Newton,Goethe and the Alleged Underdetermination of Ray Optics

Did Goethe devise an empirically viable theory of classical ray optics? Or can we at least make use of his ideas to propose one? And if so, does this confront us with an intriguing case of theory underdetermination? In this paper, which is mainly a comment on the recent work of Olaf Müller, I shall address these three questions and argue for ‘no, yes, no’. This is in contrast to Müller, who has recently launched a vivid defense of Goethe-style ray optics (Müller in “Mehr Licht. Goethe mit Newton im Streit um die Farben.” Fischer, Frankfurt a.M., 2015a; Z Philos Forsch 69(4):569–573, 2015b; Z Philos Forsch 69(4):588–598, 2015c; Br J Hist Philos 24(2):322–346, 2016). Müller aims to give an almost positive answer to all three questions: ‘perhaps, yes, yes’. My overall line of argument will be that the rather restricted regime of classical geometrical optics of spectral colors (or ray optics, for short) allows at best for a weak form of transient theory underdetermination that, in turn and more straightforwardly, also allows for a structuralist reading in terms of two structurally equivalent formulations of one and the same theory. However, extending any of the rivaling models of ray optics other than Newton’s beyond the mentioned regime and embedding them into physics in total—especially in view of thermodynamics—leads to a contradiction. Hence, Newton’s theory is confirmed as the only consistent theoretical interpretation of ray optics.     

Intuition and Nature in Kant and Goethe

Abstract: This essay addresses three specific moments in the history of the role played by intuition in Kant's system. Part one develops Kant's attitude toward intuition in order to understand how ‘sensible intuition’ becomes the first step in his development of transcendental idealism and how this in turn requires him to reject the possibility of an ‘intellectual intuition’ for human cognition. Part two considers the role of Jacobi when it came to interpreting both Kant's epistemic achievement and what were taken to be the outstanding problems of freedom's relation to nature; problems interpreted to be resolvable only via an appeal to ‘intellectual intuition’. Part three begins with Kant's subsequent return to the question of freedom and nature in his Critique of Judgment. With Goethe's contemporaneous Metamorphoses of Plants as a contrast case, it becomes clear that whereas Goethe can embrace the role of an intuitive understanding in his account of nature and within the logic of polarity in particular, Kant could never allow an intuition of nature that in his system would spell the very impossibility of freedom itself.     

Tay-Sachs and the abortion controversy

Tay-Sachs disease is a fatal recessive genetic disorder that effects the central nervous system of Ashkenazi Jewish infants. The disease is incurable. The only method of prevention is screening for heterozygotes with subsequent amniocentesis for at-risk couples and abortion of the genetically doomed infants. Genetic screening and abortion are complex ethical issues that bridge the worlds of religion and science and challenge the dynamic halachic reasoning of the Jewish people. This work examines the debate surrounding the abortion controversy, with special emphasis on the subjective biases inherent in debates of this type.     

Arnold gesell and the maturation controversy

This article examines the work of Arnold Lucius Gesell and argues that he not only paved the way for contemporary research in motor development, but that he and colleagues anticipated fundamental issues about growth that must be addressed by psychologists and neuroscientists who are committed to the advancement of developmental science. Arnold Lucius Gesell was a pioneer in developmental psychology when the field was in its infancy. He worked diligently for the rights of physically and mentally handicapped children to receive special education that would enable them to find gainful employment. Gesell’s writings in books and popular magazines increased public awareness of and support for preschool education and better foster care for orphans. Despite these achievements, many of his successors have questioned his views about infant development. Developmental psychologists have criticized Gesell for proposing a stage theory of infant growth that has fallen into disfavor among contemporary researchers. His conception of development as a maturational process has been challenged for allegedly reducing complex behavioral, perceptual, and learning processes to genetic factors. The author rejects this overly simplistic interpretation and contends that Gesell’s work continues to stand the test of time. Reprinted from Jaan Valsiner (ed.).Thinking in Psychological Science: Ideas and Their Makers. Transaction Publishers. Previously published inFrom Past to Future, Vol. 3(2), Beyond Observing Human Nature: Theoretical Contributions of Arnold Gesell to Developmental Science, pp. 7–31. @ 2001 Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology, Clark University. Author: Thomas C. Dalton, Cal Poly State University, San Luis Obispo, CA.     

Tourette's syndrome—case report and contribution to the Prata/Masson-Nunn controversy

The conflicting views on Tourette's syndrome (TS) and its management in children put forward in the November 1985 issue of Journal of Family Therapy (Nunn, 1985; Prata & Masson, 1985) and the Editorial in the same issue prompt us to report a case. A twelve-year-old boy with TS managed on interactional lines snowed changes more modest than those achieved by Prata and Masson, and we address some of the issues raised by Nunn in his critique of their paper.     

Goethe and the study of life: a comparison with Husserl and Simmel

In the paper at hand I introduce Goethe’s ontology and methodology for the study of life as an alternative to current theories. ‘Life,’ in its individual, social and/or pan-natural form, has been a recurring topic in the social sciences for the last two centuries and may currently experience a renaissance, if we are to believe Scott Lash. Goethe’s approach is of particular interest because he formulated it as one of the first critical responses to the nascent discipline of biology. It can be characterised broadly as phenomenology with a strong dose of life philosophy. For this reason, and to draw its contours more clearly, I compare his approach to the respective thoughts in Husserl’s and Simmel’s work. The comparison focuses on the two central concepts phenomenon and life but also discusses broader epistemological and methodological issues, such as the relationship between observer and observed, the relationship between culture (cultural sciences) and nature (natural sciences), the nature of causality as well as preferred methods of study.     

Psychological research and the prostate-cancer screening controversy

In October of 2011, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force released a draft report in which they recommended against using the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test to screen for prostate cancer. We attempt to show that four factors documented by psychological research can help explain the furor that followed the release of the task force's report. These factors are the persuasive power of anecdotal (as opposed to statistical) evidence, the influence of personal experience, the improper evaluation of data, and the influence of low base rates on the efficacy of screening tests. We suggest that augmenting statistics with facts boxes or pictographs might help such committees communicate more effectively with the public and with the U.S. Congress.     

On the factor score controversy

A summary and interpretation of the recent literature on the indeterminacy of factor scores is given in simple terms. A good index of factor score determinacy is the squared multiple correlation of the factor with the observed variables.     

Parsing the rainbow

Navigating the ontology of color used to be a simple affair. There was the naive view that colors really are in objects the way they appear, and the view that they are secondary qualities to cause certain experiences in us. Today, there are myriad well-developed views but no satisfactory taxonomy of philosophical theories on color. In this article, I first examine the two newest taxonomies on offer and argue that they are inadequate. In particular, I look at Brogaard’s taxonomy and then Cohen’s. One of the reasons I am displeased with Brogaard and Cohen’s taxonomies is that I find it implausible that dispositions are relational properties. I provide an argument against this way of classifying dispositions. Having learned from the vices and virtues of Brogaard and Cohens’ taxonomies, I provide what I believe is a much-enhanced way of taxonomizing philosophical views on color. My taxonomy rules out certain views, clarifies others, and shows that there is an unnoticed view worthy of consideration.     

The controversy around the concept of archetypes and the place for an emergent/developmental model

This paper addresses two key controversial questions to do with the concept of archetypes – do they operate autonomously without connection to an individual's personal life experience? Does their biological base mean they are genetically determined, innate and thus a priori inherited psychic structures? These questions are addressed through the case of a person who began life as an unwanted pregnancy, was adopted at birth and as an adult, experienced profound waking visions. An emergent/developmental model of archetype is outlined which stresses developmental start‐points through this infant's engagement via response and reaction to the affective and material world of the infant/birth mother matrix and from which emergence later occurs by way of participation in a socio‐cultural and material context. The emergentism aspect of this model rescues it from being reductionist since it allows for cultural and socialisation inputs. The model's explanatory power is vastly enlarged by combining this with the developmental component. Critically, once developmentally produced mind/brain (image schema) structures are in place, they have the capacity to generate psychological life. Imagery can then appear as if it is innately derived when that is not the case. The contemporary neuroscience which supports this model is both outlined and related back to the case example.     

Clinical controversy and the domains of scientific evidence

The diversity of mental health care "schools" or therapeutic perspectives poses problems in selecting and using any single therapeutic perspective. This article describes the genesis of clinical controversy--that is, how two or more therapeutic perspectives of the same clinical situation can be so different yet not necessarily differ in outcome. Ideas drawn from contemporary philosophy of science show how different "schools" derive separate, incompatible sets of scientific evidence from the same clinical situation. The school or theory determines (in part) not just what evidence is used, but what evidence is actually perceived. The authors conclude by recommending a pluralistic approach to mental health care; they map out some consequences of this pluralism and suggest some strategies for minimizing the disadvantages of "mixing and matching" therapeutic perspectives.     

Dynamic models of development and the mechanistic-organismic controversy

Starting with a prototypical model of Newtonian mechanics, a sequence of dynamic models with increasing structural complexity is presented. The implicated smooth variation along a dimension of structural complexity yields dynamic models which display organismic properties such as stagewise development and emergent self-organization. Consequently, it is concluded that dynamic models of development are inherently neutral with respect to the mechanism-organicism controversy. Accordingly, a unitary research program is proposed in which these dynamic models serve as building blocks for the construction of a coherent explanatory system of development.