Venturing a 30-year longitudinal study

Longitudinal inquiry has long been recognized as a uniquely powerful method for seeking understanding of psychological development. A 30-year longitudinal venture is described--its theoretical motivation, methodological rationale, and details of implementation. Some of the novel and implicative findings the study has generated are briefly described. Common to all of the results is an absolute reliance on long-term, widely ranging, independent data. Although specific aspects of the study have appeared over the years, its intentions and scope are recounted only here. By and large, the organizing constructs of ego-control and ego-resiliency find impressive support in various empirical inquiries, here quickly described. Methodologically, a number of savvy research procedures useful and perhaps even necessary in longitudinal research are conveyed. The troublesome burdens but ever-alluring attractions of longitudinal inquiry are noted. A forthcoming Web site will contain the extensive 30-year longitudinal data bank together with explanatory information. Psychological investigators may find these imminently available data resources useful.     

基于信号检测论的新业务投资决策有限理性实验

采用情境模拟实验,以60名MBA/EMBA学员为被试,对新业务投资决策的4个主要因素、36个处理、12个信号检测单元进行了观察分析.研究发现:①辨别力最强的决策信息组合、判断标准最高的决策信息组合,以及辨别力和判断标准 "双低"的决策信息组合;②影响决策者的有限理性存在程度差别,强弱依次是投资情境、面对机会、投资模式和以往机会.     

Conceptual change in science and in science education

There is substantial evidence that traditional instructional methods have not been successful in helping students to restructure their commonsense conceptions and learn the conceptual structures of scientific theories. This paper argues that the nature of the changes and the kinds of reasoning required in a major conceptual restructuring of a representation of a domain are fundamentally the same in the discovery and in the learning processes. Understanding conceptual change as it occurs in science and in learning science will require the development of a common cognitive model of conceptual change. The historical construction of an inertial representation of motion is examined and the potential instructional implications of the case are explored.The preparation of this paper was supported in part by the Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-85-K-0337 to the Learning Research and Development Center at the University of Pittsburgh. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the ONR, and no official endorsement should be inferred. I wish to thank Lauren Resnick for her helpful comments and encouragement to pursue this research. I also thank Paul Thagard for introducing me to the technique of concept mapping and Gregory Nowak for his assistance in the preparation of the figures. The paper has benefited from comments by Floris Cohen, Susan Hojnacki, Thomas Kuhn, and Michael Ranney. Any misconceptions are, however, my own.     

Gender in science

The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science, by Londa Schiebinger, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, 355 pages, hb $23.50     

Misconduct in science and the german law

In the past, only norms and rules developed for other types of illegal activities could be applied to misconduct in science in Germany. But only particularly blatant cases of misconduct can be dealt with efficiently in this way. Nowadays, a couple of very important funding agencies and research institutions have enacted special procedures that apply in cases of suspected scientific misconduct. A strongly decentralised system of dealing with misconduct in science is being established in Germany. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct. An International Perspective, organised by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998.     

On the role of simplicity in science

Simple assumptions represent a decisive reason to prefer one theory to another in everyday scientific praxis. But this praxis has little philosophical justification, since there exist many notions of simplicity, and those that can be defined precisely strongly depend on the language in which the theory is formulated. The language dependence is a natural feature—to some extent—but it is also believed to be a fatal problem, because, according to a common general argument, the simplicity of a theory is always trivial in a suitably chosen language. But, this trivialization argument is typically either applied to toy-models of scientific theories or applied with little regard for the empirical content of the theory. This paper shows that the trivialization argument fails, when one considers realistic theories and requires their empirical content to be preserved. In fact, the concepts that enable a very simple formulation, are not necessarily measurable, in general. Moreover, the inspection of a theory describing a chaotic billiard shows that precisely those concepts that naturally make the theory extremely simple are provably not measurable. This suggests that—whenever a theory possesses sufficiently complex consequences—the constraint of measurability prevents too simple formulations in any language. This explains why the scientists often regard their assessments of simplicity as largely unambiguous. In order to reveal a cultural bias in the scientists’ assessment, one should explicitly identify different characterizations of simplicity of the assumptions that lead to different theory selections. General arguments are not sufficient.     

Venturing Beyond Analytic Philosophy's “Best” Arguments to the Implied Inadequacies of Its Metaphilosophical Intuitions

Gary Gutting argues, in his recent book What Philosophers Know, that analytic philosophy provides a sizable collection of exemplary arguments that effectively yield a “disciplinary body of philosophical knowledge”—“metaphilosophy,” he names it—that is, specimens that define in a notably perspicuous way what we should understand as philosophical knowledge itself. He concedes weaknesses in the best‐known specimens, and he admits that, generally, even the best specimens do not provide answers to the usual grand questions. I admire his treatment of the matter but argue that the metaphilosophical issues are, normally, of a much grander gauge than that of his sort of specimen; that they require a much more open, informal sort of inquiry and exchange than that of the distinctive rigor of the classic specimens themselves; that analytic philosophy, not uncharacteristically, tends to ignore the metaphilosophical issue or takes the validity of its method of argument for granted; and that the issue itself invites an appraisal of competing second‐order conceptions of how philosophical argument proves fruitful. I proceed by way of the examination of cases drawn from Quine and Kripke.