MYTHIC RELIGIOUS NATURALISM

In his book Religion Is Not About God, Loyal Rue presents an evolutionarily based explanation of religion as a means to further the personal and social fulfillment of human beings. Rue argues that religions in the form of myths, adaptive falsities, provide an account of the connection between what is (facts) and what matters (values). Myths are false because they attribute subjectively based values to valueless facts, but adaptive because they motivate personally and socially beneficial actions. He maintains that the current crises of humankind, evidenced by both social conflict and environmental degradation, indicate that the major religious traditions—all of which project values onto some transcendent reality—are failing to serve humanity. To overcome these crises, Rue maintains that we need a new, scientifically based naturalized religion, one that attributes subjectively based values to Nature instead of a transcendent reality. I accept Rue's naturalism about values but reject his subjectivist account of them. Contrary to Rue, I show that the naturalistic fallacy sets no barrier to the existence of objective moral values. Modeling my view on the selection theories used in biology and psychology, I offer a scientifically based explanation of the origin and existence of objective values and support it with empirical findings from developmental psychology. Whether this account can count as religious, I do not address.     

RELIGIOUS CULTURE AND HISTORICAL CHANGE: VATICAN II ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

At Vatican II and since Vatican II there have been Catholics who have held that the Council's teaching on religious freedom is in contradiction to the Church's earlier teaching and practice. The Council defended it as a legitimate development of doctrine in part through claiming that changing human experience in history shows us only gradually what human dignity entails, and the Church learns from this experience. True, the Council's teaching is in part a denial of its earlier teaching and practice. The present article defends the legitimacy of this development through showing that there is a change of paradigm by which the Church now views this issue, a change that includes both continuity and discontinuity. This reliance on what is revealed to us by changing human experience is accepted by the Church only when it sees it as critically evaluated by an adequate philosophy and as in accord with Christian revelation, but its acceptance moves us to a growth in our understanding of revelation itself.     

RELIGIOUS REASONS AND PUBLIC POLICY

Most Liberals hold that public policies ought always be justifiable by reference to public reasons; that citizens should also refrain from advocacy in the absence of such reasons; and that exclusively religious reasons cannot be public reasons. This is challenged by Paul Weithman and Christopher Eberle. Both argue that basic liberal principles permit citizens in some circumstances to advance exclusively religious reasons, and in particular that Rawls's notions of reasonableness (Weithman) and the strains of commitment (Eberle) can be used in defence of this position. I argue that neither makes out his case, and that no plausible case has been made against the standard Liberal view.     

ENTHEOGENS IN A RELIGIOUS CONTEXT: THE CASE OF THE SANTO DAIME RELIGIOUS TRADITION

This essay first draws upon the work of William James and others to propose a nonphysicalistic understanding of the relationship between the brain and consciousness in order to articulate a philosophical perspective that can understand entheogenic visionary/mystical experiences as something other than hallucinations. It then focuses on the Santo Daime tradition, a religious movement that began in Brazil in the early part of the twentieth century, to provide an example of the personal and social ramifications of taking an entheogen (ayahuasca) within a disciplined religious context. The essay claims that the Santo Daime is one example of a contemporary mystery school; gives a brief history of the development of this religion; discusses the key theological assumptions of this movement; investigates the important role played by visionary/mystical experiences within this religion; underscores the centrality of healing and spiritual transformation for members of this tradition; and ends with an examination of the crucial significance of spiritual discipline within this entheogenically based religion.     

RELIGIOUS ETHICS AND EMPIRICAL ETHICS

In recent decades, cognitive and behavioral scientists have learned a great deal about how people think and behave. On the most general level, there is a basic consensus that many judgments, including ethical judgments, are made by intuitive, even unconscious, impulses. This basic insight has opened the door to a wide variety of more particular studies that investigate how judgments are influenced by group identity, self‐conception, emotions, perceptions of risk, and many other factors. When these forms of research engage ethical issues, they are sometimes called empirical ethics. This essay argues that the field of religious ethics would benefit from a more robust engagement with empirical ethics than it has thus far undertaken. In doing so, it offers a brief account of how issues of moral psychology and moral anthropology have been treated in religious ethics, and it highlights ways that the scientific findings challenge some prevailing norms in religious ethics. It ends by suggesting avenues by which religious ethics research could productively engage empirical ethics.     

RELIGIOUS SCHEMA AND VALUES*

Past research has consistently shown marked differences between religious believers and non-believers. Such differences were suggested in this study to be due to the presence of religious schema in believers. It was hypothesized that non-believers would be less schematic, or aschematic with respect to religion. This hypothesis was examined by comparing the value system of college student believers (Protestants and Catholics) and non-believers (those indicating no religious faith). Extensive differences were found. Consistent with the hypothesis, the differences were found mainly on the schema-relevant values. In essence, believers showed greater preference for and possession of the moral and relational values, and lesser on the personal-extrinsic, competency, and egoistic values. As predicted, no difference was found on the social and intellectual types of values which are basically schema-irrelevant. The notion of schema availability was also supported. When subjects' religiosity (as indicated by their preference for the salvation value and their self-rated possession of the religiousness value) was controlled for, all the above differences were removed. When high and low religiosity believers were compared, great differences were found. The differences between the high and low religiosity non-believers were however much less extensive.     

LOREN EISELEY: RELIGIOUS SCIENTIST

Abstract. Loren Eiseley is known both as a scientist and an essayist/poet. The disillusionment with science and technology among many in the late 1950s and the search for new values in the 1960s help account for Eiseley's significance as a writer. He appears to offer a solution to mankind's contemporary disillusionment by reminding that science has limits and that intuitive, nonscientific insight is valid, especially when it is complementary to scientific knowledge. The thesis of this essay is that in content and style Eiseley writes as a religious writer in the sense that he reaffirms what is necessary for humankind to be happy and even to be "saved."     

SELF-MAINTENANCE AS A RELIGIOUS CONCERN

Abstract. Human concern with problems of being and becoming promotes conceptions of ideal states of being, exemplified by paragons and heroes and projected as Utopias or visions of salvation; it leads to regimens for cultivating and maintaining individual ability to meet social expectations; and it produces fantasies, as in myth and popular literature, that rehearse the problems and that offer escape from them and roles to emulate in dealing with them. Many of these regimens and fantasies appear in the rituals and teachings of organized religion. Many also figure in private devotions apart from established religions. The many forms they take constitute much of the religious life of ordinary people. From this viewpoint, there is much to examine in American life.     

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

The paper argues that it can be demonstrated that the position of Jacques Dupuis, S.J., a pluralist, is compatible with that of the syllabus on religious pluralism produced by the Roman Catholic Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominius Iesus. This demonstration provides good reason to believe that at least one form of de jure pluralism, labeled “inclusivist pluralism”, is a theological theory compatible with orthodox Christian belief.