Narrative,imagination, and the search for intelligibility in environmental ethics

This essay presents a contextualist defense of the role of narrative and metaphor in the articulation of environmental ethical theories. Both the intelligibility and persuasiveness of ecocentric concepts and arguments presuppose that proponents of these ideas can connect with the narratives and metaphors guiding the expectations and interpretations of their audiences. Too often objectivist presuppositions prevent the full contextualization of environmental ethical arguments. The result is a disembodied environmental discourse with diminished influence on citizens and policy makers. This essay is a pragmatist call for more philosophical attention to locating speakers, audiences, and meanings in more intelligible “discursive spaces.”     

The uncertainty of certainty in clinical ethics

Physicians accept fallibility in technical matters as a condition of medical practice. When it comes to moral considerations, physicians are often loathe to act without a good deal more certitude and seem less willing to accept error. This article argues that ethics is intrinsic to medical decision making, that error is the inevitable risk of any action and that inaction (clearly action by default) carries even greater risk of error. Whether in the moral or the technical sphere, error must be accepted by physicians as part of the learning process which informs and enriches future decisions. Moral virtue, it is concluded, resides more in the making of a decision and in the agony of making it than it does in the potentially fallible decision itself.     

Probability,certainty and illusions

Some philosopheis (e.g. Ayer, Reichenbach, Lewis) use a version of the argument from illusion to prove that empirical statements are never certain. But this argument, unwittingly, also calls into doubt the certainty of calculations in logic and mathematics. The argument seems to call into question the application of any rule on the grounds that one might at some future time find out that one had misapplied it. But the argument from illusion is only the illusion of an argument.     

Knowledge,certainty, and assertion

Researchers have debated whether knowledge or certainty is a better candidate for the norm of assertion. Should you make an assertion only if you know it's true? Or should you make an assertion only if you're certain it's true? If either knowledge or certainty is a better candidate, then this will likely have detectable behavioral consequences. I report an experiment that tests for relevant behavioral consequences. The results support the view that assertability is more closely linked to knowledge than to certainty. In multiple scenarios, people were much more willing to allow assertability and certainty to come apart than to allow assertability and knowledge to come apart.     

Knowledge,certainty and probability

In this essay, I discuss some of the important logical principles governing the concepts of knowledge, certainty and probability. In the first section, I suggest a series of definitions of epistemic terms, employing as primitive the locution ‘p is epistemi‐cally possible to S’ In the second section, I develop an epistemic concept of probability and compare it to the concepts of certainty and knowledge. In the third section, I relate the epistemic concepts of certainty and probability to the quantifiers of traditional logic and to a non‐episteznic concept of probability. I conclude by noting similarities and differences between the two concepts of probability.     

Between uncertainty and certainty

In this study, 10 hematologists and 10 lung oncologists were interviewed regarding the information they provide to patients in four situations of uncertainty: determining the treatment that is in the patient's best interest; recurrence or progression of the patient's disease; determining when to withdraw life-prolonging treatment; discussing death, addressing questions such as whether the patient will die from the disease, and when. The primary finding is that delivery of information to patients with low survival rates can be improved by more and better disclosure by physicians at an earlier stage. The crucial point for physicians is to ascertain the wishes of patients, to learn what to reveal about what patients should expect, short term and long term, as death approaches.     

Modeling certainty equivalents for imprecise gambles

We present results from two experiments on the relative importance of, and subjects' differential sensitivity to, vagueness on both probabilities and outcomes. Subjects in these studies made certainty equivalent (CE) judgments for precise and vague gambles. In the first study subjects responded to gain gambles only; in the second they judged both gain and loss gambles. Model-free analyses of the results indicate (a) a higher concern for the precision of the outcomes than that of the probabilities, (b) vagueness seeking for positive outcomes and (c) vagueness avoidance for negative outcomes and (d) no strong modal attitude toward vagueness on the probability dimension. The greater salience of the outcomes can be explained by the nature of the response mode (CEs). The reflection of attitudes towards outcome vagueness in the two domains can be explained by the distinct goals of the DMs in the two cases, which cause them to focus on the highest (most desirable) possible gain or the largest (most dreaded) conceivable loss. We propose and fit a new model of decision making with vaguely specified attributes that generalize the Prospect Theory model for the precise case. The new generalized model combines the two submodels (preference among precise lotteries and effects of vagueness) and allows estimation of the vagueness parameters. These estimated parameters are consistent with, and confirm, the patterns uncovered by the qualitative analysis.     

Self-concept certainty, career exploration and readiness for career decision-making amongst undergraduate students

The hypotheses that (a) career exploration would lead to a more certain self-concept, and (b) a more certain self-concept would lead to readiness for career decision-making, were tested over a ten-week period with 35 undergraduate students. The results supported the first hypothesis. But they did not support the second, and in fact it seemed that high self-concept certainty carried the danger of inflexibility in career decision-making.     

Alibi believability: Corroborator certainty,cooperativeness and relationship with the defendant

Alibi believability can be affected by characteristics of the alibi corroborator, including the relationship between the defendant and corroborator, which has been studied extensively by researchers. The corroborator's certainty that they were together at the time of the crime may also influence alibi believability, but only a few studies have examined this. Another factor that may affect believability is the corroborator's cooperativeness with the police, which is yet to be studied in the alibi context. Online U.S. participants recruited from CloudResearch (N = 280) acted as mock jurors and evaluated a mock arson case where the defendant used an alibi defence. The alibi corroborator's relationship to the defendant (brother/neighbour), the certainty that they were together at the time (65%/100%) and cooperativeness with police (cooperative/uncooperative) were manipulated between participants. The participants were evenly split when it came to verdict (p > .05) but were more likely to vote guilty when the corroborator was a brother rather than a neighbour (p < .01) and when the brother was uncooperative versus cooperative (p < .05). As expected, alibis were more believable when they were corroborated by a neighbour rather than a brother and when the corroborator was 100% certain that they were together versus 65% certain (ps < .01). Alibis were also more believable when the corroborator cooperated than when he was uncooperative (p < .01). Cooperative (vs. uncooperative) corroborators led to more positive defendant and corroborator views on all six character trait measures (ps < .01). Implications and future directions are discussed.