Replacement—A theory of stereotypy: A review

Three forms of stereotypy are described and an outline given of previous theories of simple stereotypy in the retarded and autistic. An alternative theory is put forward in which stereotypy is characterized as a replacement of unpalleatable stimuli and/or responses that are overloading the system in a way with which the individual cannot cope. Although the theory derives from cognitive psychology, it can also be expressed behaviorally or experientially without loss of impact. The manner in which replacement theory applies to the three types of stereotypy is described. Testable hypotheses are derived, predictions made, and implications considered. Finally, the more general ramifications of the theory are explored.     

Is there something special about the self? A neuropsychological case study

One of the most exciting trends in psychology has been the increasing use of data and conceptual tools derived from the study of patients with neuropsychological syndromes to address questions about normal mental function. To date, however, personality theorists seldom have considered neuropsychological case material (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998). In this paper we show how neuropsychological evidence can afford new insights for personality theorists. In particular, we show how examination of persons suffering from amnesia and autism can shed light on the way in which knowledge about self is represented in memory. We first review the literature on clinical amnesia and then present evidence from a new case study exploring the relation between personal and nonpersonal knowledge in a patient with autism. We conclude that the mind may have learning systems that are specialized both for acquiring and retrieving information about one's own personality.     

Do bilinguals have two personalities? A special case of cultural frame switching

Four studies examined and empirically documented Cultural Frame Switching (CFS; Hong, Chiu, & Kung, 1997) in the domain of personality. Specifically, we asked whether Spanish–English bilinguals show different personalities when using different languages? If so, are the two personalities consistent with cross-cultural differences in personality? To generate predictions about the specific cultural differences to expect, Study 1 documented personality differences between US and Mexican monolinguals. Studies 2–4 tested CFS in three samples of Spanish–English bilinguals, located in the US and Mexico. Findings replicated across all three studies, suggesting that language activates CFS for Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Further analyses suggested the findings were not due to anomalous items or translation effects. Results are discussed in terms of the interplay between culture and self.     

One mind or many — A note on the everett interpretation of quantum theory

The Everett interpretation of quantum theory requires either the existence of an infinite number of conscious minds associated with each brain or the existence of one universal consciousness. Reasons are given, and the two ideas are compared.     

The learning theory model of neurosis—A new approach

This paper is concerned with the development of a learning theory model of neurosis which would not be susceptible to the many criticisms which can be made of former models. Two widely favoured models—those of Freud and Skinner—are rejected because they are either non-falsifiable or tautological. The Watson and Mowrer models are rejected because they have been experimentally invalidated. The model here suggested differs from previous ones in several important respects. In the first place, it replaces the classical law of extinction by a more modern version which allows for incubation (enhancement) effects of exposure to CS-only stimuli, as well as for extinction effects. In the second place, the model emphasizes the importance of individual differences, and suggests precise relations between personality and the conditioning of neurotic behaviours. In the third place, the model lays stress on innate fear patterns and ‘preparedness’ as important factors in the genesis of conditioned fear responses. In the fourth place, the concept of ‘pain’ in the classical animal literature, and its use in creating models of neurosis, is supplemented by other concepts (‘frustrative non-reward’, ‘approach-avoidance’ conflict) which are more relevant to human neurosis. In the fifth place, and most important. the notion of ‘traumatic’, single-trial conditioning is abandoned, and a new theory based on incubation is proposed. It is suggested that the new theory is more adequate than previous ones to account for the known facts of human neurosis, and that it suggests novel types of experiment in both the animal and human fields which can be used to test its adequacy.     

Behavioral changes in teachers as a function of student feedback: A case for the achievement motivation theory?

A field experiment tested whether teachers change their behavior when they receive student ratings as feedback on their own behavior and on the behavior of a fictitious ideal teacher (from the students' perspective). Explanation of such behavioral changes in the form of theories of cognitive balance, as suggested by other authors, has been criticized. As an alternative explanation, achievement motivation theory has been considered, from which a series of hypotheses has been deduced. Overall, most of the hypotheses were not confirmed, and it was concluded that the effectiveness of feedback on behavioral changes in teachers cannot be judged to be especially high, although a number of theoretical and methodological qualifications were added.     

A liberal theory of externalities?

Unlike exploitative exchanges, exchanges featuring externalities have never seemed to pose particular problems to liberal theories of justice. State interference with exchanges featuring externalities seems permissible, like it is for coercive or deceptive exchanges. This is because exchanges featuring negative externalities seem to be clear cases of the two exchanging parties harming a third one via the exchange—and thus of conduct violating the harm principle. This essay aims to put this idea into question. I will argue that exchanges featuring negative externalities are not unjust in this straightforward way, i.e. because they would constitute an instance of wrongfully causing or risking a bodily or material harm. In fact, unless we are subscribing to particularly demanding variants of liberalism—e.g. perfectionist liberalism—or unless we are exclusively focusing on borderline cases of externalities—i.e. of effects of exchanges hardly to be called externalities—there is no liberal theory of how exchanges featuring externalities are unjust.     

Maximum likelihood estimation of parameters of signal detection theory—A direct solution

Ogilvie and Creelman have recently attempted to develop maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of signal-detection theory from the data of yes-no ROC curves. Their method involved the assumption of a logistic distribution rather than the normal distribution in order to make the mathematics more tractable. The present paper presents a method of obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of these parameters using the assumption of underlying normal distributions.This research was supported in part by grants from the National Institutes of Health, MH-10449-02, and from the National Science Foundation, NSF GS-1466.     

A note on the proof theory the λII-calculus

The II-calculus, a theory of first-order dependent function types in Curry-Howard-de Bruijn correspondence with a fragment of minimal first-order logic, is defined as a system of (linearized) natural deduction. In this paper, we present a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the II-calculus and prove the cut-elimination theorem.The cut-elimination result builds upon the existence of normal forms for the natural deduction system and can be considered to be analogous to a proof provided by Prawitz for first-order logic. The type-theoretic setting considered here elegantly illustrates the distinction between the processes of normalization in a natural deduction system and cut-elimination in a Gentzen-style sequent calculus.We consider an application of the cut-free calculus, via the subformula property, to proof-search in the II-calculus. For this application, the normalization result for the natural deduction calculus alone is inadequate, a (cut-free) calculus with the subformula property being required.This paper was written whilst the author was affiliated to the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K. and revised for publication whilst he was affiliated to the University of Birmingham, England, U.K.Presented byDaniele Mundici     

A grounded theory exploration of therapists’ experiences of somatic phenomena in the countertransference

Somatic phenomena in the countertransference have historically received minimal attention despite evidence of their occurrence in the therapeutic encounter. In the field of Counselling Psychology, there seems to be an apparent gap in the academic coverage and clinical utilisation of therapists’ somatic states. The purpose of this study was to explore therapists’ somatic experiences in the countertransference using a grounded theory methodology, based on a sample of 12 participants that was composed of psychotherapists, counselling and clinical psychologists. The results indicated that therapists made sense of their somatic experiences through a developmental process of ‘relating to the body’ that combined stages of defensive operations, intellectual reflections, attributions of somatic ownership and recognitions of various working patterns in the management of somatic experiences. This study addresses the factors that constituted therapists’ processing of the experience, and the findings suggest that therapeutic work may be affected when psychosomatic phenomena as such become undermined and ignored.     

Conceptualization of perceptual attributes: a special case for color?

Young children experience difficulties establishing conceptual representations of color compared with everyday objects. We argue that comparing the development of color cognition to that of familiar objects is inappropriate since color is a perceptual attribute that can be abstracted from an object and by itself lacks functional significance. Instead, we compared the recognition, perceptual saliency, and naming of color to that of three other perceptual object attributes (motion, form, and size) in 47 children aged 2 to 5 years as a function of language age. Results revealed that, although color was perceptually salient relative to the other visual attributes, no selective impairment to color cognition (recognition and naming) was found relative to the three other visual attributes tested. Thus, when the appropriate comparisons are made, we find no special delay in the development of color conceptualization. Furthermore, the striking disparity between perceptual saliency and cognition of color in our youngest age groups suggests that perceptual saliency has little influence on the conceptual development of color.     

Intuition: A special kind of knowing?

It is argued that while counsellors have adopted the principle tenets of phenomenology—consciousness and meaning—they have built their work on an interpretation of intuition which is contrary to phenomenological rationale and presents it as a form of knowing which is esoteric and mystical. Phenomenologically, intuition differs from no other way in which sense is made of the world. Intuitions should then, in principle, be accessible to conscious understanding so as to allow counsellors to reflect (cognitively?) on their practice. If the process of intuition were really unknowable, then reflective practice in counselling would not be possible.     

A repair of Frege’s theory of thoughts

Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. Thoughts are supposed to do work that requires that they be structured and work that requires that they be unstructured. But this cannot be! While the standard response to this problem is to reject either (i) or (ii), I propose a charitable repair in the spirit of Frege’s theory that accepts both. The key idea can be found in Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic(BL, GGA). Frege argues that the thought expressed by a sentence is determined by the truth-conditions that can be derived from the semantic axioms for the sentence constituents. The fact that the same axiomatic truth-condition can be derived in different ways from different semantic axioms suggests a Fregean solution of the dilemma: A thought is a type that is instantiated by all sequences of senses (decomposed thoughts) that have the same axiomatic truth-conditions. This allows for multiple decomposability of the same thought (for different decomposed thoughts can have the same axiomatic truth-conditions) and for a notion of containment (the decomposed thought contains those senses whose semantic axioms are needed in the derivation of the truth-conditions). My proposal combines the virtues of (i) and (ii) without inheriting their vices.     

Medical semiotics in the 18th century: A theory of practice?

Medical semiotics in the 18th century was more than a premodern form of diagnosis. Its structure allowed for the combination of empirically proven rules of instruction with the theoretical knowledge of the new sciences, employing the relation between the sign and the signified.