The Structure of Frege's Thoughts

Fregean thoughts (i.e. the senses of assertoric sentences) are structured entities because they are composed of simpler senses that are somehow ordered and interconnected. The constituent senses form a unity because some of them are ‘saturated’ and some ‘unsaturated’. This paper shows that Frege's explanation of the structure of thoughts, which is based on the ‘saturated/unsaturated’ distinction, is by no means sufficient because it permits what I call ‘wild analyses’, which have certain unwelcome consequences. Wild analyses are made possible because any ‘unsaturated’ sense that is a mode of presentation of a concept together with any ‘saturated’ sense forms a thought. The reason is that any concept can be applied to any object (which is presented by a ‘saturated’ sense). This stems from the fact that Frege was willing to admit only total functions. It is also briefly suggested what should be done to block wild analyses.     

Normalization in paraphrase and recall: Effects of processing,grammatical article type,and retention interval

Investigations of semantic normalization of discourse have not generally controlled for perceived connectiveness of materials, depth of processing, and retention interval. The current experiment investigated semantic normalization in paraphrase and recall as a function of whether sentences were paraphrased or merely copied, of whether sentences were perceived by subjects to be connected or unrelated, and of retention interval. Results indicated that significantly more normalization occurred in paraphrase than in recall, that more normalization and better recall occurred when sentences were perceived as related, and that there was more normalization and better recall when sentences were paraphrased than when they were copied. No significant differences in normalization were found as a function of retention interval. Results are discussed in terms of depth of processing and a need for learners to integrate congruent and discrepant material into cohesive entities by use of grammatical articles, article changes, and intrusions that psychologically connect unrelated sentences.     

Continuants and Occurrents: Joseph Melia

In this paper I try to eliminate occurrents from our ontology. I argue against Simons' position that occurrents are needed to supply truthmakers for existential claims about continuants. Nevertheless, those who would eliminate occurrents still need some account of our willingness to assert sentences that logically entail their existence. Though it turns out to be impossible to paraphrase away our reference to occurrents, I show that the truthmakers for such sentences are facts that involve only continuants. This is enough to allow us to regard our ordinary talk about occurrents as fictional. Finally, I argue that a proper conception of the underlying temporal facts about continuants can both avoid the problematic tensed theory of time and the problem of temporary intrinsics.     

Laws, Regularities and Exceptions

Sentences of the form ' F s are G s' can express laws of nature, weaker Special Science laws, and also regularities which are not a part of any explicit science. These so-called generic sentences express nomic relationships which may have exceptions. I discuss the kinds of regularities expressed by generic sentences and argue that since they play a similar role in determining our ability to categorise and reason about the world, we should look for a unified treatment of them.     

Simple 'Might's, Indicative Possibilities and the Open Future

This paper concerns sentences of the form 'It is possible that p ', where the embedded p is in the indicative mood, like 'It is possible that Michael leads the league in scoring', and simple ' might ' sentences like 'Michael might lead the league in scoring', but not ' might have ' sentences like 'Michael might have led the league in scoring'. The thesis that the target sentences invariably express epistemic possibility is developed, argued for and defended from objections. The position defended is then compared with Robert Stalnaker's different account of ' might 's, and finally is applied to some arguments concerning the open future.     

Sentence comprehension and relative pronouns

Doubly self-embedded sentences, differing only in whether the relative pronouns were present or deleted, were presented to two groups of Ss who were required to respond to a word beginning with a particular letter in each sentence and to paraphrase the sentence. The results of both the phoneme monitor task and the paraphrase task indicated that comprehension was better when the relative pronouns were present than when they were deleted. These results are consistent with earlier results for the paraphrase task but are not consistent with earlier results for the phoneme monitor task. Possible reasons for the inconsistency were considered. It was concluded that the phoneme monitor task does reflect comprehension difficulty in a manner consistent with the paraphrase task and that deleting the relative pronouns does make comprehending self-embedded sentences more difficult.     

Accessing ambiguous words during sentence comprehension

In five experiments visual processing of sentences containing either a more frequent or a less frequent usage of an ambiguous word was examined. When prior or subsequent context was pragmatically related to the relevant sense of the ambiguous word, sentences intending the more frequent sense produced longer ambiguity detection times and shorter immediate comprehension times than sentences intending the less frequent sense. This relative frequency effect was not obtained in comprehension of corresponding unambiguous sentences containing relatively high or low frequency unambiguous synonyms of the senses. These results suggest that access of ambiguous word-senses tends to occur in order of relative frequency, and that multiple access of senses tends only to occur for low frequency usages. When the preceding verb imposed selection constraints on which sense could follow, the frequency effect did not occur consistently; and it was virtually eliminated when biasing context took the form of a previous sentence containing an unambiguous synonym of the relevant sense. Implications for models of access of unambiguous words in sentences, as well as for models of processing ambiguous sentences, are considered.     

Eponymous verb phrases and ambiguity resolution

To understand eponymous verb phrases such as "do a John Travolta," readers cannot merely select a sense out of a mental lexicon (sense selection). They must create new senses (sense creation) by retrieving salient information from memory. We conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis that these processes of memory retrieval parallel those used for ordinary lexical ambiguities. To prepare for Experiment 1, we gathered readers' interpretations of eponymous verb phrases like "do a John Travolta" to establish dominant and subordinate interpretations. We then wrote story contexts that biased comprehension toward one or the other interpretation. In Experiment 1, paraphrase judgment times were used to demonstrate that dominant meanings are privileged in the sense that they are accessible even when the story creates a subordinate bias. In Experiment 2, this privilege faded somewhat when there was a delay before the paraphrase judgment. We discuss the results with respect to the distinction between sense selection and sense creation.     

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.     

The Dependence of the form of the Pursuitmeter Learning Function on the Length of the Inter-Practice Rests: II. Theoretical

Three hypotheses derived from an explanation sketch of the ability of some individuals to understand self-embedded (SE) sentences with two embeddings involving Syllogistic reasoning ability were tested with positive results. The data indicate that those individuals who can understand SE sentences with two embeddings will be better able to reason with the use of the Syllogistic form than those who cannot, that those individuals who can reason with the use of the Syllogistic form will be able to understand SE sentences with two embeddings, and that those individuals who cannot reason with the use of the Syllogistic form will not be able to understand SE sentences with two embeddings.     

The Paraphrase Argument Against Collective Actions

This paper is about the status of collective actions. According to one view, collective actions metaphysically reduce to individual actions because sentences about collective actions are merely a shorthand for sentences about individual actions. I reconstruct an argument for this view and show via counterexamples that it is not sound. The argument relies on a paraphrase procedure to unpack alleged shorthand sentences about collective actions into sentences about individual actions. I argue that the best paraphrase procedure that has been put forward so far fails to produce adequate results.     

Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking Has No Functional Definition

Functionalism is perhaps the most prominent theory of mind today. The central thesis of functionalism is that the standard mental relations (or properties or states) are uniquely determined by their causal roles in functioning organisms. That is, the principles of psychology specify the characteristic way that (behavioral or physiological) input, the standard mental relations such as belief and desire, and (behavioral or physiological) output are causally arranged; and the central idea of functionalism is that, e.g., belief's characteristic causal role can be fulfilled by exactly one relation-namely, belief itself. Clearly, then, the most direct way to refute functionalism would be to show that there are relations that demonstrably differ from the standard mental relations and that, nevertheless, could fulfill the same causal role as those mental relations.     

涵义语义与关于概称句推理的词项逻辑

概称句推理具有以词项为单位的特征并且词项的涵义在其中起到了重要的作用。已有的处理用A一表达式表达涵义,不够简洁和自然。亚里斯多德三段论是一种词项逻辑,但它是外延的和单调的。这两方面的情况使得有必要考虑新的词项逻辑。涵义语义的基本观点是：语词首先表达的是涵义,通过涵义的作用,语词有了指称,表达概念。概称句三段论是更为常用的推理,有两个基本形式GAG和Gaa。在涵义语义的基础上建立的系统GAG和Gaa是关于这两种推理的公理系统。     

The Two Faces of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception-like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception-like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.     

Opacity,Transparency, and the Paradox of the Accessibility Requirement

Key issues in epistemology for the most part have to do with epistemic values such as justification, truth, and knowledge—that is, values related to the epistemic status of our propositional attitudes, mental events, and states. However, another important issue that is worth examining is the extent to which a subject is in a position to evaluate the strength of her epistemic position. In this paper, I wish to emphasize two properties of our mental states that play a decisive part in that respect: their opacity and transparency. In the following, I will assume that a mental state is opaque whenever it presents itself with no underlying reason, whereas states that are supported by apparent reasons are transparent. One main argument that I will defend is that even when the opacity and transparency of our mental states are not reliable cues, still they remain highly informative. Notably, I draw some implications relative to the externalist/internalist debate in epistemology. I examine the claim that only mental states that are justified are well grounded or justification conferring and the idea that often stands behind, that is, that only states whose reasons are accessible are justified—namely, the Accessibility Requirement. I also examine the source of a recent debate in epistemology: the epistemic status of our intuitive states, as these are perfect instances of opaque mental states. I conclude that intuitive states in some respect are less misleading than states that are supported by apparent reasons.     

Mental states inside out: Switching costs for emotional and nonemotional sentences that differ in internal and external focus

Mental states—such as thinking, remembering, or feeling angry, happy, or dizzy—have a clear internal component. We feel a certain way when we are in these states. These internal experiences may be simulated when people understand conceptual references to mental states. However, mental states can also be described from an “external” perspective, for example when referring to “smiling.” In those cases, simulation of visible outside features may be more relevant for understanding. In a switching costs paradigm, we presented semantically unrelated sentences describing emotional and nonemotional mental states while manipulating their internal or external focus. The results show that switching costs occur when participants shift between sentences with an internal and an external focus. This suggests that different forms of simulation underlie understanding these sentences. In addition, these effects occurred for emotional and nonemotional mental states, suggesting that they are grounded in a similar way—through the process of simulation.     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.