When competition merges people's behavior: Interdependency activates shared action representations

Previous research suggests that friendly, cooperative situations cause one to integrate a co-actor's actions into one's own action system. Departing from an interdependency perspective, we predict the activation of shared action representations even in hostile, competitive situations as a result of attending to the intentions of the co-actor. To test this, in Experiment 1 we manipulated the interdependency between actor and co-actor in a joint Simon task and observed a stronger activation of shared action representations in a cooperative as well as competitive context compared to an independent context. Experiment 2 replicated the competitive context effect on activation of shared action representations and provided additional evidence for the mediating role of attending to others’ intentions by taking into account the individual tendency to attend to others’ intentions. Together, our findings suggest that interdependency merges people's behavior even in competitive contexts, which we argue encourage actors to attend to others’ intentions.     

The role of social identity processes in mass emergency behaviour: An integrative review

This review provides a new integration of recent research that has formed the basis of a social identity explanation of supportive collective behaviour among survivors in emergencies and disasters. I describe a model in which a sense of common fate is the source of an emergent shared social identity among survivors, which in turn provides the motivation to give social support to others affected. In addition, by drawing on the concept of relational transformation in psychological crowds, I show how an emergent shared social identity can engender a range of further behavioural and cognitive consequences that contribute to collective self-organisation in emergencies, including expected support, coordination of behaviour, and collective efficacy. It will be argued that the model can been applied to explaining how potentially dangerous crowd events avoid disaster: shared social identity operates as the basis of spontaneous self-organisation in these cases, as in many emergencies and disasters.     

Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account

After having identified several shortcomings of the so‐called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended with particular reference to the work of Charles Taylor on expression, as well as recent work on embodied cognition.     

Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite

Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, group identification and team reasoning. I argue that the account of shared intentions this approach yields is less cognitively and conceptually demanding than other accounts and is thus applicable to the intentional joint actions performed by young children. I also argue that it has limitations of its own and that considering what these limitations are may help us understand why we sometimes need to take other routes to shared intentions.     

The Greta Thunberg Effect: Familiarity with Greta Thunberg predicts intentions to engage in climate activism in the United States

Despite Greta Thunberg's popularity, research has yet to investigate her impact on the public's willingness to take collective action on climate change. Using cross-sectional data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults (N = 1,303), we investigate the “Greta Thunberg Effect,” or whether exposure to Greta Thunberg predicts collective efficacy and intentions to engage in collective action. We find that those who are more familiar with Greta Thunberg have higher intentions of taking collective actions to reduce global warming and that stronger collective efficacy beliefs mediate this relationship. This association between familiarity with Greta Thunberg, collective efficacy beliefs, and collective action intentions is present even after accounting for respondents’ overall support for climate activism. Moderated mediation models testing age and political ideology as moderators of the “Greta Thunberg Effect” indicate that although the indirect effect of familiarity with Greta Thunberg via collective efficacy is present across all age-groups, and across the political spectrum, it may be stronger among those who identify as more liberal (than conservative). Our findings suggest that young public figures like Greta Thunberg may motivate collective action across the U.S. public, but their effect may be stronger among those with a shared political ideology. Implications for future research and for broadening climate activists’ appeals across the political spectrum are discussed.     

Categorizing coordination from the perception of joint actions

The ability to perceive others’ actions and coordinate our own body movements accordingly is essential for humans to interact with the social world. However, it is still unclear how the visual system achieves the remarkable feat of identifying temporally coordinated joint actions between individuals. Specifically, do humans rely on certain visual features of coordinated movements to facilitate the detection of meaningful interactivity? To address this question, participants viewed short video sequences of two actors performing different joint actions, such as handshakes, high fives, etc. Temporal misalignments were introduced to shift one actor’s movements forward or backward in time relative to the partner actor. Participants rated the degree of interactivity for the temporally shifted joint actions. The impact of temporal offsets on human interactivity ratings varied for different types of joint actions. Based on human rating distributions, we used a probabilistic cluster model to infer latent categories, each revealing shared characteristics of coordinated movements among sets of joint actions. Further analysis on the clustered structure suggested that global motion synchrony, spatial proximity between actors, and highly salient moments of interpersonal coordination are critical features that impact judgments of interactivity.     

Why Engage in Collective Action? The Conditional Effect of Social Support and Efficacy on Protest Participation

Why do people engage in collective actions, such as demonstrations? We suggest that intentions to engage in protest activities come from the perception that the action is an efficient way to affect policy but is also dependent upon the level of others’ engagement. Specifically, lower support should spur intentions to engage if the individual believes that the collective act is an efficient means to bring about social change. In two experiments, manipulating social support, efficacy increased intentions to participate in collective actions but mainly for participants with low social support (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 3, manipulating efficacy, high social support was related to decreased intentions to engage. However, in this study, social support did not interact with efficacy.     

The psychosemantics of free riding: dissecting the architecture of a moral concept

For collective action to evolve and be maintained by selection, the mind must be equipped with mechanisms designed to identify free riders--individuals who do not contribute to a collective project but still benefit from it. Once identified, free riders must be either punished or excluded from future collective actions. But what criteria does the mind use to categorize someone as a free rider? An evolutionary analysis suggests that failure to contribute is not sufficient. Failure to contribute can occur by intention or accident, but the adaptive threat is posed by those who are motivated to benefit themselves at the expense of cooperators. In 6 experiments, we show that only individuals with exploitive intentions were categorized as free riders, even when holding their actual level of contribution constant (Studies 1 and 2). In contrast to an evolutionary model, rational choice and reinforcement theory suggest that different contribution levels (leading to different payoffs for their cooperative partners) should be key. When intentions were held constant, however, differences in contribution level were not used to categorize individuals as free riders, although some categorization occurred along a competence dimension (Study 3). Free rider categorization was not due to general tendencies to categorize (Study 4) or to mechanisms that track a broader class of intentional moral violations (Studies 5A and 5B). The results reveal the operation of an evolved concept with features tailored for solving the collective action problems faced by ancestral hunter-gatherers.     

Seeking a Variable Standard of Individual Moral Responsibility in Organizations

Relatively few authors attempt to assess individuals’ moral responsibility for collective action within organizations. I draw on fairly technical recent work by Seamus Miller, Christopher Kutz, and Tracy Isaacs in the field of collective responsibility to see what normative lessons can be prepared for people considering entry into large hierarchical, compartmentalized organizations like businesses or the military. I will defend a view shared by Isaacs that group members’ responsibility for collective action depends on intentions to contribute to particular collective actions, against Miller and Kutz’s more inculpating standards. Miller and Kutz fail to achieve their goal of articulating a variable standard for measuring individual responsibility within organizations, for reasons suggesting we might not be able to do better with their theoretical commitments than a threshold warning for all potential entrants to be wary of the groups they enter. Isaacs sketches an approach that is more successful at creating a variable standard for assessing high echelon actors; I build on and refine her theory to argue that organization members can be held responsible for their unique interpretations of the organization mission and unique contributions to their role duties. High echelon actors may share personal responsibility for their subordinates’ behavior when they have created the conditions for those actions through their unique orders.     

Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of decision making in joint action: a human-robot interaction study

In this paper we present a model for action preparation and decision making in cooperative tasks that is inspired by recent experimental findings about the neuro-cognitive mechanisms supporting joint action in humans. It implements the coordination of actions and goals among the partners as a dynamic process that integrates contextual cues, shared task knowledge and predicted outcome of others’ motor behavior. The control architecture is formalized by a system of coupled dynamic neural fields representing a distributed network of local but connected neural populations. Different pools of neurons encode task-relevant information about action means, task goals and context in the form of self-sustained activation patterns. These patterns are triggered by input from connected populations and evolve continuously in time under the influence of recurrent interactions. The dynamic model of joint action is evaluated in a task in which a robot and a human jointly construct a toy object. We show that the highly context sensitive mapping from action observation onto appropriate complementary actions allows coping with dynamically changing joint action situations.     

Beyond Compliance: Mother–Child Joint Action During a “Do” Task

Much of the literature on parent-toddler interactions does not account for the lack of independence in data. This investigation used a theory and method appropriate for examining the moment-to-moment patterns of joint actions between mothers and toddlers during a “do” task. Using contextual action theory to guide a mixture of methods, we observed and described the joint goal-directed series of actions of mothers and their toddlers as well as mothers’ intentions, meanings, and emotions they ascribed to their actions. Additionally, the associations between the patterns of joint mother-toddler actions and children’s negative emotionality were examined. Thirty mothers and their children participated in the study. Data collection included video-recorded activity, video recall interviews, and self-report questionnaires. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data revealed that (a) children were mostly engaged in the task alongside with their mothers’ on-going involvement; (b) mothers attributed a range of meanings to their interactions with their children; and (c) mothers’ perceptions of their toddlers’ dimensions of emotional negativity were associated with the organization of dyads’ joint goal directed actions—both when children were engaged in the task or self-focused.     

Exercise of Human Agency Through Collective Efficacy

Social cognitive theory adopts an agentic perspective in which individuals are producers of experiences and shapers of events. Among the mechanisms of human agency, none is more focal or pervading than the belief of personal efficacy. This core belief is the foundation of human agency. Unless people believe that they can produce desired effects and forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act. The growing interdependence of human functioning is placing a premium on the exercise of collective agency through shared beliefs in the power to produce effects by collective action. The present article analyzes the nature of perceived collective efficacy and its centrality in how people live their lives. Perceived collective efficacy fosters groups' motivational commitment to their missions, resilience to adversity, and performance accomplishments.     

Brain mechanisms for predictive control by switching internal models: implications for higher-order cognitive functions

Humans can guide their actions toward the realization of their intentions. Flexible, rapid and precise realization of intentions and goals relies on the brain learning to control its actions on external objects and to predict the consequences of this control. Neural mechanisms that mimic the input–output properties of our own body and other objects can be used to support prediction and control, and such mechanisms are called internal models. We first summarize functional neuroimaging, behavioral and computational studies of the brain mechanisms related to acquisition, modular organization, and the predictive switching of internal models mainly for tool use. These mechanisms support predictive control and flexible switching of intentional actions. We then review recent studies demonstrating that internal models are crucial for the execution of not only immediate actions but also higher-order cognitive functions, including optimization of behaviors toward long-term goals, social interactions based on prediction of others’ actions and mental states, and language processing. These studies suggest that a concept of internal models can consistently explain the neural mechanisms and computational principles needed for fundamental sensorimotor functions as well as higher-order cognitive functions. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

Representation, interaction, and intersubjectivity

What the participants share, their common "sense" of the world, creates a foundation, a framing, an orientation that enables human actors to see and act in coordination with one another. For recurrent activities, the methods the participants use to understand each other as they act change, making the intersubjective space in which actors operate richer and easier to produce. This article works through some of the issues that emerge from a close examination of intersubjectivity as it is managed through representation and interaction. The data that are presented document, in detail, a sequence of related interactions, within and across episodes of cooperation, where continuity and change can be observed. The emergence of conversational structure and coordinating representations are significant milestones in the long-term development of a representational practice that support the runtime co-construction of intersubjective space. Conversational structures emerge interactively to mediate recurrent points of coordination in the domain activity, and only secondarily the conversation itself. Coordinating representations change the representational practice of the participants by making it easier to manage their "shared view" of the collective work, enabling the participants to make progress, expand the field of the common activity, while exhibiting more control of if and when explicit grounding occurs.     

Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.     

Collective rumination: When “problem talk” impairs organizational resilience

When adversity strikes, organization members often turn to others in order to vent their negative emotions and receive social support. While social interaction is commonly seen as a major resource for organizational resilience, dysfunctional social interactions and their negative effects on coping with and overcoming adversity are less well understood. This conceptual article develops theory on collective rumination—defined as repetitive and prolonged discussions of adverse events that center on the negative and uncontrollable aspects of the situation—and its detrimental effects on organizational resilience. We elaborate that collective rumination emerges through a vicious circle of a shared negative situational assessment and mutual contagion with highly negative emotions. Based on our theorizing, we propose that collective rumination is negatively related to three core dimensions of organizational resilience: perceptions of control, commitment to joint action, and the acceptance of adversity as a challenge. With our conceptual article, we answer earlier calls to theorize about forms of social interactions that are not valuable but destructive for organizational resilience and elucidate previously neglected social dynamics that are dysfunctional for recovering from adversity.     

Self-projection and the brain

When thinking about the future or the upcoming actions of another person, we mentally project ourselves into that alternative situation. Accumulating data suggest that envisioning the future (prospection), remembering the past, conceiving the viewpoint of others (theory of mind) and possibly some forms of navigation reflect the workings of the same core brain network. These abilities emerge at a similar age and share a common functional anatomy that includes frontal and medial temporal systems that are traditionally associated with planning, episodic memory and default (passive) cognitive states. We speculate that these abilities, most often studied as distinct, rely on a common set of processes by which past experiences are used adaptively to imagine perspectives and events beyond those that emerge from the immediate environment.     

Collective action control by goals and plans: applying a self-regulation perspective to group performance

In celebration of the 125th anniversary of The American Journal of Psychology, this article discusses a seminal publication by Marjorie Shaw (1932) on small group performance in the rational solution of complex problems. We then propose an approach for the effective regulation of group goal striving based on the collective action control perspective. From this perspective, group performance might be hindered by a collective intention-behavior gap: Groups fail to act on their intentions despite being strongly committed to the collective goal, knowing what the necessary actions are, and being capable of performing them. To reduce this gap, we suggest specific if-then plans (implementation intentions) in which groups specify when, where, and how to act toward their collective goal as an easily applicable self-regulation strategy to automate collective action control. Studies in which implementation intentions improved group performance in hidden profile, escalation of commitment, and cooperation task paradigms are reported and discussed.     

Ontogenesis Versus Morphogenesis Towards an Anti-realist Model of the Constitution of Society

This article firstly criticizes Margaret Archer’s Morphogenetic Approach for being indecisive about the realist notion of emergence it proposes as well as for her inadequate account of structural conditioning. It is argued that critical realists’ conceptualizations of emergence cannot but lead to inconsistencies about the adequate placement of agents as parts of emergent entities. The inconsistencies to which these conceptualizations lead necessitate an anti-realist model of the constitution of societies which takes into account that social structures are existentially dependent upon ideational elaboration. This alternative anti-realist theoretical perspective is provided by Ontogenesis, within the framework of which the realists’ idea of the ‘necessary and internal relations’ give their place to the ontological pervasiveness of the culturally shared imaginary schemata. Archer’s denial of a collective synchronic impact to social forms is implied in her analysis of morphogenetic cycles, according to which, structural elaboration post-dates social interaction; and this denial is also expressed in this very idea of emergent structures. Instead, for Ontogenesis, social forms are synchronically dependent on the collective impact of the differently socially placed agents, who have different interests and material resources, and whose interaction only becomes meaningful when drawing on these culturally shared imaginary schemata.     

On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.