裸露尤“物”:性客体化影响社会认知的眼动证据

客体化理论认为,对女性身体的关注会导致对其能力、热情和道德等社会属性评价的降低,然而以往研究缺乏直接证据。本研究以50名大学生为被试,采用眼动仪考察了对泳装图片和非泳装图片人物聪明程度评价过程中的眼动特征,结果发现:相比非泳装图片,被试对泳装图片人物的聪明程度评分更低;相比非泳装图片,被试对泳装图片人物胸部的注视点更多,注视时间和首次注视时间更长,对面孔的注视时间和首次注视时间更短。眼动特征表明,对泳装图片社会感知过程中存在客体化注视,直接且直观地支持了客体化理论。     

Subjectivity uncertainty theory of objectification: Compensating for uncertainty about how to positively relate to others by downplaying their subjective attributes

Why do people sometimes view others as objects rather than complete persons? We propose that when people desire successful interactions with others, yet feel uncertain about their ability to navigate others' subjectivity, they downplay others' subjective attributes, focusing instead on their concrete attributes. This account suggests that objectification represents a response to uncertainty about one's ability to successfully interact with others distinct from: instrumentalizing others in response to power; dehumanizing others in response to threat; and simplifying others in response to general uncertainty. Supporting this account: When uncertainty about navigating women's subjectivity was salient, men showed increased sexual objectification to the extent that they desired successful interactions with women (Study 1) and were primed to view such interactions as self-esteem relevant (Study 2). In a workplace scenario, participants made uncertain about their managerial ability felt less confident about their ability to navigate employees' subjectivity and, consequently, role-objectified employees (Study 3).     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

When can we introspect accurately about mental processes?

Some theorists have suggested that the cognitive processes determining a person’s perforance in a given task are unconscious, making introspection a poor research tool for studying these processes. Others have argued that the relevant processes usually are consciously conrolled and can be detailed by asking the person to introspect. Here, a synthesis of these two positions, a dual-factor approach, is proposed. Some of the processes involved in achieving a cognitive goal, such as learning a new concept, are viewed as unconscious and automatic; howver, other processes are intentionally allocated conscious attention, in certain tasks, to accomlish othe goal. To illustrate this dual-factor position, evidence is presented in support of the view that when concept learning occurs solely by automatic frequency processing, introspective reports are inaccurate, but when the nature of the task prompts intentional hypothesis testing, introspective reports are accurate, revealing clues that subjects engage in a conscious hypothesisesting strategy.     

From Gaze to Outrage: The Role of Group-Based Anger in Mediating the Relationship between Sexual Objectification and Collective Action

Numerous studies have demonstrated the harmful effects of sexual objectification on well-being. However, despite the rapid growth of the #MeToo movement, which has raised public awareness about sexual harassment, there has been much less research investigating the role of sexually objectifying behaviours in motivating people to try to tackle this issue through collective action (e.g., signing petitions, engaging in protests) and the process through which this occurs. Across two studies, we tested whether experiencing sexually objectifying behaviours motivates women to be willing to engage in collective action against sexual objectification via feelings of anger toward women being the target of such actions (i.e., group-based anger). In Studies 1 (n?=?127) and 2 (n?=?159), female participants rated the extent to which they had been the target of sexually objectifying behaviours, their feelings of group-based anger, and their willingness to engage in collective action against sexual objectification. We found that sexual objectification positively predicted the willingness to engage in collective action and that this relationship was mediated by feelings of group-based anger. This pattern suggests that experiencing numerous instances of sexual objectification is likely to result in women feeling group-based anger and that this anger, in turn, promotes collective action against sexual objectification. Therefore, our research demonstrates one process through which sexual objectification promotes a willingness to engage in collective action.

     

Objectification leads to depersonalization: The denial of mind and moral concern to objectified others

Philosophers have argued that when people are objectified they are treated as if they lack the mental states and moral status associated with personhood. These aspects of objectification have been neglected by psychologists. This research investigates the role of depersonalization in objectification. In Study 1, objectified women were attributed less mind and were accorded lesser moral status than non‐objectified women. In Study 2, we replicated this effect with male and female targets and extended it to include perceptions of competence and pain attribution. Further, we explored whether target and perceiver gender qualify depersonalization. Overall, this research indicates that when people are objectified they are denied personhood. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Applicability increases the effect of misattribution on judgment

Feelings and cognitions influence judgment through attribution. For instance, the attribution of positive feelings and cognitions to a stimulus leads to a positive judgment of that stimulus. We examined whether misattribution is moderated by the applicability of a distractor to the judgment question. For instance, when are people more likely to attribute to a target person the affective and cognitive experiences triggered by a kitten – when trying to judge the person’s cuteness or trustworthiness? The kitten triggers experiences specifically relevant to cuteness, but people might more easily suspect the kitten’s potential influence when judging cuteness rather than trustworthiness. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure, we found that applicability increases the effect of misattribution on valenced judgments. The results emphasise the importance of specific information (rather than only general valence) in attribution and suggest that high applicability of distractors to the judgment question does not elicit effective correction.     

Categorizing others: the dynamics of person construal

A fundamental question in social cognition is whether people categorize others on the basis of the social groups to which they belong. Integrating ideas from related work on face processing, the current research explored the emergence and boundary conditions of person categorization. Using speeded responses to facial stimuli as a marker of category activation, the authors showed in 3 experiments that person categorization: (a) occurs only under active-encoding conditions and (b) does not extend to applicable but task-irrelevant categorical dimensions, but (c) is sensitive to overlap in the perceptual features that support multiple categorical construals. The authors consider the implications of these findings for models of social-cognitive functioning and the component processes that support person perception.     

Personality in context: an interpersonal systems perspective

Because a significant part of individuals' lives involve close relationships, an important and substantial part of the situations they encounter consists of other people's behaviors. We suggest that individuals' characteristic ways of behaving, which are typically attributed to "personality," arise from two processes. One lies primarily within the individual, conceptualized as individual differences in one's cognitive and affective processing system. The other process, which has received less attention in personality research, lies outside the person in the individual differences in the situations that people encounter in their everyday lives. The interplay between these two processes can be particularly relevant for understanding close relationships. By assuming that each partner's behavior provides the situational context for the other partner, we conceptualize a dyadic relationship as the "interlocking" of the cognitive-affective processing systems of both partners. We illustrate this approach to personality-in-context with a hypothetical scenario and use this framework to organize research on attachment styles, rejection sensitivity, self-fulfilling prophecy, the self in relation to others, and interdependence theory.     

Capturing Changes in Social Identities over Time and How They Become Part of the Self‐concept

How people come to develop a feeling of belongingness to a new social group and orchestrate this new group membership with pre‐existing identities within the self‐concept is a theoretically and socially relevant phenomenon that has received increased scientific attention in recent years. Models from different fields of psychology – including social, cultural, and organizational psychology – have proposed factors involved in this change and integration process along with consequences of this phenomenon. We present overview of this literature, including a recent model on the process of identity integration: the cognitive‐developmental model of social identity integration. Specifically, this model highlights the fundamental cognitive and developmental processes involved as people develop new social identifications and integrate their different identities into their overall self‐concept. We then present recent empirical evidence testing the model. Finally, we propose conceptual, methodological, and statistical avenues for future research on identity change and integration.     

The object of my aggression: Sexual objectification increases physical aggression toward women

Objectification involves reducing someone to a sexual object, rather than seeing them as a full person. Despite numerous theoretical claims that people are more aggressive toward the objectified, and empirical evidence that objectification is linked to high willingness to aggress, rape proclivity, and aggressive attitudes, no research has examined a causal link between objectification and physical aggression, particularly in the context of provocation. In two experiments, we examined this predicted link. In Experiment 1, using a 2 (objectification: no/yes) × 2 (provocation: no/yes) factorial between‐subjects design, we investigated the effects of objectification, induced via body focus during a face‐to‐face interaction, and provocation on physical aggression toward a female confederate. Our results revealed a significant main effect of provocation, a marginal main effect of objectification, and a significant interaction between these variables. In the absence of a provocation, focusing on a woman's body increased aggression toward her. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 using a video of a target woman instead of a face‐to‐face interaction. Again, our results showed a significant two‐way interaction between objectification and provocation, wherein objectification increased aggression in the absence of provocation. Overall, this research indicates that objectification can lead to heightened physical aggression toward objectified women.

     

Social Comparison and the ‘Circle of Objectification’

The purpose of this study was to test a new theoretical model that integrates self-objectification, objectification of others, and social comparison as contributors to the development and maintenance of body image disturbance and disordered eating behavior. Within the new theoretical model, self-objectification, objectification of others, and social comparison are conceptualized as a self-perpetuating cycle, rather than as processes that occur independently of one another. Measures of self-objectification, objectification of others, social comparison, body shame, body dissatisfaction, and eating disorder symptomatology were completed by 549 female students between the ages of 18 and 30?years from a large university in the southeastern United States. Structural equation modeling with nested model comparisons was used to examine the fit of the new theoretical model relative to less complex models which contain only relationships which have received previous attention in the research literature (e.g., the relationship between self-objectification and body shame). Results indicated that the new theoretical model demonstrates good fit for the data and that the fit of this model is significantly better than the original model suggested by the literature. This model also brings together two distinct lines of research and offers a more complete understanding of processes underlying women’s body image and eating behavior. Implications for clinical work as well as theory and measurement are discussed.     

Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot

The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. Bias turns out to be relatively easy to recognize in the behaviors of others, but often difficult to detect in one's own judgments. Most previous research on the bias blind spot has focused on bias in the social domain. In 2 studies, we found replicable bias blind spots with respect to many of the classic cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, we found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. We discuss these findings in terms of a generic dual-process theory of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

A Piagetian approach to infant referential behaviors

Near the end of the first year of life, infants begin producing referential behaviors that in adults indicate joint attention, or coordinating shared attention to an object with another person. These behaviors have been interpreted in the social cognitive literature as an indication that infants realize they are sharing attention to an object with another person. In this paper, we address theory and research on infant referential behaviors described as joint attention and offer an alternative explanation for the presence of these behaviors. Using Piaget's constructivist theory, we show how research in this area can be interpreted without assuming that infants have advanced social cognitive abilities. We argue that infants’ referential behaviors are motor signifiers of thought and that infants recognize humans as particularly relevant objects for their goal-directed behaviors. Finally, we describe how the field of infant joint attention research should proceed if a comprehensive understanding of infant cognitive processes is to be desired.     

Cognitive adaptation to the experience of social and cultural diversity

Diversity is a defining characteristic of modern society, yet there remains considerable debate over the benefits that it brings. The authors argue that positive psychological and behavioral outcomes will be observed only when social and cultural diversity is experienced in a way that challenges stereotypical expectations and that when this precondition is met, the experience has cognitive consequences that resonate across multiple domains. A model, rooted in social categorization theory and research, outlines the preconditions and processes through which people cognitively adapt to the experience of social and cultural diversity and the resulting cross-domain benefits that this brings. Evidence is drawn from a range of literatures to support this model, including work on biculturalism, minority influence, cognitive development, stereotype threat, work group productivity, creativity, and political ideology. The authors bring together a range of differing diversity experiences and explicitly draw parallels between programs of research that have focused on both perceiving others who are multicultural and being multicultural oneself. The findings from this integrative review suggest that experiencing diversity that challenges expectations may not only encourage greater tolerance but also have benefits beyond intergroup relations to varied aspects of psychological functioning.     

“I and thou”: Another barrier to societal change?

The purpose of this study was to examine cognitive barriers to the incorporation of information about societal discrimination against groups of which the individual is a member. Information about discrimination, personal efficacy, and the control of reality was presented to comparable groups of students enrolled in courses on women. Items were phrased either in terms of the self (first-person singular) or generically (in the third person). The results showed that individuals are more aware of discrimination against others than against themselves, and are more likely to attribute personal efficacy and control to themselves than to others. It is suggested that the differential use of identical information when applied to the self vs others is a cognitive mechanism that leads people to ignore evidence about sociostructural biases that affect themselves.     

SASB: A Bridge Between Personality Theory and Clinical Psychology

The World Wide Web has inarguably become an integral part of the daily lives of the majority of the world's population. Many people spend more time online than with any given person on any particular day, yet the cognitive impact of being online remains understudied in psychology. We examine the research that has been done, and relate other related research findings, in an effort to attract more research to this area. We analyze some of the key factors that may have an impact on what and how we learn online, whether we are interacting with the cloud mind interpreted by Google or with other people via text based communication. We investigate how this development changes our perception of reality and how we may evaluate online information in ways that differ from face-to-face encounters. Living our lives in cyberspace changes what kinds of information we most frequently process and how we habitually deploy our cognitive resources, for better and for worse. When people interact with the Internet they may adopt particular mind-sets, modulating basic psychological processes. We integrate disparate lines of research in an effort to provide avenues for future investigation.     

自我客体化影响认知表现的研究现状

自我客体化的女性会内化他人的评价,把自己当做物品一样来定义和评价自我,并习惯性地对自己的身体以及外貌进行监测,从而导致身体羞耻、焦虑、“心流”体验的减少及身体内部感知的迟钝,并进一步造成更多的不良后果。以往的研究多关注于自我客体化在女性心理健康上造成的影响,很少有研究关注于自我客体户对认知表现的影响。本文梳理了自我客体户与认知表现的相关研究,以及自我客体户对认知表现可能的作用机制。未来研究需要从多方面来丰富自我客体化的操纵方式,通过实验的方式来检验自我客体化对认知表现的作用机制,以及考察不同的认知表现,并关注自我客体化对认知表现的累积效应。     

New approaches to demystifying insight

After a person has become stuck on a problem, they sometimes achieve a clear and sudden solution through insight--the so-called Aha! experience. Because of its distinctive experience, the origins and characteristics of insight have received considerable attention historically in psychological research. However, despite considerable progress in characterizing insight, the underlying mechanisms remain mysterious. We argue that research on insight could be greatly advanced by supplementing traditional insight research, which depends on a few complex problems, with paradigms common in other domains of cognitive science. We describe a large set of mini-insight problems to which multiple methods can be applied, together with subjective reports to identify insight problem-solving. Behavioral priming and neuroimaging methods are providing evidence about what, where, and how neural activity occurs during insight. Such evidence constrains theories of component processes, and will help to demystify insight.