Attention and recollective experience in recognition memory

The functional relation between recognition memory and conscious awareness was assessed in an experiment in which undivided attention at study was compared with two divided attention conditions, one more demanding than the other. When recognizing a word from the study list, subjects indicated whether they could consciously recollect its prior occurrence or recognized it on some other basis, in the absence of conscious recollection. Divided attention at study progressively impaired word recognition accompanied by conscious recollection. Recognition in the absence of conscious recollection was not affected by divided attention. These findings are interpreted as providing further support for the idea that recognition memory entails two distinct components, one based on associative and contextual information, the other based on a "traceless" awareness of familiarity.     

Cognitive effort and recollective experience in recognition memory

The difficulty of the cognitive operations required to process study items was manipulated in two experiments investigating recollective experience. In subsequent recognition tests, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements for items processed in these tasks were based on recollection ("remember" responses) or on familiarity ("know" responses). In Experiment 1 target items were presented in the context of a category decision task. It was found that remember responses increased with the difficulty of the category decision. For positive instances, remember responses were greater for items of low instance frequency than for items of high instance frequency, while for negative instances remember responses were greater for items from similar categories than for items from dissimilar categories. These effects were not present in know responses. In Experiment 2, remember responses were more frequent when study items had been presented in the form of anagrams to be solved than when they had been presented in the form of words to be read aloud. The incidence of know responses was not affected by the format in which study items were presented. Source judgements were also more accurate when recognition was based on recollection. It is argued that the type of conscious awareness experienced during recognition is determined by the knowledge activated by items presented in the recognition test, which in turn is determined by the nature of the operations engaged at encoding.     

Forgetting in recognition memory with and without recollective experience

Retention interval was manipulated in two recognition-memory experiments in which subjects indicated when recognizing a word whether its recognition was accompanied by some recollective experience ("remember") or whether it was recognized on the basis of familiarity without any recollective experience ("know"). Experiment 1 showed that between 10 min and 1 week, "remember" responses declined sharply from an initially higher level, whereas "know" responses remained relatively unchanged. Experiment 2 showed that between 1 week and 6 months, both kinds of responses declined at a similar, gradual rate and that despite quite low levels of performance after 6 months, both kinds of responses still gave rise to accurate discrimination between target words and lures. These findings are discussed in relationship to current ideas about multiple memory systems and processing accounts of explicit and implicit measures of retention.     

Mediators of age-related differences in recollective experience in recognition memory

This study examined states of awareness with the Remember/Know paradigm during verbal recognition memory in young and old adults. Following the presentation of a word list, subjects undertook a recognition test and indicated whether they could consciously recollect its prior occurrence (R) or recognize it on some other basis, without conscious recollection (K). In this individual-difference approach we also incorporated various processing-speed and working-memory measures to study the link between aging, states of awareness and processing resources. The results revealed that, compared to younger adults, older adults exhibited a decline in the amount of R responses during the recognition test whereas the amount of K responses did not change. Structural equation modeling indicated that a slower processing speed associated with a limited working-memory capacity is a key to explaining age-related variance in conscious recollection. The findings offer further support for the distinction between remembering and knowing and for the processing-resources hypothesis of aging.     

熟悉面孔与陌生面孔识别的差异

摘 要：面孔识别包括熟悉面孔识别和陌生面孔识别,两者之间的差异已经得到了多方面的证明。神经生理学的研究发现,识别陌生面孔和熟悉面孔所激活的脑区存在差异,与识别陌生面孔相比,识别熟悉面孔的脑区活动范围更大,包括双侧前额叶、单侧颞叶、海马回、杏仁核、后扣带回和右下额叶。并且也存在脑电的差异,比如 N400和P600的差异。对陌生面孔和熟悉面孔识别具有相同影响的因素有：遮挡、倒置等;具有不同影响的因素有：视角、表情、内外部特征等。文章也探讨了陌生面孔变成熟悉面孔的过程,以及在这一过程中起主要作用的编码形式等。     

Order of feature recognition in familiar and unfamiliar faces

Three experiments measured order of processing for single faces presented to the left or right visual field (VF) using a same-different matching task. In contrast to earlier studies, the stimuli in the present experiments were carefully matched for overall similarity prior to the actual experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a significant top-to-bottom order of processing occurred for line drawings of unfamiliar faces but not for line drawings of familiar faces. Experiment 3 found evidence supporting top-to-bottom processing for unfamiliar photographic face stimuli. The photographic stimuli in Experiment 3 were matched more quickly when presented in the left VF (right hemisphere); however, this VF asymmetry was not related to previously reported differences in order of processing. It is suggested that under some conditions faces presented to the right hemisphere may be processed more like familiar faces than faces presented to the left hemisphere; however, this difference is not critical for the left VF (right hemisphere) superiority often found in face recognition tasks.     

Gaze control and recollective experience in face recognition

In two experiments, we examined the relation between gaze control and recollective experience in the context of face recognition. In Experiment 1, participants studied a series of faces, while their eye movements were eliminated either during study or test, or both. Subsequently, they made remember/know judgements for each recognized test face. The preclusion of eye movements impaired explicit recollection without affecting familiarity-based recognition. In Experiment 2, participants examined unfamiliar faces under two study conditions (similarity vs. difference judgements), while their eye movements were registered. Similarity vs. difference judgements produced the opposite effects on remember/know responses, with no systematic effects on eye movements. However, face recollection was related to eye movements, so that remember responses were associated with more frequent refixations than know responses. These findings suggest that saccadic eye movements mediate the nature of recollective experience, and that explicit recollection reflects a greater consistency between study and test fixations than familiarity-based face recognition.     

Perceptual effects and recollective experience in face recognition

Four experiments were conducted investigating the effect of size congruency on facial recognition memory, measured by remember, know and guess responses. Different study times were employed, that is extremely short (300 and 700 ms), short (1,000 ms), and long times (5,000 ms). With the short study time (1,000 ms) size congruency occurred in knowing. With the long study time the effect of size congruency occurred in remembering. These results support the distinctiveness/ fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the memory systems account, since the size congruency effect that occurred in knowing under conditions that facilitated perceptual fluency also occurred independently in remembering under conditions that facilitated elaborative encoding. They do not support the idea that remember and know responses reflect differences in trace strength.     

Children's haptic and cross-modal recognition with familiar and unfamiliar objects

Five-year-old children explored multidimensional objects either haptically or visually and then were tested for recognition with target and distractor items in either the same or the alternative modality. In Experiments 1 and 2, haptic, visual, and cross-modal recognition were all nearly with familiar objects; haptic and visual recognition were also excellent with unfamiliar objects, but cross-modal recognition was less accurate. In Experiment 3, cross-modal recognition was also less accurate than within-mode recognition with familiar objects that were members of the same basic-level category. The results indicate that children's haptic recognition is remarkably good, that cross-modal recognition is otherwise constrained, and that cross-modal recognition may be accomplished differently for familiar and unfamiliar objects.     

Repetition priming and the haptic recognition of familiar and unfamiliar objects

In four experiments, we examined the haptic recognition of 3-D objects. In Experiment 1, blindfolded participants named everyday objects presented haptically in two blocks. There was significant priming of naming, but no cost of an object changing orientation between blocks. However, typical orientations of objects were recognized more quickly than nonstandard orientations. In Experiment 2, participants accurately performed an unannounced test of memory for orientation. The lack of orientation-specific priming in Experiment 1, therefore, was not because participants could not remember the orientation at which they had first felt an object. In Experiment 3, we examined haptic naming of objects that were primed either haptically or visually. Haptic priming was greater than visual priming, although significant cross-modal priming was also observed. In Experiment 4, we tested recognition memory for familiar and unfamiliar objects using an old-new recognition task. Objects were recognized best when they were presented in the same orientation in both blocks, suggesting that haptic object recognition is orientation sensitive. Photographs of the unfamiliar objects may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Recognizing familiar and unfamiliar faces

These experiments addressed why, in episodic-memory tests, familiar faces are recognized better than unfamiliar faces. Memory for faces of well-known public figures and unfamiliar persons was tested, not only with old/new recognition tests, in which initially viewed faces were discriminated from dis tractors, but also with tests of memory for specific information. These included: detail recall, in which a masked feature had to be described; orientation recognition, in which discrimination between originally seen faces and mirror-image reversals was required; and recognition and recall of labels for the public figures. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that memory for orientation and featural details was not robustly related either to facial familiarity or to old/new recognition rates. Experiment 3 showed that memory for labels was not the exclusive determinant of the famous-face advantage in recognition, since famous faces were highly recognizable even they were not labelable or when labels were forgotten. These results suggest that the familiarity effect, and face recognition in general, may reflect a nonverbal memory representation that is relatively abstract.     

Levels-of-processing effects on "remember" responses in recognition for familiar and unfamiliar tunes

We investigated the effect of level-of-processing manipulations on "remember" and "know" responses in episodic melody recognition (Experiments 1 and 2) and how this effect is modulated by item familiarity (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants performed 2 conceptual and 2 perceptual orienting tasks while listening to familiar melodies: judging the mood, continuing the tune, tracing the pitch contour, and counting long notes. The conceptual mood task led to higher d' rates for "remember" but not "know" responses. In Experiment 2, participants either judged the mood or counted long notes of tunes with high and low familiarity. A level-of-processing effect emerged again in participants' "remember" d' rates regardless of melody familiarity. Results are discussed within the distinctive processing framework.     

Differential time-dependent effects of emotion on recollective experience and memory for contextual information

Emotion has been suggested to slow forgetting via a mechanism that enhances memory consolidation. Here, we investigate whether this time dependent process influences the subjective experience of recollection as well as the ability to retrieve specific contextual details of the study event. To do so we examined recognition for emotional and neutral pictures at two retention intervals and collected remember/know reports and reports about the task that had been performed with the item during encoding. Recollective experience was enhanced for emotional compared to neutral photos after a 24-h delay, but not immediately after encoding. In contrast, memory for the task performed during encoding did not differ between emotional and neutral photos at either time point. The findings indicate that emotion slows the effects of forgetting on the recollective experience associated with studied events, without necessarily slowing the forgetting of specific contextual details of those events.     

The role of source memory in older adults' recollective experience

Younger adults' "remember" judgments are accompanied by better memory for the source of an item than "know" judgments. Furthermore, remember judgments are not merely associated with better memory for individual source features but also with bound memory for multiple source features. However, older adults, independent of their subjective memory experience, are generally less likely to "bind" source features to an item and to each other in memory (i.e., the associative deficit). In two experiments, we tested whether memory for perceptual source features, independently or bound, is also the basis for older adults' remember responses or if their associative deficit leads them to base their responses on other types of information. The results suggest that retrieval of perceptual source features, individually or bound, forms the basis for younger but not for older adults' remember judgments even when the overall level of memory for perceptual sources is closely equated (Experiment 1) and when attention is explicitly directed to the source information at encoding (Experiment 2).     

Identification of familiar and unfamiliar faces from internal and external features: some implications for theories of face recognition

Three experiments are reported in which recognition of faces from whole faces or internal or external features was compared. In the first experiment, where the faces were of famous people, an advantage was found for identification from internal features. In the second experiment involving unfamiliar faces, however, no difference was found in recognition rates when subjects were given the internal or the external features. In a third experiment famous faces were presented and mixed with other famous faces for a recognition test. As in experiment 1, better recognition occurred from internals as compared with external features. It is argued that the internal representation for familiar faces may be qualitatively different from that for face seen just once. In particular some advantage in feature saliency may accrue to the internal or 'expressive' features of familiar faces. The implications of these results are considered in relation to general theories of face perception and recognition.     

Phenomenological differences between familiar and unfamiliar odours

Unfamiliar odours are harder to discriminate than familiar odours. We explored the phenomenal basis of this difference. In experiments la and 1b, participants profiled odour quality for two sets of familiar and unfamiliar odours. In both cases unfamiliar odours were redolent of more odour qualities than familiar stimuli. In experiment 2, participants received (i) a set of familiar and unfamiliar odours and learnt their names, and (ii) a further set of familiar and unfamiliar odours to which they were exposed. Participants then profiled these stimuli as well as a further unexposed set of familiar and unfamiliar odours. Exposure, but not naming, led to a significantly smaller difference between the familiar and unfamiliar stimuli, in terms of their redolence to other odours, when compared to unexposed control stimuli. Unfamiliar exposed odours were also judged as less redolent than unexposed unfamiliar odours. These observations are consistent with a mnemonic basis for odour-quality perception.     

Canine responses to familiar and unfamiliar humans

Dogs were observed during controlled approaches by their owners and by strangers. Significant differences between the dogs' responses to their owners and their responses to strangers were found. These results supported the popular belief that dogs respond differently to different persons, and not merely to different situations in which persons are usually encountered.     

The self and recollective experience

Three experiments investigated the hypothesis that self-reference at encoding increases the probability of recollective experience in recognition memory. In all three experiments separate groups of subjects studied words naming personality traits. One group judged the self-relevance of the traits, the other groups performed orientating tasks low in self-reference. In a recognition test subjects first identified old items and then indicated which of these were accompanied by recollective experience ('remember' responses) and which were recognized on some other basis ('know' responses). No reliable differences in overall recognition performance between self-referent and semantic encoding tasks were observed. However, subjects who encoded trait adjectives with reference to the self produced reliably more remember responses and few know responses than subjects who had encoded the items in the low self-referent tasks. Experiment 1 demonstrated a self-reference effect in recognition accompanied by recollective experience after 1-hour retention interval, while Experiment 2 found this effect to persist over a 24-hour retention interval. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this self-reference effect is obtained under incidental as well as under intentional learning conditions. Taken together these findings demonstrate the importance of self-reference as a factor in determining the likelihood that recognition judgements will be accompanied by recollective experience.