Misinterpretation of conditional statements in Wason's selection task

Errors may be made on Wason's selection task because either (a) the rule to be tested is misunderstood, or (b) reasoning from that rule is inaccurate, or both. We report two experiments using the experimental paradigm introduced by Gebauer and Laming in which subjects are given six problems in succession. We use the subset of cards selected by each subject as (a) an indication of how the rule is understood and, when that selection is consistent throughout all six problems (so that we can infer a consistent understanding of the rule), as (b) a basis for evaluating the accuracy of the subject's reasoning according to three independent criteria. Experiment 1 adds an exactly parallel contextual version of the task to permit comparison between performances (by the same subjects) on the two versions. Experiment 2 repeats Exp. 1, but with negatives inserted in the conditional rule. Most subjects make a consistent selection of cards throughout all six problems, but typically appear to misunderstand the rule. This is so in both abstract and contextual tasks and replicates the finding by Gebauer and Laming. Most misunderstandings consisted of either (a) reading the simple conditional rule as a bi-conditional or (b) substituting “top/underneath” for “one side/other side”. In Exp. 1 subjects seldom misevaluated the rule they appeared to be testing, but such “errors” of evaluation were common in Exp. 2. Negatives confuse the subjects and should not be used in any conditional application that matters. In Exp. 2 (but not 1) there was a significant correlation between interpretations of the two tasks. We provide an explanation of “matching bias” (it results from the confluence of the two common misunderstandings above) and comment on “mental models” which are, at present, unable to accommodate the variety of results we present here. We also relate our experimental paradigm to the conditional inference task and to truth tables. Received: 26 February 1999 / Accepted: 5 November 1999     

Cues that chimpanzees do and do not use to find hidden objects

Chimpanzees follow conspecific and human gaze direction reliably in some situations, but very few chimpanzees reliably use gaze direction or other communicative signals to locate hidden food in the object-choice task. Three studies aimed at exploring factors that affect chimpanzee performance in this task are reported. In the first study, vocalizations and other noises facilitated the performance of some chimpanzees (only a minority). In the second study, various behavioral cues were given in which a human experimenter either touched, approached, or actually lifted and looked under the container where the food was hidden. Each of these cues led to enhanced performance for only a very few individuals. In the third study – a replication with some methodological improvements of a previous experiment – chimpanzees were confronted with two experimenters giving conflicting cues about the location of the hidden food, with one of them (the knower) having witnessed the hiding process and the other (the guesser) not. In the crucial test in which a third experimenter did the hiding, no chimpanzee found the food at above chance levels. Overall, in all three studies, by far the best performers were two individuals who had been raised in infancy by humans. It thus seems that while chimpanzees are very good at “behavior reading” of various sorts, including gaze following, they do not understand the communicative intentions (informative intentions) behind the looking and gesturing of others – with the possible exception of enculturated chimpanzees, who still do not understand the differential significance of looking and gesturing done by people who have different knowledge about states of affairs in the world. Received: 8 November 1999 / Accepted after revision: 24 January 2000     

Expectations,gains, and losses in the anterior cingulate cortex

The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) participates in evaluating actions and outcomes. Little is known on how action-reward values are processed in ACC and if the context in which actions are performed influences this processing. In the present article, we report ACC unit activity of monkeys performing two tasks. The first task tested whether the encoding of reward values is context dependent—that is, dependent on the size of the other rewards that are available in the current block of trials. The second task tested whether unexpected events signaling a change in reward are represented. We show that the context created by a block design (i.e., the context of possible alternative rewards) influences the encoding of reward values, even if no decision or choice is required. ACC activity encodes the relative and not absolute expected reward values. Moreover, cingulate activity signals and evaluates when reward expectations are violated by unexpected stimuli, indicating reward gains or losses.     

Anticipation of cognitive demand during decision-making

An abundance of evidence indicates that action selection is guided, at least in certain contexts, by anticipation of action outcomes. In one particularly clear demonstration of this principle, Bechara and colleagues, studying a gambling task, observed phasic skin conductance responses just prior to actions associated with a relatively high risk of monetary loss (Bechara et al. in J Neurosci 19:5473–5481, 1999; Bechara et al. in Science 275:1293–1295, 1997; Bechara et al. in Cereb Cortex 6:215–225, 1996). In the present work, we tested for the same effect in a paradigm where choices resulted not in differential monetary outcomes, but in differential requirements for subsequent mental effort. In two experiments, we observed an anticipatory skin conductance response prior to actions resulting in a high level of cognitive demand. This finding indicates that requirements for effortful cognitive control are anticipated during action selection. We argue, based on convergent evidence, that such anticipation may not only trigger preparation; it may also play a direct role in effort-based decision-making.     

Modeling cognitive control in task-switching

This article describes a quantitative model, which suggests what the underlying mechanisms of cognitive control in a particular task-switching paradigm are, with relevance to task-switching performance in general. It is suggested that participants dynamically control response accuracy by selective attention, in the particular paradigm being used, by controlling stimulus representation. They are less efficient in dynamically controlling response representation. The model fits reasonably well the pattern of reaction time results concerning task switching, congruency, cue-target interval and response-repetition in a mixed task condition, as well as the differences between mixed task and pure task conditions. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999     

Is judgment of random time intervals biased and capacity-limited?

 Recently, random generation of time intervals has been proposed as a procedure to impair executive processing in a dual-task paradigm without substantial interference with phonological and visuo-spatial working memory resources. A fundamental assumption of this procedure is that humans are able to distinguish time sequences on their degree of randomness. The present study tests this assumption. To this end, non-biased, repetition-biased, alternation-biased sequences and repetitive rhythms were judged under conditions of higher or lower executive load. In Exp. 1, load depended on the presentation speed, while in Exp. 2, a dual-task condition was used with either a concurrent number-copying task or an arithmetic task. It was found that the participants could distinguish repetitive rhythms from more or less random sequences, and that both accuracy of this judgment and latency were affected by the concurrent load. The findings are taken as a first indication that random time judgment is capacity-limited. Received: 9 September 1999 / Accepted: 1 October 1999     

Restraint and Cancellation: Multiple Inhibition Deficits in Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

We used variations of the stop signal task to study two components of motor response inhibition—the ability to withhold a strong response tendency (restraint) and the ability to cancel an ongoing action (cancellation)—in children with a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and in non-ADHD controls of similar age (ages 7–14 years). The goal was to determine if restraint and cancellation were related and if both were deficient in ADHD. The stop signal task involved a choice reaction time task (go task) which required a rapid response. The demand for inhibitory control was invoked through the presentation of a stop signal on a subset of go trials which required that the ongoing response be suspended. The stop signal was presented either concurrently with the go signal (restraint version) or after a variable delay (cancellation version). In Study 1, we compared ADHD and control children on the cancellation version of the stop task; in Study 2, we compared ADHD and controls on the restraint version. In Study 3, a subset of ADHD and control participants completed both tasks so that we could examine convergence of these dimensions of inhibition. Compared to control participants, ADHD participants showed a deficit both in the ability to cancel and to restrain a speeded motor response. Performance on the restraint version was significantly correlated with performance on the cancellation version in controls, but not in ADHD participants. We conclude that ADHD is associated with deficits in both restraint and cancellation subcomponents of inhibition.     

Reconfiguration of task-set: Is it easier to switch to the weaker task?

Switching between two tasks afforded by the same stimuli results in slower reactions and more errors on the first stimulus after the task changes. This “switch cost” is reduced, but not usually eliminated, by the opportunity to prepare for a task switch. While there is agreement that this preparation effect indexes a control process performed before the stimulus, the “residual” cost has been attributed to several sources: to a control process essential for task-set reconfiguration that can be carried out only after the stimulus onset, to probabilistic failure to engage in preparation prior to the stimulus, and to two kinds of priming from previous trials: positive priming of the now-irrelevant task set and inhibition of the now-relevant task-set. The main evidence for the carry-over of inhibition is the observation that it is easier to switch from the stronger to the weaker of a pair of tasks afforded by the stimulus than vice versa. We survey available data on interactions between task switching and three manipulations of relative task strength: pre-experimental experience, stimulus-response compatibility, and intra-experimental practice. We conclude that it is far from universally true that it is easier to switch to the weaker task. Either inhibition of the stronger task-set is a strategy used only in the special case of extreme inequality in strength, or its consequences for later performance may be masked by slower post-stimulus control operations for more complex tasks. Inhibitory priming may also be stimulus specific. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999     

The myth of technology in health care

Technology is believed to have liberated health care from dogmas, myths and speculations of earlier times. However, we are accused of using technology in an excessive, futile and even detrimental way, as if technology is compelling our actions. It appears to be like the monster threatening Dr. Frankenstein or like the socerer’s broom in the hand of the apprentice. That is, the same technology that should liberate us from myths, appears to be mythical. The objective of this article is to investigate the background for the re-entrance of the myth: How we encounter it and how we can explain it. The main point is that a myth of technology is normative: it relates ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and directs our actions. This becomes particularly clear in health care. Hence, if there is a myth of technology, it is an ethical issue, and should be taken seriously.     

Kinesis and Energeia—and What Follows. Outline of a Typology of Human Actions

This paper presents a typology of human actions, based on Aristotle’s kinesis–energeia dichotomy and on a formal elaboration (with some refinement) of the Vendler–Kenny classificatory schemes for action types (or action verbs). The types introduced are defined throughout by inferential criteria, in terms of what here are referred to as “modal-temporal expressions” (‘MT-terms’). Examples of familiar categories analysed in this way are production and maintenance, but the procedure is meant to offer a basis for defining various other commonsense categories. Among the more theoretical categories introduced are “Aristotelian projects”, i.e. actions defined in terms of Aristotle’s conceptions of movement/change, as well as “abstract projects”, in which the agent ensures that something changes from not being a fact to being a fact, and “conditional agency”, which involves actions that are to be performed when/if certain conditions come to be fulfilled. A category like “starting an action” is itself inferentially defined here in MT-terms, and so, inter alia, are proceeding with, finishing, stopping and interrupting an action. There is also a demonstration of how actions of one type may be converted into those of other types, where this is a matter of the way they are “seen” or described. There is also an implication to the effect that some of these distinctions may be useful for formulating certain critical insights regarding modern life.

Rehabilitation of executive deficits in closed head injury and anterior communicating artery aneurysm patients

This paper reports a study that was aimed to rehabilitate executive functions in closed head injury (CHI) and anterior communicating artery (ACoA) aneurysm patients. The groups tested comprised 10 CHI patients, 9 ACoA aneurysm patients and 19 controls. We employed a dual-task paradigm that is known to tap the ability to co-ordinate two actions. The treatment consisted of five experimental sessions, in which the dual-task paradigm was used. In the CHI study, the dual-task cost was measured before the treatment (assessment), immediately after the treatment (retest), and 3 months after the treatment (follow-up). In the ACoA aneurysm study, the dual-task cost was also assessed 12 months after the treatment. A significant reduction of the dual-task cost from assessment to retest was found. This reduction remained stable in the follow-up sessions. The results are discussed with reference to the absence of spontaneous recovery of this specific executive function and to the possibility that the beneficial effect of the treatment generalises to other executive functions and/or daily living activities. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999     

Task switching and the measurement of “switch costs”

The measurement of “switch costs” is held to be of interest because, as is widely believed, they may reflect the control processes that are engaged when subjects switch between two (or more) competing tasks. [In task-switching experiments, the reaction time (RT) switch cost is typically measured as the difference in RT between switch and non-switch (repeat) trials.] In this report we focus on the RT switch costs that remain even after the subject has had some time to prepare for the shift of task, when the switch cost may be approximately asymptotic (so-called residual switch costs). Three experiments are presented. All three experiments used Stroop colour/word, and neutral stimuli. Participants performed the two tasks of word-reading and colour-naming in a regular, double alternation, using the “alternating runs” paradigm (R. D. Rogers & S. Monsell, 1995). The experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that RT switch costs depend on a form of proactive interference (PI) arising from the performance of a prior, competing task. A. Allport, E. A. Styles and S. Hsieh (1994) suggested that these PI effects resulted from “task-set inertia”, that is, the persisting activation-suppression of competing task-sets, or competing task-processing pathways. The results confirmed the existence of long-lasting PI from the competing task as a major contributor to switch costs. Non-switch trials, used as the baseline in the measurement of switch costs, were also shown to be strongly affected by similar PI effects. However, task-set inertia was not sufficient to account for these results. The results appeared inconsistent also with all other previous models of task switching. A new hypothesis to explain these between-task interference effects was developed, based on the stimulus-triggered retrieval of competing stimulus-response (S-R) associations, acquired (or strengthened) in earlier trials. Consistent with this retrieval hypothesis, switch costs were shown to depend primarily on the S-R characteristics of the preceding task (the task that was switched from) rather than the upcoming task. Further, the effects of the other, competing task were found to persist over many successive switching trials, affecting switch costs long after the stimulus overlap (and hence the principal S-R competition) between the current tasks had been removed. Switch costs were also found to be affected by recent, item-specific experience with a given stimulus, in either the same or the competing task. Finally, the results showed that switch costs were massively affected by the ratio of the number of prior trials, in response to the same stimuli, that had implemented either the currently intended or the competing S-R mappings. None of these effects are predicted by current models of residual switch costs, which appeal to the differences in control processes assumed to be engaged in switch versus non-switch trials. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999     

Death and the Evolution of Language

My hypothesis is that the cognitive challenge posed by death might have had a co-evolutionary role in the development of linguistic faculties. First, I claim that mirror neurons, which enable us to understand others’ actions and emotions, not only activate when we directly observe someone, but can also be triggered by language: words make us feel bodily sensations. Second, I argue that the death of another individual cannot be understood by virtue of the mirror neuron mechanism, since the dead provide no neural pattern for mirroring: this cognitive task requires symbolic thought, which in turn involves emotions. Third, I describe the symbolic leap of the human species as a cognitive detachment from the here and now, allowing displaced reference: through symbols the human mind can refer to what is absent, possible, or even impossible (like the presence of a dead person). Such a detachment has had a huge adaptive impact: adopting a coevolutionary standpoint can help explain why language is as effective as environmental inputs in order to stimulate our bodily experience. In the end I suggest a further coevolutionary “reversal”: if language is necessary to understand the death of the other, it might also be true that the peculiar cognitive problem posed by the death of the other (the corpse is present, but the other is absent) has contributed to the crucial transition from an indexical sign system to the symbolic level, i.e., the “cognitive detachment”. Death and language, as Heidegger claimed, have an essential relation for humans, both from an evolutionary and a phenomenological perspective: they have shaped the symbolic consciousness that make us conceive of them.     

Task-set reconfiguration with binary and three-valued task dimensions

 Recently, we [Kleinsorge & Heuer (1999) Psychological Research, 62, 300–312] introduced the notion of generalizing switching operations to account for a characteristic pattern of shift costs that can be observed when participants have to shift between four tasks that result from an orthogonal combination of the two binary task dimensions kind of judgment (numerical vs spatial) and judgment-to-response mapping (compatible vs incompatible). Specifically, while a change of the kind of judgment always results in costs, a change of mapping results in costs only when the kind of judgment is repeated, but results in benefits when the kind of judgment changes as well. In Experiment 1, we replicated and extended this finding with a combination of two spatial kinds of judgment that were more similar to each other and were more unlikely to result in build-in dependencies of the two task dimensions. In Experiment 2, we extended this design to a combination of nine tasks that resulted from a factorial combination of two three-valued task dimensions. In this experiment, shift costs grew monotonically with the number of task dimensions on which a change took place. This outcome is consistent with the assumption that a generalizing switching operation is a forward-acting process that requires a specific target value to switch to. Received: 17 April 2000 / Accepted: 25 August 2000     

Compensation for subliminal timing perturbations in perceptual-motor synchronization

 It is sometimes assumed that limits of temporal discrimination established in psychophysical tasks constrain the timing information available for the control of action. Results from the five perceptual-motor synchronization experiments presented here argue against this assumption. Experiment 1 demonstrates that subliminal (0.8–2%) local changes in interval duration in an otherwise isochronous auditory sequence are rapidly compensated for in the timing of synchronized finger tapping. If this compensation is based on perception of the highly variable synchronization error (SE) rather than of the local change in stimulus period, then it could be based solely on SEs that exceed the temporal order threshold. However, that hypothesis is ruled out by additional analyses of Exp. 1 and the results of Exp. 2, a combined synchronization and temporal order judgment task. Experiments 3–5 further show that three factors that affect the detectability of local deviations from stimulus isochrony do not inhibit effective compensation for such deviations in synchronized tapping. Experiment 5, a combined synchronization and detection task, shows directly that compensation for timing perturbations does not depend on explicit detection. Overall, the results suggest that the automatic processes involved in the temporal control of action have access to more accurate timing information than do the conscious decision processes of auditory temporal judgment. Received: 19 November 1998 / Accepted: 18 March 1999     

Visual capture and human error

We investigated relationships between everyday error rates, susceptibility to stimulus‐driven (i.e. external) capture of visual attention and working memory. Using an eye‐tracking task called the antisaccade paradigm, we found that relatively error‐prone subjects made significantly more unintended, stimulus‐driven eye movements. This finding suggests a link between error‐proneness and a tendency towards environmental (versus volitional) control of behaviour. No evidence was found for a connection between working memory capacity and error proneness or eye movements, though range restriction may have affected the working memory results. The findings are compatible with the view that some mishaps stem from environmental capture and triggering of inappropriate actions, and that individuals vary in their susceptibility to capture. Some implications are that: (1) mishaps might be reduced by redesigning tasks to reduce capture errors, e.g. by restructuring critical tasks to eliminate action sequences with common initial stages; (2) the antisaccade task may be a useful dependent measure in research on how stressors (e.g. fatigue, noise, temperature) increase the likelihood of mishaps. Specifically, since antisaccade performance was correlated with reports of real‐world mistakes in the current study, antisaccade scores may allow useful predictions about how accident probability varies as a function of different conditions. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which empathy? Limitations in the mirrored “understanding” of emotion

The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading (how we represent other creatures as having mental states), and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this paper assesses mirrored understanding in cases of emotion and its import for theories of empathy and especially empathy in ethical contexts. In particular, this paper argues that the mirrored understanding claim is ambiguous and ultimately misleading when applied to emotion, partly because mirroring proponents fail to appreciate the way in which empathy might serve a distinct normative function in our judgments of what other people feel. The paper thus concludes with a call to revise the mirrored understanding claim, whether in neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy.     

Learning in noise: Dynamic decision-making in a variable environment

In engineering systems, noise is a curse, obscuring important signals and increasing the uncertainty associated with measurement. However, the negative effects of noise are not universal. In this paper, we examine how people learn sequential control strategies given different sources and amounts of feedback variability. In particular, we consider people’s behavior in a task where short- and long-term rewards are placed in conflict (i.e., the best option in the short-term is worst in the long-term). Consistent with a model based on reinforcement learning principles [Gureckis, T., & Love, B.C. Short term gains, long term pains: How cues about state aid learning in dynamic environments. Cognition (in press)], we find that learners differentially weight information predictive of the current task state. In particular, when cues that signal state are noisy, we find that participants’ ability to identify an optimal strategy is strongly impaired relative to equivalent amounts of noise that obscure the rewards/valuations of those states. In other situations, we find that noise and noise in reward signals may paradoxically improve performance by encouraging exploration. Our results demonstrate how experimentally-manipulated task variability can be used to test predictions about the mechanisms that learners engage in dynamic decision making tasks.     

A Dynamic-Logical Perspective on Quantum Behavior

In this paper we show how recent concepts from Dynamic Logic, and in particular from Dynamic Epistemic logic, can be used to model and interpret quantum behavior. Our main thesis is that all the non-classical properties of quantum systems are explainable in terms of the non-classical flow of quantum information. We give a logical analysis of quantum measurements (formalized using modal operators) as triggers for quantum information flow, and we compare them with other logical operators previously used to model various forms of classical information flow: the “test” operator from Dynamic Logic, the “announcement” operator from Dynamic Epistemic Logic and the “revision” operator from Belief Revision theory. The main points stressed in our investigation are the following: (1) The perspective and the techniques of “logical dynamics” are useful for understanding quantum information flow. (2) Quantum mechanics does not require any modification of the classical laws of “static” propositional logic, but only a non-classical dynamics of information. (3) The main such non-classical feature is that, in a quantum world, all information-gathering actions have some ontic side-effects. (4) This ontic impact can affect in its turn the flow of information, leading to non-classical epistemic side-effects (e.g. a type of non-monotonicity) and to states of “objectively imperfect information”. (5) Moreover, the ontic impact is non-local: an information-gathering action on one part of a quantum system can have ontic side-effects on other, far-away parts of the system.     

When the rules are reversed: Action-monitoring consequences of reversing stimulus–response mappings

How does switching tasks affect our ability to monitor and adapt our behavior? Largely independent lines of research have examined how individuals monitor their actions and adjust to errors, on the one hand, and how they are able to switch between two or more tasks, on the other. Few studies, however, have explored how these two aspects of cognitive?Cbehavioral flexibility interact. That is, how individuals monitor their actions when task rules are switched remains unknown. The present study sought to address this question by examining the action-monitoring consequences of response switching??a form of task switching that involves switching the response that is associated with a particular stimulus. We recorded event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants performed a modified letter flanker task in which the stimulus?Cresponse (S?CR) mappings were reversed between blocks. Specifically, we examined three ERPs??the N2, the error-related negativity (ERN), and the error positivity (Pe)??that have been closely associated with action monitoring. The findings revealed that S?CR reversal blocks were associated with dynamic alterations of action-monitoring brain activity: the N2 and ERN were enhanced, whereas the Pe was reduced. Moreover, participants were less likely to adapt their posterror behavior in S?CR reversal blocks. Taken together, these data suggest that response switching results in early enhancements of effortful control mechanisms (N2 and ERN) at the expense of reductions in later response evaluation processes (Pe). Thus, when rules change, our attempts at control are accompanied by less attention to our actions.