Knowledge,Credit, and Cognitive Agency

According to credit theories of knowledge, S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p. This article argues that any adequate credit theory has to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to subjects. It then presents a general account of these conditions and defends two models of cognitive agency. Finally, the article explains how an agent‐based approach rescues the credit theory from an apparent counterexample. The article's defense of the credit theory is qualified, however, for one lesson that emerges is that credit theories are theories of subjective justification, not theories of knowledge.     

Tropes or Universals: How (Not) to Make One's Choice

This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is little reason for preferring one theory over the other. It is not interested in this claim only for the sake of the debate between trope theory and the theory of universals. Indeed, the reasons why it claims that it is so difficult to choose one theory over the other can be applied to other cases as well (where they might lead to claims of metaphysical equivalence).     

IS QUANTUM INDETERMINISM REAL? THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Quantum mechanics (QM) studies physical phenomena on a microscopic scale. These phenomena are far beyond the reach of our observation, and the connection between QM's mathematical formalism and the experimental results is very indirect. Furthermore, quantum indeterminism defies common sense. Microphysical experiments have shown that, according to the empirical context, electrons and quanta of light behave as waves and other times as particles, even though it is impossible to design an experiment that manifests both behaviors at the same time. Unlike Newtonian physics, the properties of quantum systems (position, velocity, energy, time, etc.) are not all well‐defined simultaneously. Moreover, quantum systems are not characterized by their properties, but by a wave function. Although one of the principles of the theory is the uncertainty principle, the trajectory of the wave function is controlled by the deterministic Schrödinger equations. But what is the wave function? Like other theories of the physical sciences, quantum theory assigns states to systems. The wave function is a particular mathematical representation of the quantum state of a physical system, which contains information about the possible states of the system and the respective probabilities of each state.     

定向遗忘的编码加工机制

有目的的遗忘(定向遗忘)需要耗费认知努力吗?有研究发现, 定向遗忘可能是被动衰减的结果, 即F项目(需要遗忘的项目)未获得有效复述是选择性复述了R项目(需要记住的项目)造成的, 这一加工过程不需要认知努力; 但也有研究表明, 定向遗忘过程可能是遗忘线索诱发的对记忆加工的主动抑制, 需要耗费认知努力, 脑认知研究中发现的前额叶ERPs成分为这一机制提供了证据。还有一种观点认为, 定向遗忘编码过程可能同时包含主动抑制与被动衰减, 但是尚不清楚两种加工机制相互作用的方式。为进一步澄清定向遗忘编码阶段的认知机制, 未来研究需要将非认知因素纳入考察, 并关注不同人群的定向遗忘特征, 在此基础上尝试解决理论争议。     

Nachsicht Oder üble Nachrede? Putnam und das Problem der Theoriendynamik

The article deals with problems of incommensurability and meaning change in thecontext of scientific dynamics. Its main topic is a proposal made by Putnam basedon his version of the principle of charity. It is shown that this proposal does not workas a general principle for the understanding of theory change, for it leads in some cases to an unconvincing interpretation of now discarded theories and is even uncharitable. So it could be polemically described as a kind of defamation ('üle Nachrede') of these theories. This will be demonstrated in two case studies. The first one sketches the development of economic value theory, while the second deals with the development of the concept of probability.     

The single-mind and many-minds versions of quantum mechanics

There is a long tradition of trying to find a satisfactory interpretation of Everett's relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics. Albert and Loewer recently described two new ways of reading Everett: one we will call the single-mind theory and the other the many-minds theory. I will briefly describe these theories and present some of their merits and problems. Since both are no-collapse theories, a significant merit is that they can take advantage of certain properties of the linear dynamics, which Everett apparently considered to be important, to constrain their statistical laws.     

A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Consciousness is to be explained either in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys or in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, although there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research that purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind--the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. Two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies used in the dissociation studies--so critical, in fact, that it is no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this target article we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists of the explicit representation of information in neurally realized parallel distributed processing (PDP) networks. This hypothesis leads us to reassess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways.     

The suggestive properties of quantum mechanics without the collapse postulate

Everett proposed resolving the quantum measurement problem by dropping the nonlinear collapse dynamics from quantum mechanics and taking what is left as a complete physical theory. If one takes such a proposal seriously, then the question becomes how much of the predictive and explanatory power of the standard theory can one recover without the collapse postulate and without adding anything else. Quantum mechanics without the collapse postulate has several suggestive properties, which we will consider in some detail. While these properties are not enough to make it acceptable given the usual standards for a satisfactory physical theory, one might want to exploit these properties to cook up a satisfactory no-collapse formulation of quantum mechanics. In considering how this might work, we will see why any no-collapse theory must generally fail to satisfy at least one of two plausible-sounding conditions.     

Reconsidering the Role of Bridge Laws In Inter-Theoretical Reductions

The present paper surveys the three most prominent accounts in contemporary debates over how sound reduction should be executed. The classical Nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the target-theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary premises (so-called bridge laws) connecting the entities of the target and the base theory. The functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to their causal relations to base entities. The new-wave model of reduction deduces not the original target theory but an analogous image of it, which remains inside the vocabulary of the base theory. One of the fundamental motivations of both the functional and the new-wave model is to show that bridge laws can be evaded. The present paper argues that bridge laws—in the original Nagelian sense—are inevitable, i.e. that none of these models can evade them. On the one hand, the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws, since its fundamental concept, functionalization, is an inter-theoretical process dealing with entities of two different theories. Theoretical entities of different theories (in a general heterogeneous case) do not have common causal relations, so the functionalization of an entity—without bridge laws—can only be executed in the framework of its own theory. On the other hand, the so-called images of the new-wave account cannot be constructed without the use of bridge laws. These connecting principles are needed to guide the process of deduction within the base theory; without them one would not be able to recognize if the deduced structure was an image of the target theory.     

双语言语产生中的词汇提取机制

文章主要介绍了双语言语产生中词汇提取机制的两种理论：非特定语言提取的理论和特定语言提取的理论。重点围绕着双语言语产生中词汇提取的一个关键问题,即非目标语言的词汇是否对目标语言的词汇提取形成竞争或者干扰详细地论述了二者的理论分歧,非特定语言提取的理论认为非目标语言的词汇会对目标语言的词汇提取形成竞争,而特定语言提取的理论认为不会形成竞争。文章最后介绍了双语言语产生中词汇提取机制的最新研究趋势,表明了非特定语言提取的理论和特定语言提取的理论逐步走向融和     

Intertheory relations from unified theories

The concept of unified theory is defined in logical and abstract semantic terms, and employed in the analysis of relations between empirical scientific theories. The conceptual framework of the approach applies to binary relations such as the reduction or replacement of one theory by another, and to multiple intertheory relations. Historically, unified theories tend to arise within the contexts of scientific conflicts which they may show susceptible of solution even in the most controversial cases of the logical incompatibility or conceptual incommensurability of competing theories. These conclusions are exemplified by the Planck-Einstein quantum theory of thermal radiation. The analysis shows in which sense it can, and in which it cannot, be said that this theory unifies Wien's law and the Rayleigh-Jeans law of black-body radiation.     

QUANTUM INTERACTIVE DUALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MATERIALISM

Abstract. René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the mind of a human being and some of the matter in his or her brain. However, the classical physical theories that reigned during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are based exclusively on the material/physical part of Descartes' ontology, and they purport to give, in principle, a completely deterministic account of the physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory violates this condition in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the dynamics. Second, it requires psychophysical events, called Process 1 interventions by John von Neumann. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined, even statistically, by any known law. Orthodox quantum mechanics considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. This quantum conception of the mind‐brain connection allows many psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and practically useful way. According to this quantum approach, conscious human beings are invested with degrees of freedom denied to the mechanistic automatons to which classical physics reduced us.     

不随意自传体记忆研究述评

不随意自传体记忆指,个人过去经历的事件在没有主动提取的情况下自动浮现于脑海的记忆现象。文章从不随意自传体记忆的研究方法、记忆特点和理论解释三个方面,分别介绍结构日记、词汇联想、栅栏任务和压力电影范式等研究方法;说明了不随意自传体记忆提取直接性、内容具体性和情绪影响性等特性,认为其原因是记忆内容的非整合性和显著联结;阐述了全局工作空间智能分布模型、双重表征理论和认知模型理论及其解释能力理论与不足。最后指出未来研究应关注特殊性质的解释、记忆结构整合和记忆的功能探究。     

Lessons from realistic physics for the metaphysics of quantum theory

Quantum mechanics, and classical mechanics, are framework theories that incorporate many different concrete theories which in general cannot be arranged in a neat hierarchy, but discussion of ‘the ontology of quantum mechanics’ tends to proceed as if quantum mechanics were a single concrete theory, specifically the physics of nonrelativistically moving point particles interacting by long-range forces. I survey the problems this causes and make some suggestions for how a more physically realistic perspective ought to influence the metaphysics of quantum mechanics.

     

Early-life risk for domestic violence perpetration: Implications for practice and policy

Research on risks and causes of domestic violence is hampered by a policy framework that not only does not fund but in some cases suppresses inquiry into those causes. This discussion, then, will be placed in the context of those policy frameworks that hamper and distort inquiry. This includes an overview of ideological, political, and historical issues that have shaped those frameworks. Related explanatory theories and theories of practice are summarized. The article will examine known early-life risk factors for those disorders and behaviors associated with domestic violence perpetration. Particular emphasis will be placed on maltreatment and attachment/bonding processes. Framed in broad perspectives of psychosocial theory, risk factors from related literature sources (e.g. general violence and criminality) will be included where risk profiles are substantially similar.     

Do the laws of physics forbid the operation of time machines?

We address the question of whether it is possible to operate a time machine by manipulating matter and energy so as to manufacture closed timelike curves. This question has received a great deal of attention in the physics literature, with attempts to prove no-go theorems based on classical general relativity and various hybrid theories serving as steps along the way towards quantum gravity. Despite the effort put into these no-go theorems, there is no widely accepted definition of a time machine. We explain the conundrum that must be faced in providing a satisfactory definition and propose a resolution. Roughly, we require that all extensions of the time machine region contain closed timelike curves; the actions of the time machine operator are then sufficiently “potent” to guarantee that closed timelike curves appear. We then review no-go theorems based on classical general relativity, semi-classical quantum gravity, quantum field theory on curved spacetime, and Euclidean quantum gravity. Our verdict on the question of our title is that no result of sufficient generality to underwrite a confident “yes” has been proven. Our review of the no-go results does, however, highlight several foundational problems at the intersection of general relativity and quantum physics that lend substance to the search for an answer.     

Repetition effects in word and pseudoword identification: comment on Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel

Two recent articles by Feustel, Shiffrin, and Salasoo (1983) and Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel (1985) argue that word identification is based on episodic memory as well as semantic (or "permanent, abstract") memory. The earlier article argued for separate processing stages affected by repetition (episodic memory) and lexicality (semantic memory). To account for the new finding that number of repetitions interacts with lexicality, the later article invokes the same two types of memory, operating in parallel rather than serially. We argue that Salasoo et al.'s data are compatible with a wide variety of competing theories, including some that do not involve episodic memory at all. We question the relevance of a complex formal model shown by the authors to account for the main trends in the data, because it makes little use of key properties of episodic memory. Furthermore, we show that two variants of a less complex model inspired by logogen theory fit the data as well or better than the model of Salasoo et al., using fewer free parameters. We argue that what is needed is not an existence proof that one particular complex model can fit a body of data, but experimental manipulations that successfully discriminate between broad classes of competing theories.