can overcome this limit of 3 by chunking individuals into sets. Experiments 1 and 2 replicate infants' failure to represent a total of 4 objects. We then show that infants can exceed this limit when items are spatiotemporally grouped into two sets of 2 prior to hiding, leading infants to successfully represent a total of 4 objects. Experiment 3 demonstrates that infants tracked the 4 objects as two sets of 2, searching for each set in its correct hiding location. That infants represented the number of individuals in each set is demonstrated by their reaching for the correct number of objects in each location. These results suggest that by binding individuals into sets, infants can increase their representational capacity. This is the first evidence for chunking abilities in infants.     

Reconceptualizing the origins of number knowledge: A “non-numerical” account

This paper presents a new conceptualization of the origins of numerical competence in humans. I first examine the existing claim that infants are innately provided with a system of specifically numerical knowledge, consisting of both cardinal and ordinal concepts. I suggest instead that the observed behaviors require only simple perceptual discriminations based on domain-independent competencies. At most, these involve the formal equivalent of cardinal information. Finally, I present a “non-numerical” account that characterizes infants competencies with regard to numerosity as emerging primarily from some general characteristics of the human perception and attention system.     

Categorization in infancy based on novelty and co-occurrence

Abstract categories (i.e., groups of objects that do not share perceptual features, such as food) abound in everyday situations. The present looking time study investigated whether infants are able to distinguish between two abstract categories (food and toys), and how this ability may extend beyond perceived information by manipulating object familiarity in several ways. Test trials displayed 1) the exact familiarized objects paired as they were during familiarization, 2) a cross-pairing of these same familiar objects, 3) novel objects in the same category as the familiarized items, or 4) novel objects in a different category. Compared to the most familiar test trial (i.e., Familiar Category, Familiar Objects, Familiar Pairings), infants looked longer to all other test trials. Although there was a linear increase in looking time with increased novelty of the test trials (i.e., Novel Category as the most novel test trial), the looking times did not differ significantly between the Novel Category and Familiar Category, Unfamiliar Objects trials. This study contributes to our understanding of how infants form object categories based on object familiarity, object co-occurrence, and information abstraction.     

Do objects in working memory compete with objects in perception?

It is generally assumed that “perceptual object” is the basic unit for processing visual information and that only a small number of objects can be either perceptually selected or encoded in working memory (WM) at one time. This raises the question whether the same resource is used when objects are selected and tracked as when they are held in WM. In two experiments, we measured dual-task interference between a memory task and a Multiple Object Tracking task. The WM tasks involve explicit, implicit, or no spatial processing. Our results suggest there is no resource competition between working memory and perceptual selection except when the WM task requires encoding spatial properties.     

No intrinsic number bias: Evaluating the role of perceptual discriminability in magnitude categorization

Accumulating evidence suggests that there is a spontaneous preference for numerical, compared to non-numerical (e.g., cumulative surface area), information. However, given a paucity of research on the perception of non-numerical magnitudes, it is unclear whether this preference reflects a specific bias towards number, or a general bias towards the more perceptually discriminable dimension (i.e., number). Here, we found that when the number and area of visual dot displays were matched in mathematical ratio, number was more perceptually discriminable than area in both adults and children. Moreover, both adults and children preferentially categorized these ratio-matched stimuli based on number, consistent with previous work. However, when number and area were matched in perceptual discriminability, a different pattern of results emerged. In particular, children preferentially categorized stimuli based on area, suggesting that children's previously observed number bias may be due to a mismatch in the perceptual discriminability of number and area, not an intrinsic salience of number. Interestingly, adults continued to categorize the displays on the basis of number. Altogether, these findings suggest a dominant role for area during childhood, refuting the claim that number is inherently and uniquely salient. Yet they also reveal an increased salience of number that emerges over development. Potential explanations for this developmental shift are discussed.

Research Highlights

• Previous work found that children and adults spontaneously categorized dot array stimuli by number, over other magnitudes (e.g., area), suggesting number is uniquely salient.
• However, here we found that when number and area were matched by ratio, as in prior work, number was significantly more perceptually discriminable than area.
• When number and area were made equally discriminable (‘perceptually-matched’), children, contra adults, spontaneously categorized stimuli by area over number (and other non-numerical magnitudes).
• These findings suggest that area may be uniquely salient early in childhood, with the previously-observed number bias not emerging until later in development.

     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

There has been some debate about whether infants 10 months and younger can use featural information to individuate objects. The present research tested the hypothesis that negative results obtained with younger infants reflect limitations in information processing capacities rather than the inability to individuate objects based on featural differences. Infants aged 9.5 months saw one object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to opposite sides of an opaque occluder. Infants then saw a single ball either behind a transparent occluder or without an occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball behind the transparent occluder correctly judged that the one-ball display was inconsistent with the box-ball sequence. These results suggest that: (a) infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion) and (b) support the notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion).     

Baby arithmetic: one object plus one tone

Recent studies using a violation-of-expectation task suggest that preverbal infants are capable of recognizing basic arithmetical operations involving visual objects. There is still debate, however, over whether their performance is based on any expectation of the arithmetical operations, or on a general perceptual tendency to prefer visually familiar and complex displays. Here we provide new evidence that 5-month-old infants recognize basic arithmetic operations across sensory modalities. Using a violation-of-expectation task that eliminated the possibility of the familiarity and complexity preference, 5-month-old infants were presented alternatively with two types of arithmetical events: the expected, correct outcomes of operations (1 object+1 tone=2 objects and 1 object+2 tones=3 objects) and the unexpected, incorrect ones (1 object+2 tones=2 objects and 1 object+1 tone=3 objects). Results showed that subjects looked significantly longer at the unexpected events than at the expected events, suggesting that infants are able to recognize basic arithmetic operations across sensory modalities.     

Memory load affects object individuation in 18-month-old infants

Accurate representation of a changing environment requires individuation-the ability to determine how many numerically distinct objects are present in a scene. Much research has characterized early individuation abilities by identifying which object features infants can use to individuate throughout development. However, despite the fact that without memory featural individuation would be impossible, little is known about how memory constrains object individuation. Here, we investigated infants' ability to individuate multiple objects at once and asked whether individuation performance changes as a function of memory load. In three experiments, 18-month-old infants saw one, two, or three objects hidden and always saw the correct number of objects retrieved. On some trials, one or more of these objects surreptitiously switched identity prior to retrieval. We asked whether infants would use this identity mismatch to individuate and, hence, continue searching for the missing object(s). We found that infants were less likely to individuate objects as memory load grew, but that infants individuated more successfully when the featural contrast between the hidden and retrieved objects increased. These results suggest that remembering more objects may result in a loss of representational precision, thereby decreasing the likelihood of successful individuation. We close by discussing possible links between our results and findings from adult working memory.     

Young children associate novel words with complex objects rather than salient parts

How do children learn associations between novel words and complex perceptual displays? Using a visual preference procedure, the authors tested 12- and 19-month-olds to see whether the infants would associate a novel word with a complex 2-part object or with either of that object's parts, both of which were potentially objects in their own right and 1 of which was highly salient to infants. At both ages, children's visual fixation times during test were greater to the entire complex object than to the salient part (Experiment 1) or to the less salient part (Experiment 2)--when the original label was requested. Looking times to the objects were equal if a new label was requested or if neutral audio was used during training (Experiment 3). Thus, from 12 months of age, infants associate words with whole objects, even those that could potentially be construed as 2 separate objects and even if 1 of the parts is salient.     

Reasoning about a hidden object after a delay: evidence for robust representations in 5-month-old infants

The present research examined two alternative interpretations of violation-of-expectation findings that young infants can represent hidden objects. One interpretation is that, when watching an event in which an object becomes hidden behind another object, infants form a prediction about the event's outcome while both objects are still visible, and then check whether this prediction was accurate. The other interpretation is that infants' initial representations of hidden objects are weak and short-lived and as such sufficient for success in most violation-of-expectation tasks (as objects are typically hidden for only a few seconds at a time), but not more challenging tasks. Five-month-old infants succeeded in reasoning about the interaction of a visible and a hidden object even though (1) the two objects were never simultaneously visible, and (2) a 3- or 4-min delay preceded the test trials. These results provide evidence for robust representations of hidden objects in young infants.     

How do infants recognize joint attention?

The emergence of joint attention is still a matter of vigorous debate. It involves diverse hypotheses ranging from innate modules dedicated to intention reading to more neuro-constructivist approaches. The aim of this study was to assess whether 12-month-old infants are able to recognize a “joint attention” situation when observing such a social interaction. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm, we habituated infants to a “joint attention” video and then compared their looking time durations between “divergent attention” videos and “joint attention” ones using a 2 (familiar or novel perceptual component) × 2 (familiar or novel conceptual component) factorial design. These results were enriched with measures of pupil dilation, which are considered to be reliable measures of cognitive load. Infants looked longer at test events that involved novel speaker and divergent attention but no changes in infants’ pupil dilation were observed in any conditions. Although looking time data suggest that infants may appreciate discrepancies from expectations related to joint attention behavior, in the absence of clear evidence from pupillometry, the results show no demonstration of understanding of joint attention, even at a tacit level. Our results suggest that infants may be sensitive to relevant perceptual variables in joint attention situations, which would help scaffold social cognitive development. This study supports a gradual, learning interpretation of how infants come to recognize, understand, and participate in joint attention.     

Origins of knowledge.

Experiments with young infants provide evidence for early-developing capacities to represent physical objects and to reason about object motion. Early physical reasoning accords with 2 constraints at the center of mature physical conceptions: continuity and solidity. It fails to accord with 2 constraints that may be peripheral to mature conceptions: gravity and inertia. These experiments suggest that cognition develops concurrently with perception and action and that development leads to the enrichment of conceptions around an unchanging core. The experiments challenge claims that cognition develops on a foundation of perceptual or motor experience, that initial conceptions are inappropriate to the world, and that initial conceptions are abandoned or radically changed with the growth of knowledge.     

It's a sign of the kind: gestures and words guide infants' inductive inferences

The role of words and gestures in guiding infants' inductive inferences about nonobvious properties was examined. One hundred seventy-two 14-month-olds and 22-month-olds were presented with novel target objects followed by test objects that varied in similarity to the target. Objects were introduced with a novel word or a novel gesture or with no label. When target and test objects were highly similar in shape, both 14- and 22-month-olds inferred that these objects shared a nonobvious property, regardless of whether the objects were labeled with a word or a gesture or with no label. When objects were labeled with the same word, both 14- and 22-month-olds generalized the nonobvious properties to objects that shared minimal perceptual similarity. Finally, when objects were labeled with the same gesture, 14-month-olds, but not 22-month-olds, generalized the nonobvious properties to objects that shared minimal perceptual similarity. These results indicate that 14-month-olds possess a more generalized symbolic system as they will rely on both words and gestures to guide their inferences. By 22-months of age, infants treat words as a privileged referential form when making inductive inferences.