Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human?

Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states - that is, do they possess a 'theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.     

Abstraction and its Limits: Finding Space For Novel Explanation

Several modern accounts of explanation acknowledge the importance of abstraction and idealization for our explanatory practice. However, once we allow a role for abstraction, questions remain. I ask whether the relation between explanations at different theoretical levels should be thought of wholly in terms of abstraction, and argue that changes of the quantities in terms of which we describe a system can lead to novel explanations that are not merely abstractions of some more detailed picture. I use the example of phase transitions as described by statistical mechanics and thermodynamics to illustrate this, and to demonstrate some details of the relationship between abstraction, idealization, and novel explanation.     

Critical individualism: Whitehead's metaphysics and critique of liberalism

Conclusion Whitehead's metaphysics contains an accurate portrayal of concrete human existence - one which can serve as a ground for criticizing the abstractions into which liberalism has fallen. His critical individualism, his insistence both on the individual as the seat of all value and on our essential connectedness to one another in modern society, is a call for liberalism to restore concrete meaning to its fundamental notions of individuality and freedom. However, his suggestions that the core values of liberalism can be actualized if we but reaffirm Plato's ancient equation of knowledge with virtue rests on an optimism that is difficult to sustain apart from a compensatory metaphysical dogma. We can appropriate Whitehead's criticism of liberalism, but if we can no longer convince ourselves of a metaphysical vision that supports faith in Plato's equation, we must look elsewhere for suggestions as to how liberalism can be revitalized.     

Movement and Meaning

Movement analysis receives a new and useful examination in this paper. The fact (hat all of us always “read” each other's movement behavior as a matter of course is taken for granted. Our verbal language is rife with allusions to bodily behavior, suggesting that there really is such a thing as a language of the body. But one and the same movement can represent many differing aspects of behavior and is heavily dependent on its context. What we experience nonverbally vis-à-vis another person is the executive function of body language like, for instance, “wringing one's hands” or having “shaky knees.” Usually, people will convey nonverbally how they feel about the situation they find themselves in while the other—the recipient of the message—will convey understanding equally nonverbally. Thus, it is always (he representation of something that we experience—an embodiment of intent, not language itself. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish between the implementation and movement itself. These abstractions become helpful in the understanding of many phenomena during treatment situations as demonstrated here.     

Goals,usefulness and abstraction in value-based choice

Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar, while on the run, purportedly burned two million dollars in banknotes to keep his daughter warm. A stark reminder that, in life, circumstances and goals can quickly change, forcing us to reassess and modify our values on-the-fly. Studies in decision-making and neuroeconomics have often implicitly equated value to reward, emphasising the hedonic and automatic aspect of the value computation, while overlooking its functional (concept-like) nature. Here we outline the computational and biological principles that enable the brain to compute the usefulness of an option or action by creating abstractions that flexibly adapt to changing goals. We present different algorithmic architectures, comparing ideas from artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive neuroscience with psychological theories and, when possible, drawing parallels.     

Metaphor in intergroup relations

Belonging to groups and relating to other groups are central parts of our lives, but they confront us with abstract ideas (e.g., identity and power) and nebulous feelings. To make sense of it all, people rely on conceptual metaphors: cognitive tools that ground abstractions in dissimilar, more concrete ideas that are easier to grasp. We review some common metaphors that people use in intergroup contexts—metaphors that draw on knowledge of such familiar experiences as physical cleansing and warmth sensations. We review evidence that these metaphors are not mere figures of speech, but have a systematic and practically important influence on intergroup attitudes and behavior. Most of this work shows that reliance on metaphor contributes to prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, sometimes without the person's awareness. Yet we consider the hopeful possibility that citizens, politicians, and researchers can harness the power of metaphor to promote intergroup harmony and peace.     

Classical physical abstraction

An informal theory is set forth of relations between abstract entities, includingcolors, physical quantities, times, andplaces in space, and the concrete things thathave them, or areat orin them, based on the assumption that there are close analogies between these relations and relations between abstractsets and the concrete things that aremembers of them. It is suggested that even standard scientific usage of these abstractions presupposes principles that are analogous to postulates of abstraction, identity, and other fundamental principles of set theory. Also discussed is the significance of important disanalogies between sets and physical abstractions, including especiallymodal andtemporal aspects of physical abstractions, which is related to the problem of the characterizingconstancy, of colors, physical attributes, and locations in space.     

On Overrating Oneself. . . and Knowing it

When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most (non-depressed) people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are supported by our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not.     

Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which are Basic and Which are Derived?

Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of naturalism forces Armstrong to say that universals are abstractions from a certain class of particulars; they are abstractions from first-order states of affairs, to be more precise. It is here argued that these two tendencies in Armstrong cannot be reconciled: To say that universals are abstractions from first-order states of affairs is not compatible with saying that universals fix causal relations between particulars. Causal relations are themselves states of affairs of a sort, and Armstrong’s claim that a law is a kind of structural universal is best understood as the view that any given law logically supervenes on its corresponding causal relations. The result is an inconsistency, Armstrong having to say that laws do not supervene on particular causal relations while also being committed to the view that they do so supervene. The inconsistency is perhaps best resolved by denying that universals are abstractions from states of affairs.

The affective-representational circuit as the foundation of identity

The affective-representational circuit is presented as an idiographic model of how, in everyday life, the mind creates and activates the mental content that expresses a person's social and personal identity. The model aims to reconstruct the organizing principles of the mind that link together, within a unified identity system, memory, motivation, affect, attitudes, and representations of the world and of the self. While the model was developed in an experimental context, it could also be applied to the analysis of natural thinking. As an example, the reconstruction of an affective-representational circuit from excerpts of the Sartre - Beauvoir interviews is presented.Cognition is not a form of pure knowing to which emotion is added (whether to perturb its clarity or not). An action is a final common path based on what one knows and feels… It seems far more useful to recognize at the start that all three terms represent abstractions, abractions that have a high theoretical cost. The price we pay for such abstractions in the end is to lose sight of their structural interdependence. At whatever level we look, however detailed the analysis, the three are constituents of a unified whole. (Bruner, 1986, pp. 117–118.)     

Beyond Mental Competence

Justification for psychiatric paternalism is most easily established where mental illness renders the person mentally incompetent, depriving him of the capacity for rational agency and for autonomy, hence undermining the basis for liberal rights against paternalism. But some philosophers, and no doubt some doctors, have been deeply concerned by the inadequacy of the concept of mental incompetence to encapsulate some apparently appealing cases for psychiatric paternalism. We ought to view mental incompetence as just one subset of a broader justification for psychiatric paternalism. The very basis of liberal limitations on psychiatric paternalism, whether described in terms of rights to autonomy or as respect for differences in values and lifestyles, presupposes a sense of moral persistence, and hence some sufficiently persistent self. Paternalistic intervention is warranted when we are unable to govern our lives in a manner consistent with the goals and values that comprise that ‘self’. One way that can occur is when we lack the mental capacities required for autonomy, such that we are unable to interpret and interact with our environment in order to meaningfully pursue our goals, i.e. mental incompetence. But it can also occur when we are subject to impositions that alter our goals without altering our capacity to pursue them — i.e. when it is our ‘self’ that is impaired rather than our competence.     

Metaphor: Bridging embodiment to abstraction

Embodied cognition accounts posit that concepts are grounded in our sensory and motor systems. An important challenge for these accounts is explaining how abstract concepts, which do not directly call upon sensory or motor information, can be informed by experience. We propose that metaphor is one important vehicle guiding the development and use of abstract concepts. Metaphors allow us to draw on concrete, familiar domains to acquire and reason about abstract concepts. Additionally, repeated metaphoric use drawing on particular aspects of concrete experience can result in the development of new abstract representations. These abstractions, which are derived from embodied experience but lack much of the sensorimotor information associated with it, can then be flexibly applied to understand new situations.     

APORETIC POSSIBILITIES IN CATHERINE KELLER'S CLOUD OF THE IMPOSSIBLE

In stressing the beauty of ignorance, of not knowing in the usual manner, Catherine Keller's Cloud of the Impossible evokes the death of a metaphysical (A)uthorial presence and the dissolution of closed systems of meaning. In this article, I view her text as part of a crisis of modernity that challenges dominant theological pathways, on which certain problematic views of the human have been constructed. In my reading, Keller's Cloud enriches humanistic thinking in the West and I explore the themes it shares with my own work in religious naturalism: there is no escape from the radical relationality and the irreducible materiality that structure human existence. I also emphasize that textual strategies are mere seductive, disembodied abstractions without acknowledging the force of materiality. Materiality matters; and I explore ways in which religious naturalism demonstrates how it does. In light of Keller's rich analysis, I focus on a “learned ignorance” that accompanies all of our limited interpretations emerging from the shifting, precarious positionalities as we rethink our relationality to each other and to all that it is.     

The case against the case against group studies

We challenge the position that only the analysis of single patients can allow us to infer normal function from impaired performance. We claim that the focus on group vs. single case studies is unprofitable and that a more useful question is how best to form abstractions of relevance to cognitive theory. In this context, we consider issues concerning the category of "agrammatism."     

Abstraction and Individual Style in Syllogistic and Heterogeneous Reasoning

Syllogistic reasoning can be modelled with mental models. Heterogeneous reasoning brings together propositional and visual information, and in the Hyperproof logic-teaching system, the visual can act as a model for the propositional. Both mental models notation and Hyperproof’s visual representations allow abstractions of a limited kind. Individual differences in reasoning performance have been found in both domains. We suggest that at least some of the differences can be attributed to students’ differing ability to manipulate abstractions.     

Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity

Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend a normative claim that it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, instead of a factual claim that our perceptual judgments are generally reliable. More specifically, I offer a normative practical argument which explains why it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, even though we cannot establish the general reliability of our perceptual judgments by means of theoretical reasoning.     

Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness

The Equal Weight View holds that, when we discover we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should give our peer’s judgment as much weight as our own. But how should we respond when we cannot tell whether those who disagree with us are our epistemic peers? I argue for a position I will call the Earn-a-Spine View. According to this view, parties to a disagreement can remain confident, at least in some situations, by finding justifiable reasons to think their opponents are less credible than themselves, even if those reasons are justifiable only because they lack information about their opponents.     

The Concrete Universal and Cognitive Science

Cognitive science depends on abstractions made from the complex reality of human behaviour. Cognitive scientists typically wish the abstractions in their theories to be universals, but seldom attend to the ontology of universals. Two sorts of universal, resulting from Galilean abstraction and materialist abstraction respectively, are available in the philosophical literature: the abstract universal—the one-over-many universal—is the universal conventionally employed by cognitive scientists; in contrast, a concrete universal is a material entity that can appear within the set of entities it describes, of which it represents the essential, paradigmatic case. The potential role of concrete universals in cognitive science is discussed.