逻辑心理主义：一种信念修正的视角

以穆勒为代表的逻辑心理主义与以弗雷格为代表的反心理主义之间的争论由来已久。逻辑心理主义认为,逻辑是心理学的一部分或是其分支,具有描述性;反心理主义则认为,应当把心理的东西从逻辑中剔除,逻辑只是规范性的。信念修正理论虽具有规范性特质,但是当信念状态层级从低层级走向高层级时,其规范性解释力度则会降低,这表明信念状态的改变会受到经验描述的影响,信念修正理论研究有从规范性走向描述性的层级区分。信念修正理论一定程度上能为弱逻辑心理主义在逻辑中的合法性提供支持,并将心理主义与反心理主义聚焦在人即主体上。     

核心自我评价对大学生两种创业意向的预测作用

为探讨核心自我评价对大学生创业意向的影响机制,采用核心自我评价量表、创业自我效能感量表和创业意向问卷对264名大四毕业生进行测量,并运用相关分析与回归分析考察变量间关系。结果表明:(1)核心自我评价与创业效能感和两种大学生创业意向均显著相关;(2)核心自我评价完全通过创业效能感间接影响大学生生涯追求型创业意向;(3)核心自我评价对大学生生涯备择型创业意向的影响中,创业效能感起部分中介的作用。     

核心自我评价研究的反思与展望

核心自我评价是一种潜在的、宽泛的人格结构, 被定义为个体对自我能力和价值所持有的最基本的评价和估计。在过去十余年里, 核心自我评价的研究重点从早期关注结构的验证与测量、探讨核心自我评价在工作领域中的功能, 到近期开始转向探讨与心理健康、学业行为等变量的关系。另外, 核心自我评价的预测作用和调节作用可从动机、图式、能力、应对与获益和自我验证五种机制进行解释。核心自我评价的起源、过高核心自我评价是好是坏、核心自我评价还应包括或排除哪些因素、核心自我评价是否只有高低之分、“参照框架”对核心自我评价的预测力有何影响等涉及核心自我评价性质的问题目前仍没有得到解决。未来的研究可着眼于扩大研究领域、解决与核心自我评价性质有关的问题以及对核心自我评价进行本土化研究。     

核心自我评价研究综述*

核心自我评价自提出以来,便倍受关注。纵观15年的研究历史,核心自我评价的研究已从工作领域扩展到了学校心理健康领域。本文首先回顾了核心自我评价提出的背景、概念和结构、测量方法、与大五人格的关系、核心自我评价与工作满意和工作绩效的关系机制。然后,对核心自我评价的跨文化研究和在我国的研究进展进行了综述,并提出了一些存在的问题以及今后研究的方向。     

大学生核心自我评价与主观幸福感关系研究

核心自我评价是Judge提出的一个理论概念,他是个体对自身能力和价值所持有的最基本的评价。目的：本研究采用Judge编制的核心自我评价量表研究了中国大学生的主观幸福感,也进一步验证了核心自我评价理论。方法：我们采用自行翻译的核心自我评价量表,生活满意度量表和情感平衡量表,由研究者本人采用统一的指导语对330名大学生进行集体施测,全部数据采用SPSS13．0软件处理。结果：①生活满意度、正性和负性情感在核心自我评价的高、中、低不同得分组中差异显著。②核心自我评价与生活满意度、正性和负性情感相关十分显著。结论：本研究支持了核心自我评价理论,核心自我评价可以很好地预测个体的主观幸福感。     

他评：一种有效的人格评价手段

他评法是一种有效的人格评价手段, 甚至在一些情境下比自评法更为有效。在现实准确性模型(the Realistic Accuracy Model, RAM)以及权重平均模型(the Weighted-average Model, WAM)的基础上, 对于影响他评准确性的因素进行了梳理, 涉及熟悉性、关系质量、特质可见度以及假设相似性等。针对目前研究中存在的问题, 提出要在中国文化背景下, 进一步拓展研究对象的取样范围, 在更多不同的情境下提高研究的生态效度, 同时采用更多的人格评价手段。     

评价问题难度的一种新方法──认知负荷测量模型

认知负荷测量模型使用产生式编制计算机程序,对人们在解决同构问题时运用手段－目的分析的策略与非特定目标策略所引起的不同认知负荷进行模拟。利用工作记忆中语句的数量、产生式的数量、求解循环的次数、匹配的条件总数等指标来测量认知负荷,从而对问题的难度进行定量分析。     

核心自我评价：人格倾向研究的新取向

国外学者整合了有关工作满意度的人格倾向研究,并在此基础上提出了核心自我评价的概念。核心自我评价包括四种核心特质：自尊、控制点、神经质和一般自我效能。四种特质构成了一个更为基本的结构。核心自我评价及四种核心特质与工作态度和工作行为存在较强的相关,且能够有效预测这些变量。文章最后指出了今后的研究方向,比如对于结构问题的探讨和跨文化研究的深入     

利他惩罚中的结果评价—— ERP研究

利他惩罚是指个体为惩罚违反社会规范的人, 自愿支付成本。前人研究发现利他惩罚行为激活了背侧纹状体等与奖赏有关的脑区, 因此可以认为利他惩罚的结果是一种相当于金钱奖赏的正性结果, 不惩罚结果则是一种负性结果。本研究利用事件相关电位技术考察了被试在多次信任博弈游戏中观察“利他惩罚结果”和“不惩罚结果”的脑电成分, 结果发现被试产生了明显的反馈相关负波(feedback related negativity, FRN), 且负性程度更大的“不惩罚”结果其FRN波幅大于负性程度更小的“惩罚”结果。因为FRN是对负性反馈结果敏感的一个脑电成分。可见个体并非把利他惩罚结果知觉为一种正性结果, 因此FRN反映了对社会结果的情绪动机意义的评价。     

瑜伽的哲学 一种美学的审视与评价(上)

瑜伽,它是东方最为古老的精神性观念。它既有哲学性的思考,又有着深厚的生理学基础。不过,说起来,它虽然与哲学有关,但并不只是关心某种教理原则,它也要讨论诸如为什么或者因为……所以之类的疑惑与探求,但那并不是瑜伽学的重点。说到底,瑜伽只是某种     

A Paraconsistent Theory Of Belief Revision

This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come tobelieve in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision,in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replacesconsistency with a weaker property called coherence. In addition to herbelief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets arecoherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence.     

A Survey of non-Prioritized Belief Revision

This paper summarizes and systematizes recent and ongoing work on non-prioritized belief change, i.e., belief revision in which the new information has no special priority due to its novelty.     

Mighty Belief Revision

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information...     

Iterated Belief Revision

This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The paper emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.

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Infinitary Belief Revision

This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state.     

Revocable Belief Revision

Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result.     

A Characterization of Probability-based Dichotomous Belief Revision

Studia Logica - This article investigates the properties of multistate top revision, a dichotomous (AGM-style) model of belief revision that is based on an underlying model of probability revision....     

A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision

We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed. Giacomo Bonanno: I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments. A first draft of this paper was presented at the Sixth Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT6), Leipzig, July 2004.     

Contraction in Interrogative Belief Revision

In the paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change”, Olsson and Westlund have suggested that the notion of epistemic state employed in the standard framework of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985; G?rdenfors 1988) should be extended to include a representation of the agent’s research agenda (Olsson and Westlund 2006). The resulting framework will here be referred to as interrogative belief revision. In this paper, I attempt to deal with the problem of how research agendas should change in contraction, a problem largely left open by Olsson and Westlund. Two desiderata of an appropriate solution are suggested: one is a principle of continuity, stating that changes in the research agenda should somehow reflect that certain long term research interests are kept fixed. The other desideratum, which is based on part of Olsson and Westlund’s motivation for adding research agendas to the epistemic states, is that we should be able to account for how contraction may serve to open up new, fruitful hypotheses for investigation. In order to achieve these desiderata, I base my solution on a revised version of Olsson and Westlund’s notion of epistemic state.