The two roads of passionate goal pursuit: links with appraisal,coping, and academic achievement

Background and Objectives: In this research, we tested the role of cognitive appraisals in explaining why harmonious and obsessive passion dimensions are related to distinct forms of coping and explored if performance was impacted by these appraisal and coping processes. Design: Undergraduate students (N = 489) participated in a longitudinal study and completed three surveys throughout the course of an academic year. Methods: Participants completed assessments of both passion dimensions (Time 1), reported how they were appraising and coping with the mid-year examination period (Time 2), and provided consent to obtain their final grade in Introductory Psychology (Time 3). The hypothesized model was tested using structural equation modeling. Results: Harmonious and obsessive passion dimensions were linked with approach and avoidant coping responses, respectively. Cognitive appraisals, particularly appraisals of challenge and uncontrollability, played an indirect role in these relationships. In addition, both appraisals and coping responses had an indirect effect in the relationship between passion dimensions and final grade. Conclusions: These results identify cognitive appraisal as a reason why passion dimensions are linked with distinct coping tendencies and demonstrate the role of appraisal and coping processes in the journey to passionate goal attainment.     

压力认知评价理论在管理心理学中的应用：场景、方式与迷思

工作场所中, 压力源无处不在; 面对压力源, 个体会如何反应?压力认知评价理论从认知评价和应对角度为这一问题提供了系统解释。在过去的40年里, 该理论已成为阐释个体压力反应的主流框架。然而, 由于提出时间较早, 该理论没有提供各理论要素间的精确关系, 这使得后续实证研究从各自研究问题出发, 对该理论的应用五花八门, 甚至因曲解理论观点而造成不当应用, 不利于对该理论的持续应用和深入发展。在系统回顾理论观点的基础上, 重点梳理了125篇以该理论作为核心理论基础的管理心理学实证研究。总体发现：在应用场景方面, 压力认知评价理论可以用来解释6种压力源对员工工作态度、行为、身心健康和工作-家庭关系的影响; 其应用形式可以从初级评价、次级评价和应对3个方面分别考虑; 一些研究在应用该理论时存在误区。未来研究需要优化理论要素的测量方式, 进一步拓展该理论的应用场景, 同时丰富认知评价过程的影响因素研究。     

The place of appraisal in emotion

Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.     

Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism

In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.     

“Scaffolding” and “affordance” as integrative concepts in the cognitive sciences

There are (at least) two ways to think of the differences in basic concepts and typologies that one can find in the different scientific practices that constitute a research tradition. One is the fundamentalist view: the fewer the better. The other is a non-fundamentalist view of science whereby the integration of different concepts into the right abstraction grounds an explanation that is not grounded as the sum of the explanations supported by the parts. Integrative concepts are often associated with idealizations that can successfully set the stage for different phenomena to be compared or for explanations of different phenomena to be considered as jointly increasing our understanding of reality beyond that which each explanation provides separately. In this paper, our aim is to argue for the importance of the notions of an “affordance” and “scaffolding” as integrative concepts in the cognitive sciences. The integrational role of the concept of affordance is closely related with the capacity of affordances to generate the scaffoldings leading to the integration. The capacities of affordances that turn them into (stable) scaffoldings explain why such notions are often used interchangeably (as we shall see). On this basis, we aim to show that the concepts of affordance and scaffolding provide the sort of epistemic perspective that can overcome common complaints about the limits and unity of the cognitive sciences once claims about extended cognition are taken seriously.     

What's so funny? Modelling incongruity in humour production†

Finding something humorous is intrinsically rewarding and may facilitate emotion regulation, but what creates humour has been underexplored. The present experimental study examined humour generated under controlled conditions with varying social, affective, and cognitive factors. Participants listed five ways in which a set of concept pairs (e.g. MONEY and CHOCOLATE) were similar or different in either a funny way (intentional humour elicitation) or a “catchy” way (incidental humour elicitation). Results showed that more funny responses were produced under the incidental condition, and particularly more for affectively charged than neutral concepts, for semantically unrelated than related concepts, and for responses highlighting differences rather than similarities between concepts. Further analyses revealed that funny responses showed a relative divergence in output dominance of the properties typically associated with each concept in the pair (that is, funny responses frequently highlighted a property high in output dominance for one concept but simultaneously low in output dominance for the other concept); by contrast, responses judged not funny did not show this pattern. These findings reinforce the centrality of incongruity resolution as a key cognitive ingredient for some pleasurable emotional elements arising from humour and demonstrate how it may operate within the context of humour generation.     

Early antecedents of emotion differentiation and regulation: Experience tunes the appraisal thresholds of emotional development in infancy

In this review, we synthesize evidence to highlight cognitive appraisal as an important developmental antecedent of individual differences in emotion differentiation and adept emotion regulation. Emotion differentiation is the degree to which emotions are experienced in a nuanced or “granular” way—as specific and separable phenomena. More extensive differentiation is related to positive wellbeing and has emerged as a correlate of emotion regulation skill among adults. We argue that the cognitive appraisal processes that underlie these facets of emotional development are instantiated early in the first year of life and tuned by environmental input and experience. Powerful socializing input in the form of caregivers’ contingent and selective responding to infants’ emotional signals carves and calibrates the infant’s appraisal thresholds for what in their world ought to be noticed, deemed as important or personally meaningful, and responded to (whether and how). These appraisal thresholds are thus unique to the individual child despite the ubiquity of the appraisal process in emotional responding. This appraisal infrastructure, while plastic and continually informed by experience across the lifespan, likely tunes subsequent emotion differentiation, with implications for children’s emotion regulatory choices and skills. We end with recommendations for future research in this area, including the urgent need for developmental emotion science to investigate the diverse sociocultural contexts in which children’s cognitive appraisals, differentiation of emotions, and regulatory responses are being built across childhood.     

感激情绪的认知评估体系

本文从情绪认知理论的角度出发, 通过3个研究探究与感激情绪有关的认知评价维度, 进而建立感激情绪的认知评价体系。研究1使用回忆不同类型的情绪性事件法初步探究了感激情绪的认知评估体系; 研究2使用操作认知评估维度法探究了认知评价的变化对感激体验的影响; 研究3使用故事情境法分别从个体特质和情境因素的角度, 探究个体特质与感激情绪之间的关系如何受到个体认知评价的影响, 进而为感激情绪的评价体系提供更多的证据支持。研究1发现感激情绪体验与受关怀感、符合道德规范和他人负责性3个维度之间存在正相关关系。研究2发现3个认知评估维度体验的有无均会导致个体在感激情绪体验上出现显著差异。研究3表明感激特质可以预测个体的认知评价和感激情绪体验; 同时, 受关怀感、道德规范、他人负责3个认知评价维度在感激特质与感激情绪关系间起到中介作用。结论：3个研究结果表明, 受关怀感、道德规范、他人负责性3个认知评价维度与感激密切相关, 并在区分开感激与自豪、亏欠感等情绪中起重要作用。因此, 这3个认识评估维度共同组成了感激情绪认知评价体系。     

Brief Report The coherence of emotion systems: Comparing “on‐line” measures of appraisal and facial expressions,and self‐report

Recently, investigators have challenged long‐standing assumptions that facial expressions of emotion follow specific emotion‐eliciting events and relate to other emotion‐specific responses. We address these challenges by comparing spontaneous facial expressions of anger, sadness, laughter, and smiling with concurrent, “on‐line” appraisal themes from narrative data, and by examining whether coherence between facial and appraisal components were associated with increased experience of emotion. Consistent with claims that emotion systems are loosely coupled, facial expressions of anger and sadness co‐occurred to a moderate degree with the expected appraisal themes, and when this happened, the experience of emotion was stronger. The results for the positive emotions were more complex, but lend credence to the hypothesis that laughter and smiling are distinct. Smiling co‐occurred with appraisals of pride, but never occurred with appraisals of anger. In contrast, laughter occurred more often with appraisals of anger, a finding consistent with recent evidence linking laughter to the dissociation or undoing of negative emotion.     

Subjectively salient dimensions of emotional appraisal

Four empirical studies of cognitive appraisals in emotion are reported. In studies 1 and 2, a simplified version of the repertory grid method was used to determine subjectively salient dimensions of cognitive appraisal. For a representative sample of 30 emotions, subjects considered pairwise comparisons of remembered eliciting events (study 1) or those typically conducive to the emotions (study 2) and indicated attributes on which the situations differed. The attributes were classified using a category system derived a priori from the theoretical and empirical literature. Some evidence was obtained for the majority of the 25 distinguished potential dimensions of appraisal, and no further dimensions of appraisal were suggested by the data. The most frequently mentioned dimensions—accounting together for 85% of the attributes—were subjective evaluation, causality/agency/responsibility, focus of event, controllability, importance, moral evaluation, stability, social relation positive-negative plus close-distant, self-evaluation, time of event, evaluation of others, intentionality/activity and expectedness. A reduced set of 22 dimensions for which some evidence was obtained in the grid studies was further examined in studies 3 and 4 using a nominal scale analogue of the rating method. It was found that (a) the appraisal dimensions which emerged as the most salient ones in the grid studies tended to be those relevant for the greatest number of emotions, (b) the dimensions were largely statistically independent within the investigated domain of emotions, and (c) they permitted from moderate to good statistical classification of the situations into the emotion categories. Potential limitations of the grid method as well as the issue of the criteria for cognitive appraisals in emotion are discussed.     

A multiple‐method analysis of appraisal–emotion relationships: The case of the prosocial intergroup emotions

Despite its status as a prominent set of theories for explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, much appraisal theory and research offer little indication of the nature of the relationship expected between appraisals and emotions. Here, we present a three‐study, multiple‐method analysis in which we examine numerous ways of testing appraisal–emotion relationships using the “prosocial” intergroup emotions—sympathy, anger, and guilt—as an example. Results show that the set of appraisal dimensions that appears strongly characteristic of an emotion varies depending on the kind of appraisal—emotion relationship hypothesised and the experimental methodology/statistical analysis used. These findings demonstrate the utility of explicit theorising about the nature of the relationship between emotions and appraisals, and show how the hypothesised appraisal–emotion relationship and choice of methodology can affect the structure of appraisal theories. We recommend an analysis across multiple methods to provide a more complete picture of a given set of appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress

This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one’s grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in “Sect. 1” I argue that the paradox raises a more fundamental epistemic problem, and in “Sects.1 and 2” I argue that semantic proposals—even ones designed to capture the Fregean link between meaning and epistemic significance—fail to resolve that problem. Seeing our way towards a real solution to the paradox requires more than semantics; we also need to understand how the process of analysis can yield justification for accepting a candidate conceptual analysis. I present an account of this process, and explain how it resolves the paradox, in “Sect. 3”. I conclude in “Sect. 4” by considering the implications for the present account concerning the goal of conceptual analysis, and by arguing that the apparent scarcity of short and finite illuminating analyses in philosophically interesting cases provides no grounds for pessimism concerning the possibility of philosophical progress through conceptual analysis.     

A Historical Perspective on the Distinction Between Basic and Applied Science

The traditional distinction between basic (“pure”) and applied science has been much criticized in recent decades. The criticism is based on a combination of historical and systematic epistemic argument. The present paper is mostly concerned with the historical aspect. I argue that the critics impose an understanding at odds with the way the distinction was understood by its supporters in debates on science education and science policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And I show how a distinction that refers to difference on several epistemic and social dimensions makes good sense of representative historical cases. If this argument is tenable it suggests more continuity in the epistemology and politics of science than has been claimed by a new paradigm of science studies and politics during recent decades.     

Logic and Social Cognition

This article takes off from Johan van Benthem’s ruminations on the interface between logic and cognitive science in his position paper “Logic and reasoning: Do the facts matter?”. When trying to answer Van Benthem’s question whether logic can be fruitfully combined with psychological experiments, this article focuses on a specific domain of reasoning, namely higher-order social cognition, including attributions such as “Bob knows that Alice knows that he wrote a novel under pseudonym”. For intelligent interaction, it is important that the participants recursively model the mental states of other agents. Otherwise, an international negotiation may fail, even when it has potential for a win-win solution, and in a time-critical rescue mission, a software agent may depend on a teammate’s action that never materializes. First a survey is presented of past and current research on higher-order social cognition, from the various viewpoints of logic, artificial intelligence, and psychology. Do people actually reason about each other’s knowledge in the way proscribed by epistemic logic? And if not, how can logic and cognitive science productively work together to construct more realistic models of human reasoning about other minds? The paper ends with a delineation of possible avenues for future research, aiming to provide a better understanding of higher-order social reasoning. The methodology is based on a combination of experimental research, logic, computational cognitive models, and agent-based evolutionary models.     

Substantive assumptions in interaction: a logical perspective

In this paper we study substantive assumptions in social interaction. By substantive assumptions we mean contingent assumptions about what the players know and believe about each other’s choices and information. We first explain why substantive assumptions are fundamental for the analysis of games and, more generally, social interaction. Then we show that they can be compared formally, and that there exist contexts where no substantive assumptions are being made. Finally we show that the questions raised in this paper are related to a number of issues concerning “large” structures in epistemic game theory.     

Stressors and Stressor Appraisals: the Moderating Effect of Task Efficacy

Employees’ cognitive appraisals play important roles in determining how they perceive and react to challenge and hindrance stressors. This study examined the stress process by studying employees’ cognitive appraisals using time-lagged data collected with a time interval of 4 months. There were three major findings. First, challenge appraisals mediated the relationship of job complexity with work motivation and task persistence. Hindrance appraisals mediated the relationship of role conflict with work motivation and task persistence. Second, task efficacy significantly moderated the relationship between job complexity and challenge appraisal, as well as the relationship between role conflict and hindrance appraisal. Employees high in task efficacy were more likely to report challenge appraisals of job complexity than employees low in task efficacy. Employees low in task efficacy were more likely to report hindrance appraisals of role conflict than employees high in task efficacy. Finally, data supported the moderated mediation model in which task efficacy moderated the indirect effect of job complexity on motivation via challenge appraisal. Our study provided important input to the development of stress management interventions.     

The semantic structure of emotion words across languages is consistent with componential appraisal models of emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion, and particularly the Component Process Model, claim that the different components of the emotion process (action tendencies, physiological reactions, expressions, and feeling experiences) are essentially driven by the results of cognitive appraisals and that the feeling component constitutes a central integration and representation of these processes. Given the complexity of the proposed architecture, comprehensive experimental tests of these predictions are difficult to perform and to date are lacking. Encouraged by the “lexical sedimentation” hypothesis, here we propose an indirect examination of the compatibility of the theoretical assumptions with the semantic structure of a set of major emotion words as measured in a cross-language and cross-cultural study. Specifically, we performed a secondary analysis of the large-scale data set with ratings of affective features covering all components of the emotion process for 24 emotion words in 27 countries, constituting profiles of emotion-specific appraisals, action tendencies, physiological reactions, expressions, and feeling experiences. The results of a series of hierarchical regression analyses to examine the prediction of the theoretical model are highly consistent with the claim that appraisal patterns determine the structure of the response components, which in turn predict central dimensions of the feeling component.     

Social Support and the Religious Dimensions of Close Ties

Despite the influence of social support on physical and mental health, few studies have examined why some close ties are more supportive than others. Though religion provides a rich context for social interaction and a meaningful social identity, it has received little attention in the social support literature. A growing literature on religion and health offers insight into how religion affects social support processes. Using dyadic network data derived from the nationally representative 2006 Portraits of American Life Study, I examine how the religious dimensions of close, nonhousehold ties relate to provision of social support. Results from logistic regression analyses indicate that (controlling for a range of other social tie characteristics) same‐faith ties are significantly more likely to be sources of help “in times of need,” while religious discussion is a strong predictor of receiving both help and advice. The effect of religious homophily is strongest for evangelical Protestants and African‐American Protestants. My findings underscore the need for social support researchers to consider the role of religion in shaping support processes in close relationships.     

Diseases of the Understanding and the Need for Philosophical Therapy

The paper develops and addresses a major challenge for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy of the sort increasingly attributed to Wittgenstein. To be substantive and relevant, such conceptions have to identify “diseases of the understanding” from which philosophers suffer, and to explain why these “diseases” need to be cured in order to resolve or overcome important philosophical problems. The paper addresses this challenge in three steps: With the help of findings and concepts from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, it redevelops the Wittgensteinian notion of “philosophical pictures.” Through a case study on seminal versions of familiar mind‐body problems, it examines how such pictures shape philosophical reflection and generate ill‐motivated but captivating problems. Third, it shows that philosophical pictures are constitutive of “diseases of the understanding,” in a quite strict sense of the term. On this basis, the paper explains when and why philosophical therapy is required.