The role of representative design in an ecological approach to cognition

Egon Brunswik argued that psychological processes are adapted to environmental properties. He proposed the method of representative design to capture these processes and advocated that psychology be a science of organism-environment relations. Representative design involves randomly sampling stimuli from the environment or creating stimuli in which environmental properties are preserved. This departs from systematic design. The authors review the development of representative design, examine its use in judgment and decision-making research, and demonstrate the effect of design on research findings. They suggest that some of the practical difficulties associated with representative design may be overcome with modern technologies. The importance of representative design in psychology and the implications of this method for ecological approaches to cognition are discussed.     

Semantic grounding in models of analogy: an environmental approach

Empirical studies indicate that analogy consists of two main processes: retrieval and mapping. While current theories and models of analogy have revealed much about the mainly structural constraints that govern the mapping process, the similarities that underpin the correspondences between individual representational elements and drive retrieval are understood in less detail. In existing models symbol similarities are externally defined but neither empirically grounded nor theoretically justified. This paper introduces a new model (EMMA: the environmental model of analogy) which relies on co‐occurrence information provided by LSA (Latent Semantic Analysis; Landauer & Dumais, 1997) to ground the relations between the symbolic elements aligned in analogy. LSA calculates a contextual distribution for each word encountered in a corpus by counting the frequency with which it co‐occurs with other words. This information is used to define a model that locates each word encountered in a high‐dimensional space, with relations between elements in this space representing contextual similarities between words. A series of simulation experiments demonstrate that the environmental approach to semantics embodied in LSA can produce appropriate patterns of analogical retrieval, but that this semantic measure is not sufficient to model analogical mapping. The implications of these findings, both for theories of representation in analogy research and more general theories of semantics in cognition, are explored.     

An ecological approach to embodiment and cognition

The purpose of this article is to explore the relation between embodiment and cognition from an ecological point of view, which has been given little attention in current studies on embodiment. To begin with, two basic meanings of embodiment are distinguished: the state of being embodied and the act of embodying. This article gives more attention to embodying than to being embodied. Next, the ecological framework to investigate embodiment are presented, with focusing on affordances, tool use, and the body. On this view, it is argued that tools extend action and perception capabilities, which implies that the boundary of the body can be extended beyond the surface of the skin. Then, the empirical studies on perception of affordances, on limb proprioception, and on tool use are outlined. These studies support the idea that the boundary of the body can shift. Finally, the boundary of the body is discussed in reference to perception–action systems, suggesting that research on embodiment should pay more attention to the dynamic nature of the body.     

The developmental approach to young children's strategic social cognition and behaviour

This study explores the development of strategic behaviour related to kindness and intelligence dimensions in 3‐ to 8‐year‐old children. Previous research systematically highlighted the affective bias that limited young children's thinking and behaving in strategic terms. We argue that young children are able to grasp specific dimensions of social affordances from personality traits and behaviour exemplifying these traits. The results obtained in the partner choice paradigm revealed a developmental increase in social utility understanding. This supports our hypothesis of early social affordances understanding and provides empirical evidence that affective bias did not drastically influence strategic partner choice in 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reenactment: an embodied cognition approach to meaning and linguistic content

A central finding in experimental research identified with embodied cognition (EC) is that understanding actions involves their embodied simulation, i.e., executing some processes involved in performing these actions. Extending these findings, I argue that reenactment??the overt embodied simulation of actions and practices, including especially communicative actions and practices, within utterances??makes it possible to forge an integrated EC-based account of linguistic meaning. In particular, I argue: (a) that remote entities can be referred to by reenacting actions performed with them; (b) that the use of grammatical constructions can be conceived of as the reenactment of linguistic action routines; (c) that complex enunciational structures (reported speech, irony, etc.) involve a separate level of reenactment, on which characters are presented as interacting with one another within the utterance; (d) that the segmentation of long utterances into shorter units involves the reenactment of brief audience interventions between units; and (e) that the overall meaning of an utterance can be stated in reenactment terms. The notion of reenactment provides a conceptual framework for accounting for aspects of language that are usually thought to be outside the reach of EC in an EC framework, thus supporting a view of meaning and linguistic content as thoroughly grounded in action and interaction.     

An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of (modal or amodal) format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate.     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.     

An encoding-complex approach to numerical cognition in Chinese-English bilinguals.

We present a model of the cognitive architecture of basic numerical skills in adult Chinese-English bilinguals. The model is based on data reported by Campbell, Kanz, and Xue (1999) and combines Dehaene and Cohen's triple-code theory with Campbell and Clark's encoding-complex approach to modeling number processing. Participants were required to name, add or multiply Arabic or Mandarin numerals and to respond in English or Chinese. They also performed magnitude comparisons on pairs of Arabic or Mandarin numerals. The proposed model of their performance on this set of tasks assumes 1) that number processing is modular with respect to representational code (e.g., visual, visuo-spatial, verbal) rather than with respect to numerical function, 2) task-specific communication between representational codes is interactive rather than additive, and 3) memory for arithmetic facts is at least partially language-based and our Chinese-English bilinguals possessed both Chinese and English-language number-fact representations. We provide new analyses of the arithmetic data and a review of research on the role of language in simple arithmetic to substantiate our claims about linguistic codes for number-fact memory.     

The parent analogy: a reassessment

According to the parent analogy, as a caretaker’s goodness, ability and intelligence increase, the likelihood that the caretaker will make arrangements for the attainment of future goods that are unnoticed or underappreciated by their dependents also increases. Consequently, if this analogy accurately represents our relationship to God, then we should expect to find many instances of inscrutable evil in the world. This argument in support of skeptical theism has recently been criticized by Dougherty. I argue that Dougherty’s argument is incomplete, for there are two plausible ways of construing the parent analogy’s conclusion. I supplement Dougherty’s case by offering a new argument against the parent analogy based on failed expectations concerning the amount of inscrutable evils encountered in the world. Consequently, there remains a significant empirical hurdle for skeptical theism to overcome if it is to maintain its status as a defeater for our reliability when tracking gratuitous evils.     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

Pragmatic approach to decision making under uncertainty: The case of the disjunction effect

The disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992 Tversky, A. and Shafir, E. 1992. The disjunction effect in choice under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 3: 305–309. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) occurs when decision makers prefer option x (versus y) when knowing that event A occurs and also when knowing that event A does not occur, but they refuse x (or prefer y) when not knowing whether or not A occurs. This form of incoherence violates Savage's (1954 Savage, L. J. 1954. The foundations of statistics, New York: Wiley.  [Google Scholar]) sure-thing principle, one of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision making. The phenomenon was attributed to a lack of clear reasons for accepting an option (x) when subjects are under uncertainty. Through a pragmatic analysis of the task and a consequent reformulation of it, we show that the effect does not depend on the presence of uncertainty, but on the introduction of non-relevant goals into the text problem, in both the well-known Gamble problem and the Hawaii problem.     

Aspects of situated cognition in embodied numerosity: the case of finger counting

Numerical cognitions such as spatial-numerical associations have been observed to be influenced by grounded, embodied and situated factors. For the case of finger counting, grounded and embodied influences have been reported. However, situated influences, e.g., that reported counting habits change with perception and action within a given situation, have not been systematically examined. To pursue the issue of situatedness of reported finger-counting habits, 458 participants were tested in three separate groups: (1) spontaneous condition: counting with both hands available, (2) perceptual condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers (3) perceptual and proprioceptive condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers and with busy dominant hand. Report of typical counting habits differed strongly between the three conditions. 28 % reported to start counting with the left hand in the spontaneous counting condition (1), 54 % in the perceptual condition (2) and 62 % in the perceptual and proprioceptive condition (3). Additionally, all participants in the spontaneous counting group showed a symmetry-based counting pattern (with the thumb as number 6), while in the two other groups, a considerable number of participants exhibited a spatially continuous counting pattern (with the pinkie as number 6). Taken together, the study shows that reported finger-counting habits depend on the perceptual and proprioceptive situation and thus are strongly influenced by situated cognition. We suggest that this account reconciles apparently contradictory previous findings of different counting preferences regarding the starting hand in different examination situations.