Public Science of the Savage Mind: Contesting Cultural Anthropology in the Cold War Classroom

“What is human about human beings? How did they get that way? How can they be made more so?” These three questions formed the basis of a fifth‐grade social studies curriculum project developed in the 1960s called Man: A Course of Study, or MACOS. In the years between the curriculum's development in the 1960s and its controversial implementation in the 1970s, two separate sets of concerns served to problematize the use of anthropological materials in public school classrooms. On the one hand, MACOS designers were wary of the possibly racist interpretations of exploring so‐called “primitive” cultures in the classroom. On the other, conservative textbook reformers objected to claims that all cultural solutions to biological problems were morally equivalent. Once MACOS earned a place in national news, it came to embody both hopes for the redemption of American democratic society and fears about the violent nature of humans, depending on one's political perspective. These mixed messages eventually undermined the long‐term success of the program as public science.     

Revising the history of Cold War research ethics

President Clinton's charge to the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments included the identification of ethical and legal standards for evaluating government-sponsored radiation experiments conducted during the Cold War. In this paper, we review the traditional account of the history of American research ethics, and then highlight and explain the significance of a number of the Committee's historical findings as they relate to this account. These findings include both the national defense establishment's struggles with legal and insurance issues concerning human experiments, and the medical profession's perspective on human experimentation in the years following the Nuremberg Medical Trials. We conclude that the Committee's work both enriches the traditional view of the history of research ethics and opens important new areas for study.     

Why Social Science is Biological Science

The social sciences need to take seriously their status as divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology, and in particular the studies of one particular biological species.     

Introduction: the human sciences and Cold War America

Studies of the history of the human sciences during the Cold War era have proliferated over the past decade--in JHBS and elsewhere. This special issue focuses on the connections between the behavioral sciences and the culture and politics of the Cold War in the United States. In the recent literature, there is a tendency to identify the Cold War human sciences with two main paradigms: that of psychocultural analysis, on the one hand, and of the systems sciences, on the other. The essays in the special issue both extend understanding of each of these interpretive frameworks and help us to grasp their interconnection.     

Interpretation and its "Metaphysical" Entanglements

Singularism is the view that for a given object of interpretation there must be one and only one admissible interpretation of it. And multiplism is the view that for a given object of interpretation there may be more than one admissible interpretation of it. My book, Rightness and Reasons , argued that singularism and multiplism are logically detachable from the ontological theories of realism and constructivism. This paper extends the range of ontologies to include constructive realism, whose versions include those of Joseph Margolis, Rom Harré, Paul Thom, and Hilary Putnam. They all disagree with both realism and constructivism. But their ontologies are also logically detachable from singularism and multiplism. Finally, the detachability of these ontologies from singularism and multiplism does not preclude wider "metaphysical" considerations (such as intentionality) in a ramified theory of interpretation.     

Social Constructionist Arguments in Harding's Science and Social Inequality

Harding's aim in Science and Social Inequality is to integrate the insights generated by diverse critiques of conventional ideals of truth, value freedom, and unity in science, and to chart a way forward for the sciences and for science studies. Wylie assesses this synthesis as a genre of social constructionist argument and illustrates its implications for questions of epistemic warrant with reference to transformative research on gender‐based discrimination in the workplace environment.