Evolution,the End of Human Uniqueness,and the Election of the Imago Dei

Abstract

In both popular opinion and the minds of many scientists and theologians, the idea of human uniqueness and human superiority has been linked to the Christian doctrine of the imago Dei. Pursuing what is called the comparative approach to theological anthropology many have asked, in what ways is human nature different from the nature of animals and, therefore, like the nature of God? This article questions any concept of the imago Deithat equates the divine likeness with some characteristic, behavior, or trait which presumably makes humans unique—in a non-trivial way—from other animals and from the non-human hominids. Instead of grounding the image of God in human uniqueness, the author concludes that the imago Dei is—exegetically, theologically, and scientifically—best understood in light of the Hebrew theological framework of historical election.     

Self-Reference,Reality Principles,Marxism, and Social Transformations in the Postmodern Era

Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a social human phenomenon, through its direct bearings on the practice of society, did have a stormy history. I conclude that the fall of Bolshevism was unavoidable, and still, we might uphold our hope for a truly free society of humankind, just on the very basis of what we have learned of the fate of Marxist philosophy as such, as a recursively evolving social practice: the freedom of humankind of its own ideological burdens (constraints).     

Human rights and ethnic attitudes in Spain: The role of cognitive, social status, and individual difference factors

Cognitive, individual differences, and intergroup contact factors were examined in the formation of attitudes about human rights and ethnic bias in two studies conducted in Spain. A 7‐item scale measuring knowledge about human rights laws in Spain and the European Union was used in both studies. Participants were university students enrolled at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. In study one, participant (n = 127) knowledge about human rights laws, intergroup contact, Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Gough's Prejudice/Tolerance (Pr/To) scale were examined in relationship to bias towards Gitanos. Findings revealed that knowledge about human rights and social status variables (gender and age) were not significant predictors of Gitano bias, whereas Pr/To, RWA, and contact were all (R² = .28) significant predictors of bias against Gitanos. Findings provided cross‐cultural replication (Dunbar & Simonova, in press) of the relationship of Pr/To and RWA to Gitano bias. In study two, participant (n = 100) knowledge and feelings (measured on a three‐item semantic differential scale) about human rights laws, Pr/To, and RWA were examined in relation to strategies influencing peer attitudes about human rights on the Raven Social Influence Inventory (RSII) scale. Findings indicated that knowledge about human rights laws were correlated (r = .47, p < .001) with positive feelings about these laws. Results of a hierarchical regression analysis, controlling for knowledge about human rights laws and participants' social status, found that the Prejudice/Tolerance scale and feelings about human rights were related with both hard (R² = .11) and soft (R² = .08) social influence strategies influencing peer human rights attitudes on the RSII. Men and higher‐scoring participants on Pr/To both employed more hard social influence strategies. Findings indicate that while knowledge of human rights laws is unrelated to ethnic bias, more accurate knowledge is correlated to more positive feelings about laws meant to protect the rights of ethnic minorities.     

Revising,Correcting, and Transferring Genes

Abstract

The distinction between germline and somatic gene editing is fundamental to the ethics of human gene editing. Multiple conferences of scientists, ethicists, and policymakers, and multiple professional bodies, have called for moratoria on germline gene editing, and editing of human germline cells is considered to be an ethical “red line” that either never should be crossed, or should only be crossed with great caution and care. However, as research on germline gene editing has progressed, it has become clear that not all germline interventions are alike, and that these differences make a significant moral difference, when it comes to ethical questions about research, regulation, clinical application, and medical justification. In this paper, I argue that, rather than lumping all germline interventions together, we should distinguish between revising, correcting, and transferring genes, and I assess the consequences of this move for the ethics of gene editing.     

Contingency,arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status-conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude-based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status-holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter.     

Erikson,psychology, and religion

The writings of the late Erik H. Erikson (1) have contributed directly to the psychological study of religion, (2) were amenable to the efforts of others to develop normative theological arguments, and (3) might be seen as themselves examples of contemporary, nontheological accounts of the religious dimension of human existence. This paper begins by reviewing the principal contributions that Erikson made to the psychological study of religion, followed by a review of the uses that have been made of Erikson's work for normative/constructive activities in such areas as practical theology and pastoral counseling. I will then argue that Erikson's writings — when viewed in the vein of William James's radical empiricism and functionalist accounts of human religiosity — identify an irreducibly religious dimension to normative human functioning. Erikson's functionalism constitutes a form of nontheological religious thinking that speaks directly to concerns presenting themselves in contemporary culture.     

The neighbor and the infinite: Marion and Levinas on the encounter between self,human other,and God

In this article I examine Jean-Luc Marion's two-fold criticism of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of other and self, namely that Levinas remains unable to overcome ontological difference in Totality and Infinity and does so successfully only with the notion of the appeal in Otherwise than Being and that his account of alterity is ambiguous in failing to distinguish clearly between human and divine other. I outline Levinas’ response to this criticism and then critically examine Marion's own account of subjectivity that attempts to go beyond Levinas in its emphasis on a pure or anonymous appeal. I criticize this move as rather problematic and turn instead back to Levinas for a more convincing account of the relations between self, human other, and God. In this context, I also show that Levinas in fact draws quite careful distinctions between human and divine others.     

Talking about emotions: Semantics,culture, and cognition

Abstract

The author argues that the so-called “basic emotions”, such as happiness, fear or anger, are in fact cultural artifacts of the English language, just as the Ilongot concept of liget, or the Ifaluk concept of song, are the cultural artifacts of Ilongot and Ifaluk. It is therefore as inappropriate to talk about human emotions in general in terms of happiness, fear, or anger as it would be to talk about them in terms of liget or song. However, this does not mean that we cannot penetrate into the emotional world of speakers of languages other than our own. Nor does it mean that there cannot be any universal human emotions. Universality of emotions is an open issue which requires further investigation. For this further investigation to be fully productive, it has to be undertaken from a universal, language and culture-independent perspective; and it has to be carried out in a universalist framework that is language and culture-independent. The author proposes for this purpose the “natural semantic metalanguage” based on universal (or near-universal) semantic primitives (or near-primitives), developed over two decades by herself and colleagues, and she argues that the use of this metalanguage facilitates such a perspective and offers such a framework.     

Subsistence Needs,Human Rights,and Imperfect Duties

I address the usefulness of thinking about a human right to subsistence within conceptions of human rights grounded in ordinary moral reasoning. I argue that that natural rights should be understood as rights in rem, with their dynamism constrained by the requirements of justification and their scope constrained by the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. I then suggest that many of the most pressing demands which the moral significance of subsistence needs create are plausibly imperfect duties, and so cannot correlate to a natural right to subsistence. This restricts the helpfulness of a human right to subsistence in our reasoning about what we owe to others.     

Performing the imago Dei: human enhancement,artificial intelligence and optative image-bearing

If the imago Dei is not a taxonomic definition but rather something that is performed in context, what are the implications for questions of human enhancement and the development of artificial intelligence (AI)? The author considers Alistair McFadyen’s performative vision of the imago Dei, one that actively seeks humanity in concrete situations, in the context of human enhancement and AI, asking the questions, ‘Does becoming cyborg through human enhancement make us less bearers of the divine image?’ And, ‘Can AI ever be considered to be in the image of God?’ Briefly tracing the shift in perspectives on the imago Dei, before considering what a performance of the image might look like, the author proposes three performances that have significant implications for questions about what it means to be human. To be an image-bearer is not dependent upon human DNA or species membership, but on an optative performance of the imago Dei.     

Dualism in medicine,Christian theology,and the aging

Distinguishing a person's soul or mind from a person's body describes dualism, the philosophical premise that fails to integrate the person as one, but instead leaves the person as two, usually as souland body or as mindand body. In dualism, one tends to think of the soul or the mind as the person and the body as an appendage. I argue that 1) dualism is rampant in medicine; 2) that Christian theology has fundamentally opposed it, and 3) that cultural dualism today threatens the aging in particular. To deal with this threat, I argue that the moral task of being human is to become one in mind and body. That is, I argue that the unity of the person which is the unity of the mind and body is not really a metaphysical given, but rather the goal or end of being human.     

‘We Pray by His Mouth’: Karl Barth,Erving Goffman,and a Theology of Invocation

Rereading the opening question of the Westminster Catechism, “What is the chief end of man?”, I contend in this essay that the act of invocation — giving God thanks, praise, and petitions — is the act in and through which human being itself is founded, constituted and achieved. I take important cues from Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics and The Christian Life, and from sociologist Erving Goffman's work on the shifting “footings” involved in everyday interactions. I argue for an account of the human being as a being‐with‐God, human acting as acting‐with‐God, and human salvation as a restoration to the genuine human partner's work — indeed, the true leitourgia— of thanks, praise and petition to God.     

On human self-domestication, psychiatry, and eugenics

The hypothesis that anatomically modern homo sapiens could have undergone changes akin to those observed in domesticated animals has been contemplated in the biological sciences for at least 150 years. The idea had already plagued philosophers such as Rousseau, who considered the civilisation of man as going against human nature, and eventually "sparked over" to the medical sciences in the late 19^th and early 20^th century. At that time, human "self-domestication" appealed to psychiatry, because it served as a causal explanation for the alleged degeneration of the "erbgut" (genetic material) of entire populations and the presumed increase of mental disorders.     

Nature,corruption, and freedom: Stoic ethics in Kant's Religion

Kant's account of “the radical evil in human nature” in the 1793 Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone is typically interpreted as a reworking of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. But Kant does not talk about Augustine explicitly there, and if he is rehabilitating the doctrine of original sin, the result is not obviously Augustinian. Instead, Kant talks about Stoic ethics in a pair of passages on either end of his account of radical evil and leaves other clues that his argument is a reworking of an old Stoic problem. “Radical evil” refers to the idea that our moral condition is—by default and yet by our own deed—bad or corrupt; and that this corruption is the root (radix) of human badness in all its variety, ubiquity, and sheer ordinariness. Kant takes as his premise a version of the Stoic idea that nature gives us “uncorrupted starting points” (Diogenes Laertius 7.89). What sense can be made of the origin of human badness, given such a premise? Kant's account of radical evil is an answer to this old Stoic problem, which requires a conception of freedom that is not available in his Stoic sources.     

International Justice,Human Rights and Neutrality

A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose, rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist. This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all in a liberal society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Egocentricity,coenocentrism, and the nature of human fulfillment

This essay explores the reasons why human beings suffer unnecessarily and suggests the means by which that suffering may be alleviated. Normal psychological functioning isegocentric, a mode of being that derives from a profound sense of deficiency and proceeds with a quest to prove being and worth in face of the world.Coenocentrism is an awareness of inner commonality and relatedness that relieves a person's feelings of isolation, separateness, and difference from others. Coenocentrism requires a transformation of the self through ecstatic experience and a relinquishing of one's own basic tendencies and understandings of the self and world.     

Dispositions,explanation, and behavior 1

According to the theory of dispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non‐dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account of dispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of ‘reduction sentences’. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering‐law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To construct a potential explanation of the covering‐law type. The theory can also be applied fruitfully to human behavior, especially with respect to the issues of reasons and causes and of’ rational’ explanation. The success of the applicability of this theory of dispositions is further evidence of its adequacy.     

Heidegger,Sociality, and Human Agency

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being‐with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life.     

Pannenberg,Particularity and Eschatology: Shifting the Debate

Wolfhart Pannenberg's account of the eschatological transition in his Systematic Theology describes how human beings are transformed by passing through a purifying fire that destroys whatever in them is incompatible with the life of God. I argue that this representation of human transformation renders individual existence too discontinuous between life as it now is and the life to come, makes redeemed interhuman sociality unimportant, and transforms access to salvation for non‐Christians into a matter of works. As a result, Pannenberg cannot preserve the kind of particularity he needs for his own theological aims: ensuring the significance of history, affirming finitude and developing a non‐oppositional understanding of the relation between the finite and the infinite.