决策过程中的调节匹配效应及其机制

以大学生为被试,运用实验法探讨了决策过程中调节定向与信息搜索模式之间的匹配效应及其机制。结果显示：(1) 促进定向组被试决策时更偏好基于属性的信息搜索模式,而预防定向组被试决策时更偏好基于选项的信息搜索模式;(2)当两种调节定向组被试分别使用各自所偏好的信息搜索模式制定决策时,达成了调节匹配,相比调节不匹配,这种匹配使被试对其所做选择给出了更积极的评价,即出现了调节匹配效应;(3)加工流畅性可以部分地解释这种调节匹配效应。     

在动态认知逻辑中融合观察与内省

一直以来,我们使用逻辑系统来描述数学的证明、结构的计算以及语言的意义。近年来,逻辑系统却越来越多地被用来研究理性行动者的很多方面。例如,如何接受单一的信息,多主体间的交流行为,以及更为一般的受目标驱动的主体间的互动。特别是,对观察和交流中的信息流的研究,大家使用所谓的知识更新、信念修正和偏好改变的动态认知逻辑。当新信息进来时,这些逻辑使用信息的“语义意义”作为被更新状态的选择范围。 然而,同样重要的是,理性主体的行动也会基于其他信息,譬如,由推理和反省得到的信息。对这些问题的研究实际上是对信息在更为语法的意义上进行理解的,即,把信息看作是可以由主体阐明的东西。也许有些奇怪,尽管在这一领域已经存在不少的研究方案,但是大家对什么是信息,信息的关键机制是什么等问题更少有一致的意见。可以看出,对“信息”的意义在逻辑中确实有很多不同的理解。 本文基于可能世界的语义,给出一个一致的信息模型,同时也赋予可能世界语法的“可及通路”。这样,我们就能把外部的“更新信息”和内部的“阐明信息”放在同一个动态逻辑系统中。特别是,我们提出了两个基本的信息行动：纯粹的基于观察的更新（“单纯的看”）和把不明显的知识变为明显知识的“知觉实现”。我们阐明为什么这些行动是自然的,同时我们也提出了一些新的研究问题。其中,很多问题探讨如何使其他的逻辑传统,包括信念修正理论、情景语义学和弗协调逻辑等适用于信息一驱使的理性行动者的图景。     

毛泽东农村调查与中国共产党集体理性决策模式的形成——土地革命政策制定过程考察

接受马克思列宁主义指导的中国共产党,在组建、成长中逐步形成了一种集体理性决策模式。该模式的组成模块及其要素,能够确保党的领导集体对所处环境及面对的问题作出的反应趋向于整体利益。但在1927年前,党的政策实践活动不充分,这一模式也不完备。土地革命时期,毛泽东通过农村调查,解决了土地没收范围、土地分配数量标准、富农问题等问题,形成了一套切实可行的土地革命政策。农村调查在促成土地革命从原理到方案的操作化、配套化、协同化的同时,也促进了集体理性决策模式的形成和发展。农村调查成为政策反馈机制,为中国共产党的能动性决策提供了条件,集体理性决策模式进而具有了自主学习功能。     

基础生成的多元部分收缩的一个公理化刻画(英文)

这篇论文结合了两种信念收缩的 AGM 框架的推广,分别为:(1)基础生成收缩,其中信念集的变化是从某个信念基的变化生成的;(2)多元收缩,其中几个句子一次过同时被消去。本文引入了一个结合以上两种推广的运算,"基础生成的多元部分收缩",并将其进行了公理化刻画。     

调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制：一个有中介的调节模型

当前,选择超载领域研究的焦点已从验证其是否存在,转向至其何时存在,即边界条件的探讨。本研究基于调节模式理论,分别以决策后悔和延迟选择作为选择超载的指标,开展两个实验探查选择超载存在的调节模式条件及所涉及的内在机制。实验1以决策后悔作指标,运用量表测试法操纵调节模式,初步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与决策后悔的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时体验到更强的后悔情绪,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的决策后悔无显著差异;实验2以延迟选择作指标,通过任务启动法操纵调节模式,进一步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与延迟选择的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时更倾向于延迟选择,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的延迟选择偏好无显著差异,进一步有中介的调节模型分析表明选择难度可以部分解释这种效应。总之,通过采用不同方法操纵调节模式,选取不同的选择超载指标,数据结果都一致支持：评估模式的个体比运动模式的个体更容易出现选择超载,选择难度在其中发挥着一定的中介作用。     

女性择偶决策的线索偏好及信息加工方式

以68名20~33岁之间的未婚女性为被试, 探讨了她们在信息板上做出择偶决策时的线索偏好及信息加工方式。结果显示：(1)候选人的性格、健康状况、责任心是女性择偶时优先考虑的线索; (2)被试在完成信息板任务时间接表现出来的线索偏好不完全等同于主观评估给出的线索偏好; (3)择偶决策是一个有限理性的启发式搜索过程, 且时间紧迫性和候选人数量影响被试对择偶线索的信息加工方式; (4)候选人数量与择偶满意度之间不是简单的线性关系, 增加候选人数量并不一定能够提高决策后的满意度。依据有关的理论和发现对这些结果进行了讨论。     

基于信号检测论的新业务投资决策有限理性实验

采用情境模拟实验,以60名MBA/EMBA学员为被试,对新业务投资决策的4个主要因素、36个处理、12个信号检测单元进行了观察分析.研究发现:①辨别力最强的决策信息组合、判断标准最高的决策信息组合,以及辨别力和判断标准 "双低"的决策信息组合;②影响决策者的有限理性存在程度差别,强弱依次是投资情境、面对机会、投资模式和以往机会.     

如何科学地制定临床决策——循证医学、指南共识、精准医学、整合医学与临床决策

临床决策是每一位医生每天临床实践中必然要面临的一项基本功,也是影响无数患者健康与生命的关键。目前大家对于临床决策的内涵、原则及决策依据比较熟悉。近年来,先后出现了循证医学、临床指南/共识、精准医学及整合医学,都在不同程度上为临床决策提供了重要的依据和方法。然而,目前人们对于上述医学模式对临床决策的作用认识并不一致,见仁见智。为了更科学地发挥上述医学模式对于临床决策的作用,本文依据辩证法的基本原理对于以上医学模式与临床决策的关系和作用进行了全面和客观的评价。     

状态相似性与流量限制模型

在可能世界语义中,如果根据是否含有模态算子而将一个点上为真的公式分为两类,那么可以认为不含模态算子的公式描述的是当前点的信息,其它公式描述的是其它点的信息,以及当前点与其它点的关系。通过对不同点上命题真值指派的比较,我们可以在可能世界语义模型上定义出一种状态相似性。本文构造了三类刻画状态相似性的模型,并给出了分别刻画其中两类模型的完全的系统。本文最后讨论这些模型在时态逻辑和信念逻辑中的应用。     

新技术引进决策的信息结构与辅助要求

本研究通过对浙皖两省38家企业与6家引进主管单位的现场调研与测评,就新技术引进决策的信息特征与结构关系进行了系统的分析,结果发现,新技术引进决策的信息包含八个主要因素:(1)职工状态信息;(2)决策者特征信息;(3)决策关系信息;(4)决策参与信息;(5)组织气氛信息;(6)目标与技术信息;(7)配备条件信息;(8)经济分析信息.它们在更高层次上形成组织心理、技术经济、决策者与关系三个信息模块.文章进一步分析了上述决策信息的结构关系及其认知加工特点,并提出新技术引进任务的决策心理辅助要求.     

Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle

This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decision-theoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory – a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions – and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker set of constraints than the standard AGM postulates. The Levi identity characterizes Pareto-minimal revisions of belief bases: a change of belief base is Pareto-minimal if and only if the change satisfies the Levi identity (for “maxichoice” contraction operators). Thus for belief bases, Pareto-minimality imposes constraints that the AGM postulates do not. The Ramsey test is a well-known way of establishing connections between belief revision postulates and axioms for conditionals (“if p, then q”). Pareto-minimal theory change corresponds exactly to three characteristic axioms of counterfactual systems: a theory revision operator that satisfies the Ramsey test validates these axioms if and only if the revision operator is Pareto-minimal. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

How to Revise a Total Preorder

Most approaches to iterated belief revision are accompanied by some motivation for the use of the proposed revision operator (or family of operators), and typically encode enough information in the epistemic state of an agent for uniquely determining one-step revision. But in those approaches describing a family of operators there is usually little indication of how to proceed uniquely after the first revision step. In this paper we contribute towards addressing that deficiency by providing a formal framework which goes beyond the first revision step in two ways. First, the framework is obtained by enriching the epistemic state of an agent starting from the following intuitive idea: we associate to each world x two abstract objects x ⁺ and x ⁻, and we assume that, in addition to preferences over the set of worlds, we are given preferences over this set of objects as well. The latter can be considered as meta-information encoded in the epistemic state which enables us to go beyond the first revision step of the revision operator being applied, and to obtain a unique set of preferences over worlds. We then extend this framework to consider, not only the revision of preferences over worlds, but also the revision of this extended structure itself. We look at some desirable properties for revising the structure and prove the consistency of these properties by giving a concrete operator satisfying all of them. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this framework has strong connections with two other types of constructions in related areas. Firstly, it can be seen as a special case of preference aggregation which opens up the possibility of extending the framework presented here into a full-fledged framework for preference aggregation and social choice theory. Secondly, it is related to existing work on the use of interval orderings in a number of different contexts.     

Towards a theory of intention revision

Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely connected with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties.     

Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference

We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of some information to maintain consistency, instead of being withdrawn it will be kept and introduced in a different layer with lower value. Throughout this development we will follow the principle of minimal change, being one of the important principles proposed in belief change theory, particularly emphasized in the AGM model. Regarding the reasoning part from the stratified belief base, the agent will obtain the inferences using an argumentative formalism. Thus, the argumentation framework will decide which information prevails when sentences of different layers are used for entailing conflicting beliefs. We will also illustrate how inferences are changed and how the status of arguments can be modified after a revision process.     

Revising Beliefs Towards the Truth

Belief revision (BR) and truthlikeness (TL) emerged independently as two research programmes in formal methodology in the 1970s. A natural way of connecting BR and TL is to ask under what conditions the revision of a belief system by new input information leads the system towards the truth. It turns out that, for the AGM model of belief revision, the only safe case is the expansion of true beliefs by true input, but this is not very interesting or realistic as a model of theory change in science. The new accounts of non-prioritized belief revision do not seem more promising in this respect, and the alternative BR account of updating by imaging leads to other problems. Still, positive results about increasing truthlikeness by belief revision may be sought by restricting attention to special kinds of theories. Another approach is to link truthlikeness to epistemic matters by an estimation function which calculates expected degrees of truthlikeness relative to evidence. Then we can study how the expected truthlikeness of a theory changes when probabilities are revised by conditionalization or imaging. Again, we can ask under what conditions such changes lead our best theories towards the truth.     

自省主体对Moore-型信息的处理与融合

The main task is to discuss the issue in belief dynamics in which philosophical beliefs and rational introspective agents incorporate Moorean type new information. First, a brief survey is conducted on Moore’s Paradox, and one of its solutions is introduced with the help of Update Semantics. Then, we present a Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL) which revises the belief of introspective agents put forward by Lindström &; Rabinowicz. Next, we attempt to incorporate Moorean type new information within the DEL (DDL) framework, as advised by van Benthem, Segerberg et al. Though we maintain the principle of “the primacy of new information” from the literature on traditional belief revision theory, several unsuccessful ways are also presented. We then conclude that some special kind of success (weak success) can still be found in those revision processes although absolute success does not hold. At last, the relevant problem of “learnability” is re-considered through weak success.     

Local Change

An agent can usually hold a very large number of beliefs. However, only a small part of these beliefs is used at a time. Efficient operations for belief change should affect the beliefs of the agent locally, that is, the changes should be performed only in the relevant part of the belief state. In this paper we define a local consequence operator that only considers the relevant part of a belief base. This operator is used to define local versions of the operations for belief change. Representation theorems are given for the local operators.     

Belief Revision And Epistemology

Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen that the belief revision operators on which the postulational theories are based are ill-defined. It is further argued that there is no way to repair the definitions so as to retain the spirit of those theory. Belief revision is better studied from within an independently motivated epistemological theory.     

Preference-based belief revision for rule-based agents

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation.