自由的张力——从根本恶看康德对意志与任性的区分

本文尝试在与根本恶学说的关联中分析康德对意志与任性进行区分的意义。由于引入根本恶的概念,康德修正了以自律为核心的自由理论,纳入自由意志的另一面向——其作恶的可能性,凸显了自由意志内蕴的张力。然而,通过将任性与立法意志界说为意志官能的两个要素,使前者从属于后者,康德对其自由理论的修正并没有完全背离他早先自律的自由观。本文质疑康德将任性对道德法则的违背看作一种无能或者自由的缺失的观点,认为这一可以追溯到奥古斯丁的观点使得意志与任性的区分失去意义,不再能解释恶与过错的归责问题。     

斐洛论自由意志和罪

自由意志和罪的关联是西方思想史所要处理的一个核心问题。关于这个主题学者们多只追溯到奥古斯丁的著名论述,然而这无法真正地揭示其演变脉络。该文分析了希腊化犹太教思想家斐洛对自由意志和罪的阐释,着重论述了自由意志作为神圣性的存在原理何以成为罪的自明性自欺的根源,进而指出了希伯来和希腊传统在这个理论上的各自贡献。     

自由意志视野下健康行为转变的伦理困境

虽然慢性病的危害十分巨大,预防慢性病的措施非常简单易行,但慢性病预防行动却十分缺乏.对自由意志的强调及自由意志本身的局限性,导致了促进慢性病预防行为存在伦理困境,不能有效促进慢性病预防行为.要走出两难困境以有效促进慢性病预防行为,需要对自由意志有新的认识,既不能完全放弃自由意志,也不能守住自由意志不松.     

自由意志视野下健康行为转变的伦理困境

虽然慢性病的危害十分巨大,预防慢性病的措施非常简单易行,但慢性病预防行动却十分缺乏。对自由意志的强调及自由意志本身的局限性,导致了促进慢性病预防行为存在伦理困境,不能有效促进慢性病预防行为。要走出两难困境以有效促进慢性病预防行为,需要对自由意志有新的认识,既不能完全放弃自由意志,也不能守住自由意志不松。     

神经科学决定论与自由意志——兼论自由意志与自我是否可能?

神经科学的最新研究成果为决定论提供了科学依据,由此推断没有自由意志和恒定不变的自我。而传统生命伦理学中我们对其它生命体的伦理义务乃是基于这个生命体具备自由意志,即有自我的精神生活。神经科学技术对自由意志和自我的挑战不会对我们的伦理实践产生重要影响。只有在实践生活中人们采用了科学研究结论,从神经科学的发现到影响我们伦理实践的范式转换才会发生。从相容性与非相容性、物理系统自身的识别、神经科学的其它证据等方面探讨了怀疑的内在原因,认为不会因为神经科学家的新发现而否认自由意志和恒定自我。     

神经科学决定论与自由意志——兼论自由意志与自我是否可能?

神经科学的最新研究成果为决定论提供了科学依据,由此推断没有自由意志和恒定不变的自我.而传统生命伦理学中我们对其它生命体的伦理义务乃是基于这个生命体具备自由意志,即有自我的精神生活.神经科学技术对自由意志和自我的挑战不会对我们的伦理实践产生重要影响.只有在实践生活中人们采用了科学研究结论,从神经科学的发现到影响我们伦理实践的范式转换才会发生.从相容性与非相容性、物理系统自身的识别、神经科学的其它证据等方面探讨了怀疑的内在原因,认为不会因为神经科学家的新发现而否认自由意志和恒定自我.     

自由意志:实证心理学的视角

自由意志是哲学史上最古老、最持久和最艰难的问题之一,并且一直是哲学,包括实证主义哲学和人文主义哲学关注的问题.近年来,心理学家开始尝试用实证科学的方法探索自由意志的心理机制、影响及表达.研究发现虽然自由意志是一种错觉,但人们仍然相信它的存在,并受到它的影响.自由意志与道德责任、道德行为、创造力、自尊和幸福等概念有密切关系.未来研究应在自由意志的概念界定、产生机制、作用功能等方面进行更深入的探索,并从实证、理论和常识三种水平上综合考察、理解自由意志问题.     

自由意志与道德责任

道德责任是伦理学的核心概念。为确定道德责任,亚里士多德引入了"出于意愿"的概念,并借用"始因"来说明何为"出于意愿",由此引发了关于意志是否可以为始因即自由意志的争论。站在决定论的立场,尝试从相容论的角度,说明道德责任不必以自由意志为前提。     

“自由意志”与孟子伦理究责的心性根据

对伦理道德秩序的维护乃儒学之要务,所以即使在“自由意志”词汇缺席的情况下,儒家也必须明确何为恶之根源,以说明判定究责对象时的根据与标准。新儒家以气质论人之恶的成因,但是该诠释路径会使决定性因素从人自身转移到外在影响力上,导致责任主体认定的困难。在此诠释路径中,人的善恶形态被困于儒学本心良知的伦理道德规范性含义里。孟子本心良知说中存在一类通过自我取舍而形成的恶的主体,这类恶的主体所据并非本心良知具有的知善规范性,而是以能力层面能善的普遍性作为其产生的逻辑基础。从心性上溯源恶才能突破本心良知在知善的规定性上对恶之于人的属己性的遮蔽,以此明确善与恶皆是人自己的善恶,如此伦理究责才不会陷入主体判定的困难之中。     

自由在于开放性的选择吗——西方自由意志观批判

西方学界在自由与必然的二元对立架构中,往往倾向于把能够做出随机偶然的"开放性选择"说成自由的本质特征。其实,自由首先在于人们基于"由我自主的意欲志向"提出的诉求性价值偏好能够得到从心所欲的实现。相比之下,"可供取舍的备选方案"或"能够替代的可能机遇"不但只是有助于达成自由的从属性工具,而且还始终遵循着"趋善避恶"和"取主舍次"的人性必然逻辑,因而其开放性程度并不会实质性地影响到人们的自由意志和自由存在。     

自由意志与决定论的关系：基于心理学视角

西方心理学的各种理论流派在对人格、自我和行为动因等基本问题作出解答时,始终存在自由意志与决定论的分歧与对峙。该文在对这些分歧和对峙作出评述和分析的基础上,厘清了人类行为的决定因素和目的性动因,主张目的性是自由意志存在的基础,而人类意识行为选择的多样性以及自我对不同选择的断言则使自由意志成为必然。自由意志与决定性是一个问题的两个方面,二者是一种辩证统一的关系。     

生命权利平等的伦理诠释

人的生命是十分珍贵的,生命权利应该优先于一切权利。没有先进的医学技术和较高的社会发展水平,生命权利就很难得到保障和实现。在发展医学技术的同时,应认真思考卫生经济政策的核心价值,保证卫生经济政策在任何时候都不背离公民的健康利益,从而保障人的生命权利得以实现。     

生前预嘱选择缓和医疗的伦理法律问题探讨

从自由意志与生命权之处置两个角度入手,探讨生前预嘱与缓和医疗相关的伦理与法律问题。发现自由意志系生前预嘱的生效基础,对于不涉及生命权处置的预立医疗计划依现行法律“当然有效”;而对于选择缓和医疗、放弃治疗等涉及生命权消极处置的生前预嘱,则需严格限定其生效条件,且医院应当建立一套机制对此予以审查。此外,亦探讨了生前预嘱确定的消极治疗所带来的其他问题,有助于相关领域的继续深入与补充立法,并对医生选择绝症患者的治疗方案及减小医院法律风险具有实际意义。

     

从婚检看隐私权与知情权的冲突与协调

医生为当事人进行婚检,当发现其中一方患有性病等疾病时,告知是否会涉及到隐私权与知情权的问题,就隐私权与知情权的冲突与协调问题进行了探讨.     

Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Free Will

In this dialogue Derk Pereboom and Marcel Brass discuss the free will problem from the perspective of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. First, they give their opinion on how the two disciplines contribute to the free will problem. While Pereboom is optimistic regarding the contribution of science, Brass is more pessimistic and questions the usefulness of an empirical approach to the question whether free will exists or not. Then they outline their position on the free will problem. The idea of a transcendental agent is discussed in more detail. Furthermore, it is discussed whether free will scepticism is a politically, socially, psychologically viable position. Pereboom argues that promoting the idea of free will scepticism can have a positive impact on retributive emotions and the political practice regarding retributive punishment. Brass argues that retributive emotions are deeply rooted in evolution and therefore difficult to change via high-level beliefs about free will. Finally, the future of the free will debate is discussed. Both agree that the dialogue between philosophy and psychology should be intensified. Philosophy can benefit from taking empirical research more seriously. Psychology and neuroscience can benefit from philosophy by appreciating the sophistication and conceptual clarity of the philosophical debate. Both have to find a common language and define common problems that can be tackled from both perspectives.     

Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non–naturalism

In his recent book The Natural Selection of Autonomy , Bruce Waller defends a view that he calls "natural autonomy." This view holds that human beings possess a kind of autonomy that we share with nonhuman animals, a capacity to explore alternative courses of action, but an autonomy that cannot support moral responsibility. He also argues that this natural autonomy can provide support for the ethical principle of noninterference. I argue that to support the ethical principle of noninterference Waller needs either a libertarian or a compatibilist theory of autonomy. I then go on to argue that, contra Waller, the libertarian view is both compatible with Darwinism and able to make sense of how autonomous acts belong to the agents who perform them. Thus, I conclude that the libertarian position is a live option for Darwinians. If however, naturalism is taken to include a deterministic view of the universe (at least at the nonquantum level), as is often the case, then my article takes some strides in defending "Darwinian non–naturalism."     

Freedom of the Will in Plato and Augustine

There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will. It is surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to discuss whether Plato had such an account. Those who have made an attempt quickly deny that such an account is present in the dialogues. I shall argue that if we draw a distinction between two notions of free will, it is plausible that some account of free will is, in fact, present in the dialogues, the Republic in particular. This is the first in depth search into the question and I demonstrate that the defender of a Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she first appears to. It also has the benefit of giving us an obvious source material for Augustine's discussion.     

Impulse and Self-Reflection: Frankfurtian Responsibility versus Free Will

Harry Frankfurt's early work makes an important distinction between moral responsibility and free will. Frankfurt begins by focusing on the notion of responsibility, as supplying counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities; he then turns to an apparently independent account of free will, in terms of his well-known hierarchy of desires. But the two notions seem to reestablish contact in Frankfurt's later discussion of issues and cases. The present article sets up a putative Frankfurtian account of moral responsibility that involves the potential for free will, as suggested by some of Frankfurt's later remarks about taking responsibility. While correcting what seem to be some common misinterpretations of Frankfurt's view, the article attempts to extract some reasons for dissatisfaction with it from consideration of cases of unfreedom, particularly cases involving addiction.     

Twenty‐First‐Century Counseling Theory Development in Relation to Definitions of Free Will and Determinism

This article is a continuation of Wilks's ( 2003 ) review of the development of counseling theory in relation to definitions of free will and determinism. The original review showed that theoretical synthesis was in part achieved when causal events inherent in absolute determinism were incorporated into a soft self‐determinist process. This review traces three 21st‐century challenges to self‐determinism and provides evidence supporting the inclusion of both self‐determinism and indeterminate free will in a single but asymmetrical causal model.     

生物样本泛知情同意的撤回权及相关问题探讨

泛知情同意的撤回权是指通过泛知情同意模式参加生物样本库的捐献者具有随时撤销其泛知情同意的权利,其在国内外都有相应的法律与道德基础。明确这一权利符合捐献者、生物样本库等多方的长远利益,既能更好地保护捐献者,也对生物样本库建设有重要意义。一般情况下,捐献者可随时向生物样本库撤回泛知情同意,然而在涉及国家利益、干细胞治疗、样本去识别等特殊情况时,撤回权将受到一定限制。此外,我们提出信息交互平台的建设是泛知情同意撤回管理的优化策略,为有关机构进一步健全泛知情同意撤回制度和加强实践指导提供理论依据。