Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. It is a prime measure of the miserly information processing posited by most dual process theories. The original three-item test may be becoming known to potential participants, however. We examined a four-item version that could serve as a substitute for the original. Our data show that it displays a .58 correlation with the original version and that it has very similar relationships with cognitive ability, various thinking dispositions, and with several other rational thinking tasks. Combining the two versions into a seven-item test resulted in a measure of miserly processing with substantial reliability (.72). The seven-item version was a strong independent predictor of performance on rational thinking tasks after the variance accounted for by cognitive ability and thinking dispositions had been partialled out.     

Real‐World Correlates of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks in a Community Sample

In the current study, we sought to examine whether performance on several heuristics and biases tasks and thinking dispositions was associated with real‐life correlates in a community sample of adults. We examined performance on five heuristics and biases tasks (ratio bias, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, cognitive reflection, probabilistic and statistical reasoning, and rational temporal discounting), three thinking dispositions (actively open‐minded thinking, future orientation, and avoidance of superstitious thinking), and a questionnaire assessing real‐world correlates in several domains (substance use, driving behavior, financial behavior, gambling behavior, electronic media use, and secure computing). Our heuristics and biases tasks and thinking disposition measures were modestly associated with several real‐world outcomes, including the domains of secure computing, financial behaviors, and the total scores. That is, better performance on the heuristics and biases measures was associated with fewer negative outcomes. We found that the associations were generally higher in males than in females. Heuristics and biases performance and thinking dispositions were unique predictors of real‐world outcomes after statistically controlling for educational attainment and sex differences. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The mediating effect of reflective-analytic cognitive style on rational thought

Abstract

We investigate whether non-miserly cognitive styles mediate the effects of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. Specifically, we review relevant literature on two dimensions that define non-miserly cognitive style: reflection-impulsivity and analytic-intuitive. We use these two dimensions to identify a continuum of cognitive styles that vary from miserly (impulsive-intuitive) to non-miserly (reflective-analytic) and are congruent with tendencies to commit specific rational thinking errors. Further, we argue that this continuum, which we label reflective-analytic cognitive style, mediates the effect of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. We conduct an experiment testing our predictions and find evidence, via structural equation modelling, that reflective-analytic cognitive style does mediate the effect of cognitive ability (as measured by working memory capacity) and thinking dispositions (as measured by need for cognition and actively open-minded thinking) on responses to traditional rational thinking tasks.     

The Development and Testing of a New Version of the Cognitive Reflection Test Applying Item Response Theory (IRT)

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a short measure of a person's ability to resist intuitive response tendencies and to produce a normatively correct response, which is based on effortful reasoning. Although the CRT is a very popular measure, its psychometric properties have not been extensively investigated. A major limitation of the CRT is the difficulty of the items, which can lead to floor effects in populations other than highly educated adults. The present study aimed at investigating the psychometric properties of the CRT applying item response theory analyses (a two‐parameter logistic model) and at developing a new version of the scale (the CRT‐long), which is appropriate for participants with both lower and higher levels of cognitive reflection. The results demonstrated the good psychometric properties of the original, as well as the new scale. The validity of the new scale was also assessed by measuring correlations with various indicators of intelligence, numeracy, reasoning and decision‐making skills, and thinking dispositions. Moreover, we present evidence for the suitability of the new scale to be used with developmental samples. Finally, by comparing the performance of adolescents and young adults on the CRT and CRT‐long, we report the first investigation into the development of cognitive reflection. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

One test,five scoring procedures: different ways of approaching the cognitive reflection test

Although the cognitive reflection test (CRT) represents a frequently used instrument within the field of judgement and decision-making, its scope and detailed characteristics are still not well understood. Therefore, the present article discusses 5 different ways of scoring the CRT that include the regular CRT scoring procedure (CRT-Regular), adding up the intuitive answers (CRT-Intuitive), calculating the proportion of intuitive in total incorrect answers (CRT-Proportion Intuitive), scoring only non-intuitive answers irrespective of their correctness (CRT-Reflection) and calculating the proportion of correct in total non-intuitive answers (CRT-Calculation). We conducted 2 studies aimed at investigating the associations among these scoring techniques and their relationships with thinking dispositions, specifically the need for cognition, faith in intuition, superstitious thinking, maximising and post-choice regret. The results indicate that thinking dispositions play a modest role in explaining the performance on the CRT. The specific associations among the investigated dispositions and different CRT scoring techniques are discussed.     

The illusion of replacement in research into the development of thinking biases: the case of the conjunction fallacy

The conjunction fallacy is a violation of a very basic rule of probability. Interestingly, although committing the fallacy seems irrational, adults are no less susceptible to the fallacy than young children. In Experiment 1, by employing tasks where the conjunctive response option involved two non-representative items, we found a large reduction in fallacy rates as compared to traditional conjunction fallacy problems. Nevertheless, fallacy rates remained relatively high in both adolescents and adults, although adults showed more consistency in their normative responses. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that children’s relatively good performance on the task was not the consequence of their missing knowledge of social stereotypes. Additionally, children were more strongly affected by explicitly presented frequency information than adults. Indeed, adults only took frequency information into account when frequencies were made relevant by a training in probabilistic reasoning. Overall, the results suggest that whereas the potential for normative reasoning increases with development, this potential is often overshadowed by a pervasive tendency in adolescence and adulthood to rely on contextual information, knowledge, and beliefs, even when conflicting information is available. By contrast, children are more strongly influenced by explicitly presented information than relevant knowledge cued by the tasks.     

Ecological rationality or nested sets? Individual differences in cognitive processing predict Bayesian reasoning

The presentation of a Bayesian inference problem in terms of natural frequencies rather than probabilities has been shown to enhance performance. The effect of individual differences in cognitive processing on Bayesian reasoning has rarely been studied, despite enabling us to test process-oriented variants of the two main accounts of the facilitative effect of natural frequencies: The ecological rationality account (ERA), which postulates an evolutionarily shaped ease of natural frequency automatic processing, and the nested sets account (NSA), which posits analytical processing of nested sets. In two experiments, we found that cognitive reflection abilities predicted normative performance equally well in tasks featuring whole and arbitrarily parsed objects (Experiment 1) and that cognitive abilities and thinking dispositions (analytical vs. intuitive) predicted performance with single-event probabilities, as well as natural frequencies (Experiment 2). Since these individual differences indicate that analytical processing improves Bayesian reasoning, our findings provide stronger support for the NSA than for the ERA.     

Overconfidently underthinking: narcissism negatively predicts cognitive reflection

Abstract

There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining the role of dispositional factors in these differences and understanding these associations could provide valuable insight into decision-making. Here, we examine whether individual differences in cognitive reflection are related to narcissism (excessive self-focused attention) and impulsiveness (trait-based lack of inhibitory control). Participants across three studies completed measures of narcissism, impulsiveness and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as well as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy cognitively effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly related to self-report measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and need for cognition), it showed no association with a behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT scores). Our results suggest that certain individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in certain forms of reflective thinking.     

Are Thoughtful People More Utilitarian? CRT as a Unique Predictor of Moral Minimalism in the Dilemmatic Context

Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT performers’ tendency to regard utility‐optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the “minimalist” orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.     

The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. In this study, we showed that the CRT is a more potent predictor of performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases literature than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning. Although the CRT has a substantial correlation with cognitive ability, a series of regression analyses indicated that the CRT was a unique predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. It accounted for substantial additional variance after the other measures of individual differences had been statistically controlled. We conjecture that this is because neither intelligence tests nor measures of executive functioning assess the tendency toward miserly processing in the way that the CRT does. We argue that the CRT is a particularly potent measure of the tendency toward miserly processing because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.     

Individual differences in religiosity as a function of cognitive ability and cognitive style

The current study examines the degree to which individual differences in cognitive ability and cognitive style (rational thinking vs. experiential thinking) uniquely and jointly account for differences in religiosity. Using an array of measures of religiosity, results show that cognitive ability has a medium to large negative effect on various aspects of religiosity. Though also negatively related to religiosity, rational thinking style did not add significant unique effects, nor did it convey a significant indirect effect from cognitive ability. Experiential thinking was generally unrelated to ability but was positively related to some aspects of religiosity. Overall the results confirm that those with higher cognitive ability are less likely to accept religious doctrine or engage in religious behaviors and those with lower ability are more likely to accept religious doctrine and exhibit higher levels of fundamentalism. Cognitive style appears to play a lesser role in explaining individual differences in religiosity than cognitive ability.     

Individual differences in logical intuitions on reasoning problems presented under two-response paradigm

ABSTRACT

Studies on individual differences in susceptibility to cognitive biases have identified several cognitive dispositions which were thought to predict reasoning by contributing to the efficiency of analytic thought. However, hybrid models suggest that differences between reasoners may arise already in the intuitive stages of the reasoning process. To address this possibility, we examined standard individual difference measures, mindware instantiation, and conflict detection efficiency as predictors of the accuracy on conflict problems presented under a two-response paradigm. We found that almost half of conflict reasoning problems were solved correctly already at the initial response stage and that the individual differences in initial reasoning performance were predicted by participants’ cognitive reflection, mindware instantiation, and detection efficiency. The findings advance the specification of hybrid dual-process models and provide corroborating evidence that a part of the link between bias susceptibility and cognitive dispositions is due to differences in intuitive processing.     

Dispositional factors predicting Chinese students’ critical thinking performance

Dispositional factors have been suggested to affect individuals’ critical thinking performance. The relative and combined effects of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability on the critical thinking performance of a group of 137 Chinese undergraduates were examined. Participants were administered the Need for Cognition Scale, Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness Subscales of the NEO Five Factor Inventory as well as the Concern for Truth Scale. Cognitive ability and critical thinking performance were respectively estimated with the WAIS-III Verbal Comprehension Index and the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment Using Everyday Situations. Hierarchical regression analysis showed that only the disposition of concern for truth accounted for unique additional variance in critical thinking beyond that explained by cognitive ability. The findings are discussed in the light of cultural factors affecting critical thinking in the Chinese context.     

The grim reasoner: Analytical reasoning under mortality salience

The human species enjoys uniquely developed capacities for analytical reasoning and rational decision making, but these capacities come with a price: They make us aware of our inevitable physical death. Drawing on terror management theory and dual-process theories of cognition, we investigate the impact of mortality awareness on analytical reasoning. Two experiments show that experimentally induced thoughts of death impair analytical reasoning performance, just as cognitive load would. When made aware of their own mortality, reasoners allocate their executive resources to the suppression of this disturbing thought, therefore impairing their performance on syllogisms that require analytic thought. This finding has consequences for all aspects of rational thinking that draw on executive resources, and calls for an integrated approach to existential psychology and the psychology of rational thought.     

Is running a state of mind? Sports training as a potential method for developing cognitive flexibility

The study aimed to test the significance of sports participation as a potential means of improving cognitive function, particularly cognitive flexibility. Based on the characteristics of orienteering, such as frequent changes of behavioural strategies in response to changes in the situation or the simultaneous performance of several mental activities, we assumed that practising this sport could foster the development of cognitive flexibility. Two groups of volunteers were compared: 50 middle and long-distance runners and 50 orienteering runners in terms of their performance on the following measures of cognitive flexibility: a divergent thinking task, a computer flexibility task, Cognitive Flexibility Scale, and Verbal Fluency Test as a measure of executive function. Orienteering runners outperformed others on all measures except the Cognitive Flexibility Scale. Furthermore, we found that training characteristics (regularity, frequency, participation in competitions) were associated with levels of cognitive flexibility, particularly among orienteering runners, where they explained between 38% and 39% of the overall flexibility variance. Our results suggest that cognitive flexibility can be developed through sports training requiring effective dealing in a changing, complex environment. We also discuss the implications of our results for cognitive training research.     

Brooding and reflection: rumination predicts suicidal ideation at 1-year follow-up in a community sample

The cognitive processes underlying suicidal thinking and behavior are not well understood. The present study examined brooding and reflection, two dimensions of rumination, as predictors of suicidal ideation among a community sample of 1134 adults. Participants completed self-report measures of rumination and depression, and a semi-structured clinical interview that included an assessment of suicidal ideation, at baseline and 1-year follow-up. Brooding was more strongly related to degree of ideation at baseline than was reflection. However, both brooding and reflection predicted whether an individual thought about suicide at 1-year follow-up, even after adjusting for baseline suicidal ideation. Symptoms of depression mediated the relationship between brooding and ideation but not that between reflection and ideation. Implications for the nature of thought processes that result in suicidal thinking are discussed.     

Does the cognitive reflection test measure cognitive reflection? A mathematical modeling approach

We used a mathematical modeling approach, based on a sample of 2,019 participants, to better understand what the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick In Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42, 2005) measures. This test, which is typically completed in less than 10 min, contains three problems and aims to measure the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind. However, since the test contains three mathematically based problems, it is possible that the test only measures mathematical abilities, and not cognitive reflection. We found that the models that included an inhibition parameter (i.e., the probability of inhibiting an intuitive response), as well as a mathematical parameter (i.e., the probability of using an adequate mathematical procedure), fitted the data better than a model that only included a mathematical parameter. We also found that the inhibition parameter in males is best explained by both rational thinking ability and the disposition toward actively open-minded thinking, whereas in females this parameter was better explained by rational thinking only. With these findings, this study contributes to the understanding of the processes involved in solving the CRT, and will be particularly useful for researchers who are considering using this test in their research.     

“The threat is in the head,not in the legs”: Activating negative age stereotypes generates extra cognitive load during walking

ObjectiveActivating negative age stereotypes has been consistently shown to impair cognitive performance in older adults, but not motor performance, especially on mobility tasks. We tested the hypothesis that older adults may still experience stereotype threat, even if mobility performance is not affected. To do so, we examined whether inducing negative stereotypes may increase cognitive load during a walking task.MethodThis question was investigated in a dual-task paradigm: older adults performed simultaneously a walking task and a Stroop task, in stereotype and control conditions.ResultsResults showed that the stereotype induction did not affect walking parameters but decreased performance on the Stroop task, indicating that this induction increased cognitive load during walking.DiscussionThese results suggest that negative age stereotypes may be damaging even if walking parameters are not affected, by altering older adults' attention to their walking environment. We conclude by highlighting theoretical and practical implications.     

技能和风格：理性思维的两种测量途径

本文通过总结前人关于理性思维的个体差异的研究, 介绍和区分了两种有关理性思维的测量途径, 并讨论了二者之间的内在关系。理性思维可以分成技能和风格两种形式。前者常用评价性的、情境测试方式进行评估, 后者常用描述性的、自陈量表方式进行测量。通过分析认知能力对这两种理性思维的影响, 本文提出一个认知能力与理性思维技能和思维风格关系的理论模型, 为后续在理性思维测量方法上的研究提供一种理论指导。     

What is “theory of mind”? Concepts,cognitive processes and individual differences

Research on “theory of mind” has traditionally focused on a narrow participant group (preschool children) using a narrow range of experimental tasks (most notably, false-belief tasks). Recent work has greatly expanded the age range of human participants tested to include human infants, older children, and adults, has devised new tasks, and has adopted methods from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, theoretical work has not kept pace with these changes, with the result that studies using one kind of method or participant group often inherit assumptions about the nature of theory of mind from other research, with little regard for whether these assumptions are appropriate. I argue that three distinct approaches to thinking about theory of mind are already implicit in research practice, and that future work, whether with infants, children, or adults, will benefit from articulating these approaches more clearly and following their different implications for what theory of mind is and how it should be studied.