Is counter-terrorism policy evidence-based? What works, what harms, and what is unknown

Is counter-terrorism policy evidence-based? What works, what harms, and what is unknown. One of the central concerns surrounding counter-terrorism interventions today, given the attention and money spent on them, is whether such interventions are effective. To explore this issue, we conducted a general review of terrorism literature as well as a Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism strategies. In this article, we summarize some of our findings from these works. Overall, we found an almost complete absence of evaluation research on counter-terrorism strategies and conclude that counter-terrorism policy is not evidence-based. The findings of this review emphasise the need for government leaders, policy makers, researchers, and funding agencies to include and insist on evaluations of the effectiveness of these programs in their agendas.     

what is a disposition?

Attempts to capture the distinction between categorical and dispositional states in terms of more primitive modal notions – subjunctive conditionals, causal roles, or combinatorial principles – are bound to fail. Such failure is ensured by a deep symmetry in the ways dispositional and categorical states alike carry modal import. But the categorical/dispositional distinction should not be abandoned; it underpins important metaphysical disputes. Rather, it should be taken as a primitive, after which the doomed attempts at reductive explanation can be transformed into circular but interesting accounts.     

Actions,contexts, memory—what is the relation?

Whole list contexts have been found to influence action memory differently than item-specific contexts. Usually there is no recall enhancement with item-specific contexts, but considerable improvement with whole-list contexts. Three experiments investigated the effect of both kinds of context upon action memory. The results showed that whole-list contexts gave the beneficial effect, probably through their ability to string together actions within a common frame. Contrary to expectation the effects of item-specific contexts were not found to differ between motor and nonmotor encoding conditions, irrespective of whether these contexts were self-generated or provided by the experimenter. The experimental results suggest that the function of item-specific contexts has more to do with helping item differentiation than relational encoding. Since action events possess a high degree of distinctiveness, there is not much to gain by the addition of item-specific contexts in action memory tasks.     

So finally, what is Christian about Christian bioethics?

The author criticizes the essays in this issue by Waters, Erickson, Trotter and Verhey for not placing an adequate Christology at the center of their definitions what is Christian bioethics.     

What is iso and what is morphic in isomorphism?

Summary Isomorphism is not a simple concept. As a rule, the term applies to geometrical sameness. However, mathematicians use the term to denote algebriac linear, invertible relationships. Substantively there is also a problem: isomorphism may refer to the brain-experience relation, to the brain-environment relation, or to a three-way relationship of all of these. This commentary summarizes work done and discussions by the author with Wolfgang Köhler regarding these meanings of isomorphism.     

Who or what is the preembryo?

...The moral status -- and specifically the controversial issue of personhood -- is related to attainment of developmental individuality...This contrasts with the view that holds that personhood occurs earlier, at the point of genetic uniqueness. I believe that an embryo that has developed to the point where it can be one individual and one individual only, differs in moral status from a preembryo that has not, even if in many cases we may choose to treat them similarly...In view of the conviction that the preembryo is not yet a person and that its statistical potential for becoming such is small, it is not clear that nontherapeutic experiments can be excluded in principle. However, because the preembryo does have intrinsic potential...the preembryo should be treated as a person...Any exceptions from the prima facie duty to treat the preembryo as a person should be based on criteria established at the national level....     

People think about what is true for conditionals,not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of “if”

We report the results of two priming experiments that examine the comprehension of conditionals—for example, “if there are apples then there are oranges”—and biconditionals—for example, “if and only if there are apples then there are oranges”. The first experiment showed that participants read a biconditional faster when it was primed by a true possibility, “there were apples and there were oranges” than when it was primed by a false possibility, “there were no apples and there were oranges”; a conditional was primed equally by both possibilities. The second experiment showed that participants read the negated-antecedent conjunction faster when it was primed by a conditional than when it was primed by a biconditional; the affirmative conjunction was primed equally by both connectives. The experiments show that (a) when people understand “if A then B”, they access the true possibilities, “A and B”, and “not-A and B”, and (b) when they understand “if and only if A then B” they access “A and B”, but they do not access “not-A and B”. We discuss their implications for current theories of reasoning.     

What is Overt and what is Covert in Congenital Prosopagnosia?

The term covert recognition refers to recognition without awareness. In the context of face recognition, it refers to the fact that some individuals show behavioural, electrophysiological or autonomic indices of recognition in the absence of overt, conscious recognition. Originally described in cases of people that have lost their ability to overtly recognize faces (acquired prosopagnosia, AP), covert face recognition has more recently also been described in cases of congenital prosopagnosia (CP), who never develop typical overt face recognition skills. The presence of covert processing in a developmental disorder such as CP is a particularly intriguing phenomenon, and its investigation is relevant for a variety of reasons. From a theoretical point of view, it is useful to help shed light on the cognitive and neural underpinnings of face recognition deficits. From a clinical point of view, it has the potential to aid the design of rehabilitation protocols aimed at improving face recognition skills in this population. In the current review we selectively summarize the recent literature on covert face recognition in CP, highlight its main findings, and provide a theoretical interpretation for them.     

If merely more words,what is the point? A critical response

A critical response is given to the five articles constituting the special issue theme ‘Critical psychotherapy and counselling: if not now, when?’ The related arguments concerning political justice, professional struggles, new public management, therapeutic language use and ecotherapy are considered concisely and challenges made. Into this discussion is injected a degree of ‘brutalist objection’, along with a recommendation for radical honesty, a confession of depressive realism and hints of nihilism. Psychotherapy, whether traditional or critical, is taken to task for its romantic enmeshment in a hubristic fantasy of infinite relevance and improvement.     

Composites, compromises, and CHARM: what is the evidence for blend memory representations?

Metcalfe's (1990) distributed memory model simulates many misinformation effects by assuming representations that superimpose information from multiple sources. In the present article, two types of evidence are reviewed for such "blend" representations: composite recollections, including items from both the original and postevent sources (e.g., a previously seen intersection is remembered with a subsequently suggested stop sign), and compromise recollections, including features that cannot be exclusively associated with either source (e.g., a green car that was later suggested to be blue is remembered as bluish green). The considerable evidence for composite recollections provides little support for blend representations. Compromise recollections, though seemingly more persuasive, are both rare and interpretable without postulating blend representations. Speculation is made about potential findings that would support blend representations.     

On ‘what is said to be’

I wish to thank Arnold Koslow and David Rosenthal for helpful comments.     

Philosophy—what is to be done?

Philosophical thinking, in the historically original sense, is simply the human mind in operation, unaided by anything supernatural and unfettered by any human authority or any procedure for reaching some pre-given end. This means that “philosophy” originally included far more than it does now, including all the natural sciences, as well as rational reflection on society, history, and art. What this means for us now is that philosophy must be an essentially outward-facing discipline, open to others. Most importantly, it needs now to be open to the sciences, to practical social reflection, and to its own history. But what philosophy brings to all its reflections is above all a spirit of critical reflection, respect for evidence and argument, and a ruthless honesty that demands of people that they form their beliefs and views of life according to the best reasons and information they have, rather than forming their views according to their wishes or prejudices, or letting them be dictated by authorities or social traditions. In this sense, we are living in an unphilosophical, or even anti-philosophical, age, but this makes it all the more important for philosophy to continue to do its work.     

What is behavior? And so what?

This article addresses a longstanding problem in the field of psychology, that of lacking an adequate explication of what is arguably our central concept as a “science of behavior,” the concept of “behavior” itself. The three sections comprising the paper are devoted, respectively, to (a) presenting a conceptual formulation of behavior; (b) discussing this formulation by, among other things, addressing objections to it and noting its advantages over psychology’s currently preferred definition of behavior as observable activity; and (c) relating why having such a formulation is important. The final section includes several uses to which the present formulation has already been and can in future be put, including a sketch of how it may be used to integrate the various subfields of our currently fragmented science of behavior.