Differentiating accounts of actual,suggested and fabricated childhood events using the judgment of memory characteristics questionnaire

Statement analysis procedures are used in forensic settings to classify reported events as experienced or non‐experienced. These procedures are typically validated using accounts of actual events and intentionally fabricated events. However, people can also unintentionally develop false memories. To examine whether inclusion of accounts of suggested events affects classification accuracy, we validated the judgment of memory characteristics questionnaire (JMCQ) statement analysis procedure using all three statement types. Participants attempted to recall two actual events and one suggested event from their childhood over two cognitive interviews, then intentionally fabricated an account of another childhood event. Fourteen of the 34 participants (41%) reported having experienced the suggested event. Independent raters then used the JMCQ to analyse and classify each type of statement from this participant subset. Inclusion of accounts of suggested events did not reduce classification accuracy. Raters tended to classify accounts of both fabricated and suggested events as non‐experienced. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Should I believe this? Reality monitoring of accounts of self‐experienced and invented recent and distant autobiographical events

To examine personal and interpersonal reality monitoring, 240 participants wrote accounts of invented or self‐experienced autobiographical events. Half the participants wrote about a distant event that happened before the age of 15 and half wrote about a recent event that happened after the age of 15. Using a yoked design, participants rated the qualitative details of their own accounts and the details of other participants' accounts. Consistent with previous research, we found that self‐experienced accounts contained more qualitative details than invented accounts, and that accounts of recent events contained more qualitative details than accounts of distant events. Participants rated their own accounts as more qualitatively detailed than other participants' accounts, which suggests that they did not base their self‐ratings solely on the written details. We discuss the practical and theoretical importance of our findings. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using source cues and familiarity cues to resist imagination inflation

To investigate whether people can resist imagination inflation--the imagination-induced increased confidence that fictitious childhood events really happened--we gave them different types of cues. In a three-stage procedure, participants: (1) rated their confidence that a list of childhood events had happened to them, (2) imagined some of these events, and (3) made confidence ratings a second time. Subjects received either no cues about the source of the imagined event, an additional source cue (perspective), an additional familiarity cue (a plausibility questionnaire), or both cues. Only subjects who had both types of cues resisted imagination inflation. These results suggest that additional cues can sometimes safeguard people from becoming more confident that fictitious events were genuine experiences.     

Crashing memories and reality monitoring: distinguishing between perceptions,imaginations and ‘false memories’

Research has shown that the memory characteristics questionnaire (MCQ) can be used to discriminate between ‘memories’ of perceived events and ‘memories’ of imagined events. The present study extended this research by examining the utility of the MCQ in distinguishing impossible memories (i.e., reports of an event a person could not have witnessed). Congruent with previous research, a considerable number of participants in both the pilot study (45%) and the main study (44%) were willing to report that they had seen a non‐existent film of the car crash in which Diana, Princess of Wales was killed. The MCQ ratings of three groups of participants were therefore compared: (1) those who indicated that they had seen the non‐existent film, (2) those who were asked to imagine having seen the film, and (3) a control group who were asked to rate their memory of when they first heard the news of the crash. The MCQ did not serve to distinguish impossible memories, but there were reliable differences on one of the MCQ subscales between those who imagined the film and controls. Furthermore, participants who reported that they had seen the film gave higher scores on the Self Monitoring scale. Implications are discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imagination equally influences false memories of high and low plausibility events

To examine the effects of event plausibility on people's false beliefs and memories for imagined childhood events, subjects took part in a three‐stage procedure. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events. They also rated their memories of the events. Second, 1 week later, subjects imagined one high, one moderate and one low plausibility event. Third, 1 week later (and 2 weeks after their initial ratings), subjects rated their confidence and memory a second time. Imagining the events made subjects more confident that they were genuine experiences and gave subjects clearer and more complete memories. Plausibility did not affect subjects' confidence but it did affect their memories. Subjects developed clearer and more complete memories for high, followed by moderate, followed by low plausibility events regardless of whether those events were imagined. We use a nested model of plausibility, belief and memory to discuss our findings. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Within‐Pair Consistency in Child Witnesses: The Diagnostic Value of Telling the Same Story

Judges and jurors often rely on consistency for assessing veracity. The present study examined the diagnostic value of within‐pair consistency to predict truth‐telling in pairs of children aged 8 to 10 years. Twenty‐three pairs were questioned about one experienced event and one imagined event (which they had discussed before questioning). Within‐pair consistency was significantly higher for experienced events than for imagined events. The diagnostic value of within‐pair consistency to predict truth‐telling was, however, modest: approximately one out of three judgments based on this cue would have been mistaken. Analyses of children's discussions of the imagined events revealed that interview questions about topics that had been discussed before questioning did not effectively discriminate experienced and imagined events, providing support for theoretical assumptions underlying the unanticipated‐question approach. Practical recommendations for police interviewers are provided. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imagination can create false autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that imagining an event can alter autobiographical beliefs. The current study examined whether it can also create false memories. One group of participants imagined a relatively frequent event and received information about an event that never occurs. A second group imagined the nonoccurring event and received information about the frequent event. One week before and again 1 week immediately after the manipulation, participants rated the likelihood that they had experienced each of the two critical events and a series of noncritical events, using the Life Events Inventory. During the last phase, participants were also asked to describe any memories they had for the events. For both events, imagination increased the number of memories reported, as well as beliefs about experiencing the event. These results indicate that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories.     

Imagining nice and nasty events in childhood or adulthood: recent positive events show the most imagination inflation

We explored whether event recency and valence affect people’s susceptibility to imagination inflation. Using a three-stage procedure, subjects imagined positive and negative events happening in their distant or recent past. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced particular positive and negative events in childhood or adulthood using a Life Events Inventory (LEI). Two weeks later, they imagined two positive and two negative events from the LEI. Finally, they rated their confidence on the LEI a second time. For positive events, subjects showed more imagination inflation for adulthood than childhood events. For negative events, they showed no difference in imagination inflation for adulthood and childhood events. We discuss factors that may influence source confusions for memories of the past and highlight directions for future research.     

Adults' memories of childhood: affect, knowing, and remembering

Adult questionnaire respondents reported, for each of a number of events, if they had experienced that event during childhood and, if so, if they remembered the experience or merely knew it had happened. Respondents also rated the emotion of each event and judged whether they would remember more about each reportedly experienced event if they spent more time trying to do so. Study 1 respondents were 96 undergraduates, whereas Study 2 tested 93 community members ranging widely in age. Respondents often reported no recollections of reportedly experienced events. Reportedly experienced events rated as emotional were more often recollected than those rated as neutral, and those rated as positive were more often recollected than those rated as negative. Predicted ability to remember more was related to current memory. Claims of remembering reportedly experienced events increased with age, but predicted ability to remember more about them declined with age.     

Adults' memories of childhood: Affect,knowing, and remembering

Adult questionnaire respondents reported, for each of a number of events, if they had experienced that event during childhood and, if so, if they remembered the experience or merely knew it had happened. Respondents also rated the emotion of each event and judged whether they would remember more about each reportedly experienced event if they spent more time trying to do so. Study 1 respondents were 96 undergraduates, whereas Study 2 tested 93 community members ranging widely in age. Respondents often reported no recollections of reportedly experienced events. Reportedly experienced events rated as emotional were more often recollected than those rated as neutral, and those rated as positive were more often recollected than those rated as negative. Predicted ability to remember more was related to current memory. Claims of remembering reportedly experienced events increased with age, but predicted ability to remember more about them declined with age.     

Criteria‐based content analysis of true and suggested accounts of events

Worldwide, the criteria‐based content analysis (CBCA) is probably the most widely used veracity assessment technique for discriminating between accounts of true and fabricated events. In this study, two experiments examined the effectiveness of the CBCA for discriminating between accounts of true events and suggested events believed to be true. In Experiment 1, CBCA‐trained judges evaluated participants' accounts of true and suggestively planted childhood events. In Experiment 2, judges analysed accounts of recent events that were experimentally manipulated to be a (a) true experience, (b) false experience believed to be true and (c) deliberately fabricated experience. In both experiments CBCA scores were significantly higher for accounts of true events than suggested events. However, this difference was not significant for participants classified as experiencing ‘full’ memories for the suggested event. Self‐report memory measures supported the findings of the CBCA analyses. Taken together these results suggest that the CBCA discriminative power is greatly constrained. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conditions affecting the revelation effect for autobiographical memory

In four experiments involving 184 participants, people rated their confidence that particular events had happened in their childhood (e.g., "Broke a window playing ball"). If participants had to unscramble a key word in a phrase just before rating it (e.g., "Broke a nwidwo [window] playing ball"), confidence ratings increased-the revelation effect. However, the pattern of revelation effects depended on the particular way in which participants processed key words (e.g., visualizing vs. counting vowels in the word window) approximately 10 min prior to rating life events that contained those words. Prior exposure to key words never in itself directly affected confidence ratings. These results demonstrate that one can manipulate the revelation effect by altering the processing that participants perform on words prior to unscrambling them. These results also pose difficulties for many accounts of the revelation effect. The major puzzle posed by our present findings is that unscrambling key words increases confidence that an event has happened in childhood, whereas prior exposure to these words does not.     

Self-affirmation and affective forecasting: Affirmation reduces the anticipated impact of negative events

When forecasting how they will feel in the future, people overestimate the impact that imagined negative events will have on their affective states, partly because they underestimate their own psychological resiliency. Because self-affirmation enhances resiliency, two studies examined whether self-affirmation prior to forecasting reduces the extremity of affective forecasts. Participants in self-affirmation conditions completed a values scale or wrote an essay asserting their most important value, whereas participants in the no-affirmation condition asserted a relatively unimportant value. Participants then predicted their affective reactions to a negative or positive imagined event. In both studies, self-affirmation reduced the unpleasant affect expected to result from a negative event, but had no impact on affective forecasts for a positive event. This pattern was mediated by participants’ cognitive appraisals of the imagined event, but not by differential focus on that event. Results are consistent with self-affirmation activating or enhancing psychological resiliency to counteract immune neglect during affective forecasting of a negative event.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants' reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

False reports of childhood events in appropriate interviews

The present study employed the "parental misinformation" paradigm to examine whether individuals report false events from their childhood even when they are interviewed in an appropriate manner by a trained interviewer. Each participant was interviewed on three occasions. By the final interview, one participant produced a "full" report, and six participants produced "partial" reports, of childhood events that did not occur. Although participants reported perceiving greater pressure to report the false events than the real events, independent judges' ratings of social pressure in the interviews did not differ as a function of what type of event participants were being asked about. Participants also reported higher confidence in their parents', compared to their own, recall of events from their childhood. False reports were also positively correlated with scores on both the full and the revised versions of the Dissociative Experiences Scale, and negatively correlated with score on the Self-Monitoring scale. These results indicate that, despite being interviewed in an appropriate manner by a trained interviewer, some participants will falsely report events from their childhoods.     

Event familiarity influences memory detection using the aIAT

The developers of the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) describe it as a possible memory detection tool. This claim rests on the assumption the aIAT can reliably and automatically detect the accuracy of autobiographical events. However, the aIAT may be susceptible to factors that affect the assessment of truth vs. falseness, such as the relative familiarity of those events. We compared aIAT performance when participants reported recent vs. childhood autobiographical events, and when participants imagined vs. did not imagine a fabricated autobiographical event. The aIAT was less effective at distinguishing between real and fabricated events from childhood, compared to recent real and fabricated events. Imagining a fabricated event did not affect aIAT performance; however, there was a trend in the data suggesting imagination may have reduced the effect of event recency. Our results provide further evidence that reducing or enhancing source confusion—via familiarity—can influence the predictive value of the aIAT.     

Warnings reduce the magnitude of the imagination inflation effect

Imagination inflation occurs when people increase their confidence that an event actually happened after imagining the details of the event. The purpose of this study was to determine whether warning people about the imagination inflation effect would reduce their tendency to inflate their ratings of the imagined events. In one condition, we warned participants about the deleterious effects of imagining distant events. Compared with a control group that did not receive a warning, this group produced a significantly smaller imagination inflation effect. We discuss these results and the imagination inflation effect in the context of 2 theories designed to explain the cognitive processes that produce this effect.     

Episodic memory and episodic foresight in 3- and 5-year-old children

In the present study, we examined the development of episodic memory and episodic foresight. Three- and 5-year-olds were interviewed individually using a personalised timeline that included photographs of them at different points in their life. After constructing the timeline with the experimenter, each child was asked to discuss a number of different events: an event that happened yesterday, an event that happened earlier today, an event that would happen later today, and an event that would happen tomorrow. As judged by their parents, children's accounts were highly accurate. After controlling for age and language scores, there was a strong relation between amount of information reported about past and future events. Overall, 5-year-olds reported more total information than 3-year-olds; however, reports by 3-year-olds included a similar proportion of first-person reference as did reports by 5-year-olds. No age difference appeared in proportion of future-oriented talk. We conclude that the present task provides a promising method of exploring the emergence of mental time travel during early childhood.