TO SEE OR NOT TO SEE:

Abstract— When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced Identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided showing that poor visibility is not the cause of this difficulty. Identification is also faster for objects considered to be important in the scene. These results support the idea that observers never form a complete, detailed representation of their surroundings. In addition, the results indicate that attention is required to perceive change, and the basis of high-level interest.     

TO INTERPRET,OR TO BE OMNISCIENT

Abstract

Susan Moller Okin has criticized Michael Sandel's view that the family is an example of an institution that is sometimes ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ justice, and for which justice is not, under the best conditions, a virtue. She argues that he both misses the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions and that he idealizes the family, and after undertaking this ‘ground-clearing’, goes on to argue that families should be just. This paper offers a qualified defense of Sandel. I argue, first, that Sandel has not missed the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions. But I go on to argue, more centrally, that if we distinguish between what I call ‘internal’ and ‘social’ justice of the family, and look carefully at the conclusions of Okin's own arguments, we see that she has really argued for the social justice of the family, and that this can be maintained alongside Sandel's vision of the family as an institution within which considerations of justice are neither central, nor necessarily appropriate. I try to carve out space both for Sandel's vision of the family, and for Okin's substantive feminist conclusions about family-based gender injustice.     

FREE TO MOVE,FREE TO BE

The Hungarian Pikler-Lóczy Institute for Infants’ Well-being and Healthy Development could not have been created without the fundamental contribution of the Budapest School’s approach to Object Relations. For historical reasons, very little is known in psychoanalytical circles about this extraordinary experience and work. Pikler created an original model with a space for partnership, reciprocity, and the baby’s “true” autonomy, which focuses on the baby’s self-initiated motor development: “freedom to move”. The atmosphere of this world around babies can be related to the “rêveries” of Ferenczi about the necessity for an early, caring environment provided through adult tenderness as it appears in his Clinical Diary.     

FROM BELIEF TO UNBELIEF AND BACK TO BELIEF: A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL RUSE

Abstract. Michael Ruse's rejection of religious belief is questioned at two levels. First, on the metaethical level of analysis, evolutionary ethics cannot account for moral behavior that is based on a "strong version" of the Love Command. Second, agnosticism is discussed as a form of belief. Insights from religious forms of life that are inclusive, pluralistic, and expansive are contrasted with exclusivistic, closed, and fundamentalist forms of religion in order to develop criteria for "genuine religion." Theistic agnosticism is presented as a prolegomena to belief.     

COSMOLOGY FROM ALPHA TO OMEGA: RESPONSE TO REVIEWS

I gratefully acknowledge and respond here to four reviews of my recent book, Cosmology from Alpha to Omega. Nancey Murphy stresses the importance of showing consistency between Christian theology and natural science through a detailed examination of my recent model of their creative interaction. She suggests how this model can be enhanced by adopting Alasdair MacIntyre's understanding of tradition in order to adjudicate between competing ways of incorporating science into a wider worldview. She urges the inclusion of ethics in my model and predicts that this would successfully challenge the competing naturalist tradition in contemporary society. John F. Haught weighs the alternatives of viewing divine action as objective versus subjective and of divine action at one level in nature or at all levels. He asks whether physics is fundamental to nature, arguing instead that metaphysics should be considered as fundamental. Michael Ruse assesses occasional versus universal divine action, the problems raised to divine action when it is related to quantum mechanics, and the way these relations exacerbate the challenge of natural theodicy. As an alternative he suggests viewing God as outside time and acting through unbroken natural law. Willem B. Drees discusses my use of the bridge metaphor for the relation between theology and science, the implications when science is inspired by theology, the role of contingency and necessity in the anthropic principle/many-worlds debate, and the challenge of cosmology to eschatology with the ensuing problem of theodicy.     

FROM BIOGENETIC STRUCTURALISM TO MATURE CONTEMPLATION TO PROPHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract. The publication of Brain, Symbol 3 Experience by Charles D. Laughlin, Jr., John McManus, and Eugene G. d'Aquili marks a significant advance in their biogenetic structural theory. They set forth a neurophenomenology of human consciousness and mature contemplation. A question is raised about their espousal of pristine perception, while their emphasis on polyphasic awareness is appreciated. In their contribution to interdisciplinary dialogue, limitations of gender, neglect of the religious traditions of the West, and linguistic issues are explored. While the style is difficult, the volume promises to become a classic in affirming "the human brain as the main locus of causality."     

HOW TO ANALYSE SUBSTANCE: A REPLY TO SCHNIEDER

In a recent issue of this journal, Benjamin Schnieder has presented an objection to the account of individual substance that we have developed and put to various uses in our works on metaphysics. According to Schnieder's objection, our proposal to analyse this notion of substantiality suffers from a special kind of circularity. In this paper, we give two replies to Schnieder's objection. The first is that a successful analysis is not, in fact, required to avoid the sort of circularity about which Schnieder complains. The second is that our analysis does not involve the alleged circularity.     

FREUD'S LETTERS TO FLIESS: FROM SEDUCTION TO SEXUAL BIOLOGY, FROM PSYCHOPATHOLOGY TO A CLINICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The author describes the development of Freud's theory of neurosis from 1892 onwards, starting with his distinction between the actual neuroses and the psychoneuroses and his discovery of a specific, sexual aetiology for both, until which point it remained limited to pathology. The problem of the aetiology of perversion, however, confronted him with a paradox within the theory of seduction: how can an infantile sexual pleasure produce unpleasure when it is remembered at the time of puberty? This problem could not be solved within the framework of the seduction theory because the asexuality of childhood was essential to this theory. For an answer Freud had to turn to biology. He considered that the transformation of an infantile pleasure into unpleasure presupposed an organic repression of non‐genital sexual pleasure. This hypothesis of organic repression radically changed the anthropological claim of Freud's theory. As long as he was looking for a specific aetiology of neurosis and perversion, Freud's theory remained restricted to pathology. However, when he introduced infantile sexuality and its organic repression as universal organic processes, the strict distinction between normality and pathology could not be maintained. The author concludes that by turning to sexual biology, Freud transformed psychopathology into a clinical anthropology.     

SUBJECT TO ROMANCE

Safer sex campaigns directed at heterosexuals have increasingly targeted women to encourage them to take responsibility for condom use. It appears, however, that many women are unable or unwilling to accept this role. In this article we report on one particular kind of obstacle that some women face in initiating condom use. We draw on data from interviews with 14 women, aged 22 to 43 years, about their experiences with, and views of, condoms. There was considerable variability, as well as commonalities, among the women interviewed in the way they regarded condoms. Using a feminist poststructuralist form of discourse analysis, we explored two women's accounts of being unable to initiate condom use despite their stated intentions not to have intercourse without a condom and having condoms in their possession. We suggest that this particular dynamic results from the passivity women can experience through being positioned in a discourse of heterosexual feminine sexuality in general and a discourse of heterosexual romance in particular. We discuss how this passivity can be experienced by women who are otherwise assertive and committed to sexual equality, making it confusing and disconcerting for them and others.