Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.     

Adults' emotional states and recognition of emotion in young children

This study addressed the degree to which adults' emotional states influence their perception of emotional states in children and their motivation to change such states. Happiness, sadness, anger, or a neutral state was induced in adults, who then viewed slides of 4-year-old children who were actually experiencing various emotional states. Adults' own emotional states had little impact on their accurate recognition of children's emotions or on their motives for social action to change such emotions. However, adults' states did influence the intensity they assigned to children's emotions, with happy adults tending to rate some emotions as more intense for black children (sadness) and for girls (anger and neutrality). The base rates with which adults used different emotion labels also influenced judgments, increasing it for the recognition of happiness and reducing it for anger. The results are discussed in terms of the factors that influence whether or not emotional states affect judgment processes and the role of emotion labels in the effective recognition of ongoing emotional states. Also addressed is the consequence of adults' recognition of emotion in children for the effective socialization of emotion.     

Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: an adverbial account of mental representations

This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger's views in his Being No One. Though perception does involve internal processing and representations, it is argued that perception is direct. We track real features of the world, but fallibly, in a certain way. Moreover, it is claimed that mental representations are quite different from internal neural representations. They are best construed in an adverbial way. What we perceive, the object of perception, is the real world. Internal neural representations are the means by which we perceive the world. And mental representations are the way in which we experience the world, the adverbial content of perception. Finally, what goes for the world goes for ourselves as well: in self-consciousness we track real features of ourselves, but fallibly, in a certain way.     

The Switch Task for Children: Measuring mental flexibility in young children

Age-related changes in mental flexibility, in the form of task switching, were assessed in 292 children (58–156 months old). Task switching was examined with a new task for young children, the Switch Task for Children (STC). The STC consists of two easy, comparable games and does not require reading skills, which makes it suitable for children younger than 6 years of age. The aims of the present study were: (1) to evaluate the STC; (2) to examine task switching in young children; and (3) to study age-related changes in task switching across childhood. The results indicated that children younger than 6 years are able to switch between two tasks and that general performance increased with age. Young children (58–89 months) displayed a larger global switch cost, that is they made more errors when the tasks were presented randomly compared with a repeated-task baseline, than older children (106–156 months). These findings suggest that the STC is a useful task for detecting task-switching abilities in young children and that the ability to maintain and manipulate two different tasks in working memory, is present, but not yet fully developed, in young children.     

The social ascription of obligations to engineers

Discovering obligations that are ascribed to them by others is potentially an important element in the development of the moral imagination of engineers. Moral imagination cannot reasonably be developed by contemplating oneself and one's task alone: there must be some element of discovering the expectations of people one could put at risk. In practice it may be impossible to meet ascribed obligations if they are completely general and allow no exceptions--for example if they demand an unlimited duty to avoid harm. But they can still serve to modify engineers' prior ethics, for example by limiting a purely utilitarian approach to deciding who should bear risk and how much risk they should bear. Ascribed obligations can also give engineers insight into the public reaction to risks that arise from engineered systems, and the consequent expectations that the public have about how much protection is desirable and where the responsibility for this protection lies. This article analyses the case for taking ascribed obligations seriously, and reviews some of the obligations that have been ascribed in the aftermath of recent engineering failures. It also proposes ways in which ascribed obligations could be used in engineers' moral development.     

Personal epistemology and theory of mind: deciphering young children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing

The beliefs that individuals hold about knowledge and knowing have been the focus of a growing body of work on “personal epistemology.” There has been general agreement among researchers about a developmental trajectory of epistemological understanding that takes place in adolescence and adulthood. Rarely has this research included children, however, and we know little about the origins of epistemological awareness or its early development. A separate group of researchers have investigated children's “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand others’ beliefs, actions, and desires, with primary attention to the onset of this cognitive achievement between the ages of 3 and 5. This article reviews the theoretical foundation for a proposed relation between these constructs, and reports on an exploratory investigation with 3–5 year olds, in which epistemological level was significantly related to theory of mind ability. Results are discussed in relation to a general timeline depicting the development of children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing, a process that involves an ongoing tension between objective and subjective perspectives. We propose that the trajectory of epistemological development be expanded to include an initial period of egocentric subjectivity that characterizes epistemological thinking prior to the achievement of theory of mind.     

Knowing that, knowing how, and knowing to do

Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how has recently been challenged. The paper first briefly defends the distinction and then proceeds to address the question of classifying moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is special in that it is practical, that is, it is essentially a motive. Hence the way we understand moral knowledge crucially depends on the way we understand motivation. The Humean theory of motivation is wrong in saying that reason cannot be a motive, but right in saying that desire is essential for motivating us. The right response to the Humean theory of motivation is to see that moral knowledge is desire-related rationality or thought-related desire. Moral knowledge is neither knowing that nor knowing how but rather a third species of knowledge which we may call “knowing to do.” Knowing to do is to be rationally disposed to do the right thing. This understanding of moral knowledge is exactly what we can learn from Aristotle’s ethics.     

A temporal-interactivist perspective on the dynamics of mental states

This paper addresses the dynamics of mental states in relation to the dynamics of the interaction with the external world. It contributes a formalised temporal-interactivist approach to these dynamics based on temporal traces for semantics and on a temporal trace language as an expressive means to formulate dynamic properties. The approach provides a foundation for the dynamic and interactivist perspective on cognitive phenomena.