Alternative motivation: a new challenge to moral judgment internalism

Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases. I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior that accords with the content of the moral judgment but that has been performed not because of the moral judgment. Instead it is due to some other source of motivation. I call these alternative motivation cases. I distinguish two sorts of alternative motivation cases, and I argue that externalists have natural explanations of these cases. By contrast, extant internalist accounts of failure cases are inadequate when applied to alternative motivation cases.     

Alternative Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

In this paper, I assume that if we have libertarian freedom, it is located in the power to choose and its exercise. Given this assumption, I then further assume a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) which states that an agent is morally responsible for his choice only if he could have chosen otherwise. With these assumptions in place, I examine three recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I argue that all fail to undermine the intuitive plausibility of PAP.     

Alternative Actions and the Spirit of Consequentialism

The simple idea behind act-consequentialism isthat we ought to choose the action whoseoutcome is better than that of any alternativeaction. In a recent issue of this journal, ErikCarlson has argued that given a reasonableinterpretation of alternative actions thissimple idea cannot be upheld but that the newtheory he proposes nevertheless preserves theact-consequentialist spirit. My aim in thispaper is to show that Carlson is wrong on bothcounts. His theory, contrary to his ownintentions, is not an act-consequentialisttheory. By building on a theory formulated byHolly Smith, I will show that the simple ideacan be upheld. The new theory I will proposehas all the merits of Carlson's theory withoutsharing its demerits.     

Alternative possibilities and asymmetry

It has often been noted that many of our intuitive assessments of particular actions suggest that there is an asymmetry between blameworthy and praiseworthy actions with regard to the question of whether moral responsibility requires that the agent could have acted otherwise. It is a quite different question, though, whether such an asymmetry between good and bad cases can be supported by more systematic considerations. In this paper, I will develop a new argument for a restricted version of the asymmetry, by showing that in cases of praiseworthy actions responsibility cannot generally presuppose that the agent could have acted otherwise. This argument will be based on a distinction between two different kinds of roles that moral norms can play in determining whether an action is right and in guiding our deliberation. That agents can sometimes be responsible for their praiseworthy actions even though they cannot act otherwise is best seen as a reflection of the fact that moral norms can prohibit treating certain courses of action as genuine options at all.

     

Alternative religion kids: spiritual and cultural identity among children and youth involved with new religious movements

ABSTRACT

The term ‘new religious movement’ (NRM) has come to replace the more provocative term ‘cult,’ however this shift of scholarly language has not resulted in a softening of public perception towards those in religious groups perceived as ‘weird’. This perception leaves a distinct mark on the identities of children raised in these communities.Children from alternative and controversial religions comprise a unique subculture.. The experience of growing up in a new religious movement has an important impact on a young person’s cultural and spiritual identity. Drawing on and expanding Useem and Downie’s model of ‘third culture kids’ (TCKs) the model of ‘alternative religion kids’ (ARKs) is developed. It is proposed that ARKs are a subculture in their own right and share a sense of belonging and identity based on their experience of being religious ‘others’. ARKs may be able to connect through a powerful, shared experience not paralleled with other peers.     

对科学主义新版本的质疑

一、科学主义的旧版本关于科学主义的旧版本,说法也很多,选择几种有代表性的。1.“科学主义”一词最早出现于1877年。它的原意是指“作为科学家特征的方法、精神态度等等。”2.随后我们便发现了一本专门讲科学主义的书,英国学者汤姆·索雷尔的《科学主义》,书中指出:“科学主义就是这样的信念:科学特别是自然科学是人类知识中最有价值的部分——因为它最有权威,最严肃和最有益。”     

F. A. Trendelenburg and the Neglected Alternative

Despite his impressive influence on nineteenth-century philosophy, F. A. Trendelenburg's own philosophy has been largely ignored. However, among Kant scholars, Trendelenburg has always been remembered for his feud with Kuno Fischer over the subjectivity of space and time in Kant's philosophy. The topic of the dispute, now frequently referred to as the ‘Neglected Alternative’ objection, has become a prominent issue in contemporary discussions and interpretations of Kant's view of space and time. The Neglected Alternative contends that Kant unjustifiably moves from the claim that we have a priori intuitions of space and time to the sceptical conclusion that space and time are exclusively subjective. Most current discussions trace the objection back to Trendelenburg and often use him to motivate the objection. However, to date Trendelenburg's actual arguments and reasons for rejecting the Kantian view of space and time have not been sufficiently uncovered; my goal here is to fill this lacuna. By better understanding what Trendelenburg actually argued, we will be in a better position to assess whether the Neglected Alternative objection against Kant is successful. But in addition, Trendelenburg's own system is of independent philosophical interest, and my work here will shed light on one part of it.     

Alternative Spiritualities and the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism

Some practices in Alternative Spiritualities have been criticised by social commentators for their ‘appropriation’ of indigenous cultures. This article will argue that ‘appropriation’ is not limited to these cultures but is part of a larger phenomenon, that of cultural consumption of selective parts of history. Furthermore, this cultural consumption is not restricted to history alone, but is extended to contemporary popular culture, such as people and groups who find inspiration for their spirituality from the fictions of H.P. Lovecraft, vampire stories and the Star Wars mythos. Following Fredric Jameson's work on Postmodernism, this article will provide an insight into how the cultural consumption of history and popular culture by people involved in Alternative Spiritualities has become part of the cultural logic of late capitalism.     

Differential Reinforcement of Alternative Behavior in Center-Based Classrooms: Evaluation of Pre-teaching the Alternative Behavior

This study investigated the effectiveness of a differential reinforcement of alternative behavior procedure in decreasing disruptive behavior while simultaneously increasing the appropriate behavior of four children of typical development between the ages of 4 and 6 in center-based classrooms. We began with brief functional analyses for each child. Then, differential reinforcement procedures, with and without pre-teaching the alternative behavior, were compared using an alternating treatments design. Results indicated that the differential reinforcement procedure with pre-teaching resulted in lower levels of problem behavior and greater levels of the alternative behavior compared to differential reinforcement alone. Results are discussed in terms of implications for applied practice and functional assessment and intervention research.     

Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities

It has been argued that a successful counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities must rule out any possibility of the agent making an alternative decision right up to the moment of choice. This paper challenges that assumption. Distinguishing between an ability and an opportunity, this paper presents a Frankfurt-style case in which there is an alternative possibility, but one it is highly improbable that the agent will access. In such a case the agent has only the opportunity, not the ability to do otherwise.