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唐代道教义理的代表作《道教义枢》是孟安排根据隋代巨著《玄门大论》而精炼简编的一部理论的专著。其作者“青溪道士”孟安排是唐武则天时期荆州———青溪山一带的道士 ,也是一个卓有成效的道教理论家和修炼者。因其生平事迹不见史传 ,我们仅从现存的少许资料中 ,就他与青溪山道教浅作探讨。一、孟安排生平略考《正统道藏》太平部收有《道教义枢》十卷 ,原书题“青溪道士孟安排集”① ,这是出现孟安排名与书的第一处 ;唐代诗人陈子昂撰《荆州大崇福观碑记》中有“道士孟安排者 ,玄禀真骨 ,记上阶黄裳羽袂 ② ……”这是《道家金石略》中收… 相似文献
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我是龙虎山嗣汉天师府门下授职的道教正一派散居道士 ,15岁从祖入道 ,奉守道教经典、戒规 ,擅长各种斋醮祭祷、超亡追思科仪 ,历经 6 5年道龄 ,耄耋年迈 ,白首残烛 ,但对太上的虔诚不改 ,于是有几句憋在心里的话不得不讲。道教伴随着新中国的诞生而新生 ,特别是在改革开放中迈上健康发展的道路。民族振兴 ,国家富强 ,古老的道教充满着活力与生机。中国道协张继禹副会长在庆祝中华人民共和国成立五十周年《中华振兴 ,道教庆幸》一文中指出 :散居正一派道士是道教衍传的传统形式之一 ,应予认定和管理 ,散居正一派道士的权益都应得到尊重和政策… 相似文献
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There is an old but powerful argument for the claim that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A crucial ingredient in this argument is the principle of the “Fixity of the Past” (FP). A seemingly new response to this argument has emerged, the so-called “dependence response,” which involves, among other things, abandoning FP for an alternative principle, the principle of the “Fixity of the Independent” (FI). This paper presents three arguments for the claim that FI ought to be preferred to FP.
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Two types of matching designs, static and dynamic, are differentiated. While all matching designs are logically the same in terms of the probability model which determines chance level of performance, an attempt is made to demonstrate that there is an interaction between the tactics, strategies, and actual knowledge ofS and the type of design used which will, in turn, lead to different results even whenS's knowledge is held constant. It is suggested that analogous situations may exist within the framework of the traditional psychometric model.The work reported in this paper was supported by a National Science Foundation Undergraduate Research Participation Grant (NSF-G15797) to the senior author. The authors are indebted to Joel E. Greene for his advice and criticism. 相似文献
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《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3):303-321
If practical reasoning deserves its name, its form must be different from that of ordinary (theoretical) reasoning. A few have thought that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, rather than a mental state. I argue here that if the conclusion is an action, then so too is one of the premises. You might reason your way from doing one thing to doing another: from browsing journal abstracts to reading a particular journal article. I motivate this by sympathetically re-examining Hume's claim that a conclusion about what ought to be done follows only from an argument one of whose premises is likewise about what ought to be done. 相似文献
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