Intensional verbs in event semantics

In Attitude Problems, I gave an account of opacity in the complement of intensional transitive verbs that combined neo-Davidsonian event-semantics with a hidden-indexical account of substitution failure. In this paper, I extend the account to clausal verbs.     

The Intensional Many - Conservativity Reclaimed

Following on Westerståhl’s argument that many is not Conservative [9], I propose an intensional account of Conservativity as well as intensional versions of EXT and Isomorphism closure. I show that an intensional reading of many can easily possess all three of these, and provide a formal statement and proof that they are indeed proper intensionalizations. It is then discussed to what extent these intensionalized properties apply to various existing readings of many.     

Intensional concepts in propositional semantic networks

An integrated statement is made concerning the semantic status of nodes in a propositional semantic network, claiming that such nodes represent only intensions. Within the network, the only reference to extensionality is via a mechanism to assert that two intensions have the same extension in same world. This framework is employed in three application problems to illustrate the nature of its solutions. The formalism used here utilizes only assertional information and no structural, or definitional, information. This restriction corresponds to many of the psychologically motivated network models. Some of the psychological implications of network processes called node merging and node splitting are discussed. Additionally, it is pointed out that both our networks and the psychologically based networks are prone to memory confusions about knowing unless augmented by domain-specific inference processes, or by structural information.     

Intensional Protocols for Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - In dynamical multi-agent systems, agents are controlled by protocols. In choosing a class of formal protocols, an implicit choice is made concerning the types of...     

Canonicity for Intensional Logics Without Iterative Axioms

David Lewis proved in 1974 that all logics without iterative axioms are weakly complete. In this paper we extend Lewiss ideas and provide a proof that such logics are canonical and so strongly complete. This paper also discusses the differences between relational and neighborhood frame semantics and poses a number of open questions about the latter.     

Rules of Existential Quantification into "Intensional Contexts"

Propositional and notional attitudes are construed as relations (-in-intension) between individuals and constructions (rather than propositrions etc,). The apparatus of transparent intensional logic (Tichy) is applied to derive two rules that make it possible to export existential quantifiers without conceiving attitudes as relations to expressions (sententialism).     

An Intensional Theory of Truth: An Informal Report

Saul Kripke’s theory of truth suffers from expressive limitations – in particular, there are no extensional operators within that framework that allow one to characterize those sentences that fail to receive a truth value within the framework. Especially worrisome is the fact that there is no operator that outputs true on exactly the paradoxical sentences. In this paper I extend Kripke’s approach via the addition of extensional operators, which allows us to characterize many (but not all) such sentences, including the paradoxical ones.     

Intensionality: What are Intensional Transitives?: Jennifer Saul

This paper discusses the question of which verbs are intensional transitives. In particular, I ask which verbs Forbes should take to be intensional transitives. I argue that it is very difficult to arrive at a clear and plausible understanding of what an intensional transitive is— making it difficult to answer these questions. I end by briefly raising some questions about the usefulness of the category of intensional transitives.