Toward a decolonial global ethics

This paper argues that decolonial theory can offer a distinctive and valuable ethical lens. Decolonial perspectives give rise to an ethics that is fundamentally global but distinct from, and critical of, moral cosmopolitanism. Decolonial ethics shares with cosmopolitanism a refusal to circumscribe normative commitments on the basis of existing political and cultural boundaries. It differs from cosmopolitanism, though, by virtue of its rejection of the individualism and universalism of cosmopolitan thought. Where cosmopolitan approaches tend to articulate abstract principles developed from within a particular Western tradition, decolonial approaches reject abstract global designs in favour of inter-cultural dialogue amongst multiple people(s), including peoples who deem collective and non-human entities to be of fundamental moral importance. In addition, decolonial global ethics rejects universality in favour of ‘pluriversality’.     

THE CONFLICTING LOYALTIES OF STATISM AND GLOBALISM: CAN GLOBAL DEMOCRACY RESOLVE THE LIBERAL CONUNDRUM?

Abstract: The cosmopolitan ideal of liberal universalism seems to be at odds with liberalism's insistence on national borders for liberal democratic communities, creating disparate standards of distributive justice for insiders and outsiders. The liberal's dilemma on the question of cosmopolitan justice would seem to be an extension of this broader conundrum of conflicting loyalties of statism and globalism. The challenge for liberalism, then, seems to be to show how the practices of exclusive membership embody the principle of moral equality. While discerning a variety of liberal reasons to give some scope to the claim that statism and globalism need not be an irreconcilable dilemma within liberalism, the essay argues that these reasons fail to provide a satisfactory resolution. Instead, the essay points out, global democracy can be the direction for both a statist and a cosmopolitan liberal, and the two camps a case not of conflicting loyalties but of multiple loyalties.     

Liberal internationalism and global social justice

Theories of global justice have moved from issues relating to crimes against humanity and war crimes or, furthermore, ‘negative duties’ with respect to non-citizens, towards problems of distributive justice and global inequality. Thomas Nagel's Storrs Lectures from 2005, exemplifying Rawlsian internationalism, argue that liberal requirements concerning duties of distributive justice apply exclusively within a single nation-state, and do not extend to duties of this nature between rich and poor countries. Nagel even argues that the demand for global equality is not a demand of justice at all. In the present article I will try to offer a normative basis for the criticism of such a view. Following Kant and more recently Philip Pettit, I locate this normative basis on political freedom conceived as non-domination. Such a conception opens up the possibility of a political cosmopolitanism, which is based not on an empirical interdependence among people at a global level, but on a normative interdependence. Subsequent cosmopolitan duties extend both to the elimination of domination everywhere in the world and to the equal enjoyment of non-dominated choice. Thus, it will be argued that modern republicanism is falsely identified with a particular, bounded community, but supports a political, not simply a moral, cosmopolitanism. This kind of cosmopolitanism conceives of sovereign states neither as useless constructions, nor as mere instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is what gives the value of justice its application. Cosmopolitanism is not after all about the abolishment of all boundaries, but about the essential capacity to draw and redraw them infinitely under conditions of global justice.     

The western ethic of care or an Afro-communitarian ethic? Specifying the right relational morality

Assuming similarities between the domestic and global spheres of justice, I consider how lessons from the debate over women's rights and multiculturalism can be applied to global justice. In doing so, I focus on one strain of thinking on global justice, current moderations and modifications to cosmopolitanism. Discussions of global justice tend to approach the question of gender equity in one of two distinct ways: through articulations a cosmopolitanism ethic, advancing women's rights with the discourse of universal human rights or through the lens of Care Ethics. The former approach emphasizes a universal core shared by all human beings, the latter the specific relationships we each are situated within. Recently, the discourse of global justice has moved away from this universal/particular dichotomy, with a range of theories, call them rooted cosmopolitanisms. My goal in this paper is to consider how these rooted versions of cosmopolitanism might respond to issues of gender equity and women's rights. (1) In pursuit of this aim, I first outline the parameters that define rooted cosmopolitanism. (2) I then assume, for the sake of argument, a continuity between domestic and global domains of justice, a continuity which allows for a translation of insights gained in domestic debates over multiculturalism into the global domain. (3) Finally, offering an answer to my leading question, I claim that rooted cosmopolitanism might assist in the struggle to protect the well-being of women as it endeavors to advance global justice.     

Against Pogge's ‘Cosmopolitanism’

Thomas Pogge labels the idea that each person owes each other person equal respect and concern ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ and correctly states that it is a ‘non‐starter’. He offers as an allegedly more convincing cosmopolitan alternative his ‘social justice cosmopolitanism’. I shall argue that this alternative fails for pretty much the same reasons that ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ fails. In addition, I will show that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, since it actually applies to ethical cosmopolitanism and not to social justice cosmopolitanism. This means that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge is wrong in the light of his own arguments and that Pogge is not even a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition. I will further show that he is also not a cosmopolitan if cosmopolitanism is defined as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.     

Cosmopolitan Pacifism

In this paper I argue that cosmopolitanism prohibits war and requires a global approach to criminal justice. My argument proceeds by drawing out some implications of the core cosmopolitan intuition that every human being has a moral status which constrains how they may be treated. In the first part of this paper, I describe cosmopolitanism. In the second part, Cosmopolitanism and War, I analyse violence, consider the standards cosmopolitanism sets for its justification, and argue that war fails to meet them. In the third part, Cosmopolitanism and Criminal Justice, I argue that cosmopolitanism implies a moral obligation to deal justly with human wrongdoing wherever it occurs. Cosmopolitan pacifism follows: war is prohibited, and a consistent global criminal justice system is required. In the fourth part, Why No Cosmopolitan Pacifists?, I consider why cosmopolitans tend not to identify as pacifists, and in the final part, Objections, I discuss some objections.     

The indeterminacy failures of moral cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism

Much of the discussion on cosmopolitanism and nationalism has focused on their different normative views. The purpose of this article is to shift the attention away from the normative debate to the metatheoretical argument about how we determine moral and political principles independently of each other. I argue that the discussion among proponents of cosmopolitanism and contextualist models boils down to latent methodological and metatheoretical assumptions about what selection of facts are considered politically relevant. In the article, I explore what I call ‘the indeterminacy failure’ of moral cosmopolitanism, that is, the view according to which moral principles fail to determine what political-institutional level might be preferable; and the ‘indeterminacy failure’ of liberal nationalism, that is, the view according to which national identity fails to determine moral principles. In opposition to dichotomist cosmopolitan models (including various nonideal types of moral cosmopolitanism) and alternative contextualist approaches (including the practice-dependence thesis and liberal nationalism), I promote a ‘split-level’ model that is set to avoid the difficulties in the other approaches. The split-level corrects the indeterminacy failures of cosmopolitanism and contextualism by distinguishing clearly between the level of moral theorising and the level of political theorising.     

Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice

Many liberals have argued that a cosmopolitan perspective on global justice follows from the basic liberal principles of justice. Yet, increasingly, it is also said that intrinsic to liberalism is a doctrine of nationalism. This raises a potential problem for the liberal defense of cosmopolitan justice as it is commonly believed that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are conflicting ideals. If this is correct, there appears to be a serious tension within liberal philosophy itself, between its cosmopolitan aspiration on the one hand, and its nationalist agenda on the other. I argue, however, that this alleged conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan liberalism disappears once we get clear on the scope and goals of cosmopolitan justice and the parameters of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan global justice, properly understood, are mutually compatible ideals.     

Cosmopolitanism as Virtue

This paper explores cosmopolitanism, not as a position within political philosophy or international relations, but as a virtuous stance taken by individuals who see their responsibilities as extending globally. Taking as its cue some recent writing by Kwame Anthony Appiah, it argues for a number of virtues that are inherent in, and required by, such a stance. It is critical of what it sees as a limited scope in Appiah's conception and enriches it with Nigel Dower's concept of ‘global citizenship’. It then seeks to overcome a distinction that Appiah draws between a ‘thin’ moral conception of justice and a ‘thick’ ethical conception of our obligations to those with whom we have identity-forming relationships. It argues that a richer conception of the virtue of justice, as suggested by Raimond Gaita, can fully articulate the ideals of cosmopolitanism.     

A Comparative Study on Confucius’ and Chrysippus’ Cosmopolitan Theories

A large number of papers and books on cosmopolitanism have been published since 1990, marking a renewed interest in the field among Western scholars. When we try to locate the original source of cosmopolitan ideas in human civilization, we find Chrysippus’ thought in western philosophy, and Confucius’ as its eastern counterpart. In this paper, I offer a comparative analysis of Confucius’ and Chrysippus’ cosmopolitan theories from the following three perspectives. I begin with the theoretical origins of the two thinkers on cosmopolitanism, which mainly center on the relationship between human beings and nature in their respective natural philosophies, and on the question of how to be a good person from their moral philosophies. Then, I explain the concrete schemes they posit for a cosmopolitan society. Finally, I compare their differing concerns regarding one’s attitude to family members or fellow citizens, which constitutes the main source of disagreement between them. In conclusion, I propose that both of their ideas can be located within a continuum of “moral cosmopolitanism.” The difference being that Confucius holds to a moderate cosmopolitan idea, while Chrysippus prefers a stricter version of cosmopolitanism.     

COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RADICALISM IN A GLOBAL AGE

Abstract: The cosmopolitan imagination constructs a world order in which the idea of human rights is an operative principle of justice. Does it also construct an idealisation of human rights? The radicality of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, as developed by Kant, lay in its analysis of the roots of organised violence in the modern world and its visionary programme for changing the world. Today, the temptation that faces the cosmopolitan imagination is to turn itself into an endorsement of the existing order of human rights without a corresponding critical analysis of the roots of contemporary violence. Is the critical idealism associated with Kantian cosmopolitanism at risk of transmutation into an uncritical positivism? We find two prevailing approaches: either the constitutional framework of the existing world order is presented as the realisation of the cosmopolitan vision, or cosmopolitanism is turned into a utopian vision of a world order in which power is subordinated to the rule of international law. I suggest that the difficulties associated with both wings of cosmopolitanism threaten the legitimacy of the project and call for an understanding and culture of human rights that is less exclusively "conceptual" and more firmly grounded in social theory.     

Disability as a test of justice in a globalising world

This paper shows how most modern theories of justice could require or at least condone international aid aimed at alleviating the ill effects of disability. Seen from the general viewpoint of liberal egalitarianism, this is moderately encouraging, since according to the creed people in bad positions should be aided, and disability tends to put people in such positions. The actual responses of many theories, including John Rawls's famous view of justice, remain, however, unclear. Communitarian, liberal egalitarian, and luck egalitarian thinkers alike have to consider their attitude towards cosmopolitan ideals before they can extend their theories across national borders. The only view of justice that automatically rejects the obligation of international aid based on disability is libertarianism. This is significant for two reasons. Libertarianism is arguably the economic doctrine of globalisation; and its moral appeal to voluntary charity draws attention to the foundations of voluntary corporate social responsibility. Is the latter a prompt for greater or lesser social and political responsibility in global matters?     

Confucianism and cosmopolitanism

ABSTRACT

This essay investigates the Confucian cosmopolitan aspiration. First, it examines the nature of cosmopolitanism and its distinction from universalism. It demonstrates that cosmopolitanism is a philosophical doctrine that consists of two core tenets: (1) the tenet that humankind in whole is a social-political community under the rule of law; each person has global duty and obligation; (2) the tenet that a cosmopolitan world society is one of peoples of diverse cultures that are constellated into a community under the rule of law. Secondly, it explores Confucian cosmopolitanism consisting of five tenets: (1) the vision of humankind in whole as a community; (2) the concept of one’s cosmopolitan belonging; (3) the concept of equal moral worthiness of all human beings and inviolability of human dignity; (4) the concept of cultural diversity of humanity; and (5) the aspiration to a world society of permanent peace. Thirdly, it discusses why we must have a cosmopolitan reading, not a universalistic reading, of Confucianism.     

Practical Nationalism and Global Duties of Justice

Abstract

The interrelated causes and consequences of enviromnental degradation, poverty, and war are creating a dangerous snowball effect that poses a real threat to people in every nation. While moral arguments for cosmopolitanism may be subject to nationalist objections, the practical argument becomes more convincing as the long-term consequences of global injustice unfold. Contemporary conditions demand a critical re-examination of what is at stake in the question of global justice: when understood as highly influential to all national spheres, the global sphere of justice may turn out to be just as relevant to nationalists as it is to cosmopolitans. Given the pressing nature of the practical demands posed by poverty, war, and enviromnental destruction, it may well be in the best interest of everyone’s co-nationals to prioritise global duties of justice, at least for the time being.     

Global cities,global justice?

ABSTRACT

The global city is a contested site of economic innovation and cultural production, as well as profound inequalities of wealth and life chances. These cities, and large cities that aspire to ‘global’ status, are often the point of entry for new immigrants. Yet for political theorists (and indeed many scholars of global institutions), these critical sites of global influence and inequality have not been a significant focus of attention. This is curious. Theorists have wrestled with the nature and demands of global justice, but have for the most part supposed that the debate is between statist and cosmopolitan formulations. Questions of redistribution, immigration, humanitarian obligations, coercion at borders, and territorial rights have correspondingly been cast as either the domain of sovereign territorial states, or of the nascent web of supranational institutions that might bind those states and peoples, morally and legally. Examining some of these issues and arguments through the lens of the global city casts them in a new and informative light, and buttresses an associative turn in thinking about global justice.     

“Put Yourself in Their Shoes”: Testing Empathy's Ability to Motivate Cosmopolitan Behavior

Political theorists have long contemplated the concept of cosmopolitanism, yet almost no empirical studies have investigated how individuals can be encouraged to act as ethical cosmopolitans in practice. This article reports the findings of an experiment designed to investigate the effect of empathy on cosmopolitan‐helping behavior. The extent to which empathy may be useful in motivating cosmopolitan behavior has been the subject of substantial debate among political theorists. Empathy was manipulated using a perspective‐taking technique adapted from social psychological research, and the extent to which individuals were willing to engage in cosmopolitan helping was measured. Results showed that perspective taking increased cosmopolitan helping and that empathy mediated that effect. Furthermore, empathy was found to predict cosmopolitan helping even after controlling for several related constructs. Overall, results indicate that increasing empathy by encouraging people to take the perspective of distant individuals is a promising way to foster cosmopolitan helping.     

Cosmopolitanism as a Corrective Virtue

This paper defends an account of cosmopolitanism as a corrective virtue of the sort endorsed by Philippa Foot. In particular, it argues that cosmopolitanism corrects a common and dangerous tendency to form overly strong identifications with political entities such as countries, nations, and cultures. The account helps to unify the current heterogeneous collection of cosmopolitan theories, as is illustrated by a discussion of the cultural cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron, and the political cosmopolitanism of Simon Keller. The account also helps distinguish cosmopolitans from their critics, most of whom share the cosmopolitan’s commitment to respect for human rights: for example, liberal patriots, liberal nationalists and liberal culturalists.     

Toward a liberal socialist cosmopolitan nationalism

I explicate and defend a form of liberal socialist nationalism. It is also a nationalism which is cosmopolitan. Explication and explanation are crucially in order here, for it is not unreasonable to believe that ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ and ‘liberal socialist nationalism’ and even ‘liberal nationalism’ are oxymoronic. Against that I argue that there is a straightforward understanding of these concepts and their relations to each other that does not have inconsistencies or even paradoxes. Liberal socialism properly understood goes well with cosmopolitanism (both moral and institutional), and there are plausible and attractive forms of both liberalism and socialism that go together. Moreover, the only candidate for a nationalism that would survive careful reflective inquiry is a liberal nationalism: a nationalism which is neither ethnic nor civic. It is widely believed, however, that even a liberal nationalism is incompatible with cosmopolitanism. I contend in a series of arguments that in contexts where nationalism is rightly on the agenda the form that it should take is that of a liberal nationalism, and it is further argued that to be viable, nationalism requires cosmopolitanism.     

Solidarity and Cosmopolitanism

The review article examines the relation of solidarity and cosmopolitanism in contemporary political, philosophical and sociological debates. In some contexts, solidarity and cosmopolitanism are closely related, in others they are understood to be incompatible. The main body of the report is divided into three parts displaying a tentative classification of the reviewed literature on the subject. The first part serves to outline a general account of solidarity, the communal obligations that follow from it, and its opposition to the moral arguments grounding cosmopolitan obligations. The second part deals with the actual development and realization of solidarity and cosmopolitanism, as well as the tension between both within the European Union. The third part considers some arguments for the extension of solidarity relations beyond state or nation towards cosmopolitan affiliations, obligations and institutions. Finally, a reading of solidarity and cosmopolitanism is offered in which both are compatible with each other.

Indirect cosmopolitan education: on the contribution of national education to attitudes towards foreigners

ABSTRACT

Many rich countries are witnessing the rise of xenophobic political parties. The opposition to immigration and global redistributive policies is high. How can we pursue global justice in such non-ideal circumstances? Whatever the way we want to pursue global justice, it seems that a change in the political ethos of citizens from rich countries will be necessary. They must come to internalize some genuine concern for foreigners and relativize national identities. Can education contribute to the promotion of such cosmopolitan ethos? An overtly cosmopolitan educational agenda is not likely to be endorsed in these societies where national ties and national priority may be considered fully legitimate by the majority. Nevertheless, this paper argues, some more achievable educational aims may have desirable cosmopolitan spillover effects although it is not their primary purpose. Decentration, empathy, critical thinking, understanding of social reality and social mix can be defended as necessary for a better domestic society. Yet these aims also make the widespread development of a cosmopolitan ethos more likely. This paper thus considers the arguments that can be made for these educational aims and their potential effects on citizens’ attitudes towards foreigners. Then, it discusses a possible tension with another aspect of national civic education: national integration.