What do mind readers know and what do we know about mind readers?

In this commentary, I raise various questions about Kim and Harris's fascinating findings. I ask what kind of knowledge children expect telepathic individuals to have, who children might consider to be good mind readers, why children value telepathy, and how puzzled children are by telepathy. I suggest potential ways to address some of these questions and end by reiterating the importance of probing individual differences in scepticism and credulity.     

What do we know about psycholinguistic effects?

Identifying clear and unequivocal psycholinguistic effects for lexical retrieval tasks has been the aim of a significant proportion of recent research activity. Debates have erupted concerning the existence or otherwise of particular effects on particular lexical tasks. Here, it is suggested that the reason for these debates is that researchers exercise choice in what variables they consider in their analysis. It is further illustrated that methods that have been employed for comparing the size of these effects between tasks can only lead to inconclusive results. It is suggested that psycholinguistic data may be better analysed using structural equation modelling methodologies. An example of such an approach is presented.     

What do we know about psycholinguistic effects?

Identifying clear and unequivocal psycholinguistic effects for lexical retrieval tasks has been the aim of a significant proportion of recent research activity. Debates have erupted concerning the existence or otherwise of particular effects on particular lexical tasks. Here, it is suggested that the reason for these debates is that researchers exercise choice in what variables they consider in their analysis. It is further illustrated that methods that have been employed for comparing the size of these effects between tasks can only lead to inconclusive results. It is suggested that psycholinguistic data may be better analysed using structural equation modelling methodologies. An example of such an approach is presented.     

How do I remember that I know you know that I know?

Communication is aided greatly when speakers and listeners take advantage of mutually shared knowledge (i.e., common ground). How such information is represented in memory is not well known. Using a neuropsychological-psycholinguistic approach to real-time language understanding, we investigated the ability to form and use common ground during conversation in memory-impaired participants with hippocampal amnesia. Analyses of amnesics' eye fixations as they interpreted their partner's utterances about a set of objects demonstrated successful use of common ground when the amnesics had immediate access to common-ground information, but dramatic failures when they did not. These findings indicate a clear role for declarative memory in maintenance of common-ground representations. Even when amnesics were successful, however, the eye movement record revealed subtle deficits in resolving potential ambiguity among competing intended referents; this finding suggests that declarative memory may be critical to more basic aspects of the on-line resolution of linguistic ambiguity.     

What do we really know about witness preparation?

Witnesses often meet with an attorney or witness preparation specialist before trial to review, discuss, and sometimes modify the substance and delivery of their anticipated testimony. This process is commonly referred to as witness preparation. During witness preparation, witnesses are taught to use effective testimony delivery skills (e.g., verbal and nonverbal communication skills) so that they will be perceived as being credible and persuasive in the courtroom. Although social scientists know much about communication skills, credibility, and persuasion, few published studies have attempted to determine whether or not these factors can be modified through witness preparation training. The present article reviews the psychological literature pertaining to witness preparation and makes recommendations for needed witness preparation research.     

How do we know that we are unique?

This paper aims to examine the notion of uniqueness as one aspect of the self that is taken for granted in psychotherapy. This paper attempts to address the question 'how do we know that we are unique individuals?' and in so doing, points out some difficulties. One plausible, but not problem-free answer is the notion of privileged access. Some of the problems will be briefly outlined.     

What do we know about how best to assess counsellor competence?

Issues of assessment of counsellor competence are becoming increasingly important as counselling becomes more professionalized and recognizable as a distinct profession. There is, however, a lack of systematic research into competence assessment in this field. The existing literature is discussed in terms of the issues involved in employing different sources of assessment, such as trainers, tutors, managers, supervisors, external assessors, clients, self and peers. Techniques of assessment are reviewed, including questionnaires, video and audiotapes, role play, examinations, learning diaries and computer simulations. Some suggestions are offered for increasing the validity of assessment judgements.     

Do chimpanzees know what others can and cannot do? Reasoning about ‘capability’

Much recent comparative work has been devoted to exploring what nonhuman primates understand about physical causality. However, few laboratory experiments have attempted to test what nonhumans understand about what physical acts others are capable of performing. We tested seven chimpanzees’ ability to predict which of two human experimenters could deliver a tray containing a food reward. In the ‘floor’ condition, legs were required to push the tray toward the subject. In the ‘lap’ condition, arms were required to hand the tray to the subject. In Exp. 1, chimpanzees begged (by gesturing) to either an experimenter whose legs were not visible (LNV) or whose arms were not visible (ANV). Rather than flexibly altering their preferences between conditions, the chimpanzees preferred the ANV experimenter regardless of the task. In subsequent experiments, we manipulated various factors that might have controlled the chimpanzees’ preferences, such as (a) distance between experimenter and subject (Experiment 2), (b) amount of occlusion of experimenters’ body (Experiments 2 and 3), (c) contact with the food tray (Experiments 3 and 4) and (d) positioning of barriers that either impeded the movement of the limbs or not (Experiment 5). The chimpanzees’ performance was best explained by attention to cues such as perceived proximity, contact, and maximal occlusion of body that although highly predictive in certain tasks, were irrelevant in others. When the discriminative role of such cues was eliminated, performance fell to chance levels, indicating that chimpanzees do not spontaneously (or after considerable training) use limb visibility as a cue to predict the ability of a human to perform particular physical tasks. Thus, the current findings suggest a possible failure of causal reasoning in the context of reasoning about the use of the limbs to perform physical acts.     

Conceptualization in the pigeon: What do we know?

This article reviews studies on conceptual behaviour in the pigeon that have been conducted over the past four decades. These studies reveal a variety of definitions and procedures employed in the assessment of this behaviour, a reflection of its multifaceted nature. Overall, pigeons have been found capable of categorizing a wide variety of static and moving natural and artificial stimuli. They have also demonstrated learning of abstract or relational concepts, even though such concepts seem to be more challenging. More recently, pigeons have also been shown to be capable of conceptualization as reflected in the ability to form functional or contingency classes (Lea, 1984), and some preliminary findings point to the possibility that pigeons can exhibit the more demanding equivalence classes (Sidman, 1990) that manifest themselves in the formal properties of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity emerging from conditional discriminations, when adequate procedures are employed. Available evidence now seems to suggest that functional and equivalence classes are closely related, but more work is needed to specify the nature of this relationship. At this point, it seems safe to conclude that language may not be necessary for conceptualization, including equivalence learning. Taken together, the findings of this review reveal learning abilities in the pigeon far beyond simple discrimination or categorization, although it is not yet well understood how this learning is achieved. Memorization of individual stimuli, featural analysis, and formation of prototypes have all been suggested as strategies utilized by pigeons in perceptual categorization tasks, while abstraction has been posited in explaining pigeons' relational concept learning. The reinforcement contingency has more recently been offered as a possible mechanism underlying equivalence learning. More broadly, the review illustrates how a hybrid of psychological and biological approaches can be employed in animal experimentation to tackle complex questions and enhance our understanding of behaviour and cognition.     

What do category-specific semantic deficits tell us about the representation of lexical concepts?

A reassessment of category-specific semantic deficits in light of their contribution to a theory of the representation of lexical concepts is proposed. Two theories are examined: one, held by the majority of researchers in the field, claims that concepts are represented by sets of features; another, in contrast, claims that concepts are atomic representations. An analysis of category-specific semantic deficits in terms of inferential relations (of the meaning-postulates type) between atomic concepts is elaborated. It is argued that this theory can better account for the pattern of performance exhibited by patients with semantic deficits.     

What do infants know about continuous quantity?

We investigated infants' sensitivity to amount of continuous quantity and to change in amount of continuous quantity. Using a habituation procedure, Experiment 1 examined whether 6-month-old infants can distinguish between different amounts of liquid in a container. Infants looked significantly longer at a novel quantity than at the familiar quantity. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm, Experiment 2 examined whether 9-month-old infants expect a change in amount when liquid is added to a hidden container which is already one-fourth full of liquid. Infants looked significantly longer at the impossible event than at the possible event. These findings indicate that infants are sensitive to amount, calling into question claims that infants have a quantitative mechanism which is exclusive to number.     

What do graded effects of semantic transparency reveal about morphological processing?

We examined the influence of semantic transparency on morphological facilitation in English in three lexical decision experiments. Decision latencies to visual targets (e.g., CASUALNESS) were faster after semantically transparent (e.g., CASUALLY) than semantically opaque (e.g., CASUALTY) primes whether primes were auditory and presented immediately before onset of the target (Experiment 1a) or visual with an stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 250 ms (Experiment 1b). Latencies did not differ at an SOA of 48 ms (Experiment 2) or with a forward mask at an SOA of 83 ms (Experiment 3). Generally, effects of semantic transparency among morphological relatives were evident at long but not at short SOAs with visual targets, regardless of prime modality. Moreover, the difference in facilitation after opaque and transparent primes was graded and increased with family size of the base morpheme.     

What do we know about the effects of mental training applied to combat sports? A systematic review

ObjectivesThis study aimed to investigate the effects of mental training applied to combat sports athletes.MethodsA systematic review was conducted, following the criteria recommended by the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement, from inception up to February 2021, with an electronic search in PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, PsycINFO, and SPORTDiscus databases. As eligibility criteria, this review included original studies that carried out any type of mental training, with or without a control group, acute or chronic, in combat sports athletes, of both sexes, age >16 and < 45 years old, from any competitive level, and evaluated the effect of these interventions on psychological measures. The quality assessment was conducted through the application of the Cochrane Collaboration tool.ResultsIn total, 1921 studies were found and after application of the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 21 articles were included in this review. A total of 417 subjects were investigated from the 21 studies. As results, despite the variations in the type and characteristics of the interventions, studies showed that mental training seems to improve anxiety, mood, self-confidence, emotions, cohesion, emotional balance, and relaxation, in addition to physical and athletic performance.ConclusionsThis systematic review based on the evidence from the selected studies indicates that mental training seems to be beneficial for athletes in combat modalities, while combat sports can benefit from mental training in preparation, competition, and recovery. However, the interpretation of these findings must consider that there is limited scientific production with good quality studies investigating the effects of psychological intervention protocols in athletes of combat sports in different combat modalities.Prospero register numberCRD42020169793.     

What are we doing to the earth's climate and what are we going to do about it?

Climatic considerations are critical if our planet is to survive. The environment, and in particular the atmosphere, is particularly sensitive to man. The time has come to act in favor of that which gives us life. This is why, in a field which knows no boundaries, only an international strategy can be effective.     

The development of arithmetic principle knowledge: How do we know what learners know?

This paper reviews research on learners’ knowledge of three arithmetic principles: Commutativity, Relation to Operands, and Inversion. Studies of arithmetic principle knowledge vary along several dimensions, including the age of the participants, the context in which the arithmetic is presented, and most importantly, the type of knowledge assessment (e.g., application of procedures, evaluation of examples). The vast majority of studies utilize single-faceted knowledge assessments, which can lead to incomplete or misleading views of learners’ knowledge. Both context and type of knowledge assessment can influence conclusions about learners’ arithmetic principle knowledge. However, relatively few studies directly address the possible effects of context or type of knowledge assessment on their results. To move the field forward, research that utilizes multifaceted knowledge assessments is needed.     

What can we learn about physical laws from the fact that we have memories only of the past?

Not much. I demonstrate this by constructing a model of a memory system governed by deterministic, time reversible laws only, thereby showing that the mere fact of our having memories solely of the past does not necessitate an indeterministic, time asymmetric or stochastic physics, essentially thermodynamic processes or a primitive notion of time asymmetric causation.     

What do students remember? Episodic memory and the development of schematization

Research examining changes in memory and memory awareness during learning suggests that early in the process, students primarily have representations that are episodic in nature and experience ‘remember’ awareness during recall. However, as learning continues and schematization occurs, students' knowledge is more likely to be dominated by semantic memory representations and ‘just know’ awareness is experienced during recall. The greater the amount of remembering experienced early in learning, the more likely it is that the shift to knowing will occur in students. In this study, university students studied either material rich in distinctive features that may serve as cues to episodic memory, or material lacking in these features. Students' knowledge was tested after a 2‐day and a 5‐wk interval. In contrast to students who studied the material lacking distinctive features, students who studied the distinctively rich material showed a predominance of remember awareness on the first test, and on the follow‐up test showed a predominance of know awareness and were able to recall more details of the learning material. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.