Mononormativity,Polypride, and the “Mono–Poly Wars”

Both in everyday life and scholarly discourse, monogamists and polyamorists tend to unfavorably portray one another as somehow flawed, misguided, or, in a word, “inferior.” This article documents and critically examines two pairs of interlocked psychosocial attitudes—monopride/polyphobia and polypride/monophobia—mediating this predicament of mutual competition in the context of Western mononormative culture. The ideological nature of these “mono–poly wars” is demonstrated through a brief review of empirical literature on the psychological health and relationship quality of monogamous and polyamorous individuals and couples. The article concludes by outlining a critical pluralist approach that eschews universalizing hierarchies between monogamy and polyamory, and provides tools for making qualitative distinctions within and among relational styles.     

Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously

This paper offers a qualified defense of a historically popular view that I call sentimental perceptualism. At a first pass, sentimental perceptualism says that emotions play a role in grounding evaluative knowledge analogous to the role perceptions play in grounding empirical knowledge. Recently, András Szigeti and Michael Brady have independently developed an important set of objections to this theory. The objections have a common structure: they begin by conceding that emotions have some important epistemic role to play, but then go on to argue that understanding how emotions play that role means that there must be some alternative, emotion-independent route to obtaining knowledge of value. If there has to be such an emotion-independent route, then the perceptual analogy breaks down in a significant way. In this paper, I argue that the right ways for sentimental perceptualists to respond to each of these objections are revealed by thinking through how analogous objections applied to perception and the empirical domain would be answered. Although Szigeti's and Brady's objections should not persuade sentimental perceptualists to give up their view, the objections do put important constraints on what a form of the view has to be like in order to do exciting metaethical work.     

Standing up for an affective account of emotion

This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions—for example, indignation and regret—necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited.     

The Transcendental Nature of Mind and World

Critics of John McDowell's Mind and World have by and large failed to take sufficient notice of the transcendental context within which McDowell situates his work—a failure that has adversely affected their criticisms. In this paper, I make clear this transcendental context and show how it figures in the transcendental argument I see McDowell offering in Mind and World. Interpreting McDowell's argument in this way, I further argue, helps to answer some of the most pressing objections to what he is doing in Mind and World, particularly certain objections made by Robert Brandom and Hilary Putnam.     

Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion

This paper situates abortion in the context of women's duties to themselves. I argue that the fundamental Kantian requirement to respect oneself as a rational being, combined with Kant's view of our animal nature, form the basis for a view of pregnancy and abortion that focuses on women's agency and characters without diminishing the importance of their bodies and emotions. The Kantian view of abortion that emerges takes abortion to be morally problematic, but sometimes permissible, and sometimes even required.
After sketching Kant's account of duties to oneself, I discuss the challenges pregnancy poses to women's agency. I then argue that abortion is morally problematic because it is antagonistic to an important subset of morally useful emotions that we have self-regarding duties to protect and cultivate; thus, there is a rebuttable deliberative presumption against maxims of abortion for inclination-based ends. I close by considering objections.     

How to prove that some acts are wrong (without using substantive moral premises)

I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: Φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then anything is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use only plausible claims that most moral skeptics and error theorists can and do accept. The final section diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral that may help those worried that the strategy is a sophisticated trick. I conclude by considering two objections. In replying to these objections, I explain why the strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral truths, and why it may also address a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral truths are not possible.     

Human Enhancement,Social Solidarity and the Distribution of Responsibility

This paper tries to clarify, strengthen and respond to two prominent objections to the development and use of human enhancement technologies. Both objections express concerns about the link between enhancement and the drive for hyperagency (i.e. the ability to control and manipulate all aspects of one’s agency). The first derives from the work of Sandel and Hauskeller—and is concerned with the negative impact of hyperagency on social solidarity. In responding to their objection, I argue that although social solidarity is valuable, there is a danger in overestimating its value and in neglecting some obvious ways in which the enhancement project can be planned so as to avoid its degradation. The second objection, though common to several writers, has been most directly asserted by Saskia Nagel, and is concerned with the impact of hyperagency on the burden and distribution of responsibility. Though this is an intriguing objection, I argue that not enough has been done to explain why this is morally problematic. I try to correct for this flaw before offering a variety of strategies for dealing with the problems raised.     

Extending Traditional Psychological Disciplines to Positive Psychology: A View from Subjective Well-being

This article reviews how research from traditional psychological disciplines has been extended and applied to the area of positive psychology (PP), specifically in the area of subjective well-being (SWB). Moving from a universal to cultural perspective, then to a group, and finally an individual perspective, this article draws theories from evolutionary, cultural, social, and personality psychology. The evolutionary perspective that negative emotions (i.e. evolved psychological mechanisms) are an impediment to positive psychology’s goal of building positive experiences has been extended and modified. Research in PP now recognizes the pitfalls of excessive positive emotions and happiness, and how negative emotions can contribute to optimal human functioning. The cultural approach investigates cultural variations in conceptualizations of SWB and highlights that the benefits and detrimental effects of positive and negative emotions are not universal. Theories on social dynamics further our understanding of how evaluative judgments influence well-being, and address a fundamental question in PP: Is the goal of increasing people’s well-being viable? Finally, personality theories explain individual differences in well-being and the practice of PP. In sum, the recognition that PP encapsulates the negative, and growing awareness of the importance of culture, social context, and the individual, heralds the evolving conceptualization of PP.     

The epistemology of evolutionary debunking

Fifteen years ago, Sharon Street and Richard Joyce advanced evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism, which purported to show that the evolutionary history of our moral beliefs makes moral realism untenable. These arguments have since given rise to a flurry of objections; the epistemic principles Street and Joyce relied upon, in particular, have come in for a number of serious challenges. My goal in this paper is to develop a new account of evolutionary debunking which avoids the pitfalls Street and Joyce encountered and responds to the most pressing objections they faced. I begin by presenting a striking thought experiment to serve as an analogy for the evolution of morality; I then show why calibrationist views of higher-order evidence are crucial to the evolutionary debunking project; I outline a new rationale for why finding out that morality was selected to promote cooperation suggests that our moral judgments are unreliable; and I explain why evolutionary debunking arguments do not depend on our having a dedicated faculty for moral cognition. All things considered, I argue, evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism are on relatively secure footing – provided, at least, that we accept a calibrationist account of higher-order evidence.

     

eQuest: case study of a comprehensive online program for self-study and personal growth.

eQuest is an online program that guides participants through a variety of online activities in order to help them address some specific personal issue, as well as encourage self-insight on a broader level. These activities include locating and evaluating information, joining discussion/support groups, establishing one-on-one relationships with knowledgeable people, experimenting with different types of online communication, utilizing and evaluating online psychological tests, creating a personal web page, and experimenting with freeform browsing techniques. eQuest stimulates integrated learning by encouraging people to compare and combine what they discover in these different online activities, and to bring their online and offline lifestyles together. It includes educational/therapeutic exercises to help people prepare for and benefit from these activities. Unlike traditional forms of clinical intervention, in which a professional "does" psychotherapy with a client, the eQuest consultant assists people through the program, helps them evaluate their experiences, and encourages the integration process. Underlying all these therapeutic activities is a philosophy that advocates the therapeutic value of developing an online lifestyle and integrating it into one's offline life, while also recognizing the potential pitfalls of cyberspace.     

In the Pursuit of Absence: Reimagining Early Loss within the Psychotherapy Relationship

In this paper I examine absence—absence as an internal relationship, absence as an enactment, absences characteristic of psychotherapy, absence as a theory, and absence as something people do to each other, including patients, therapists, families, and societies. To illustrate these ideas, I discuss my work with Gemma. When absence enters our relationship in a very present way, the powerful emotions that absence eludes come alive for us. Forced to confront my own absences, I begin doing a better job of holding her in mind, which ultimately helps her to hold me in mind and make better use of me.     

A DEFENCE OF THE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT FOR PHYSICALISM

One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.     

What Do People Want to Feel and Why?: Pleasure and Utility in Emotion Regulation

ABSTRACT— It is typically assumed that people always want to feel good. Recent evidence, however, demonstrates that people want to feel unpleasant emotions, such as anger or fear, when these emotions promote the attainment of their long-term goals. If emotions are regulated for instrumental reasons, people should want to feel pleasant emotions when immediate benefits outweigh future benefits, but when future benefits outweigh immediate benefits, people may prefer to feel useful emotions, even if they are unpleasant. In this article, I describe an instrumental account of emotion regulation, review empirical evidence relevant to it, and discuss its implications for promoting adaptive emotional experiences.     

The Zhuangist views on emotions

In this article, I will look into the Zhuangist views on emotions. I will argue that the psychological state of the Zhuangist wise person is characterized by emotional equanimity accompanied by a general sense of calmness, ease, and joy. This psychological state is constitutive of and instrumental to leading a good life, one in which one wanders the world and explores the plurality of daos. To do so, I will first provide an overview of the scholarly debate on this issue and unveil the disconcerting disagreement that underlies it. Then, I will survey some passages in the Zhuangzi and sketch my interpretation of the Zhuangist views on emotions. Next, I will examine the theoretical foundation for this interpretation by referencing the Zhuangist pluralism and their conception of the good life. Finally, I will look into some potential objections to the Zhuangist views on emotions and attempt responses to them.     

Value Receptacles

Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token‐pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not.     

An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value

In this paper I develop a theological account of intrinsic value drawn from some passages in Robert Merrihew Adams’ book Finite and Infinite Goods. First I explain why Adams’ work on this topic is interesting, situate his theory within the broader literature on intrinsic value, and draw attention to some of its revisionist features. Next I state the theory, raise some problems for it, and refine it in light of those problems. Then I illustrate how the refined theory works by showing that it has the resources to deal with some seemingly formidable objections.     

The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion

Several philosophers think there are important analogies between emotions and perceptual states. Furthermore, considerations about the rational assessibility of emotions have led philosophers—in some cases, the very same philosophers—to think that the content of emotions must be propositional content. If one finds it plausible that perceptual states have propositional contents, then there is no obvious tension between these views. However, this view of perception has recently been attacked by philosophers who hold that the content of perception is object‐like. I shall argue for a view about the content of emotions and perceptual states which will enable us to hold both that emotional content is analogous to perceptual content and that both emotions and perceptual states can have propositional contents. This will involve arguing for a pluralist view of perceptual content, on which perceptual states can have both contents which are proposition‐like and contents which are object‐like. I shall also address two significant objections to the claim that emotions can have proposition‐like contents. Meeting one of these objections will involve taking on a further commitment: the pluralist account of perceptual content will have to be one on which the contents of perception can be non‐conceptual.     

Phenomenal intentionality: reductionism vs. primitivism

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.     

Walking,eating, sleeping. Rhythm analysis of human/dog intimacy

This article argues that human/dog co-habitation and the interspecies routines of walking, eating, sleeping and the emotions they create, can be fruitfully analyzed through the conceptual frame built from ‘intimacy’ and ‘rhythm’. The rhythmic analytical approach to interspecies routines, including breaks in them and the emotions these breaks create, contributes with a spatio-temporal understanding of human/animal intimacy. As intimacy is inherently a spatial phenomenon, it creates places. Intimate social relations also transform and get transformed by places. ‘Home’ is the typical example, where the iconic emplaced attachment of intimacy with the family is manifested. But the place itself does not create intimacy; instead, it is situationally formed through relations between, in this case, interspecies practices and space. By theorizing auto-ethnographical observations of everyday human/dog routines, the article explores intimacy as a particular social form. Building on recent developments in cultural geography in the field of ‘rhythm analysis,’ it is argued that while intimacy is performed in everyday life, it is foremost produced though 'arrhythmia,' in the moments when the routines are broken.     

Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections

Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can (and do) sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view in value theory – Neo-Sentimentalism – according to which values are analysed in terms of fitting emotions.