Partitions,probabilistic causal laws,and Simpson's paradox

I wish to thank Elisabeth Lloyd, Samuel Mitchell, Greg Ray, Piers Rollins and two anonymous readers for their insightful criticisms and comments.     

Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.     

Inductive reasoning in psychometrics: A philosophical corrective

A brief historical overview of inductive logic is presented, and the logic of enumerative induction is discussed in its two generalized forms: rule-derivative and event-predictive. The psychometric tradition and experimental studies in induction are briefly recapitulated to indicate that they have not included event-predictive induction, that probabilities have not been prevalently included in rule-generative induction, and that the linguistic medium might be utilized more fully in the inductive area. An experimental test model designed in order to address these considerations is discussed. This test model of event-predictive induction in the linguistic medium was administered to a large sample of college graduates. Statistical characteristics of the tests and items were very satisfactory when compared to operational subtests. The theoretical significance of the study for future psychometric and experimental investigations in induction is discussed.     

Partition-edit-count: naive extensional reasoning in judgment of conditional probability

The authors provide evidence that people typically evaluate conditional probabilities by subjectively partitioning the sample space into n interchangeable events, editing out events that can be eliminated on the basis of conditioning information, counting remaining events, then reporting probabilities as a ratio of the number of focal to total events. Participants' responses to conditional probability problems were influenced by irrelevant information (Study 1), small variations in problem wording (Study 2), and grouping of events (Study 3), as predicted by the partition-edit-count model. Informal protocol analysis also supports the authors' interpretation. A 4th study extends this account from situations where events are treated as interchangeable (chance and ignorance) to situations where participants have information they can use to distinguish among events (uncertainty).     

If dancers ate their shoes: Inductive reasoning with factual and counterfactual premises

This experiment addressed the effect of precue information, which may be either familiar or novel, and either relevant or irrelevant, on the solution of inductive reasoning problems. Sixty undergraduate students each completed 216 verbal inductive reasoning problems and five psychometric ability tests. The reasoning problems were equally divided among analogies, classifications, and series completions, with half of each kind of item presented in a standard, uncued format, and half presented with a precue. With respect to internal validation, it was found that for analogies and classifications, subjects take longer to process irrelevant than relevant information if the precue is familiar, but they take longer to process relevant than irrelevant information if the precue is novel. For series completions, this relation does not hold; rather, both novelty and irrelevance add time to the processing of information, with the time for irrelevance greater than that for novelty. The utility of precues for different tasks was explored, and it was found that familiar relevant precues facilitated solution of the more difficult kinds of items (classifications and series completions), but hampered solution of the easier, more automatically solved items (analogies). With respect to external validation, it was found that the nonentrenched induction tasks overlapped with psychometric tests in terms of abilities measured, that the abilities measured were fluid rather than crystallized, and that the precued (more nonentrenched) items were better measures of fluid abilities than were the uncued items.     

A new consequence of Simpson's paradox: stable cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma from populations of individualistic learners

Theories of choice in economics typically assume that interacting agents act individualistically and maximize their own utility. Specifically, game theory proposes that rational players should defect in one-shot prisoners' dilemmas (PD). Defection also appears to be the inevitable outcome for agents who learn by reinforcement of past choices, because whatever the other player does, defection leads to greater reinforcement on each trial. In a computer simulation and 4 experiments, the authors show that, apparently paradoxically, when players' choices are correlated by an exogenous factor (here, the cooperativeness of the specific PD chosen), people obtain greater average reinforcement for cooperating, which can sustain cooperation. This effect arises from a well-known statistical paradox, Simpson's paradox. The authors speculate that this effect may be relevant to aspects of real-world human cooperative behavior.     

Involvement of shared resources in time judgment and sequence reasoning tasks

Previous research suggests that time perception is supported by the same attentional resources involved in sequence processing. The present experiment was designed to clarify this connection by examining the relation between timing and reasoning tasks that involved either sequencing or non-sequencing judgments. For the timing task, subjects produced a series of 5-s intervals. For the reasoning tasks, subjects judged whether pairs of statements describing common actions either (a) were presented in the correct temporal order (sequencing), or (b) described similar actions or objects (similarity). Subjects performed the timing and reasoning tasks both separately and concurrently in a series of 3-minute trials. Comparisons of single-task and dual-task performance assessed interference patterns between concurrent tasks. Both reasoning tasks interfered with timing by making temporal productions longer and more variable. Timing had differential effects on the two reasoning tasks. Concurrent timing caused sequencing judgments to become slower, less accurate, and less sensitive relative to sequencing-only conditions. In contrast, similarity judgments were either unaffected or affected to a lesser degree by the concurrent timing task. These results support the notion that timing and sequencing are closely related processes that rely on the same set of cognitive resources or mechanisms.     

How two causes are different from one: The use of (un)conditional information in Simpson's paradox

In a causally complex world, two (or more) factors may simultaneously be potential causes of an effect. To evaluate the causal efficacy of a factor, the alternative factors must be controlled for (or conditionalized on). Subjects judged the causal strength of two potential causes of an effect that covaried with each other, thereby setting up a Simpson's paradox--a situation in which causal judgments should vary widely depending on whether or not they are conditionalized on the alternative potential cause. In Experiments 1 (table format) and 2 (trial-by-trial format), the subjects did conditionalize their judgments for one causal factor on a known alternative cause. The subjects also demonstrated that they knew what information was needed to properly make causal judgments when two potential causes are available. In Experiment 3 (trial-by-trial), those subjects who were not told about the causal mechanism by which the alternative cause operated were less likely to conditionalize on it. However, the more a subject recognized the covariation between the alternative cause and the effect, the more the subject conditionalized on it. Such behavior may arise from the interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing.     

推理判断中双重加工过程的协作与转换机制

推理判断中双重加工理论的发展经历了不同发展阶段, 早期主要对两个加工过程的定义及特征的关注, 当前转向对两者间的协作及转换机制的研究。本研究梳理了双重加工过程协作及转换机制的代表性模型及其相关实验支持证据, 综合归纳为以下三类模型：序列加工模型(Serial processing model)、平行竞争模型(Parallel competitive model)以及混合模型(Hybrid model), 并比较和论述了三类模型在两个加工过程的转换和协作机制、冲突探查的加工机制、偏差反应的解释机制上的异同, 以及三类模型各自面临的问题。     

The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: testing three principles of harm

Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.     

Toward a physiology of dual-process reasoning and judgment: lemonade, willpower, and expensive rule-based analysis

This experiment used the attraction effect to test the hypothesis that ingestion of sugar can reduce reliance on intuitive, heuristic-based decision making. In the attraction effect, a difficult choice between two options is swayed by the presence of a seemingly irrelevant "decoy" option. We replicated this effect and the finding that the effect increases when people have depleted their mental resources performing a previous self-control task. Our hypothesis was based on the assumption that effortful processes require and consume relatively large amounts of glucose (brain fuel), and that this use of glucose is why people use heuristic strategies after exerting self-control. Before performing any tasks, some participants drank lemonade sweetened with sugar, which restores blood glucose, whereas others drank lemonade containing a sugar substitute. Only lemonade with sugar reduced the attraction effect. These results show one way in which the body (blood glucose) interacts with the mind (self-control and reliance on heuristics).     

A partial resolution of the paradox of interference: The role of integrating knowledge

It has been noted that models of memory that posit retrieval interference imply that the more one knows about a topic, the harder it is to retrieve any one of these facts. Smith, Adams, and Schorr (Cognitive Psychology, 1978, 10, 438–464) regard this to be a paradox and postulate that people use world knowledge to integrate various facts about a concept and thereby avoid interference. Exploring this issue further in two experiments we discovered that integration of facts alleviates interference only when a person can perform his memory task by simply making a consistency judgment and can avoid the need to retrieve a specific fact. When foils force subjects to retrieve the specific assertion, the interference occurs among integrated facts as among unrelated facts. It appears that, when possible, subjects will judge whether they have seen a fact simply by judging if it is related to (consistent with) a theme they have studied. In other words, people judge themes rather than facts. Consistent with this interpretation, we found interference among themes; that is, the more themes were associated with a concept, the greater the interference.     

Statistical significance testing, construct validity, and clinical versus actuarial judgment: an interesting (seeming) paradox

What practical implications does Meehl’s attack on significance testing have for clinical psychologists, and doesn’t Meehl contradict himself in placing so much emphasis on scientific theories in such works as “Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks” and yet advocating for actuarial judgement, which is essentially an atheoretical approach to clinical predication? This seemingly paradoxical ideology, when considered within the broader context of Meehl’s work, can be readily aligned.     

Age differences in proactive interference, working memory, and abstract reasoning

It has been hypothesized that older adults are especially susceptible to proactive interference (PI) and that this may contribute to age differences in working memory performance. In young adults, individual differences in PI affect both working memory and reasoning ability, but the relations between PI, working memory, and reasoning in older adults have not been examined. In the current study, young, old, and very old adults performed a modified operation span task that induced several cycles of PI buildup and release as well as two tests of abstract reasoning ability. Age differences in working memory scores increased as PI built up, consistent with the hypothesis that older adults are more susceptible to PI, but both young and older adults showed complete release from PI. Young adults' reasoning ability was best predicted by working memory performance under high PI conditions, replicating M. Bunting (2006). In contrast, older adults' reasoning ability was best predicted by their working memory performance under low PI conditions, thereby raising questions regarding the general role of susceptibility to PI in differences in higher cognitive function among older adults. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).