Mood and realism of confidence judgements of one''s own answers to general knowledge questions

This study examines the effect of a depressed mood on the realism of subjects' confidence judgements of the correctness of answers to general knowledge questions. Research conducted on how mood influences cognitive processes gives reason to expect that a depressed mood might increase the realism of individuals' confidence ratings. Sixty subjects were divided into three conditions, two of which were given mood induction, one condition into an elated-happy mood and one condition into a depressed-sad mood. As evidenced by subjects' responses to mood scales only the depressed condition was affected by the mood induction. All subjects answered 93 general knowledge questions and rated their confidence in the correctness of the answer given. Subjects were instructed to think aloud when answering the last 31 questions. The conditions did not differ with respect to the proportion of questions answered correctly, mean level of confidence, nor with respect to three measures of the realism in subjects' confidence ratings (calibration, over/underconfidence and resolution). The results were the same when questions answered with and without think aloud instructions were analysed separately.     

Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: Two different accounts

The purpose of this study was to test predictions of two recent theories of realism of confidence. Ecological approaches to realism of confidence in one's general knowledge (Gigerenzer et al. , 1991; Juslin, in press a ; Björkman, in press) predict good calibration or, in the case of poor cognitive adjustment, overconfidence, within the cognitive domain. The subjective distance theory of confidence in sensory discriminations (Björkman et al. , 1992) predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias for sensory discriminations. Empirical data are reported showing that: (a) Calibration for sensory judgments is considerably poorer than calibration for well adapted cognitive judgements, a difference that can be entirely traced to underconfidence in the sensory domain. (b) While an initial overconfidence bias in the cognitive domain is removed by outcome feedback, the bias observed in sensory discriminations is unaffected even by a prolonged feedback session. It is suggested that the nature of confidence in sensory discriminations is different from the nature of confidence in cognitive judgments.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

The Role of Individual Differences in the Accuracy of Confidence Judgments

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of visual perceptual judgments results in under-confidence. Despite contrary empirical evidence, in models attempting to explain those phenomena, individual differences have often been disregarded. The authors report on 2 studies in which that shortcoming was addressed. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 520) completed a large number of cognitive-ability tests. Results indicated that individual differences provide a meaningful source of overconfidence and that a metacognitive trait might mediate that effect. In further analysis, there was only a relatively small correlation between test accuracy and confidence bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 107 participants), both perceptual and cognitive ability tests were included, along with measures of personality. Results again indicated the presence of a confidence factor that transcended the nature of the testing vehicle. Furthermore, a small relationship was found between that factor and some self-reported personality measures. Thus, personality traits and cognitive ability appeared to play only a small role in determining the accuracy of self-assessment. Collectively, the present results suggest that there are multiple causes of miscalibration, which current models of over- and underconfidence fail to encompass.     

Children's metacognitive judgments in an eyewitness identification task

Two experiments examined children's metacognitive monitoring of recognition judgments within an eyewitness identification paradigm. A confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration approach was used to examine patterns of calibration, over-/underconfidence, and resolution. In Experiment 1, children (n=619, mean age=11 years 10 months) and adults (n=600) viewed a simulated crime and attempted two separate identifications from 8-person target-present or target-absent lineups given lineup instructions that manipulated witnesses choosing patterns by varying the degree of social pressure. For choosers, but not nonchoosers, meaningful CA relations were observed for adults but not for children. Experiment 2 tested a guided hypothesis disconfirmation manipulation designed to improve the realism of children's metacognitive judgments. Children (N=796, mean age=11 years 11 months) in experimental and control conditions viewed a crime and attempted two separate identifications. The manipulation had minimal impact on the CA relation for choosers and nonchoosers. In contrast to adults, children's identification confidence provides no useful guide for investigators about the likely guilt or innocence of a suspect. These experiments revealed limitations in children's metacognitive monitoring processes that have not been apparent in previous research on recall and recognition with younger children.     

社会信念的自信判断:自我一致性模型的验证

采用重复测验的自信判断范式,检验自我一致性模型。项目一致性与项目共识性的分析表明:被试从大量共享的信念总体中抽取样本进行正误判断,自信判断则基于各个样本信念的一致性,并反映新样本做相同判断的可能性;建立在代表性样本上的判断有更高的一致性或共识性,信念建构的反应时更短且自信更高;项目一致性与项目共识性存在交互关系:高一致性的判断也是高共识性的判断。结果验证了自我一致性模型在中国文化背景下的存在。     

Preferences and Children's Use of Gender-Stereotyped Knowledge About Musical Instruments: Making Judgments About Other Children's Preferences

A developmental model of gender-stereotype acquisition (Martin, 1989) proposes that by the age of 8 years children draw upon information about gender-stereotyped interests as well as other children's sex when deciding how much other children would like different activities; younger children rely on sex only when making such decisions. We examined whether the judgments that children made about other children's preferences were different from those that they made about their own preferences for masculine and feminine musical instruments. Three hundred twelve children aged 8–9 years ranked 6 instruments in order of preference, and rated on a 4-point scale how much they would like to play each one. Children were then asked to decide how much other children would like to play each instrument. Only girls' own preferences for feminine instruments differed according to the gender-stereotyping of their most-preferred instrument. Judgments about how much other children would like masculine and feminine instruments did not differ according to those children's gender-stereotyped interest. Children made stereotypical predictions about the preferences of children of unknown sex who played either a masculine or feminine instrument. Implications for a theoretical account of the development of children's gender-stereotypes are discussed.     

Accuracy and bias in estimates of others' knowledge

Perspective-taking is central to much social interaction, but the processes by which it is accomplished are poorly understood. The current study examines accuracy and bias in one type of perspective-taking: inferences about what others know. Twenty-two New York City landmarks were presented in three conditions: Picture Only, Picture-+ Name and Name Only. Subjects estimated the proportion of short- and long-term New York City residents who could identify each landmark from its picture. They also rated their subjective recognition of the stimuli. Subjects in all three conditions were good at estimating stimulus identifiability, but their estimates were biased in the direction of their own knowledge. Estimates of the difference in identifications by short-and long-term residents were relatively inaccurate, probably because the two groups differed less than anticipated. For most but not all subjects, subjective feelings of recognition were significantly correlated with estimates of identifiability. We conclude that perceptions of the distribution of knowledge are socially shared.     

Explaining own and others' behavior in a controversial issue: animal experimentation

The authors investigated how 2 groups with different attitudes toward animal experimentation-researchers who conducted animal experiments and members of animal welfare organizations who protested against animal experiments--made attributions for the behavior of the opposing group. The 2 groups showed an actor--observer effect, mentioning more internal causes for the opponents' behavior and more external causes for their own behavior. Both groups were able to take the other's perspective, resulting in a reversed actor-observer effect. The less involved participants followed the pattern of ratings of the group whose attitudes corresponded to their own. In particular, the participants with a negative attitude toward animal experimentation rated researchers' behavior as more internally caused than did those with a positive attitude. The results illustrated how the participants formed and defended attitudes in a social context.     

Perception of one's own and others' ability by preschool Japanese children

This study examined the perception of one's own and others' ability in preschool Japanese boys and girls. In Study 1, 70 Japanese boys and girls aged 4–6 years rated their own and their close friend's ability on their favorite outdoor and indoor activities. In Study 2, 65 Japanese children aged 5 and 6 years rated their own and their close friend's ability and guessed that of a nonfriend (a mere acquaintance child in the preschool) on their most and least favorite outdoor and indoor activities. The major findings were as follows: (a) the perception of preschool children's own ability correlates with that of their close friend's ability; (b) ability perception was influenced by preference for the activity and by gender; and (c) no difference was found between ratings for a close friend and a nonfriend according to activities preferences, which differed from the ability perception by preadolescent children.     

Confidence and decision type under matched stimulus conditions: overconfidence in perceptual but not conceptual decisions

Within the domain of metacognition, there is disagreement whether different processes underlie evaluations of confidence in perceptual versus conceptual decisions. The relationship between confidence and accuracy for perceptual and conceptual decisions was compared using newly created stimuli that could be used to elicit either decision type. Based on theories of Brunswikian and Thurstonian uncertainties, significant underconfidence for perceptual decisions and overconfidence for conceptual decisions were predicted. Three within‐subjects experiments did not support this hypothesis. Participants showed significant overconfidence for perceptual decisions and no overconfidence for conceptual decisions. In addition, significant hard‐easy effects were consistently found for both decision types. Incorporating our findings with past results reveals that both over‐ and underconfidence are attainable on perceptual tasks. This conclusion, in addition to the common presence of hard‐easy effects and significant across‐task correlations in over/underconfidence, suggests that confidence judgments for the two decision types may depend on largely shared processes. Possible contributions to confidence and over/underconfidence are explored, focusing on response time factors and participants' knowledge bases. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

A Comparative Investigation of Confidence Intervals for IndependentVariables in Linear Regression

In linear regression, the most appropriate standardized effect size for individual independent variables having an arbitrary metric remains open to debate, despite researchers typically reporting a standardized regression coefficient. Alternative standardized measures include the semipartial correlation, the improvement in the squared multiple correlation, and the squared partial correlation. No arguments based on either theoretical or statistical grounds for preferring one of these standardized measures have been mounted in the literature. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, the performance of interval estimators for these effect-size measures was compared in a 5-way factorial design. Formal statistical design methods assessed both the accuracy and robustness of the four interval estimators. The coverage probability of a large-sample confidence interval for the semipartial correlation coefficient derived from Aloe and Becker was highly accurate and robust in 98% of instances. It was better in small samples than the Yuan-Chan large-sample confidence interval for a standardized regression coefficient. It was also consistently better than both a bootstrap confidence interval for the improvement in the squared multiple correlation and a noncentral interval for the squared partial correlation.     

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.     

Age differences in the effects of social influence on children's eyewitness performance and their metacognitive monitoring

The current work investigated the effects of social influence on children's recall accuracy and metacognitive monitoring. Two studies were conducted in which 8- and 10-year-olds were confronted with postevent information in an interview situation. An interviewer (Study 1) or a confederate (Study 2) provided postevent information with two levels of assertiveness, inducing (a) a variation of conformity pressure and (b) a variation of information credibility. Afterwards, children's confidence judgments were assessed. The results revealed significant age differences in children's ability to adequately cope with variations of social influence. Although conformity pressure was especially important for the 8-year-olds, effects of informative social influence were independent of age. However, 10-year-olds were also able to act appropriately on low credibility, thereby demonstrating a more sophisticated consideration of social influence sources. Moreover, varying assertiveness also affected the quality of children's confidence judgments by improving their metacognitive differentiation skills.     

What you are confident of determines your choices in context: Confidence in yourself versus in your ability

The notion that consumers' preference is constructed by decision context is well established. Two of such salient manifestations are compromise effect and attraction effect. Although literature has explored the moderators of these effects from the perspective of a decision maker, little is known about whether a significant difference exists between the effects of individual differences as a situational state and as a stable personality. This article approaches this question by examining how specific self‐confidence and general self‐confidence shape consumer's preference for context options. Four studies find that compromise effect is greater for consumer with high specific self‐confidence, whereas attraction effect is greater for consumer with low specific self‐confidence. The two context effects are greater for consumers with low general self‐confidence only in the presence of social influence. In addition, low (vs. high) general self‐confidence strengthens (vs. weakens) the impact of specific self‐confidence on context effects under this condition. This article concludes by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.     

French translation and validation of the Karitane Parenting Confidence Scale

IntroductionPerceived parental self-efficacy (PSE) is thought to play a crucial role in parental well-being, the parent-infant relationship, and other aspects of infant development, particularly in the early postnatal period. The Karitane Parenting Confidence Scale (KPCS) is a 15-item self-report questionnaire designed for parents with infants aged 0–12 months.ObjectiveTo explore the factor structure of a French translation of the KPCS and assess its psychometric qualities.MethodUsing a French-language translation of the KPCS (KPCS-F), 257 parents of children aged 0–12 months were recruited via childcare structures (e.g. nurseries, community centers, mother and child protection centers). Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted to examine 2- and 3-factor solutions for the KPCS-F scale. Internal reliability and convergent validity were evaluated.ResultsThe best model was a two-factor solution (PSE “infant care” and PSE “parental role”) restricted to 12 items. Sound internal consistency was indicated, with a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.80 and a McDonald's omega coefficient of 0.80. Test-retest reliability was good. KPCS-F score was correlated with social support and psychological well-being scores.ConclusionThe KPCS-F showed substantial validity and reliability for this sample. The translated scale should therefore improve assessment and intervention processes for professionals working with parents of young children.     

Agency and observation in knowledge of one's own thinking

This essay addresses the question how we know our conscious thinking. Conscious thinking typically takes the form of a series of discrete episodes that constitute a complex cognitive activity. We must distinguish the discrete episodes of thinking in which a particular content is represented in phenomenal consciousness and is present “before the mind's eye” from the extended activities of which these episodes form a part. The extended activities are themselves contentful and we have first‐person access to them. But because their content is not represented in phenomenal consciousness, this access cannot be broadly observational. Instead, I argue, it is agential. Furthermore, that extended activities are intentional explains the possibility of a nonobservational form of introspective access to the discrete episodes in consciousness.     

Depression,Confidence, and Decision: Evidence Against Depressive Realism

This research examined how retrospective self-assessments of performance are affected by major depression. To test the validity of the depressive realism versus the selective processing hypotheses, aggregate posttest performance estimates (PTPEs) were obtained from clinically depressed patients and an age-matched comparison group across 4 decision tasks (object recognition, general knowledge, social judgment, and line-length judgment). As expected on the basis of previous findings, both groups were underconfident in their PTPEs, consistently underestimating the percentage of questions they had answered correctly. Contrary to depressive realism, and in partial support of the selective processing account, this underconfidence effect was not reduced but modestly exacerbated in the depressed patients. Further, whereas the PTPEs of the comparison group exceeded that expected on the basis of chance alone those of the depressed individuals did not. The results provide no support for the depressive realism account and suggest that negative biases contribute to metacognitive information processing in major depression.The results reported in this paper are based on an extension of the MSc dissertation of Tiffany Fu, conducted in partial fulfillment of the degree of MSc in Research Methods in Psychology, University of Reading, 2003     

Anomalous Evidence,Confidence Change,and Theory Change

A novel experimental paradigm that measured theory change and confidence in participants' theories was used in three experiments to test the effects of anomalous evidence. Experiment 1 varied the amount of anomalous evidence to see if “dose size” made incremental changes in confidence toward theory change. Experiment 2 varied whether anomalous evidence was convergent (of multiple types) or replicating (similar finding repeated). Experiment 3 varied whether participants were provided with an alternative theory that explained the anomalous evidence. All experiments showed that participants' confidence changes were commensurate with the amount of anomalous evidence presented, and that larger decreases in confidence predicted theory changes. Convergent evidence and the presentation of an alternative theory led to larger confidence change. Convergent evidence also caused more theory changes. Even when people do not change theories, factors pertinent to the evidence and alternative theories decrease their confidence in their current theory and move them incrementally closer to theory change.