Sometimes happy people focus on the trees and sad people focus on the forest: context-dependent effects of mood in impression formation

Research indicates that affect influences whether people focus on categorical or behavioral information during impression formation. One explanation is that affect confers its value on whatever cognitive inclinations are most accessible in a given situation. Three studies tested this malleable mood effects hypothesis, predicting that happy moods should maintain and unhappy moods should inhibit situationally dominant thinking styles. Participants completed an impression formation task that included categorical and behavioral information. Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, no fixed relation between mood and processing emerged. Whether happy moods led to judgments reflecting category-level or behavior-level information depended on whether participants were led to focus on the their immediate psychological state (i.e., current affective experience; Studies 1 and 2) or physical environment (i.e., an unexpected odor; Study 3). Consistent with research on socially situated cognition, these results demonstrate that the same affective state can trigger entirely different thinking styles depending on the context.     

不同冥想类型对创造性思维的影响及作用机制

冥想与创造性的关系正逐渐被关注,澄清冥想练习对创造性思维的影响效果和作用机制对个体创新潜能的培养与提升具有重要意义。不同冥想类型对创造性思维的影响具有特异性,专注冥想主要通过注意聚焦和提升自上而下的执行控制能力来对聚合思维产生积极影响;正念冥想引起的离焦的注意状态,以及对认知灵活性和积极情绪的促进,有助于发散思维。未来应加强不同冥想类型与创造性思维的整合研究,探讨冥想影响创造性思维的脑机制,以及冥想与其他干预训练对创造性思维的不同作用机制等。     

Toward the Desegregation of Thought and Affect in Psychological Theorizing

This article interrogates the historical segregation of thought and affect in psychological theorizing. I note how, across a range of theoretical approaches to the study of thinking, the relations between thought and affect have been either negated or ignored or underemphasized. In the context of the recent ‘turn to affect’ in the social sciences, which has been seen as offering a new paradigm for conceptualizing social and psychological phenomena, this elision is all the more striking, and a selective overview of current writings illustrative of this literature is presented. Yet, reciprocally, it is noteworthy that the ‘turn to affect’ literature has not addressed the relation between affect and thought, and hence that it contributes to the theoretical segregation that I argue is problematic. I then discuss some recent proposals within psychology that, in each of their specific ways, dissolve the theoretical dualism between thinking and affect, and offer an integrative reformulation that synthesizes the affective, intellectual, and psychosocial constituents of thought, as well as some works outside of psychology that can be viewed as illustrating the fusion of thought and affect. I argue for an approach that recognizes the biographical intertwining of the affective and intellectual life of the epistemic agent and the way in which both are shaped by processes of social constitution and by transgenerational influences.     

Cognitive-versus-affective positivity asymmetries in thought systems

Positive-negative asymmetry in thought can involve both cognitive asymmetry, (thinking about characteristics that a stimulus has versus does not have), which we predict will be large and preponderantly a positivity bias, and affective asymmetry (thinking about desirable versus undesirable characteristics that the stimulus has or has not), predicted to be small and to fluctuate predictably in direction. The first four of the 10 studies reported here investigate asymmetries in thinking ability, measured by giving people directed-thinking tasks specifically asking them to generate positive versus negative thoughts. We predicted and found no affective asymmetry and a moderate-sized cognitive positivity bias that declines with practice. The second four of the 10 studies investigate asymmetries in proclivity (or preference beyond ability) that appear when people free associate on a variety of stimuli. As regards proclivity, we predicted and found a large, uniformly positive cognitive bias (that declines somewhat as children mature), but only a slight affective bias that is positive when autistic needs are dominant and negative when realistic needs dominate. A final pair of studies show that the cognitive and affective variables interact as regards how directed positive versus negative thinking about a stimulus affects evaluation of that stimulus.     

分析思维降低情感预测影响偏差

人们在决策前需要对决策可能带来的结果进行预测。人们往往会高估未来事件对情感的影响, 这被称为影响偏差。本研究从双系统理论出发, 考察了分析思维是否会降低情感预测影响偏差。实验1(采用图片启动)和实验2(采用语言流畅性任务)考察了分析思维对影响偏差的影响, 并分析了情感预测程度的中介作用。实验3在现场中以真实的决策(生育二孩)为例, 考察了分析思维启动对情感预测的影响。结果发现:分析思维会降低情感预测强度, 进而降低影响偏差。     

Assessing affective experience of in-situ environmental walk via wearable biosensors for evidence-based design

In environmental psychology research, the most commonly used methods are phenomenological interviews and psychometric scales. Recently, with the development of wearable bio-sensing devices, a new approach based on bio-sensing data is becoming possible. In this study, we examined the feasibility of using wearable biosensors to document affective experience during in-situ walk. An eight-channelled Procomp multi-bio-sensing devices (EKG, EEG, skin conductance, temperature, facial EMG, respiration) were used, in addition with a GPS tracker, to measure the in situ physiological affective responses to environmental stimuli. This pilot experiment revealed consistent results between bio-sensing measures and two traditional methods, i.e. phenomenological interviews and psychological Likert scale rating, which indicated that mobile bio-sensing could be a promising method in measuring in-situ affective responses to environmental stimuli as well as diagnosing potential environmental stressor. This new bio-sensory method, as exemplified in this paper, could help identifying negative stressful stimuli and providing evidence-based diagnosis to support design strategies.     

意象思维与躯体化症状：疾病表达的文化心理学途径

意象思维是中国人的传统思维模式, 它通过观物取象和取象比类的方式认知世界、推演联系。这种思维模式塑造了中国人特有的身心不分而非两分的身体观、疾病观和治疗观。在中国人的观念中, 身体不仅仅是一具生理躯体, 还具有气、阴阳、五行等本土概念所体现的弥合物质与精神、联结生理与心理的模糊性与开放性。人们在表达疾病感觉时通常不分生理与心理, 任何一方面出现不适感觉即可认为自己生病, 在面对心理医生时也倾向于同时报告躯体状况与心理感觉, 从而使得临床报告出现较高的躯体化报告率。这正是文化心理影响疾病表达的体现。这也使得疾病不仅是一种医学现象, 也是一种文化现象; 医学不仅需要生理知识, 也需要人文知识。     

Intuition: Dumb But Lucky. Fortuitous Affective Cues and Their Disruption by Analytic Thought

'Intuition' can sometimes produce attitudes and judgments that are superior to those generated from conscious, analytic thinking. I consider two unsatisfying explanations for the differences: (i) that reasoning is 'dumb', in that it simply limits and biases otherwise adequate decisions; or (ii) that intuition is 'smart', in that it improves those processes by invoking qualitatively distinct and sophisticated cognitive mechanisms. I propose, instead, that intuition is 'dumb but lucky', that its positive benefits are achieved via fortuitious covariation, often inherent in the structure of the social world, between decision outcomes and subjective feeling states – particularly positive affect, familiarity, and cognitive fluency. I also advance the 'affect disruption hypothesis', which proposes that analytic thinking interferes with the use of these affective cues by underweighting affective responses, conflating feeling states that are subjectively similar, and/or generating competing emotions. I review data in support of this hypothesis in domains such as art preferences, music popularity, and sports prediction, and provide a new characterization of what constitutes 'good intuition'.     

The computerized Tower of Hanoi: a new form of administration and suggestions for interpretation

A computerized version of the Tower of Hanoi with a new form of administration was administered to two different groups, 15 men and 22 women, who were university students reporting normal psychological histories, and 24 traumatically brain-injured patients (20 men and 4 women). Scores on this test for both groups can be interpreted as an index of ability to solve problems and of learning strategies. Men and women scored differently on the task, i.e., women used different strategies than men to solve problems.     

Pleasure,Arousal, Dominance: Mehrabian and Russell revisited

This paper presents a discursive review of the dimensions pleasure, arousal and dominance that Mehrabian and Russell developed in 1974 to assess environmental perception, experience, and psychological responses. Since then numerous researchers applied these dimensions to assess the experience of the physical environment and its perceived qualities. Although the dimensions appeared to be useful, there is a long-lasting debate going on among environmental psychologists about the interpretation of pleasure, arousal and dominance and its underlying mechanisms. Due to the lack of clarity researchers use different adjectives to describe environmental experiences, which makes any comparison between research findings difficult. This paper shows that the three dimensions can be linked to the current ABC Model of Attitudes: pleasure, arousal and dominance can be respectively related to affective, cognitive and conative responses, i.e. Affect, Cognition and Behaviour (ABC). In addition, connecting the three dimensions to the triad feeling, thinking and acting, can also help to improve our understanding, interpretation and measurement of pleasure, arousal and dominance. Based on this review, it is proposed to re-introduce the three dimensions and to replace the nowadays often used two dimensional model with pleasure and arousal by a three dimensional model, including dominance as a third dimension, to represent the complete range of human responses.     

The affective basis of violence

Violence is a complex matter, and understandingly perhaps, it is the objective, behavioral aspects that are commonly focused on. Here, however, it is the subjective psychological and especially affective substrates of violence that are brought to the fore. Psychoanalytic perspectives provide a way of thinking about these that also sets them in a human-developmental context. In this essay, psychoanalytic ideas about aggression and violence are considered, and what they have to say about the relationship between states of mind and behavior is critically reviewed. There also is an exploration of the ways that some recent findings in developmental science and neuroscience can refine and augment an understanding of these relationships, facilitating the construction of a psychobiological model, which may be placed in a social context. From this biopsychosocial perspective, aggression is seen as a heuristic concept that encapsulates numerous interacting elements that in ordinary development integrate and serve to promote optimal organism survival: By contrast, from this perspective, in humans violence may be understood as a pathological variant of aggression.     

Priming in interpersonal contexts: implications for affect and behavior

Priming stereotypes can lead to a variety of behavioral outcomes, including assimilation, contrast, and response behaviors. However, the conditions that give rise to each of these outcomes are unspecified. Furthermore, theoretical accounts posit that prime-to-behavior effects are either direct (i.e., unmediated) or mediated by cognitive processes, whereas the role of affective processes has been largely unexplored. The present research directly investigated both of these issues. Three experiments demonstrated that priming a threatening social group ("hoodies") influences both affect and behavior in an interpersonal context. Hoodie priming produced both behavioral avoidance and several affective changes (including social apprehension, threat sensitivity, and self-reported anxiety and hostility). Importantly, avoidance following hoodie priming was mediated by anxiety and occurred only under conditions of other- (but not self-) focus. These results highlight multiple routes through which primes influence affect and behavior, and suggest that attention to self or others determine the nature of priming effects.     

Consent's Been Framed: When Framing Effects Invalidate Consent and How to Validate It Again

In this article I will argue first that if ignorance poses a problem for valid consent in medical contexts then framing effects do too, and second that the problem posed by framing effects can be solved by eliminating those effects. My position is thus a mean between two mistaken extremes. At one mistaken extreme, framing effects are so trivial that they never impinge on the moral force of consent. This is as mistaken as thinking that ignorance is so trivial that it never impinges on the moral force of consent. At the other mistaken extreme, framing effects are so serious that their existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. This is as mistaken as the idea that ignorance is so serious that its existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. I will argue that, instead of endorsing either of these mistaken extreme views, we should instead endorse a moderate view according to which framing effects sometimes pose a serious challenge for the validity of consent, just as ignorance does, but one which we can solve by eliminating the effect, just as we can solve the problem of ignorance by eliminating it.     

情感一致性及其对认知加工的影响

具身情绪观认为情感的核心功能是评价,这种评价信息会同时表征在低层感知系统和高层认知系统中,它们相互影响、互为因果。情感一致性反映的是情感具身反应（心理感受、情感相关的身体动作和表情等）与情感认知评价（情感的观念性内容,积极与消极）在效价上的耦合关系。这种关系突出的表现为效价上是否一致,情感一致促进其后的认知加工,情感不一致的作用相反。该观点在短时记忆、叙事建构、刻板印象和说服效果等领域得到了证实。未来的研究应重视情感一致性的情感意义,扩展情感一致性定义及假设,并检验情感一致性的评价本质。     

Emotions beyond brain and body

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make emotions “embedded” or “extended” in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of “embedded” emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are “extended” or “distributed.”     

Strategy for Animalism

The central argument for animalism is the thinking animal problem (TAP): if you are not an animal, there are two thinkers within the region you occupy, i.e., you and your animal body. This is absurd. So you are an animal. The main objection to this argument is the thinking brain problem (TBP): animalism faces a problem that is structurally analogous to TAP. Specifically, if animalism is true, you and your brain both think. This is absurd. So animalism is false. The purpose of this paper is to propose strategies animalists can endorse to solve TBP. I first show that animalists can solve TBP by arguing that it is not sound. This solution to TBP raises questions about personal identity over time and the mereological relation between the person and the brain. I argue that animalists can answer the personal identity question by endorsing non-biological persistence conditions as well as biological ones. For the mereological question, I first show that animalism is incompatible with four-dimensionalism and eliminativism. I then argue that animalists should endorse the dominant sortal account to answer the mereological question.     

The Psychological Basis of Homophobia: Cultural Construction of a Barrier

The main goals of this article are: (a) to analyze the intricate relations between sexuality, gender, culture and power, and more precisely, the connections between homophobia and sexism; and (b) to analyze the psychological and cultural basis of homophobia and its affective roots. The model of the semiotic regulatory system and the general notion of tension between the two processes (specified by Ernest Boesch)--Heimweh ("homeward road"--striving towards the known and the secure) and the Fernweh ("road to the far away"--adventure, encountering novelty) is used as the theoretical ways to analyze homophobia as a cultural barrier. It is suggested: homophobia is a boundary phenomenon of affective meaning making, a collective historical-cultural construction. Presented in the conclusion are some implications of the promotion of strategies against homophobia in our societies.     

Neuroticism and emotional risk during the COVID-19 pandemic

Large-scale health crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, may evoke negative affective responses, which are linked to psychological maladjustment and psychopathology. Here, we shed light on the role of the personality trait neuroticism in predicting who experiences negative affective responses. In a large-scale experience-sampling study (N = 1,609; 38,120 momentary reports), we showed that individuals high in neuroticism experienced more negative affect and higher affective variability in their daily lives. Individuals high in neuroticism also (a) paid more attention to COVID-19-related information and worried more about the consequences of the pandemic (crisis preoccupation), and (b) experienced more negative affect during this preoccupation (affective reactivity). These findings offer new insights into the consequences and dynamics of neuroticism in extreme environmental contexts.     

Affect as a foundational psychological process for spirituality and empathy

There is growing interest in understanding the manner by which spiritual experiences, religious beliefs and behaviours, and prosocial traits (e.g., empathy, altruism) are related. Research has recently focused on determining those psychological constructs (e.g., affective, behavioural, cognitive) that are common to these related constructs, although the specific relationships remain unclear. The current study evaluated relationships among spiritual experiences and affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy in 98 participants with heterogeneous health conditions. Results indicate that spirituality is significantly related to affective empathy, but not cognitive empathy. These findings suggest that individuals’ propensity to be both spiritual and empathetic is primarily related to a greater disposition towards emotional connection with others (i.e., whether with the divine or other people). Research and practical implications are discussed.