Is ‘Spiritual But Not Religious’ a Replacement for Religion or Just One Step on the Path Between Religion and Non-religion?

We analyze survey data collected from six universities in the United States, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (n?=?6571). Survey respondents were asked to self-identify as “spiritual and religious,” “spiritual but not religious,” “religious but not spiritual” or “not religious or spiritual.” Using a battery of items describing both religious and spiritual beliefs, we uncover which beliefs are most regularly shared by persons choosing each of the four self-identity labels. Even though American students are generally more religious than the Scandinavian students, we find that three of the four self-identity labels have quite similar meanings across cultural settings. Factor analyzing the belief items, we find two latent factors that we label as “religio-spirituality” and “anti-institutional spirituality.” However, when plotted in a two-dimensional space defined by these two latent factors, respondents in each of the four self-identity categories mostly align along a single continuum from “spiritual and religious” to “not spiritual or religious.” Nevertheless, the “spiritual but not religious” students stand out for their high scores on “anti-institutional spirituality.”     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.     

Learning on a response continuum: Comparison of a linear change and a functional learning model

Two reinforcement schedules were used to compare the predictive validity of a linear change model with a functional learning model. In one schedule, termed “convergent,” the linear change model predicts convergence to the optimum response, while in the other, termed “divergent,” this model predicts that a subject's response will not converge. The functional learning model predicts convergence in both cases. Another factor that was varied was presence or absence of random error or “noise” in the relationship between response and outcome. In the “noiseless” condition, in which no noise is added, a subject could discover the optimum response by chance, so that some subjects could appear to have converged fortuitously. In the “noisy” conditions such chance apparent convergence could not occur.The results did not unequivocally favor either model. While the linear change model's prediction of nonconvergence in the divergent conditions (particularly the “noisy” divergent condition) was not sustained, there was a clear difference in speed of convergence, counter to the prediction inferred from the functional learning model. Evidence that at least some subjects were utilizing a functional learning strategy was adduced from the fact that subjects were able to “map out” the relation between response and outcome quite accurately in a follow-up task. Almost all subjects in the “noisy” conditions had evidently “learned” a strong linear relation, with slope closely matching the veridical one.The data were consistent with a hybrid model assuming a “hierarchy of cognitive strategies” in which more complex strategies (e.g., functional learning) are utilized only when the simpler ones (e.g., a linear change strategy) fail to solve the problem.     

The Wretchedness of Belief

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly “religious man” thinks himself to be, not merely “imperfect” or “ill,” but wholly “wretched.” While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist‐relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of “genuine” religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological‐salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that “ought implies can.” In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.     

EDITORIAL COMMENT: GUEST COMMENTARY READING RESEARCH THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE: A MODEL FOR PRACTICING EDUCATORS

In this rather unorthodox commentary Dr. Gunderson takes a “tongue‐in‐cheek” look at the methods used to place students in reading groups. His “study” is meant to provide us with a humorous look at some of our approaches to research in reading. Normally, this kind of a disclaimer is not necessary but in the past we have published other laughable items (See, “A Physiognolinguistic Approach to Reading Assessment: An Alternate Form of Miscue Analysis,” by Dallas Cheek, READING PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1983, Pgs. 365‐368, and “Interaction Process Analysis of Sustained Silent Reading,” by John Mateja.RP Vol. 1, No. 2, 1980, Pgs. 121‐126.) and I have received several letters from our readers, not to mention the uncomplimentary “critical” reviews from our editorial advisors, making it quite clear that they have either missed the point or find nothing funny in these articles. Hope you can enjoy them as I and some of our staff have     

Doubts about ordinary language in ethics

Many writers assume one of the major functions (if not the major function) of ethical theory is to analyze the “ordinary language”; of moral discourse. This paper argues that different social groups develop quite different concepts of values; that there are many “ordinary languages.”; What analysts often in practice arc concerned with is middle‐class ethical usage. In addition, it is argued that widely accepted moral usages may be incorrect because they are based on faulty empirical generalizations, pre‐scientific opinions, or socially‐determined prejudices. “Ordinary language”; needs to be viewed critically, therefore, rather than to be assumed as correct.     

Rewording the Rules on Disjunctive Probability

Logic is a central and highly useful part of philosophy. Its value is particularly evident when it comes to keeping our thinking about disjunctive probabilities clear. Because of the two meanings of “or” (“just one of these statements is true,” “at least one of these statements is true”), logic can show how the likelihood of a disjunction being true can be determined quite easily. To gauge the chance that one of two or more exclusive alternatives is true, one need only sum up their respective likelihoods. And to know the chance that at least one of two or more compatible alternatives is true, one simply has to figure the chance that it is false that all of them are false!     

Reaction times in a task analogous to “same”-“different” judgment

Subjects responded “yes” if two equal-length strings of letters contained a common letter in a common position; otherwise they responded “no.” Thus, the task was to judge whether all or not all of the letters in one string differed from the letter occupying the corresponding position in the other string. Conversely, in “same”-“different” judgment, the task is to judge whether all or not all of the letters in one string match the corresponding letter in the other string. Thus, common-letter judgment and “same”-“different” judgment are symmetrically related with “no” analogous to “same” and “yes” analogous to “different.” The response “same” is often faster than the response “different.” However, in the common-letter task, “no” was slower than “yes.” More specifically, both the “yes” and “no” reaction times were consistent with a serial self-terminating search. This is precisely what would be expected from Bamber’s (1969) two-process model.     

THE ROLE OF THE MANPOWER COUNSELOR AS PERCEIVED BY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE PERSONNEL AND COUNSELOR EDUCATORS

This study investigated how manpower counselors, district office supervisors, and counselor educators in the state of Wisconsin perceive the role of the manpower counselor. Questionnaires were mailed to the 26 district office supervisors, to 26 manpower counselors—one from each district—and to 11 counselor educators. Analysis of the data reveals that the perceptions of each group are quite similar. However, the rankings produced an “ideal” rather than a “real” picture. It is suggested that a concentrated and combined effort be made to make the “ideal” “real.”     

Infinity in Mathematics and Theology

Abstract

“Infinity” and its derivatives are frequently used in mathematics and theology. Do these expressions denote the same thing in those distinct areas of scholarship? In this article the uses of “infinity” in mathematics and its uses in theology are examined and compared. One conclusion is that quite different concepts go under the heading of “infinity.” Although they must not be confused, there are some relations between mathematical and theological senses of infinity.     

Diseases of the Understanding and the Need for Philosophical Therapy

The paper develops and addresses a major challenge for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy of the sort increasingly attributed to Wittgenstein. To be substantive and relevant, such conceptions have to identify “diseases of the understanding” from which philosophers suffer, and to explain why these “diseases” need to be cured in order to resolve or overcome important philosophical problems. The paper addresses this challenge in three steps: With the help of findings and concepts from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, it redevelops the Wittgensteinian notion of “philosophical pictures.” Through a case study on seminal versions of familiar mind‐body problems, it examines how such pictures shape philosophical reflection and generate ill‐motivated but captivating problems. Third, it shows that philosophical pictures are constitutive of “diseases of the understanding,” in a quite strict sense of the term. On this basis, the paper explains when and why philosophical therapy is required.     

Voices,Boxes, and Sources of Messages

Can adults be induced to use social rules distinguishing “self” and “other” to respond to the behaviors of technologies? In a 2×2×2 between-subjects laboratory experiment involving the use of multiple computers with voice output, 88 computer-literate college students used a computer for tutoring and a different computer for testing. The performance of the tutoring session was either praised or criticized (Manipulation 1) in the same voice as the tutoring session or a distinct voice (Manipulation 2) via the computer (box) that performed the tutoring or a distinct computer (box; Manipulation 3). Respondents were shown to use voices but not boxes to distinguish “self” from “other” behavior in applying the social rules “Performance evaluations from others are more accurate than are performance evaluations of self,”“Praise from others is friendlier than praise from self,” and “Criticism from self is friendlier than is criticism from others,” to evaluate the tutoring and evaluation session.     

“Strong objectivity”: A response to the new objectivity question

Where the old “objectivity question” asked, “Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?”, the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, “How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects?” One response to this question is the “strong objectivity” program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing our ability to block “might makes right” in the sciences. It does so by delinking the neutrality ideal from standards for maximizing objectivity, since neutrality is now widely recognized as not only not necessary, not only not helpful, but, worst of all, an obstacle to maximizing objectivity when knowledge-distorting interests and values have constituted a research project. Strong objectivity provides a method for correcting this kind of situation. However, standpoint approaches have their own limitations which are quite different from the misreadings of them upon which most critics have tended to focus. Unfortunately, historically limited epistemologies and philosophies of science are all we get to choose from at this moment in history.     

“They Go Too Far”: Reply to Review Essays by Lewes and O'Connor

Kenneth Lewes and Noreen O'Connor share little common ground in their discussions of Lesbian Lives. They agree that it represents, in Lewes's words, “important trends in psychoanalysis and more general intellectual discourse” (“the developing discourse on homosexuality, the ascendancy of feminist ideas within psychoanalysis, … the shift … from classical drive theory to … more … relational approaches, and the influence of postmodern social and literary thought”). But whereas O'Connor welcomes a text she sees as offering “critiques of traditional psychoanalysis's binary theorising of gender and sexuality,” Lewes finds that Lesbian Lives presents “certain questions and difficulties, especially to those who, like myself, espouse theoretical and political allegiances quite different from them.” This article responds to several of Lewes's distortions and misreadings, including his allegations that the authors believe they can “conduct therapy without theory or value” and that they “insist on the essential sameness of people who are heterosexual and homosexual.” Lewes also wrongly attributes to the authors a simplistic belief in “sexual fluidity” and the “multiplicity of selves.” Instead, the text of Lesbian Lives in various ways encourages psychoanalysis to incorporate into its developmental models what it has learned clinically about the multiple dimensions of subjective experience.     

Motivated changes of auditory sensitivity in a simple detection task

Recently both neurophysiological and psychophysical theories have suggested that the sensitivity of receptors, or of the whole organism, may change through “efferent control” or as a result of “motivation.” A psychophysical method has been devised to investigate changes in a listener’s ability to detect signals in a noisy background, which are elicited “on demand” by the E, and when the time course of the changes may be in the order of seconds rather than minutes orhours. Observed effects, which are consistent with the hypotheses of active control of sensitivity, are found to be orderly but quite small, generally less than that associated with a 1–2 dB increase in the level of a tonal signal. While the average increment in performance is thus slight, it is found that the variance between Ss is significantly reduced when strong motivating stimuli are introduced. This reduction in variance may reflect an upper limit on the performance of real listeners, which might be fruitfully compared with the theoretical limits proposed in the theory of signal detectability.     

Reflections on Hollander’s “Hegemonic Mind” and How to Treat It

This response to Hollander’s consideration of the “hegemonic mind” critiques her social psychoanalytic formulation of man’s inclination to disempower the many to serve the personal, particularly the financial desires of the few. In the spirit of her point of view, I propose that this inclination is a function of active if not always conscious motivation, not a manifestation of “social malaise.” Further, I raise for consideration the fact that hegemonic “fever” is quite contagious, noting that those perpetrating it, and those on its receiving end, are attracted to it. I also consider that hegemony is an important manifest content, the latent determinant of which is a stubborn universal tendency for humans to show ill will toward one another. Through clinical examples I show that hegemonic formulations add to but do not replace other conceptualizations of how to understand and work with our patients’ personal and social dysfunction.     

Why Talk about Chinese Metaphysics?

Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The tension is particularly manifest in notions such as “Chinese philosophy,” “Daoist cosmology,” “Neo-Confucian idealism,” or “Chinese metaphysics.” For some, “Chinese metaphysics” may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which talk about “metaphysics” is frequent and popular and to which talk of “Chinese metaphysics” may wish to contribute: the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting “Chinese metaphysics” on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy—of which talk about “Chinese metaphysics” may but need not be an example.     

The categorical interpretation of Guo Xiang’s “independent genesis”

Seemingly, “independent genesis” refers to the independent existence and changes of each thing, but it is clear that there cannot be any truly “independent” things at all. Each thing in the world has to stay in connection or relationship with other things outside itself if it wants to represent its own “independence” and “genesis” in terms of form; and inevitably such connection or relationship itself has to be embodied in the internal nature of each thing. In the metaphysical thought of Guo Xiang, the former was known as the quality of “interdependence”; and the latter the characteristics of “quality” or “quality image.” Such characteristics of “quality” or “quality image” were interdependent, which constituted the essence of each thing itself as “beingness” and “beinglessness,” and thus resulted in the independent manifestation and change of things in terms of their external forms. The grasping of essence of things as “beingness” and “beinglessness” depended upon comprehension or rational intuition, and that was the realm of “profundity” in Guo Xiang’s terms.