The Harvard Pigeon Lab under Herrnstein

The history of the Harvard Pigeon Lab is a history of two periods of remarkable productivity, the first under Skinner's leadership and the second under Herrnstein's. In each period, graduate students flocked to the leader and then began stimulating one another. Chance favored Herrnstein's leadership, too, because an unusually large number of graduate students were admitted in the fall of 1962. In each period, productivity declined as the leader lost interest in the laboratory and withdrew. Directly and indirectly, the laboratory finally died as a result of the cognitive "revolution." Skinner and his students saw the possibility of a natural science of behavior and set about establishing that science based on concepts such as response rate, stimulus control, and schedules of reinforcement. Herrnstein and his students saw that the science could be quantitative and set about making it so, with relative response rate, the matching law, and the psychophysics of choice (analogous to S. S. Stevens' psychophysics). The history might provide a golden research opportunity for someone interested in the impact of such self-organizing research groups on the progress of science.     

Scientist-administrators at the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development as contributors to the scientific enterprise

At the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD), as in other government research supporting agencies, scientist-administrators who are "program staff" work to accomplish their organization's set of research priorities using established mechanisms for supporting research. At the same time, the definition of their work is given to their interpretation, which, in turn, is guided by their understanding of their scientific discipline and their commitment to it. The tension that may arise between the organization-guided role and the science-guided role is more apparent than real because the major responsibility of "program staff" within the Institute is to cultivate a grant portfolio addressing scientific issues relevant to the mission of the Institute and exemplifying the most advanced research concepts and methodologies. When the overlap between the mission of the Institute and the direction of science is small, the push to increase it leads to new and imaginative solutions that benefit both the Institute and the science.     

Nomothetic science and idiographic history in twentieth-century Americanist anthropology

For over a century, Americanist anthropologists have argued about whether their discipline is a historical one or a scientific one. Proponents of anthropology as history have claimed that the lineages of human cultures are made up of unique events that cannot be generalized into laws. If no laws can be drawn, then anthropology cannot be a science. Proponents of anthropology as science have claimed that there indeed are laws that govern humans and their behaviors and cultures, and these laws can be discovered. Interestingly, both sides have the same narrow view of what science is. The same sorts of debates over science and history were played out in evolutionary biology over a half-century ago, and what emerged was the view that that discipline and its sister discipline, paleontology, were both history and science--hence the term "historical sciences." Anthropology and its sister discipline, archaeology, have only recently begun to realize that they too are historical sciences.     

Theory of mind in nonhuman primates

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?," it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as "want" and "know." Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept "see." Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.     

Postmodernism: Its Origins and its Threat to Psychoanalysis

Postmodernism originated in an overreaction to "modernist" sociocultural trends of the past few centuries. Flaws of postmodern writers include: ignorance and distortion of the history of science and philosophy; the erroneous assumption that such faults of some natural scientists as reductionism and narrowness are intrinsic to the entire enterprise, even to rationality; overgeneralizing such valid criticisms to the level of metaphysical relativism; and deliberately obscure and pretentious writing. Its vogue is a threat to science in general and to psychoanalysis in particular. Psychoanalysis was vulnerable to a postmodernist attack because of Freud's rejection of scientific standards for his creation, his na¨ L ve realism, and his authoritarian heritage plus certain weaknesses of theory, technique, and organization resulting from it. Analysts are urged to stay close to clinical observation and abstain from generalizing outside their realm of expertise.     

Knowledge in science and engineering

It is now fashionable to say that science and technology are social constructions. This is true, or rather, a truism. Man is a social animal. Man is a linguistic animal, and language is social. Hence all products of human activities and everything that involves language are social constructions. But an assertion that covers everything becomes empty. The constructionist mantra that science or technology is “not a simple input from nature” attacks a straw man, for no one denies the necessity of enormous human efforts in research, development, and design. To say that these are social activities should not imply that they are indistinguishable from other social activities such as politicking or profiteering. An investigation into their peculiarities will bring to relief their intellectual and technical characteristics. The argument that science and technology are social constructions because they involve many assumptions is again a truism. Whenever we think, whenever we find things intelligible, we invariably have used some concepts and made some assumptions. Philosophers such as Kant have painstakingly analyzed concepts without which intelligibility is impossible. The important questions are not whether scientists and engineers make assumptions but what kind of assumptions they make; not whether they make judgments, but what kind of reasons they offer to support their judgments. Are the assumptions and justifications all social? Or are they mainly technical? Admittedly, the boundaries between the two are not always sharp, but is it impossible to make any differentiation at all?     

What Counts as Science? Families’ Perceptions of Science in a Natural History Museum

ABSTRACT

Natural history museums open their doors to millions of family visitors each year and are considered to have a valuable role to play in engaging these families with science. Yet little is known about whether or in what way families perceive such institutions to be connected with science. The current study set out to explore such perceptions via interviews with family visitors to a large natural history museum. Analyses reflected that families’ perceptions of the museum and of their own engagement with science were intertwined with their definitions and impressions of science. For these families, perceptions of the museum as fun, interesting, and educational at times counteracted impressions of it as a science-y institution. Moreover, some families also did not consider natural history to count as science, which further contributed to a reluctance to categorize the museum as science-y. Although such perceptions may challenge how natural history museums would like to portray themselves, they also represent an opportunity to broaden visitors’ definitions and images of science.     

Psychological science in the public arena: Three cases of dubious influence

Psychological science has a great deal to contribute to social welfare in all societies, because the world's most pressing social problems are behavioral in nature—violence, hunger, drug abuse, environmental pollution, low worker productivity, poor educational outcomes, and so forth. Thus, psychological research can inform public policies to improve approaches to these important social problems. The relationship of psychological science to public policy is often troubled, however, by misunderstandings about the role of science in the policy making process. Many scientists fear that their research results will be "misused" by others whose values differ from those of scientists. Thus, psychologists are reluctant to publish research results that can be used to support policies contrary to their own values and hesitate to ask research questions that can generate politically incorrect results. In this article, I argue that psychological science has a primary responsibility to ask dangerous questions and to report results honestly, without fear of their use; that research is not translated directly into public policies; and that psychological science should not be perverted either by fear of political consequences or by compromising truth in a quest for power. Three research examples are given to illustrate the different faces of temptation to pervert psychological science in a misguided hope that scientists' own values will be reflected in public policies.     

Studying the ecclesiology of a national church: the Danish context

Studying the ecclesiology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Denmark is a complicated matter. It requires knowledge of a broad range of subjects such as theology, political science, history, and anthropology. This article shows some of the difficulties and problems related to studying a national church which is heavily politicised, because a national church, in a globalised context, easily becomes the symbol of a past identification of nation, state, church, and people. Today, this identification is changing because of immigration, secular ideologies, and secularisation. Researchers in ecclesiology must be aware of the political and national dimensions of their research and how their conclusions are used in the political debate.     

The American Psychological Association's response to Brown v. Board of Education. The case of Kenneth B. Clark

In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court struck down the "separate but equal" doctrine of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision (1896) that was the foundation of school segregation in 17 states and the District of Columbia. Brown is arguably the most important Supreme Court decision of the 20th century in terms of its influence on American history. Moreover, it has a special significance for psychology because it marked the first time that psychological research was cited in a Supreme Court decision and because social science data were seen as paramount in the Court's decision to end school segregation. This article describes psychologist Kenneth B. Clark's role in that case and the response of the American Psychological Association to scientific psychology's moment in a great spotlight.     

The impact of chess research on cognitive science

Summary Although chess research has not been a mainstream activity in cognitive science, it has had a significant impact on this field because of the experimental and theoretical tools it has provided. The two most-cited references in chess research, de Groot (1965) and Chase and Simon (1973 a), have accumulated over 250 citations each (SSCI andSCI sources summed), with the majority of citations coming a decade or more from their publication dates. Both works are frequently cited in contemporary cognitive-psychology textbooks. Chess playing provides a model task environment for the study of basic cognitive processes, such as perception, memory, and problem solving. It also offers a unique opportunity for the study of individual differences (chess expertise) because of Elo's (1965, 1978) development of a chess-skill rating scale. Chess has also enjoyed a privileged position in Artificial-Intelligence research as a model domain for exploring search and evaluation processes.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

Neural functions of calcineurin in synaptic plasticity and memory

Major brain functions depend on neuronal processes that favor the plasticity of neuronal circuits while at the same time maintaining their stability. The mechanisms that regulate brain plasticity are complex and engage multiple cascades of molecular components that modulate synaptic efficacy. Protein kinases (PKs) and phosphatases (PPs) are among the most important of these components that act as positive and negative regulators of neuronal signaling and plasticity, respectively. In these cascades, the PP protein phosphatase 2B or calcineurin (CaN) is of particular interest because it is the only Ca(2+)-activated PP in the brain and a major regulator of key proteins essential for synaptic transmission and neuronal excitability. This review describes the primary properties of CaN and illustrates its functions and modes of action by focusing on several representative targets, in particular glutamate receptors, striatal enriched protein phosphatase (STEP), and neuromodulin (GAP43), and their functional significance for synaptic plasticity and memory.     

Forschungsprogramm und Wissenschaftsentwicklung

For Imre Lakatos hismethodology of scientific research programmes was not only a philosophical theory of science and scientific change but also the conceptual foundation of empirical and historical studies of science. At least terminologically this view is today widely accepted: The concept of aresearch programme is used in all sorts of literature on science. In the present paper I argue that this concept can lead to serious distortions of empirical and historical studies of science if it is not detached from the Lakatosian philosophical framework. Themethodology of scientific research programmes has three main pitfalls, which may lead to disorientations of empirical and historical studies of science: (1) Contrary to what the term research programme may suggest, it offers no perspective on scientific research as an object of analysissui generis; (2) its concept of science is too narrow and covers only minor parts of what counts as science in the real world; (3) it reduces history of science to a mere sequence of research programmes and thereby eliminates the fact that there is an evolution of the structure of research programmes, too.

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Der vorliegende Beitrag ist die überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung eines Vortrages, den der Verfasser im Juli 1988 auf einem vomInstitut für Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft gemeinsam mit demInterdisziplinären Institut für Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg veranstalteten Kolloqium gehalten hat.     

Dispelling the "mystery" of computational cognitive science

H. Crowther-Heyck (1999) argued that early advocates of computational cognitive science, especially George Miller, aimed to bring about a revival of traditional mentalism, including the issues of consciousness and free will. He therefore found it inexplicable, and even "ironic," that they selected the computer as their main research tool because computers seem no more conscious and no more free than, for instance, the telephone switchboard that was one of the behaviorists' key metaphors. I argue, by contrast, that this misunderstands the main thrust of cognitive science, which was not to bring back all of traditional mentalism, but was rather only to give a rigorous account of intentionality. Once this is recognized, Crowther-Heyck's "mystery" of cognitive science is dispelled because, as is well known, computers use symbolic representations, and thus were seen by the early cognitive scientists as being prime mechanical models of intentional processes.     

On “Bettering Humanity” in Science and Engineering Education

Authors such as Krishnasamy Selvan argue that "all human endeavors including engineering and science" have a single primary objective: "bettering humanity." They favor discussing "the history of science and measurement uncertainty." This paper respectfully disagrees and argues that "human endeavors including engineering and science" should not pursue "bettering humanity" as their primary objective. Instead these efforts should first pursue individual betterment. One cannot better humanity without knowing what that means. However, there is no one unified theory of what is to the betterment of humanity. Simultaneously, there is no one field (neither science, nor engineering, nor philosophy) entitled to rule univocally. Perhaps if theorists tended their own gardens, the common weal would be tended thereby.     

心理史学的发展对心理学史教学与研究的启示

心理史学的发展给心理学史的教学与研究带来如下启示:心理学史专业工作者应加强史学修养,明确自己的史学研究立场和原则;心理学史不只是心理学的学科发展史,也是人类社会历史发展的缩影;从拒绝到接受精神分析作为一种史学研究方法的态度转变,蕴涵着当代人文社科研究发展的趋势和走向。     

Self-organizing individual differences in brain development

Brain development is self-organizing in that the unique structure of each brain evolves in unpredictable ways through recursive modifications of synaptic networks. In this article, I review mechanisms of neural change in real time and over development, and I argue that change at each of these time scales embodies principles of self-organizing systems. I demonstrate how corticolimbic configurations that emerge within occasions lay down synaptic structure across occasions, giving rise to individual trajectories that become entrenched with age. Emotions have a powerful influence on this process.This is because the neural processes mediating emotion consolidate patterns of activation across the brain, through their enhancement of inter-regional coordination in real time and their contribution to synaptic shaping over development. The loss of corticolimbic plasticity with age is an unfortunate fact of development, but it is compensated in part by transitional phases and individual learning experiences through which habits are modified or replaced. I emphasize variations in inter-systemic coupling as a key mediator of developing individual differences, and I discuss the acquisition of anxious/depressive appraisals as an example.     

Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century? A fresh look at Kant's old argument

Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless. In Part I, I show how the issue of a quantification of the mind was discussed before Kant, and I analyze the philosophical considerations both of pessimistic and optimistic authors. This debate reveals a certain progress, although it remains ultimately undecided. In Part II, I present actual examples of measuring the mind in the eighteenth century and analyze their presuppositions. Although these examples are limited in certain ways, the common view that there was no such measurement is wrong. In Part III, I show how Kant's notorious " impossibility claim" has to be viewed against its historical background. He not only accepts actual examples of a quantitative treatment of the mind, but also takes steps toward an explanation of their possibility. Thus, he does not advance the claim that the mind as such cannot be mathematized. His claim is directed against certain philosophical assumptions about the mind, assumptions shared by a then-dominating, strongly introspectionist conception of psychology. This conception did and could not provide an explanation of the possibility of quantifying the mind. In concluding, I reflect on how this case study helps to improve the dispute over when and why psychology became a science.     

Rendering unto Science and God: Is NOMA Enough?

The proverbial “war between science and religion” has in many quarters reached the status of truism. Francisco J. Ayala seeks to negotiate a truce between the opposing sides through implementing the concept of the Non-overlapping Magisteria (NOMA) of science and theology. The NOMA understanding of the interaction between science and religion maintains that science and religion cannot contradict each other because each discipline has its own proper range of inquiry, namely questions of fact versus questions of value. This article explores the boundaries of these two different domains of knowledge and finds that in both theory and practice, the territorial claims overlap significantly. Furthermore, the author argues that such “territorial trespassing” is not owing to misunderstandings concerning the essence of science and of religion as such. Instead, the overlap of boundary lines—when viewed in light of the history and philosophy of science—is understood as integral to how progressive research normally advances in both science and theology.