The Essentiality of “Culture” in the Study of Religion and Politics

This article reviews various theoretical approaches political scientists employ in the analysis of religion and politics and posits culture as a conceptual bridge between competing approaches. After coming to the study of religion slowly in comparison with other social science disciplines, political science finally has a theoretically diverse and thriving religion and politics subfield. However, political scientists’ contributions to the social scientific study of religion are hampered by a lack of agreement about whether endogenous or exogenous theoretical approaches ought to dominate our scholarship. I assert that the concept of culture—and more specifically, subculture—might help create more connections across theoretical research traditions. I emphasize how the concept of religion‐based subculture is inherent in psychological, social psychological, social movement, and contextual approaches to religion and politics scholarship, and I explore these theoretical connections using the example of religion‐based “us versus them” discourses in contemporary American politics.     

INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

Abstract. I explore the contributions of Ibrahim Moosa, a Muslim legal scholar, to a Muslim‐Christian dialogue on religion and science. Moosa begins from the context of Shari'a, Islamic law, and not from the usual issues of the religion‐science dialogue. Beginning as it does from a legal tradition, the approach suggests a perspective on science and religion that is particular to Islam and provides insight into how an authentic dialogue between Muslims and Christians would proceed—and thereby an alternative model for a religion‐science dialogue.     

Science,Politics and the Production of Biological Knowledge: New Trends and Old Challenges

In the history of biology, knowledge about human differences often has been produced through an interaction with politics and values assumed to be external to science. Two recent books—Jonathan Marks’ Is Science Racist? and Maurizio Meloni’s Political Biology—shed new light on this interplay. While Marks looks into the field of anthropology, Meloni offers a historiographical view on the soft-hard heredity debate. Based on these new contributions, this essay addresses a number of current ways in which society and science conceptualize human differences through categories like race, gender, and class. Especially, this refers to the separation of what is taken as natural and purportedly fixed, from what is cultural and changeable.     

Metaphor and Thinking in Science and Religion

Excerpts from Chapters 1 and 3 of New Maps for Old: Explorations in Science and Religion (Gerhart and Russell 2001) explore the ramifications of metaphoric process for changes in thinking, especially those changes that lead to a new understanding of our world. Examples are provided from science, from religion, and from science and religion together. In excerpts from Chapter 8, a double analogy—theology is to science as science is to mathematics—is proposed for better understanding the contemporary relationship between science and religion. A conservation of epistemological sufficiency is disclosed as one moves from mathematics to empirical science to theology—a move from one discipline to another that involves a sacrifice of one aspect of thought to gain another.     

Explaining Religion (Away?)

In light of the advancements in cognitive science and the evolutionary psychology of religion in the past two decades, scientists and philosophers have begun to reflect on the theological and atheological implications of naturalistic—and in particular, evolutionary—explanations of religious belief and behaviour. However, philosophical naiveté is often evinced by scientists and scientific naiveté by philosophers. The aim of this article is to draw from these recent contributions, point out some common pitfalls and important insights, and suggest a way forward. This proposal avoids the genetic fallacy as well as misunderstandings of the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to religious belief. In the end, it may well be that the cognitive science of religion is atheologically and theologically ambiguous; traditional philosophers of religion on both sides of the debate still have work to do.     

Scientists in the Swamp: Narrowing the Language–Practice Gap in Community Psychology

As a confluence of unique values and activities, the collective practice of community psychology is difficult to characterize in a simple way. Increasingly, however, professional contexts are laden with pressure to define any practice—from library work to medical interventions—in the orderly, compact language of traditional science. This trend has historically been resisted in the field by those sensing a fundamental lack of fit between the fluid, emergent aspects of community psychological practice and the fixed, precise language of classic science. In response to this “language–practice gap,” some have attempted to adapt the traditional language of science to better fit the field's practice, while others have explored alternative languages of practice seemingly more indigenous to the messy “swamp” of actual communities. While the former effort leaves some theoretical contradictions intact, the latter tends to discount scientific identity entirely. This paper proposes a potential step forward by resituating questions of disciplinary language and identity within a current philosophical discourse where the nature of social science itself remains sharply contested. This suggests shifting attention away from “should we be a science?” to “what kind of science might we be after all?”; in turn, alternative languages may be re‐cast as legitimate contributors to a kind of science more authentic to human communities—even a viable “science in the swamp.” One such language–philosophical hermeneutics—is presented as a particularly valuable supplement to traditional science. Illustrations highlight ways that hermeneutics may advance the formal language of the field towards a closer fit of what actually happens in practice, while preserving and even bolstering the empirical rigor and scientific identity of the field.     

Contributions of parents and peers to children's moral socialization

This article is concerned with the process of moral development, or specifically, how children acquire a sense of right and wrong from their interactions with two major agents of socialization—parents and peers. The first section of the paper critically examines the literature on parental influences and draws several conclusions about the ways in which parents affect children's moral character. The focus then shifts to a review of the literature on peer group contributions to moral socialization. The paper concludes by examining the literature on cross-pressures, and offering a perspective on the ways in which parental and peer group influences combine to affect children's moral development.     

A philosopher's view of values and ethics

Counseling is the practical art of making rational decisions about values; thus it is part science and part philosophy. As a professional activity it falls midway between science and philosophy and partakes of the characteristics of both. Counseling readily recognizes its dependence on professional science for empirical knowledge about fact and theory but tends to ignore the analytic contributions of professional philosophy for understanding the nature of value and value theory. Counseling will be a better art when counselors are as concerned with what philosophy says about values as they are with the contributions of the social sciences.     

What do our critical practices say about the nature of morality?

A prominent argument for moral realism notes that we are inclined to accept realism in science because scientific inquiry supports a robust set of critical practices—error, improvement, explanation, and the like. It then argues that because morality displays a comparable set of critical practices, a claim to moral realism is just as warranted as a claim to scientific realism. But the argument is only as strong as its central analogy—and here there is trouble. If the analogy between the critical practices of science and morality is loosely interpreted, the argument does not support moral realism—for paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion display the relevant critical practices just as well. So if the argument is to have force, the realist must say more about why the critical practices of morality are sufficiently like those of science to warrant realism. But this cannot be done—moral inquiry differs from scientific inquiry in too many important ways. So the analogy with the critical practices of science fails to vindicate moral realism. But there are further lessons: in looking closely at the critical practices of our moral discourse—and in comparing them to the critical practices of science and fashion—we gain insight into what is distinctive about morality objectivity and moral metaphysics.     

Symbolic Sequence Effects on Consumers’ Judgments of Truth for Brand Claims

We introduce symbolic sequence effects—the consequences of whether the sequence of the initial letters of a pair of words (e.g., a word representing a putative cause and another word representing a putative effect) conforms to the structure of symbolic sequences that are stored in the mind as overlearned natural language traces (“natural sequence”). We synthesize insights from psychophysics as well as numerical and natural language symbolic representations to demonstrate that consumers are able to unconsciously perceive the mere sequence of symbols contained in a brand claim, and that this sequence information influences judgments of truth. Across three experiments, we showed that when a brand claim is structured in a way that is consistent with the natural sequence of symbols (“A causes B” rather than “B causes A”), people experience feelings of sequential fluency, which in turn influences judgments of truth. This occurs despite the inability of participants to attribute the true source of the feelings. Our results suggest that carefully designed brand claims are likely to benefit from this natural sequencing. These findings provide important contributions to the literatures on processing fluency, branding, and advertising. These findings also have sobering societal implications and warn that fake news might be more persuasive if the perpetrators understand symbolic sequencing techniques.     

Stereotypes and crossed‐category evaluations: The case of gender and science education

A sample of UK adolescents (n = 1140), grouped by sex and liking of science, evaluated themselves, and girl and boy targets who did or did not like science, on masculine, feminine and gender non‐specific traits. Contrary to sociological concerns about the masculine image and appeal of science, those who liked science more rated themselves more positively on feminine and gender non‐specific—but not masculine—traits. The girl target was rated lower on feminine traits if she liked science, but the boy was rated higher on feminine traits if he liked science. Target ratings also showed in‐group enhancement based on liking of science, and a ‘black sheep’ effect: those who liked science less discriminated against the same‐sex target who liked science, especially on gender in‐group relevant traits. We argue that gender differences in science education should be attributed partly to subjective group dynamics and not solely to images of science.     

Science Blogging: Networks,Boundaries and Limitations

There is limited research into the realities of science blogging, how science bloggers themselves view their activity and what bloggers can achieve. The ‘badscience’ blogs analysed here show a number of interesting developments, with significant implications for understandings of science blogging and scientific cultures more broadly. A functioning and diverse online community (with offline elements) has been constructed, with a number of non-professional and anonymous members and with boundary work being used to establish a recognisable outgroup. The community has developed distinct norms alongside a type of distributed authority and has negotiated the authority, anonymity and varying status of many community members in some interesting and novel ways. Activist norms and initiatives have been actioned, with some prominent community campaigns and action. There are questions about what science blogging—both in the UK and internationally—may be able to achieve in future and about the fragility of the ‘badscience’ community. Some of the highly optimistic hopes which have been associated with science blogging have not been realised. Nonetheless, the small group of bloggers focused on here have produced significant achievements with limited resources, especially when one considers this in the context of community values as opposed to some of the expectations attached to science blogging within scientific cultures more broadly. While the impacts of this science blogging community remain uncertain, the novel and potentially significant practices analysed here do merit serious consideration.     

Theory of science in the light of Goethe's science of nature∗

J. W. Goethe is well known as one of the world's greatest poets. Some are also aware that throughout his long and active life Goethe devoted much of his time to natural science. His theory of colour and studies in the morphology of plants are acknowledged contributions in their fields. What is much less known is that in his scientific work Goethe was attempting to elaborate and justify a new basic methodology for the natural sciences. He opposed and wished to refute the one‐sided quantitative‐mechanistic method which had been dominant since Galileo and Newton (and in principle still prevails today) and to set up against it a qualitative method. An essential characteristic of this qualitative method, according to Goethe, is that it is immune to a Humean reduction of the status of ‘natural laws’ to mere hypotheses. This claim makes Goethe's view directly relevant for current discussion of such questions as the status of scientific ‘laws’ and the correct method of theory construction. The present essay tries to show the fruitfulness of Goethe's view for such discussions, partly by means of an exposition of the view — drawn from various works — and partly by drawing consequences from it which bring it into direct contact with contemporary discussions in philosophy of science.     

INTO TERRA INCOGNITA: CHARTING BEYOND PETER HARRISON'S THE TERRITORIES OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Peter Harrison's The Territories of Science and Religion throws down a serious challenge to advocates of dialogue as the primary means of engagement between science and religion. This article accepts the validity of this challenge and looks at four possible responses to it. The first—a return to the past—is rejected. The remaining three—exploring new epistemic frameworks for the encounter of science and religion, broadening out the engagement beyond the context of the physical sciences and Western culture, and looking at ways in which scientific and theological practitioners may collaborate on practical problems—are all offered as potential ways in which science and religion may engage with one another, in ways which move beyond Harrison's critique.     

Do Genetic Factors Influence Religious Life? Findings from a Behavior Genetic Analysis of Twin Siblings

Social scientific research assumes that religious involvement is primarily, if not exclusively, the product of social-environmental influences There is growing evidence, however, that genetic or other biological factors also play a role Analyzing twin sibling data from the National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS), this study addresses this issue by showing that individual-level variation on four different aspects of religious life—organizational involvement, personal religiosity and spirituality, conservative ideologies, and transformations and commitments—is indeed the product of both genetic and environmental influences Specifically, genetic factors explain 19–65 percent of the variation, while environmental influences account for the remaining 35–81 percent depending upon the aspect of religion under investigation Research of this type enhances contemporary social science by providing a new perspective that nicely supplements existing ones, but it also highlights potential implications, including explanatory power deficiencies and potentially bias     

Human Nature and World Politics: Cognition,Identity, and Influence

Many psychologists deem it self‐evident that psychology can make fundamental contributions to our understanding of world politics. Many social scientists, however, argue that policymakers are tightly constrained by macro political and economic forces. This article will advance a systemic approach to world politics that challenges: (a) psychologists by highlighting ways in which macro social structures may transform the character of “basic” intrapsychic processes; (b) anti‐psychological theorists by showing that even the most sweepingly deterministic macro claims—for example, claims about the power of free trade to promote peace—rest on controversial assumptions about human nature. Systemic approaches to world politics are far more consistent with how seasoned diplomats—from Dag Hammarskjöld to Henry Kissinger—have historically approached geopolitical problems than are the traditional but increasingly obsolete micro and macro dualities that have dominated academic analyses.     

Toward a Psychological Science for a Cultural Species

ABSTRACT— Humans are a cultural species, and the study of human psychology benefits from attention to cultural influences. Cultural psychology's contributions to psychological science can largely be divided according to the two different stages of scientific inquiry. Stage 1 research seeks cultural differences and establishes the boundaries of psychological phenomena. Stage 2 research seeks underlying mechanisms of those cultural differences. The literatures regarding these two distinct stages are reviewed, and various methods for conducting Stage 2 research are discussed. The implications of culture-blind and multicultural psychologies for society and intergroup relations are also discussed.     

The force and the content of judgment

This essay explores what it means to reject Frege's distinction of force and content: the rejection completes Frege's anti‐psychologism as it leaves no space for a psychological concept of judgment distinct from the logical concept, which is the concern of no empirical science, but of logic. It emerges that logic, as the science of judgement, is — not a metaphysics of judgement, but — metaphysics. And it emerges that the opposition of subject to subject — the elementary nexus of thinker to thinker in dialogue — is contained within the logical concept of judgment.     

Power Bases and Attribution in Three Cultures

Abstract

The authors used a Saudi context to verify the cross-cultural generality of findings (A. Rodrigues & K. L. Lloyd, 1998) reported for U.S. and Brazilian samples in which compliant behavior caused by reward, informational, and referent influences was perceived as more controllable and more internal than compliant behavior resulting from legitimate, expert, and coercive influences. This differential attribution led, in turn, to different affective and behavioral responses. In the present study, cognitive and affective reactions of Saudi students were measured with regard to compliant behavior (leading to a good outcome or a bad outcome) caused by each of the 6 bases of power described by B. H. Raven (1965). As expected, power bases had significant effects. However, when the outcome of the compliant behavior was bad, compliant behavior caused by a coercive influence led to the perception of more internality and controllability. Also—and not found in previous studies—the perception of less internality and controllability of compliant behavior was caused by an informational influence. Findings are discussed in the light of related research and Saudi cultural characteristics.