Expertise and the evolution of consciousness

This paper argues that expertise can be used as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. The argument is based on the following observations: (1) expertise and skill acquisition require deliberate practice; and (2) the characteristics of deliberate practice such as performance evaluation against a more proficient model, retention of voluntary control over actions, self-monitoring, goal-setting, error-detection and correction, and the construction of hierarchically organized retrieval structures are outside of the currently understood bounds of unconscious processing. Thus, to the extent that evidence of expertise exists in an organism, evidence of conscious experience is also present. Two important implications arise from this conclusion: (1) evidence of expertise can be used as the basis for cross-species comparisons of consciousness; and (2) the evolution of human consciousness can be assessed using fossil evidence of skilled behavior as a measure of consciousness.     

Functional role theories of representation and content explanation: with a case study from spatial cognition

The aim of this paper is to show that the widespread opinion, according to which functional role theories of representation fail to account for content explanations of human and animal behaviour, cannot be confirmed with respect to each type of functional role theory. Functional resemblance theories (as referred to by O’Brien and Opie in Representation in mind, Elsevier, 2004) allow for content explanations of successfully performed cognitive abilities as much as for explanations of systematic errors resulting from misrepresentation. How functional roles do their explanatory work in actual scientific research examples is shown by a detailed exploration of model assumptions about homing performances based on path integration mechanisms in humans and animals.

Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I claim that the argument therefore fails.

Deliberate practice in dogs: a canine model of expertise

The acquisition of expertise is an area of controversy between those who lean more toward learning and those who lean more toward talent. Because the genetics and early life experiences of humans are not open to direct manipulation, human studies are of limited use in this debate. Studies using nonhumans as expert models may prove useful in resolving this dispute. For nonhumans to be considered proper models of human experts, there must be evidence supporting a shared acquisition mechanism. A candidate mechanism is deliberate practice. The author tested the deliberate practice theory of expertise acquisition on dogs competing in the sport of agility. The author examined the relationships between amounts of accumulated deliberate practice and agility performance measures. The author found there was a statistically significant relationship between the amount of deliberate practice and measured performance in agility dogs, even when controlling for sex, breed group, age, and height.     

Thinking across species—a critical bioethics approach to enhancement

Drawing upon a concept of ‘critical bioethics’ [7] this paper takes a species-broad approach to the social and ethical aspects of enhancement. Critical Bioethics aims to foreground interdisciplinarity, socio-political dimensions, as well as reflexivity to what becomes bioethical subject matter. This paper focuses upon the latter component and uses the example of animal enhancement as a way to think about both enhancement generally, and bioethics. It constructs several arguments for including animal enhancement as a part of enhancement debates, and considers some connections between human and animal enhancement. The paper concludes in a plea for an ‘enhancement’ to our critical abilities to examine some of the underlying social, moral and ethical assumptions bound up in varied anticipated ‘enhanced’ futures.

Suffering without subjectivity

This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that those animals dont suffer, and arent appropriate objects of sympathy and concern.     

Cultivating expertise in informal reasoning.

People generally develop some degree of competence in general informal reasoning and argument skills, but how do they go beyond this to attain higher expertise? Ericsson has proposed that high-level expertise in a variety of domains is cultivated through a specific type of practice, referred to as "deliberate practice." Applying this framework yields the empirical hypothesis that high-level expertise in informal reasoning is the outcome of extensive, deliberate practice. This paper reports results from two studies evaluating the hypothesis. University student participants completed 12 weeks of deliberate practice in informal reasoning. Quantity of practice was recorded by computer, and additionally assessed via self-report. The hypothesis was supported: Students in both studies showed a large improvement, and practice, as measured by computer, was related to amount of improvement in informal reasoning. These findings support adopting a deliberate practice approach when attempting to teach or learn expertise in informal reasoning.     

Mental Practice or Spontaneous Play? Examining Which Types of Imagery Constitute Deliberate Practice in Sport

Imagery use was examined within the deliberate practice framework (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993 Ericsson, K., Krampe, R. and Tesch-Römer, C. 1993. The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological Review, 100: 363–406. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Athletes (N = 150) from three competitive levels (recreational, intermediate, and elite) completed an adapted version of the Sport Imagery Questionnaire (SIQ; Hall, Mack, Paivio, & Hausenblas, 1998 Hall, C., Mack, D., Paivio, A. and Hausenblas, H. 1998. Imagery use by athletes: Development of the sport imagery questionnaire. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 29: 73–89. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Each SIQ item was scored for frequency, deliberation, relevance, concentration, and enjoyment. Eight SIQ items were deemed to be deliberate practice: five cognitive-specific images, two cognitive-general images, and one motivational general-mastery image. Motivational-specific imagery instead resembled deliberate play (Côté, Baker, & Abernethy, 2003 Côté, J., Baker, J. and Abernethy, B. 2003. “From play to practice: A developmental framework for the acquisition of expertise in team sports”. In Expert performance in sports: Advances in research on sport expertise, Edited by: Starkes, J. L. and Ericsson, K. A. 89–114. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.  [Google Scholar]). Elite and intermediate athletes used imagery more frequently and deliberately and perceived imagery to be more relevant and requiring more concentration than recreational athletes. Differences also existed regarding how deliberately the athletes engaged in various imagery types. The findings may inform applied practitioners regarding differences in imagery use between competitive levels and differences in the characteristics of imagery types.     

Reasonable Partiality and Animal Ethics

Moral psychology is often ignored in ethical theory, making applied ethics difficult to achieve in practice. This is particularly true in the new field of animal ethics. One key feature of moral psychology is recognition of the moral primacy of those with whom we enjoy relationships of love and friendship – philia in Aristotles term. Although a radically new ethic for animal treatment is emerging in society, its full expression is severely limited by our exploitative uses of animals. At this historical moment, only the animals with whom we enjoy philia – companion animals – can be treated with unrestricted moral concern. This ought to be accomplished, both for its own sake and as an ideal model for the future evolution of animal ethics.     

Cognitive contours: recent work on cross-cultural psychology and its relevance for education

This paper outlines new work in cross-cultural psychology largely drawn from Nisbett, Choi, and Smith (Cognition, 65, 15–32, 1997); Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, Psychological Review, 108(2), 291–310, 2001; Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently...and Why. New York: Free Press 2003), Ji, Zhang and Nisbett (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(1), 57–65, 2004), Norenzayan (2000) and Peng (Naive Dialecticism and its Effects on Reasoning and Judgement about Contradiction. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 1997) Peng and Nisbett (Cross-Cultural Similarities and Differences in the Understanding of Physical Causality. Paper presented at the Science and Culture: Proceedings of the Seventh Interdisciplinary Conference on Science and Culture, Frankfort, K. Y. 1996), and Peng, Ames, & Knowles (Culture and Human Inference: Perspectives from three traditions. In: D. Matsumoto (Ed.), Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (pp. 1–2). Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000). The paper argues that the findings on cultural influences on inference-making have implications for teaching and education generally, and specifically for the debate on conceptions and misconceptions of Asian students studying in western tertiary institutions around the world. The position defended is that, while there seems to be compelling empirical evidence for intercultural differences in thought patterns, these patterns are, for the most part, insignificant in everyday exchanges, though language and culture might subtlety modulate our inference-making at the margins. Linguistic determinism however is not defended. Nonetheless, the evidence provides food for thought, and it needs to inform the recent debates about international students studying overseas.

Expertise in Ultra-Endurance Triathletes Early Sport Involvement,Training Structure,and the Theory of Deliberate Practice

Abstract

The theory of deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) is predicated on the concept that the engagement in specific forms of practice is necessary for the attainment of expertise. The purpose of this paper was to examine the quantity and type of training performed by expert UE triathletes. Twenty-eight UE triathletes were stratified into expert, middle of the pack, and back of the pack groups based on previous finishing times. All participants provided detailed information regarding their involvement in sports in general and the three triathlon sports in particular. Results illustrated that experts performed more training than non-experts but that the relationship between training and performance was not monotonic as suggested by Ericsson et al. Further, experts' training was designed so periods of high training stress were followed by periods of low stress. However, early specialization was not a requirement for expertise. This work indicates that the theory of deliberate practice does not fully explain expertise development in UE triathlon.     

HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MINDFULNESS AND SELF-ACCEPTANCE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

We describe some of the historical conditions that made possible Kabat-Zinn’s [(1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Delacorte] very successful use of mindfulness in his stress management program. The ground had been prepared by the nonjudgmental acceptance of people and symptoms by Humanistic psychotherapists, and by the increasing assimilation of Buddhist ideas into Western psychology and psychotherapy. In addition the word “mindfulness,” as the translation of the Pali sati, came to refer to both the manualized practice that provides the evidence for its efficacy in the hands of Kabat-Zinn and others, and the more complex process of clear comprehension and recollection that is described in his more discursive writings, and is similar to Ellen Langer’s use of “mindfulness” in her book of that name.

Mindfulness as a moderator of the effect of implicit motivational self-concept on day-to-day behavioral motivation

Drawing from theories regarding the role of awareness in behavioral self-regulation, this research was designed to examine the role of mindfulness as a moderator between implicit motivation and the motivation for day-to-day behavior. We hypothesized that dispositional mindfulness (Brown and Ryan, J Pers Soc Psychol, 84, 822–848, 2003) would act to modify the expression of implicit autonomy orientation in daily behavioral motivation. Using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al. J Pers Soc Psychol, 74, 1464–1480, 1998), Study 1 provided evidence for the reliability and validity of a new measure of implicit autonomy orientation. Using an experience-sampling strategy, Study 2 showed the hypothesized moderating effect, such that implicit autonomy orientation predicted day-to-day motivation only for those lower in dispositional mindfulness. Those higher in mindfulness showed more autonomously motivated behavior regardless of implicit orientation toward autonomy or heteronomy. It also showed that this moderating effect of awareness was specific to mindfulness and was primarily manifest in spontaneous behavior. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for dual process theory and research.

Memory for the order of briefly presented numerals in humans as a function of practice

Inoue and Matsuzawa (Curr Biol 17: R1004–R1005, 2007) showed that with an accuracy of approximately 79%, the juvenile chimpanzee, Ayumu, could recall the position and order of a random subset of five Arabic numerals between one and nine when those numerals were presented for only 210 ms on a computer touch screen before being masked with white squares. None of nine humans working on the same task approached this level of accuracy. Inoue and Matsuzawa (2007) claimed this performance difference was evidence of a memorial capacity in young chimpanzees that was superior to that seen in adult humans. While the between-species performance difference they report is apparent in their data, so too is a large difference in practice on their task: Ayumu had many sessions of practice on their task before terminal performances were measured; their human subjects had none. The present report shows that when two humans are given practice in the Inoue and Matsuzawa (2007) memory task, their accuracy levels match those of Ayumu.     

Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?

The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.

Nothing But Stereotypes? Negligible Sex Differences Across Creativity Measures in Science,Arts, and Sports Adolescent High Achievers

Previous research has focused on understanding when, why, and how sex differences in creativity occur, as results vary across samples, measures, and methodologies. In the current study we investigated sex differences in creativity among 984 high achieving adolescents in three expertise areas: Sciences, Arts, and Sports. Eight creativity indicators were analyzed: Alternative uses task (AUT) fluency; creative self-efficacy (CSE); intraindividual strengths (difference between CSE and AUT Fluency); five self-reported creativity scales: Self/everyday, scholarly, performance, mechanical/scientific, artistic. The results showed negligible sex differences ( $n_{\mathrm{p}}^2$ = .01), with females performing better in AUT Fluency and males self-rating their CSE higher. No sex differences were found in self/everyday, scholarly and performance creativity. Males self-rated their mechanical/scientific creativity ( $n_{\mathrm{p}}^2$ = .06) higher than females; while females self-rated their artistic creativity ( $n_{\mathrm{p}}^2$ = .02) higher in comparison to males. Our results extend the existing literature by finding negligible sex differences in adolescent expert groups. However, some stereotypical differences emerged, for example, females with Sciences expertise rated their mechanical/scientific creativity lower than males with and even without Sciences expertise. Results call for further investigation into the links between sex differences, expertise, and specific creativity domains.     

Bohr as a Phenomenological Realist

There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism, which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist, because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist on the level of models. Such a realist position is what I call phenomenological realism. In this paper, and by taking Bohr’s debate with Einstein as a paradigm, I try to prove that Bohr was such a realist.

Meaning and the External World

Realism, defined as a justified belief in the existence of the external world, is jeopardized by ‘meaning rationalism,’ the classic theory of meaning that sees the extension of words as a function of the intensions of individual speakers, with no way to ensure that these intensions actually correspond to anything in the external world. To defend realism, Ruth Millikan (1984, 1989a, b, 1993, 2004, 2005) offers a biological theory of meaning called ‘teleosemantics’ in which words, without requiring any contribution from the speaker’s intensions, are supposedly matched directly with their extensions by external norms. But even if one granted as a theoretical possibility that word meaning might possibly be stabilized through an external process, nonetheless, realists who wish to appeal to teleosemantics for a semantic proof of the external world must be capable of identifying these external norms, something that Millikan describes as highly fallible. Furthermore, because they can be aware of these norms only as these are internally represented, it would also be necessary for realists to verify that these internal representations accurately reflect the norms as they occur in the external world. But given that this is virtually the same stumbling block to realism found in meaning rationalism, it is concluded that teleosemantics is not likely to restore faith in this worldview.

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Mother, Melancholia, and Play in Erik H. Erikson’s Childhood and Society

In an earlier article on Erik H. Erikson’s earliest writings (Capps, 2007), I focused on the relationship between the child’s melancholia and conflict with maternal authority, and drew attention to the restorative role of humor. In this article, I discuss two of the three chapters in part three, “The Growth of the Ego,” of Erikson’s first major book, Childhood and Society [Erikson, Childhood and society. New York: W. W. Norton, 1950, Childhood and society (rev. edition). New York: W. W. Norton, 1963]. I explore the same theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, but focus on the restorative role of play. I interpret the differences between the two cases in light of Sigmund Freud’s essay, “Mourning and Melancholia” [Freud, Mourning and melancholia. In S. Freud, General psychological theory (pp. 164–179). P. Rieff (ed.). New York: Collier Books. 1963].