Exemplar models as a mechanism for performing Bayesian inference

Probabilistic models have recently received much attention as accounts of human cognition. However, most research in which probabilistic models have been used has been focused on formulating the abstract problems behind cognitive tasks and their optimal solutions, rather than on mechanisms that could implement these solutions. Exemplar models are a successful class of psychological process models in which an inventory of stored examples is used to solve problems such as identification, categorization, and function learning. We show that exemplar models can be used to perform a sophisticated form of Monte Carlo approximation known as importance sampling and thus provide a way to perform approximate Bayesian inference. Simulations of Bayesian inference in speech perception, generalization along a single dimension, making predictions about everyday events, concept learning, and reconstruction from memory show that exemplar models can often account for human performance with only a few exemplars, for both simple and relatively complex prior distributions. These results suggest that exemplar models provide a possible mechanism for implementing at least some forms of Bayesian inference.     

不同概化的问题原型对问题归类和解决的影响

探讨原理学习过程中形成不同概化程度／问题原型对解决不同适宜程度问题的影响。实验1探讨个体形成不同概化程度问题原型对解决表面内容不同适宜程度的问题的效果;实验2探讨形成不同概化程度问题原型的被试解决问题的信息加工方式与机制;实验3进一步探讨形成不同概化程度问题原型的个体解决复杂问题的效果与机制。结果表明：(1)形成概化程度较高的问题原型有利于个体对表面内容不适宜题目的解答;(2)形成概化程度较高问题原型的被试在解答适宜或不适宜问题时均能迅速激活问题原型而通达原理图式,因此,更多地采用图式的方法解决问题;(3)形成概化程度较高的问题原型会有助于被试排除题目的无关信息,正确进行解答。     

Linking the demands–control–support model to innovation: The moderating role of personal initiative on the generation and implementation of ideas

The demands–control–support model indicates that workers can use job control and social support for problem solving. We examined whether personal initiative moderated relationships between, on the one hand, job control used for problem solving and social support used for problem solving and, on the other hand, ideas generation and implementation. We operationalized job control used for problem solving as ‘changing aspects of work activities to solve problems’. We operationalized social support used for problem solving as ‘discussing problems to solve problems’. Using an experience sampling methodology, participants provided data for up to four times a day for up to five working days (N= 89). The extent to which people ‘changed aspects of their work activities to solve problems’ was associated with higher levels of ideas generation for people with high personal initiative. The extent to which people ‘discussed problems to solve problems’ was associated with higher levels of ideas implementation for people with high personal initiative.     

The Cognitive Social Network in Dreams: Transitivity,Assortativity, and Giant Component Proportion Are Monotonic

For five individuals, a social network was constructed from a series of his or her dreams. Three important network measures were calculated for each network: transitivity, assortativity, and giant component proportion. These were monotonically related; over the five networks as transitivity increased, assortativity increased and giant component proportion decreased. The relations indicate that characters appear in dreams systematically. Systematicity likely arises from the dreamer's memory of people and their relations, which is from the dreamer's cognitive social network. But the dream social network is not a copy of the cognitive social network. Waking life social networks tend to have positive assortativity; that is, people tend to be connected to others with similar connectivity. Instead, in our sample of dream social networks assortativity is more often negative or near 0, as in online social networks. We show that if characters appear via a random walk, negative assortativity can result, particularly if the random walk is biased as suggested by remote associations.     

On the potential value and limitations of emphasis change and other exploration-enhancing training methods

Two experiments are presented that examine the efficiency of training methods that force trainees to explore the possible strategy space. Both experiments used a 2-dimensional search task. Experiment 1 studies a method that enforces exploration by preventing repetitions within short sequences. It shows that the effect of this "enhanced exploration" method in the abstract setting is similar to the effect of "emphasis change" training (see D. Gopher, 1993) in high cognitive workload tasks. This finding appeared only in strategic spaces where intuitive exploration converges to a local optimum. Experiment 2 compares the effect of exploration enhancement with the effect of guided instruction. The results of the experiments, which are captured well by a generalization of I. Erev and D. A. Gopher's (1999) model of the conditions for the success of emphasis change training, shed light on the limitations and potential of exploration-enhancing training methods.     

心理定势现象的认知神经机制

问题解决活动中的心理定势,是指人们固执地沿用熟悉方案、忽略其他方案的反应倾向。它可能源于人们已经掌握的陈述性知识,也可能源于程序性知识,两类不同来源的心理定势的发生条件和影响效果都不尽相同。然而,过往的研究都没有做出严格区分。本文通过梳理相关研究,描述心理定势现象,解释心理定势是怎么发生的,分析心理定势是在什么条件下发生的、会对心理与行为活动造成什么样的影响,从而评述两种来源的心理定势的认知神经机制,指出尚未解决的科学问题。     

My point is valid,yours is not: myside bias in reasoning about abortion

The study explores whether people are more inclined to accept a conclusion that confirms their prior beliefs and reject one they personally object to even when both follow the same logic. Most of the prior research in this area has relied on the informal reasoning paradigm; in this study, however, we applied a formal reasoning paradigm to distinguish between cognitive and motivational mechanisms leading to myside bias in reasoning on value-laden topics (in this case abortions). Slovak and Polish (N?=?387) participants indicated their attitudes toward abortion and then evaluated logical syllogisms with neutral, pro-choice, or pro-life content. We analysed whether participants’ prior attitudes influenced their ability to solve these logically identical reasoning tasks and found that prior attitudes were the strongest predictor of myside bias in evaluating both valid and invalid syllogisms, even after controlling for logical validity (the ability to solve neutral syllogisms) and previous experience of logic.     

Knowledge in transition: Adults' developing understanding of a principle of physical causality

What are the conditions that make it likely that cognitive change will occur? We investigate this issue with respect to 25 college students' developing understanding of gear movement (a particular problem in the domain of physical causation). The participants solved problems, then received minimal instruction, and solved additional problems. Significantly, only some of the participants changed their approach to solving the problems after receiving instruction; the remainder of the participants were stable in their understanding and either continued to solve all problems correctly or continued to solve key problems incorrectly. Most analyses focused on the participants who began by solving problems incorrectly. In particular, we attempted to differentiate those participants who exhibited cognitive change from those who did not. To do this, we examined precursors of knowledge change that were motivated by different theoretical positions on mechanisms of cognitive change and development (i.e., consideration of multiple approaches, cognitive conflict, and instruction as an example of a sociocultural process). Results suggest that having multiple approaches available and using instructional information to build on not-well-developed conceptions are likely candidates for understanding knowledge change for adult participants with respect to their developing understanding of physical causality.     

Productive and Re‐productive Thinking in Solving Insight Problems

Many innovations in organizations result when people discover insightful solutions to problems. Insightful problem‐solving was considered by Gestalt psychologists to be associated with productive, as opposed to re‐productive, thinking. Productive thinking is characterized by shifts in perspective which allow the problem solver to consider new, sometimes transformational, approaches. Re‐productive thinking, on the other hand, involves the application of familiar, routine, procedures. This article reports a study which investigated how self‐reported productive and re‐productive thinking are related to an individual's ability to solve insight problems. Our measures were tested against the Kirton Adaption‐Innovation Inventory (KAI), and a battery of spatial insight problems. The results indicated that productive and re‐productive thinking and the KAI were successful in predicting performance on spatial insight problems. Furthermore, the measures of productive and re‐productive thinking accounted for spatial insight performance independently of scores on the KAI. In addition, the results suggested that re‐productive thinking consists of two different components—one based on group conventions and the other on personal experience. Each contributed differently to solving insight problems.     

Use of social knowledge in tacit coordination: Social focal points

Social focal point theory predicts that, in matching, people search for a shared characteristic that makes one decision option salient whereas, in mismatching, they search for complementary characteristics that make different options salient for each of the coordinating parties. In two studies, participants learned about a partner’s activity preferences and then tried to either match or mismatch choices on a series of pictures that were remotely associated with one of these preferences. Being the same on a relevant preference facilitated matching whereas being different facilitated mismatching. In the second study, participants also used overall perceived similarity to supplement specific trait information. Coordination performance also affected interpersonal impressions: successful matching increased interpersonal attraction whereas successful mismatching did not. These downstream effects were obtained even when participants had considerable prior social information about their partners. Tacit coordination is compared with mimicry and synchrony, and the implications for coordinated team performance are discussed.     

Acquisition of hierarchical reactive skills in a unified cognitive architecture

In this paper, we review Icarus, a cognitive architecture that utilizes hierarchical skills and concepts for reactive execution in physical environments. In addition, we present two extensions to the framework. The first involves the incorporation of means-ends analysis, which lets the system compose known skills to solve novel problems. The second involves the storage of new skills that are based on successful means-ends traces. We report experimental studies of these mechanisms on three distinct domains. Our results suggest that the two methods interact to acquire useful skill hierarchies that generalize well and that reduce the effort required to handle new tasks. We conclude with a discussion of related work on learning and prospects for additional research, including extending the framework to cover developmental phenomena.     

Evidence against integration of spatial maps in humans: generality across real and virtual environments

A real-world open-field search task was implemented with humans as an analogue of Blaisdell and Cook’s (Anim Cogn 8:7–16, 2005) pigeon foraging task and Sturz, Bodily, and Katz’s (Anim Cogn 9:207–217, 2006) human virtual foraging task to 1) determine whether humans were capable of integrating independently learned spatial maps and 2) make explicit comparisons of mechanisms used by humans to navigate real and virtual environments. Participants searched for a hidden goal located in one of 16 bins arranged in a 4 × 4 grid. In Phase 1, the goal was hidden between two landmarks (blue T and red L). In Phase 2, the goal was hidden to the left and in front of a single landmark (blue T). Following training, goal-absent trials were conducted in which the red L from Phase 1 was presented alone. Bin choices during goal-absent trials assessed participants’ strategies: association (from Phase 1), generalization (from Phase 2), or integration (combination of Phase 1 and 2). Results were inconsistent with those obtained with pigeons but were consistent with those obtained with humans in a virtual environment. Specifically, during testing, participants did not integrate independently learned spatial maps but used a generalization strategy followed by a shift in search behavior away from the test landmark. These results were confirmed by a control condition in which a novel landmark was presented during testing. Results are consistent with the bulk of recent findings suggesting the use of alternative navigational strategies to cognitive mapping. Results also add to a growing body of literature suggesting that virtual environment approaches to the study of spatial learning and memory have external validity and that spatial mechanisms used by human participants in navigating virtual environments are similar to those used in navigating real-world environments.     

Job search and social cognitive theory: The role of career-relevant activities

Social cognitive theory was used to explain the relationships between career-relevant activities (environmental and self career exploration, career resources, and training), self-regulatory variables (job search self-efficacy and job search clarity), variables from the Theory of Planned Behavior (job search attitude, subjective norm, job search intention), and job search intensity. Based on a sample of employed and unemployed job seekers, we found that job seekers who spent more time in career exploration, attended more training programs, and used more career resources reported higher job search clarity and job search self-efficacy. Job search self-efficacy, job search attitude, and subjective norm predicted job search intention, and job search clarity and job search intention predicted job search intensity eight months later. The results of this study provide practical information on what job seekers can do to improve their job search clarity and job search self-efficacy and demonstrate the application of social cognitive theory for understanding and predicting job search behavior.     

Together We Rise: How Social Movements Succeed

Social movements, such as Black Lives Matter, surge when support grows for their social justice goals. At their core, social movements advance when people act collectively by rising in solidarity with a shared purpose to address injustice and inequality. Drawing on insights from consumer psychology, this review investigates how social movements succeed in creating social change. We build on an established 21^st‐century framework for how social movements succeed to outline the promising practices of successful social movements. For each of these practices, we identify the consumer psychology mechanisms that motivate collective action and encourage people to transform from bystanders to upstanders, those who provide the grassroots momentum for successful social movements. We illustrate this framework with examples from the growth of the Black Lives Matter movement. Finally, we highlight insights from consumer psychology that promote an understanding of social movements, and we raise research questions to encourage more consumer psychologists to investigate how social movements succeed.     

Social neuroscience evidence for dehumanised perception

Dehumanisation describes perceiving a person as nonhuman in some ways, such as lacking a mind. Social psychology is beginning to understand cognitive and affective causes and mechanisms—the psychological how and why of dehumanisation. Social neuroscience research also can inform these questions. After background on social neural networks and on past dehumanisation research, the article contrasts (a) research on fully humanised person perception, reviewing studies on affective and cognitive factors, specifically mentalising (considering another's mind), with (b) dehumanised perception, proposing neural systems potentially involved. Finally, the conclusion suggests limitations of social neuroscience, future research directions, and real-world consequences of this all-too-human phenomenon.     

Simple mechanisms for gathering social information

Social contexts are notoriously complex, yet decisions are nevertheless made by using simple strategies. We argue that the concept of fast and frugal heuristics provides a promising framework for understanding how we gather social information to make decisions in social environments. That is, we assume that under limitations of time, energy, and computational resources people use cognitively based shortcuts that rely on information from social environments to solve different types of real problems. We review three successful applications of heuristics to the social arena. We first introduce some commonly faced social inference problems (e.g., selecting a mate or deciding whether to cooperate with someone) and then discuss how individuals can use simple strategies to solve such problems. For each problem, we consider how social environments are structured, and how we take advantage of this structure when using heuristics to make inferences and decisions.     

知识经验与顿悟：来自认知神经科学的证据

知识经验对于顿悟问题解决是一把双刃剑,强势知识会阻碍顿悟问题解决,弱势知识才是顿悟问题解决的关键。强势知识引导的组块效应、约束效应和固着效应等心理定势现象,“帮助”问题解决者以惯用方案来理解、思考和解决问题。之所以会这样,可能是因为大脑内存在一套具有优先级差的层级加工系统,赋予惯用方案的优先级最高。不过,惯用方案不仅不能够解决顿悟问题,而且还会通过注意竞争和注意失灵方式来阻碍新异方案的探索和执行,所以,问题解决者往往都会进入思维僵局。僵局的打破和顿悟的实现,需要抑制住强势知识及其相关的惯用方案、激活弱势知识和新异方案,这违反了大脑的认知加工惯性,是很难以自发发生的。但是,可以通过激活扩散来增强弱势知识的激活水平,或者是拓宽注意范围、提高注意灵活性来增加弱势知识激活的可能性,从而促进顿悟问题解决。     

Changes are not localized before they are explicitly detected

Change detection is in many ways analogous to visual search. Yet, unlike search, successful detection depends not on the salience of features within a scene, but on the difference between the original and modified scene. If, as in search, pre-attentive mechanisms guide attention to the change location, the change itself must produce a preattentively detectable signal. Despite recent evidence for implicit representation of change in the absence of conscious detection, few studies have yet explored whether attention is guided to a change location prior to explicit detection. In four “change blindness” experiments using several variants of the “flicker” task, we tested the hypothesis that implicit or preattentive mechanisms guide change localization prior to explicit detection. None of the experiments revealed improved localization of changes prior to explicit reports of detection, suggesting that implicit detection of change does not contribute to the eventual explicit localization of a change. Instead, change localization is essentially arbitrary, driven by the salience of features within scenes.     

Patterns of theorizing about chess skill – Commentary on Linhares and Freitas (2010) and Lane and Gobet (2011)

Although Linhares and Freitas (2010) have failed to characterize earlier experimental work in chess skill accurately, their conceptual approach of “experience-recognition”-driven problem solving points to the need to incorporate analogical reasoning mechanisms into explanations of how chess players choose the best move in chess. The Lane and Gobet (2011) commentary and the cognitive simulation models that they espouse consist of plausible mechanisms to support choosing a good move, but need additional development to incorporate abstract/semantic information. One possible avenue for future exploration will be to produce hybrid models that use both “piece-on-square” chunk and template representations and abstract high-level representations to guide search in chess.     

Expecting tasks to help or hurt subsequent cognitive performance: Variability,accuracy, and bias in forecasted after-effects

After-effects on cognition—where a prior activity either benefits or hinders subsequent cognitive performance—are empirically inconsistent. Do people have insight into when their subjective energy and cognition will be helped or hurt by engaging in prior activities? Studies 1a and 1b (combined N  =  316) find that people expect more demanding and unenjoyable tasks to hinder their subsequent energy and cognitive performance, regardless of their willpower lay theory. Study 2 (N  =  167) examines the accuracy of these forecasts using a within-subject design. Participants’ forecasts of their future subjective states did predict their actual experienced subjective states, but participants were not able to accurately forecast their subsequent maths performance. Additionally, they significantly overestimated the detrimental effects of demanding prior activities on both subjective state and performance. Study 3 (N  =  210) found that participants’ overestimation of detrimental after-effects could result in unnecessary financial costs, suggesting these biased forecasts can have consequences.