WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF FRAZER

This paper provides a systematic exposition of what Wittgenstein took to be the fundamental error committed by James George Frazer, author of the classic anthropological work The Golden Bough, in his account of ritual practices. By construing those rituals in scientific or rationalistic terms, as aimed at the production of certain effects, Frazer ignores, according to Wittgenstein, their expressive and symbolic dimension. It is, moreover, an error to try to explain the powerful emotions evoked even today by traditions such as fire festivals (which may once have involved human sacrifice) by searching for their causal origins in history or prehistory; the disquieting nature of such practices needs to be understood by attending to the inner meaning they already have in our human lives. Certain important general lessons are drawn about the necessarily limited power of scientific and causal explanations when it comes to alleviating many of our fundamental perplexities not just in the area of anthropology but in philosophy as well. ¹ 1 Originally published in French as ‘Wittgenstein, Critique de Frazer’, Agone 23 (2000), pp. 33–54. Translated into English (with minor editorial corrections and additional bibliographical references and abstract) specially for the present issue of Ratio by John Cottingham, by kind permission of Jacques Bouveresse and Editions Agone, Marseilles. English version © John Cottingham. The translator is grateful to Severin Schroeder and Christopher Wingfield for helpful corrections to an earlier draft.
     

THE CATHOLIC IMAGINATION AND MODERNITY: WILLIAM CAVANAUGH'S THEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION AND CHARLES TAYLOR'S MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINATION1

This essay argues that William Cavanaugh's ‘Theopolitical Imagination’ uncovers some of the possibilities latent within the Catholic imagination. While his critique of modernity is often persuasive, this essay questions whether Cavanaugh's assessment of modernity can be complemented by a more differentiated approach. What Charles Taylor provides is both a bolstering of Cavanaugh's thesis about the power of the imagination and an alternative: that there is a way of thinking about the relationship between the Church and modernity other than in dialectical terms – namely a ‘Ricci reading’ of modernity.     

LOGICAL SYNTAX IN WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

P.M.S. Hacker has argued that there are numerous misconceptions in James Conant's account of Wittgenstein's views and of those of Carnap. I discuss only Hacker's treatment of Conant on logical syntax in the 'Tractatus'. I try to show that passages in the 'Tractatus' which Hacker takes to count strongly against Conant's view do no such thing, and that he himself has not explained how he can account for a significant passage which certainly appears to support Conant's reading.     

WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PICTURE "THEORY" OF MEANING

Recently, commentators such as Kenny and Hacker have disagreed about whether Wittgenstein's early picture theory of meaning is at all compatible with his later theory of "meaning-as-use". Arguing in favor of their compatibility, Kenny finds that meaning-as-use supplements, rather than rivals the earlier conception of meaning: