Do We Need a Theory for the Religious Development of Women?

J. W. Fowler (1993) suggested that psychological theories of religious development need to be modified to take into account women's ways of knowing and acting. After recalling results of research on gender differences of religiousness and insights by Carol Gilligan (1982f1993) and Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986), that contention is examined. The parallelisms posited by Fowler between women's epistemological orientations and his developmental stages are analyzed, and a different interpretation is proposed. Whereas the insights under discussion may be helpful when interviewing women and scoring the results, the conclusion is that at present theories of religious development need not be modified on that account. As regards gender- sensitive research on the religiousness of adults, it may be more fruitful to use feminine and masculine "orientations" as variables rather than being female or male.     

Career Development Theories: What Help for Older Persons?

Career development theory, although most highly developed for persons in the first two or three decades of life, can help counselors plan ways to work with older persons. The career development theories of Super, Tiedeman, Holland, Blau and other sociologists, Ginzberg, and Krumboltz, as well as the developmental theories of Levinson, Gould, and Neugarten are briefly reviewed to support this assertion. Although applications should be made with caution, concepts from these theories seem to have potential for enhancing the effectiveness of counseling of older persons. There seems, however, to be an increase in research and theory-building on the career development of this age group; more helpful guidelines can be expected in the future.     

Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?

True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: (i) the orthodox definition given in terms of interpretations or models, (ii) a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and (iii) a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference.     

Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?

William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple.

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Is Good Sex Good for You? Rethinking Sexuality and Health

Despite the central importance of sexuality to human well‐being, the study of sexuality remains marginalized within health psychology, which hampers the ability of clinicians and policy‐makers to promote comprehensive health and well‐being. In this review we discuss the evidence that sexual functioning makes critical contributions to human health, focusing specifically on findings linking sexual activity to morbidity and mortality, to the health‐promoting effects of intimate relationships, and to processes of emotion regulation. We argue that researchers studying the psychology of health and well‐being should more substantively integrate sexuality into their research agendas. Health psychologists’ specific expertise in investigating and interpreting complex, reciprocal associations between subjective emotional states, health‐relevant cognitions, and health‐relevant behavior can make a notable contribution to elucidating some of the most intruiging correlations between sexuality and health that have emerged from medical and epidemiological studies. If we want to foster optimum physical and mental health among youths and adults, we must rigorously investigate the multiple mechanisms through which positive sexual functioning plays a unique and fundamental role in human well‐being across the life course.     

Is Satan a Lover of the Good?

There are, apparently, two inherited stories of intentional action. On the motivational story, intentional agents are pursuers of goals. On the evaluative story, intentional agents are pursuers of value. In a spirit of unification, we might try to supplement the motivational story with the evaluative one – or even collapse the former into the latter. The problem with such moves is that they cannot accomodate certain pathologies of agency. Thus, they convert apparently perverse agents – like Satan and self-haters – into closet lovers of the good. I argue that pathological agents like Satan and self-haters are not lovers of the good. They are just lovers of success in action. We can make sense of such agents as practical reasoners because the cares that constitute us as practical reasoners are plural.     

Is Retirement Good or Bad for Subjective Well-Being?

Retirement has been viewed either as a transition that is accompanied by psychological distress or as a time of continued, or even enhanced, subjective well-being. Existing evidence is mixed, with some studies reporting retirement as positively related to well-being and others reporting a negative relationship or none at all. Our research indicates that developmental and social contexts shape an individual’s retirement decisions and experiences, so that retirement should be studied in its ecological and life-course context. Research on marital quality and subjective well-being in retirement has demonstrated both similarities and differences between men and women, as well as the need to consider couples conjointly (rather than viewing individuals in isolation). Future research focusing on the retirement process as it unfolds over time and in ecological context can serve to illuminate the circumstances under which retirement promotes or detracts from the quality of life.     

Is Age a Good Predictor of Research Productivity?

The research productivity of psychologists holding appointment in Australian universities was established at two times of measurement across groups defined with respect to chronological age and date of birth. The design allowed cross-sectional gradients to be contrasted over times of measurement, and longitudinal gradients to be compared across cohorts. Psychologists aged 26–35 years in 1970 showed no decline in publication rate between 1968–1970 and 1978–1980, while psychologists aged more than 35 years in 1970 showed a drop in research output over the 10-year period. However, a person's publication rate in 1978–1980 was better predicted by their past productivity (publication rate in 1968–1970) than by their age. These results are discussed in the context of factors that affect research productivity, as well as changes that will occur in the age distribution of Australian academics over the next 20 years.     

Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?

Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A central reason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view to achieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel some misconceptions associated with it. My aim is to show that the prospect of conceptual atomism is a promising one.     

Is the Expiration of Intellectual Property Rights a Problem for Non-consequentialist Theories of Intellectual Property?

The expiration of intellectual property rights has been seen to amount to a problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property. In this article, I assess whether the difficulty is real. I maintain that, as things are at least, there is no sufficient reason to believe that the termination of intellectual property rights is an insurmountable problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property rights.     

What Is Integral Theory?

Integral theory is a way of knowing that helps foster the recognition that disparate aspects of reality—such as biological constitution, cultural world‐views, felt‐sense of selfhood, and social systems—are all critically important to any knowledge quest. Integral theory provides an “all quadrants, all levels” (K. Wilber, 2006, p. 26) metatheoretical framework that simultaneously honors the important contributions of a broad spectrum of epistemological outlooks while also acknowledging the parochial limits and misconceptions of those perspectives. In other words, integral theory affords a perspective that allows counselors to situate diverse knowledge approaches in such a way that they synergistically complement, rather than contradict, one another.     

Suffering a Loss Is Good Fortune: Myth or Reality?

We sometimes decide to take an offered option that results in apparent loss (e.g., unpaid overtime). Mainstream decision theory does not predict or explain this as a choice we want to make, whereas such a choice has long been described and highly regarded by the traditional Chinese dogma “吃亏是福” (suffering a loss is good fortune). To explore what makes the dogma work, we developed a celebrity anecdote‐based scale to measure “Chikui” (suffering a loss) likelihood and found that:(i) people with higher scores on the Chikui Likelihood Scale (CLS) were more likely to report higher scores on subjective well‐being and the Socioeconomic Index for the present and (ii) the current Socioeconomic Index could be positively predicted not only by current CLS scores but also by retrospective CLS scores recalled for the past, and the predictive effect was enhanced with increasing time intervals. Our findings suggest that “suffering a loss is good fortune” is not a myth but a certain reality. © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Is there a memory for sentences?

A critical discussion of the model of sentence memory which enjoyed greatest popularity in the psycholinguistic research of the sixties, namely the model based on the deep-structure-plus-tag hypothesis of sentence memory, is presented together with the results of an experiment on prompted recall for sentences with various intervals after presentation and with two types of instructions. This experiment contributed to show that immediate memory for sentences can be affected by appropriate instructions, and that after a short time after presentation only the main semantic information of the sentences is recalled. An alternative model is presented, based on the notion of storage of the meaningful elements of the sentences in a rather abstract form, and of recall as a reconstructive process to produce new sentences. The results of two new experiments on sentence memory, the first a free and prompted recall experiment with children, the second a recognition memory study with adolescents, are then presented and discussed in relation to the model.     

What Makes for a Good Life? A Four-Nation Study

How do we assess the value of our lives? What makes the life we live a good or worthy one in our own eyes? What are its aims? The answers to these questions are implicit in the often unarticulated commitments by which people define their selves, purposes, and actions. These commitments structure the moral framework that guides our everyday qualitative distinctions and positions us within a unified narrative of continuity and change. The substantive conception of a good life, we argue, presupposes but is not reducible to a set of basic values. As an initial exploration of cultural variation, Canadian, Chinese, Indian, and Japanese university students were compared on what they held to be most important for assessing the worth of their lives. The results revealed considerable commonality of content with notable differences consistent with the cultural ethos of each group.